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OF
PLUTARCH'S GREEK LIVES
VOL. III.
NICIAS AND ALCIBIADES

SIX OF PLUTARCH'S GREEK LIVES


NEWLY TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

BERNADOTTE PERRIN

Lampson Professor (Emeritus) of Greek Literature and History, Yale University

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(Lives)

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TO

THE MEMORIES

OF MY FRIENDS

THOMAS DAY SEYMOUR

AND

JOHN HENRY WRIGHT

Plutarch occupies a unique place in literature as an encyclopædia of Greek and Roman antiquity. Whatever is eminent in fact or in fiction, in opinion, in character, in institutions, in science — natural, moral, or metaphysical, drew his attention and came to his pen with more or less fulness of record. He is, among prose-writers, what Chaucer is among English poets, a repertory for those who want the story without searching for it at first hand, — a compend of all accepted traditions. . . . It is for his pleasure that he recites all that is best in his reading: he prattles history.

RALPH WALDO EMERSON.

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PREFACE

THIS volume is independent of the two volumes which have preceded it, the "*Themistocles* and *Aristides*" (1901) and the "*Cimon* and *Pericles*" (1910), except that I have allowed myself in it an occasional reference to its predecessors. I could not well repeat, however, the essays on "Plutarch the Biographer", and "Biography before Plutarch", from the first volume. I should be glad, of course, to have my readers know these essays, but such knowledge is not essential to the profitable use of this third and final volume of the series. To set forth my aims in writing it, I may be allowed to quote from the Preface to the first volume: "I have had in mind as possible friends to be won by it, first, all lovers of Plutarch, whose name, it is to be hoped, is still legion. Knowing how impossible it is to reproduce in English the illusive qualities which distinguish one Greek style from another, they will commend my work of translation if it brings out clearly the spirit of Plutarch as a writer of *Lives:* the easy and comfortable movements of his thought; his attitude toward men who are struggling with great problems of life and destiny; his amiable weaknesses as a judge of historical evidence; his relish for the personal anecdote and the *mot;* his disregard of the logic and chronology of events; his naïve appropriation of the literary product of others; his consummate art in making deeds and words, whether authentic or not, portray a preconceived character, — a more or less idealized character. They will welcome my introductions and explanatory notes also, in so far as these enable the English reader to reproduce, even though faintly, the atmosphere of bountiful literary tradition which Plutarch amply breathed before and as he

wrote. It should be possible, in some degree, at least, for the student of these notes and introductions to penetrate, as it were, into the very studio of the greatest of ethical portrait-painters, and watch him mix his colors and apply them to the canvas."

I have had in mind also all students and lovers of Greek history. For the lives of Nicias and Alcibiades, it is true, Plutarch does them less important service than for those of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, or Pericles, inasmuch as for the life of Nicias and most of that of Alcibiades, Thucydides son of Olorus is a full-flowing and incomparable source, and Plutarch had no advantage over us in the control of this source. But even here the biographer supplements the historian in a most welcome manner. He had access to many other testimonies contemporary, or as good as contemporary, with those of Thucydides, testimonies which often take us back among the conflicting currents of opinion which, with ever increasing frequency, swept over the excitable democracy of imperial Athens. He cites comic poets, tragedians, orators, Platonic and Socratic dialogues, and above all, for the Sicilian expedition, Philistus of Syracuse, an eyewitness of many of the events of the great siege. Then there is a wealth of secondary testimony, like that of the later rhetorical historians, and masses of anecdotes and apothegms which had gathered in luxuriant growth round such names as those of Themistocles, Pericles, and Alcibiades, to all of which Plutarch is heir by legacy of long literary tradition. No analysis of his brilliant literary mosaics which the conscientious historian may feel called upon to make in a search for residual truth, can destroy their charm as idealized ethical portraits. There is no reason why one should not enjoy this charm while realizing the truth which it overlies.

I have, of course, used all the standard histories of Greece in the preparation of my notes and introductions, but feel a special indebtedness to Busolt's *Griechische Geschichte*, Vol. III., and to Freeman's *History of Sicily*. Ivo Bruns' *Literarisches Portraet der Griechen* has again, as in the first

two volumes of the series, been of constant service; and I ought not to leave unmentioned Bury's *Ancient Greek Historians*, Cornford's *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, Holden's edition of the *Nicias* in the Pitt Press Series (Cambridge, 1887), and Baehr's edition of the *Alcibiades* (Leipsic, 1822). Much comment takes the form of citations from Thucydides, Xenophon, and Pausanias. These I have made in the standard translations of Jowett, Dakyns, and Frazer, with the kind permission of the Oxford University Press, and of the Messrs. Macmillan & Co.

As regards the criticism of the Greek text, I have, as in the two preceding volumes of the series, merely noted any essential variation between the Sintenis and Bekker texts where one is preferred over the other, as well as any departure from both. The excellent Codex Seitenstettensis furnishes no readings of importance for the *Nicias*, and none at all for the *Alcibiades*.

As I send this volume to the press, I find that my thoughts are more than usually inclined to dwell on the aid and comfort which my work long drew from intimate companionship with the two friends to whose memories I am permitted to dedicate it.

B. P.

New Haven, April, 1912.

INTRODUCTION

I. PRIMARY SOURCES FOR GREEK HISTORY DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

For the twenty-seven years of the Peloponnesian war, 431–404 B. C., we have richer and more trustworthy sources than for any other period of Greek history, and within these years fell the active careers both of Nicias and Alcibiades. For these years important inscriptions, more or less fragmentary, are preserved, containing popular decrees, state treaties, official budgets and inventories, not to speak of purely dedicatory or memorial inscriptions. These reënforce, amplify, and sometimes correct our literary sources for the period. And our literary sources are abundant, varied, and, from the fact of their being largely contemporary, in the highest degree valuable.

Four of the seven extant tragedies of Sophocles, and eleven of the fifteen of Euripides, were either written or performed during the years of the Peloponnesian war, and often, consciously or unconsciously, they reflect or even voice the political and spiritual agitations of their day. But what tragedy could do only indirectly and suggestively, Athenian comedy of this time did with powerful directness and plainness. The comic poets "delighted in finding matter for ridicule in all that was most admired, whether in public morals, politics, or art and letters. Exaggeration, gross exaggeration, was the basis of their success, but beneath their exaggeration there had to be a real foundation of truth to make their exaggeration successful. And when it is remembered that comedy arose in connection with a rural religious festival, and like tragedy was part of the worship of Dionysus the Lord of Life, the Lord of Death, and the Great Inspirer, it is

not impossible to think of the Attic drama, with its two vehicles of tragedy and comedy, as in great measure answering in power, as an organ of public opinion, to the modern pulpit and press. When, however, Attic tragedy or comedy is brought into evidence as historical documents, these documents must be carefully studied in the light of their origin and purpose. To have been unsparingly and continuously attacked and ridiculed by the comic poets, 'of whom to be dispraised were no small praise,' does not make Pericles less of a statesman or Euripides less of a poet. It points rather to their real greatness in new and fruitful lines of endeavor" (Introduction to the *Cimon and Pericles*, pp. 54 f.). And this must be borne in mind when we form our estimates of such butts of Old Comedy as Cleon and Hyperbolus, the demagogues, as well as in the cases of Pericles and Nicias. No less than nine of the eleven extant comedies of Aristophanes, the king of Old Comedy, were brought out between the years 425 and 405, and eight of them, aside from all their literary and artistic values, have the force and worth of vivacious political pamphlets. But Aristophanes was only one of many, and every year's Dionysiac festivals brought out half a dozen prize comedies, many of which were awarded a higher place than those of Aristophanes, although none of them have come down to us. So virulent did the attacks of comedy become that the efficiency of men in public office was seriously impaired by them, and more than once the "freedom of the press" had to be curtailed by popular decrees.

From three of the elder orators, Antiphon, Andocides, and Lysias, we have speeches, or fragments of speeches, composed and delivered during, or shortly after this period. The first was an uncompromising oligarch; the second a renegade oligarch and truckling democrat; the third an uncompromising democrat. All shades of political opinion are therefore represented in their speeches, and in setting values on their historical testimonies, their characters and personal experiences must be duly weighed, as well as the bias of the special pleader or the retained advocate.

From Isocrates also, who was born a few years before the Peloponnesian war, and felt, as a young man, the influence of Socrates and the Sophists, we have part of an oration (xvi., *De bigis*) written for the younger Alcibiades, which is devoted to a general and warm defence of the career of the elder Alcibiades, who had been attacked and slandered in the speech of the plaintiff prosecuting his son. The oration was probably written in 397–396 B. C., although the period which Isocrates most represents is that of 380–338, and since its author elsewhere expressed his admiration for the genius of Alcibiades, the praise here bestowed upon him cannot be ascribed merely to the zeal of an advocate at law. It was about two years later that Lysias wrote a speech (xiv.) for a plaintiff prosecuting the younger Alcibiades on a charge of military desertion. "Both bear striking witness to the hatred felt for the memory of the elder Alkibiades in the early years of the restored democracy. Here, denunciations of the father fill about one-half of the speech against the son; there, the son devotes more than three-fourths of his address to a defence of his father. The speech Against Alkibiades ascribed to Andokides, but probably the work of a late sophist, indirectly illustrates the same feeling; being, in fact, an epitome of the scandalous stories about Alkibiades current at the same period" (Jebb, *Attic Orators*, i. p. 250).

The speech of Andocides "On the Mysteries", and the spurious oration "Against Alcibiades" attributed to him, will be more fully discussed in the current notes.

The political writings, in prose and verse, of Critias, the leading spirit among the "Thirty Tyrants" (404–403), were of pronounced oligarchical and Laconian tendencies, and ridiculed the democracy of Athens and its leaders. But the fragments which have come down to us are few, and it is doubtful whether the works had any prevailing influence on historical tradition. Much more important is the oligarchical pamphlet which Aristotle used so generously in his *Constitution of Athens*, and by using sanctioned. Whoever the writer was, he was clearly in sympathy with the moderate wing of the

oligarchical party as represented by Theramenes, and traced a history of the growth of democracy at Athens in a severely hostile vein. It was an able, but specious plea for a limited and circumscribed democracy. Theopompus also, as well as Aristotle, made use of it in the tenth book of his *Hellenica* (see p. 33). Another nameless oligarch, somewhat earlier in the last quarter of the fifth century B. C., pictures the democracy of Athens after the death of Pericles, in the treatise on the *Constitution of Athens* which has been preserved for us among the writings of Xenophon. All the excesses and follies of that democracy are treated with relentless severity. But it is democracy itself, and not those who made it what it was, which this oligarch despises. "Given that a democratic form of government has been agreed upon, they do seem to me to go the right way to preserve the democracy by the adoption of the particular type which I have set forth" (iii. 1, Dakyns' translation).

Much of this material — inscriptions, tragedies, comedies, orations, and political pamphlets — must have been accessible and known to the great historian of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides, and his work, so far as he lived to complete it, has come down to us entire. "The Peloponnesian war", says Professor Bury (*Hist. of Greece*, ed. in one vol., pp. 397 ff.), "has had an advantage which has been granted to no other episode in the history of the world. It has been recorded by the first and greatest of all critical historians. To read the book which Thucydides, the son of Olorus, has bequeathed to posterity is in itself a liberal education; a lesson in politics and history which is, as he aimed to make it, 'a possession for ever.' . . . . It must be granted that the incidents of the war would lose something of their interest, that the whole episode would be shorn of much of its dignity and eminence, if Thucydides had not deigned to be its historian. But it was not a slight or unworthy theme. For it is the story of the decline and fall of the Athenian empire, and at this period Athens is the centre of ecumenical history. The importance of the war is not impaired by the smallness of the states which were

involved in it. For in these small states lived those political ideas and institutions which concerned the future development of mankind far more than any movements in barbarous kingdoms, however great their territory."

It was the spectacular attempt of the Oriental Persian empire to conquer the Aegean basin which engaged the Homeric genius of Herodotus; Thucydides depicts the struggle of Athens to maintain her empire of the Aegean basin, and he does it as a contemporary and participant. An imperial democracy was a new thing in the world's experience, as was the historical treatment of contemporary events. Current events had been chronicled in time relations merely by Hellanicus, but Thucydides was the first to apply to them the laws of cause and effect, and, whatever his excellencies or defects, he was the founder of historical science as we now understand it, the creator of historical criticism, the discoverer of its laws, and the first teacher of the art of writing history. The foremost modern historian of antiquity calls him the incomparable and unequaled teacher of this art; but there are strong voices of dissent to such high praise. Those who dissent from such praise often fail to consider sufficiently the exceedingly narrow limits which Thucydides imposed upon himself; and those who agree with and echo it are often blind to the inadequacies of Thucydides even within his self-imposed limits.

"Thucydides, an Athenian," — so begins his great work, "wrote the history of the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought against one another. He began to write when they first took up arms, believing that it would be great and memorable above any previous war. For he argued that both states were then at the full height of their military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes either siding or intending to side with one or the other of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Barbarians, and might be said even to affect the world at large" (Jowett's translation). He began to write, that is, when it broke out, the history of

a great war, not a history of Athens or of the Peloponnesian states; not a history of Hellenic culture or of Athenian democracy; not a description of unknown countries, except as absolutely necessary, or of unknown peoples and customs; not personal descriptions or anecdotes of private life, — Ion of Chios and Stesimbrotus of Thasos could do that, — but a war history. And even in writing a war history his aim would not be to please and entertain, as Herodotus did, but to instruct. "If he who desires to have before his eyes a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not a prize composition which is heard and forgotten."

The man who spoke with this new note of self-repression and scientific purpose, was, at the time, about thirty-five years old, belonging by descent to a princely family of Thrace, as Cimon had, and possessed of rich estates in that country. He was highly educated after the manner of the best Sophists, and doubtless found Anaxagoras an intellectual father, as Pericles did. He was emancipated from the undue authority of tradition and custom, and given to logical analysis and criticism. His intellectual processes, that is, were distinctly modern. That he took active part in public affairs before the year 424, may be safely inferred from the fact that in that year he was made one of the ten Strategi, or generals, — the highest office under the Empire. Assigned to command on the coast of Thrace, he failed to prevent Brasidas from capturing Amphipolis, the northern jewel of the Empire, and was in consequence banished on pain of death. His purpose to write a history of the war, however, was not thwarted by this misfortune. Indeed, it may rather be inferred that he now had the leisure, as he had long had the means and the disposition to continue the history which he had begun at the outbreak of the war in 431. "The same Thucydides of Athens", he writes (v. 26), "continued the

history up to the destruction of the Athenian empire. For twenty years I was banished from my country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events, and I took great pains to make out the exact truth."

It is safe inference that this banished Athenian spent much of his time on his estates in Thrace, and that he travelled much, where it was allowed him to travel, in the prosecution of his enquiries. He returned to Athens in 404, after the war was over, and began to put his material into final form. Eight years, perhaps, were employed in this task, when death overtook him before its completion. His work, therefore, unlike that of Herodotus, is a torso. Seven of the twenty-seven years during which Athens was fighting to maintain her empire, find no record in what has come down to us from Thucydides, and the last of the eight books into which the extant material has been judiciously divided by ancient critics, plainly lacks the author's final revision. But three distinct manners are clearly to be distinguished in what we have of the work, — a philosophic manner, as in the first book; an annalistic manner, as in the greater part of the second, third, fourth, fifth and eighth books; and an episodic manner, as in the story of the campaign at Pylos and Sphacteria, or of the siege of Plataea, or the major story of the Sicilian expedition. All these three manners are characterized by a dramatic method which projects events and persons as it were upon a stage, and leaves the fall of the Athenian empire to be acted out there. Apparently, but only in appearance, the author pronounces few judgments on men and events, leaving them for the judgment of his readers. His detachment, in all three manners, has certainly never been surpassed. An oligarch by political conviction, to whom an extreme democracy was " manifest folly ", he yet gives us a sympathetic and spirited picture of the Athenian democracy under Pericles, in which inherent weaknesses are

not suffered to obscure pure and lofty ideals. An Athenian to the core, he never belittles Spartan nobility and greatness, but gives us in his portrait of Brasidas a character hardly second to that of Pericles. An admirer of the Athenian empire, a participant in its honors, and stimulated to literary activity by its splendor, as Herodotus had been by that of the Persian empire, he uncovers with relentless hand the greed and cruelty which marked its growth, culmination, and decline. In historical philosophy the best modern historians may well surpass him, especially as the appreciation of economic laws is a modern acquisition. But in candor, fidelity, analytic and episodic power, and above all in personal detachment from persons and events, it is no exaggeration to say that he remains unsurpassed.

The interrupted task of Thucydides was completed, actually if not formally, by Xenophon, who tried to follow his methods and continue his spirit, but succeeded with only a faint success. The words of Grote are familiar: "It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydides. . . . The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived. . . . To pass from Thucydides to the Hellenica of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us." We have, indeed, great reason to rejoice. Xenophon was born with the Peloponnesian war; was a boy when the "Clouds" of Aristophanes was produced; a youth when the news of the Sicilian disaster came; a young man, and a disciple of Socrates when Athens fell. His life and his works show, as Croiset says, what the Socratic education could produce in a nature which was healthy, moral, active, reasonable, somewhat ordinary, and rather happily balanced than really superior. His father was a rich landed proprietor, and a knight. The son was therefore naturally of aristocratic or oligarchical sympathies, like Thucydides. Unlike Thucydides, he was also partial to Spartan institutions.

Under the triumphant democracy which followed the short power of the "Thirty Tyrants", Xenophon was ill at ease, and welcomed the invitation of his guest-friend, Proxenus the Boeotian, to attach himself to the expedition which Cyrus the Younger was preparing. Socrates warned him that in doing so he was likely to incur the enmity of his fellow citizens, since Cyrus had persistently aided Sparta to her triumph over Athens. But Xenophon cunningly surmounted the objections of the Master, and set out for Sardis. He accompanied Cyrus "neither as a general, nor as an officer, nor yet as a private soldier, but simply on the invitation of an old friend", — a sort of literary *attaché*. Fifteen months of the most romantic adventure followed, during which Xenophon, according to his own fascinating story in the *Anabasis*, became the leading spirit among the Ten Thousand mercenary Greeks of Cyrus, and conducted them from the heart of Asia out to the Euxine sea, then to Thrace, and from there into Asia Minor, where they were merged in the forces of the Spartan general Thimbron, at war with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus the Persian Satraps. When the Spartan king Agesilaus came out to conduct the war, Xenophon attached himself to him, and became his intimate companion. When Agesilaus was recalled to Greece by a threatening coalition against Sparta, Xenophon accompanied him, and in the battle of Coroneia fought with the Spartans against Thebans and Athenians. Banishment from Athens probably followed, if it had not already preceded this devotion to his country's enemy, but in 392, two years after Coroneia, the devotion was richly rewarded. Scillus, a town of Elis long desolate, was seized and colonized by Sparta, and here in a rich, well watered and well wooded valley, the Laconizing Athenian was recompensed for the loss of his estates in Attica. Here, hard by the road leading from Sparta to Olympia, where Spartan friends would readily find him, Xenophon lived for twenty years an ideal country gentleman's life, combining the practices of religion, the cultivation of the soil, a delightful family and home experience, excel-

lent sport, and extensive authorship in a rare blend. And here, in all probability, the first two books of his *Hellenica*, which contain (i. 1–ii. 2) the story of the seven concluding years of the Peloponnesian war left untouched by Thucydides, were written. No other account of these years by a contemporary, as Xenophon was, has come down to us; and later writers, like Ephorus and Theopompus, who make Xenophon's work the basis of their own, add very little to it that has intrinsic value. His *Hellenica* was his only strictly historical work, and the first two books, much superior to the rest, although they lack the vigor and precision of Thucydides, the richness and depth of his political philosophy, have more elegance, ease, and graceful vivacity than his work can show, and constitute, as we may grant with Croiset, "une belle oeuvre d'histoire".

Like Xenophon, Philistus, the historian of Sicily, was born with the Peloponnesian war, but at Syracuse. As Xenophon's youth and young manhood coincided with the events which, as an exile from his country in later years, he described in the first two books of his *Hellenica*, so Philistus witnessed as youth and young man the events of the Athenian siege of Syracuse, and described them thirty years later during his exile in Magna Graecia, in his *Sicelica*. Nothing but insignificant fragments of his works have come down to us, and we are forced to form our estimate of him from the judgments of antiquity. These unite in denying him the highest rank as a historian, although Plutarch ranges him along side of Thucydides. He imitated Thucydides in method and style, but though he surpassed his model somewhat in clarity, was far beneath him in vigor and power (imitator Thucydidis et ut multo infirmior ita aliquatenus lucidior, Quintilian, x. 1, 74). Cicero called him a "miniature Thucydides" (paene pusillus Thucydides). He was far from imitating the calm impartiality of Thucydides, being a lover and flatterer of tyrants and tyranny. In his description of the siege of Syracuse, he undoubtedly used the story of Thucydides, but he was able to add minor items of interest and value

from the Syracusan standpoint. Many of these appear in the *Nicias* of Plutarch, and give it a unique value.

Plato, like Xenophon and Philistus, was born with the Peloponnesian war. He must therefore, as boy, youth, and young man, have had personal recollections of the events and men of the later periods of the war. But Plato was essentially a poet and dramatist, using the prose of dialogue as his means of expression for an idealistic philosophy, and even in his earlier dialogues he takes great liberties with his historical settings and details. Still, he evidently aimed at a certain degree of dramatic verisimilitude, so much at least as was needful for the best artistic effects. We may therefore use with due caution the historical material indirectly furnished by such dialogues as the *Laches*, the *Protagoras*, and the *Symposium*, in which Nicias and Alcibiades appear as participants. There was a well established tradition in Socratic circles that Socrates had distinguished himself as a soldier, and won a prize for bravery, which he preferred to have bestowed upon Alcibiades. Of so much we may be reasonably certain. But in what battle the prize was won, and under exactly what circumstances, we may not feel so sure. In these matters Plato probably allowed his fancy to disport itself more or less. In such a dialogue as the *First Alcibiades*, the authorship of which is uncertain, and in the dialogues of the later Socratics, there is clearly even less attempt at historical accuracy. As in the allusions of Old Comedy, so in the historical materials of the Platonic and Socratic dialogues, we must seek for the historical residuum, and not be disappointed if it is indefinite and meager.

Pasiphon of Eretria, in the first half of the third century B. C., seems to have busied himself with the composition of Socratic dialogues, which he attributed to immediate disciples of Socrates like Aeschines and Phaedo. Such a dialogue was the *Nicias*, from which Plutarch, or his immediate source, draws much material concerning the daily life and conversation of Nicias (chaps. iv. and v.). In this dialogue, the artistic verisimilitude so much desired in biographical

details must have been secured by reference to good contemporary or historical sources for the private life of Nicias, such as the comic poets, and, possibly, Theopompus, who undoubtedly drew from the comic poets himself. In this way so late a document as the *Nicias* of Pasiphon, like Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, came to have something of the value of a primary and contemporary source. See the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, xxxiii., pp. 139–149.

"We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favorite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing that name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato" (Jowett, Plato, ii. p. 417).

Such are our primary sources for the history of the Peloponnesian war, and, incidentally, for the lives of Nicias and Alcibiades. They are not only primary, but in the main contemporary sources, and constitute a historical apparatus of unequaled dignity, value, power, and charm.

II. CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS IN THE LIVES OF NICIAS AND ALCIBIADES

It is impossible to date precisely the birth of either Nicias or Alcibiades, but when Pericles died, in 429 B. C., Nicias was already a man of political influence, and had served as general (*Nicias*, ii. 2). He must therefore have been at least thirty-five years old. Alcibiades, the cousin and ward of Pericles, could not have been far from twenty. It will answer all practical purposes, then, if this table include the principal events of Athenian history between the years 461 and 404. In the former year, Pericles became the leading man at Athens; in the latter, Alcibiades was put out of the way by the emissaries of Pharnabazus. From 461 down to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war in 431, only the more salient events will be noted, and in larger outline; from 431 onward, through the active careers of Nicias and Alcibiades,

the table will be full enough to render unnecessary any further sketch of the history of the Peloponnesian war. Owing to the great work of Thucydides and the continuation of that incomplete work by Xenophon, the period of the Peloponnesian war is the best known and most familiar one in Greek history.

461–450 B. C. Athens at war with Peloponnesian states and Persia. Pericles is the leading man at Athens. In 456, Athens is at the acme of her power. In 454, the great Athenian armament in Egypt is destroyed, and the treasury of the Delian League is removed from Delos to Athens. In 450, a five years' truce is made between Athens and Sparta.

450–446. Nominal peace between Athens and Sparta. The war with Persia continues until Cimon's death in 449 and the so-called "Peace of Callias" in 448. Thucydides son of Melesias succeeds Cimon as leader of the conservative and aristocratic party in opposition to Pericles (*Nicias*, ii. 2). In 447, Boeotia revolts from Athens, and the Athenians are defeated in the battle of Coroneia (*Alc.*, i. 1). About this time, Damon (Damonides), the friend and teacher of Pericles, is ostracised (*Nicias*, vi. 1). In 446, Euboea and Megara revolt from Athens, and a Peloponnesian army invades Attica, led by Pleistoanax, the youthful king of Sparta.

445–431. In 445, Athens renounces supremacy on land to Sparta in a thirty years' peace. In 444–443, the pan-Hellenic colony of Thurii in Italy is founded (*Nicias*, v. 2). In 442, Thucydides son of Melesias is ostracised, and Pericles becomes supreme in power. In 440–439, Samos revolts from Athens, and is subdued (Nicias a general with Pericles and Sophocles? *Nicias*, xv. 2). In 436, a colony is successfully founded at Amphipolis,

on the river Strymon, in Thrace. In 435, hostilities begin between Corinth and Corcyra. In 433, Athens forms a defensive alliance with Corcyra, and Athenian ships take part in a battle between Corinthians and Corcyraeans. In 432, Potidaea, on the Chalcidic peninsula, revolts from Athens, is aided by Corinth, and besieged by the Athenians (*Alc.*, vii. 3). A congress of Peloponnesian allies at Sparta votes for war with Athens.

431–421, Peloponnesian War, First Period

431–430, First Year (spring, summer, autumn, and winter, April to April).

Plataea, an allied city of Athens, is surprised and taken in a night attack by Thebans, at the beginning of spring; a Peloponnesian army invades and devastates Attica, retiring in midsummer; while this army is still in Attica, an Athenian fleet makes a predatory voyage around the coasts of Peloponnesus; after the departure of the Peloponnesian army, the Athenians expel the Aeginetans and take possession of their island; in the autumn, the Athenian fleet returns and cooperates with the army in an invasion and devastation of Megara; in the early winter, Pericles is appointed to deliver the funeral oration over the citizens who had fallen during this year.

430–429, Second Year.

In the spring, Pericles is reëlected general for the twelfth consecutive time since the ostracism of Thucydides; early in the summer, a Peloponnesian army invades and devastates Attica for the second time; the great plague breaks out and rages in Athens (*Nicias*, vi. 3); an Athenian fleet for the second time makes a predatory voyage along the coasts of Peloponnesus; in midsummer, the Peloponnesian army withdraws, and

the Athenian fleet returns; public opinion turns against Pericles, and an embassy to Sparta sues in vain for peace; in the autumn, Pericles is deposed from his command, tried for malversation in office, and fined (*Nicias*, vi. 1); during the winter, Potidaea, which had been under siege by the Athenians for more than two years, surrenders.

429–428, Third Year.

In the spring, Pericles is reinstated in his office of general; in the summer, a Peloponnesian army begins the siege of Plataea; an expedition of Athenian hoplites under Xenophon and two other generals against the rebellious Chalcidians is nearly annihilated (*Nicias*, vi. 3); during the summer and autumn, Phormio wins two brilliant naval victories over the Peloponnesians in the Corinthian gulf; in the autumn, Pericles dies after a long illness.

428–427, Fourth Year.

In the early summer, a Peloponnesian army invades and ravages Attica for the third time; an Athenian fleet, originally intended for the usual voyage along the coasts of Peloponnesus, is sent instead, as soon as the Peloponnesians withdraw from Attica, against the Lesbians, who threaten revolt, and Mitylene is blockaded; another fleet is sent round Peloponnesus, in the hope of deterring the Peloponnesians from attacking Athens by land and sea while she is occupied with the revolt in Lesbos, and accomplishes its object; in the autumn, Paches is sent with reënforcements to Lesbos, and by the beginning of winter, Mitylene is completely enclosed.

427–426, Fifth Year.

In the spring, a Peloponnesian fleet is sent to the aid of Mitylene; in the early summer, a Pelo-

ponnesian army invades and ravages Attica for the fourth time; after its withdrawal, and while the Peloponnesian fleet is no further on its way than Delos, Mitylene capitulates, and the Peloponnesian fleet returns home; Lesbos is completely subdued by Athens, and the principal rebels among the Mitylenaeans are put to death; Nicias conducts a successful expedition against the island of Minoa, over against Megara (*Nicias*, vi. 4); Plataea surrenders to the Peloponnesians and is handed over to the tender mercy of Thebes; Corcyra is convulsed by bloody political feuds which result in the triumph of the democracy under Athenian support; in the autumn, the Athenians send a fleet under Laches and Charoeades to Sicily, ostensibly to aid the Leontines in their struggle with Syracuse; during the winter, Paches, the conqueror of Lesbos, takes his own life while rendering the customary account of his campaign (*Nicias*, vi. 2).

426–425, Sixth Year.

In the early summer, a Peloponnesian army assembles for the invasion of Attica, but is disbanded in consequence of earthquakes; Nicias conducts a fleet on an expedition to Melos, Thera, and the shore regions of Boeotia and Locris, devastating the enemy's territories; Demosthenes conducts a fleet on the usual predatory expedition round Peloponnesus, and is drawn into a disastrous invasion of Aetolia (*Nicias*, vi. 3); in the autumn, Demosthenes partially redeems his failure by saving Naupactus and Acarnania to Athens; during the winter, on fresh appeals from Sicilians for aid against Syracuse, the Athenians determine to send in the following spring a larger fleet under Eurymedon, Pythodorus, and Sophocles, and Pythodorus goes on in advance with a

few ships to replace Laches in command, who has not been aggressive enough.

425–424, Seventh Year.

In the early spring, Nicias conducts an *architheoria* to Delos with great magnificence (*Nicias*, iii.); in the late spring, a Peloponnesian army invades Attica for the fifth time; the fleet under Eurymedon and Sophocles sets out for Sicily, carrying Demosthenes on a special errand and with special powers; in consequence of the occupation and fortification of Pylos by the Athenians under Demosthenes, the Peloponnesian army retires from Attica, and the Lacedaemonians lay siege to Demosthenes; during the summer, a Lacedaemonian garrison on the island of Sphacteria is cut off and besieged, in consequence of which a truce is made, and Sparta sues for peace; the suit is rejected, and in the early autumn, Cleon and Demosthenes force the Lacedaemonians on Sphacteria to surrender (*Nicias*, vii. and viii. 1); the Athenian fleet proceeds to Sicily; Nicias leads a predatory expedition into Corinthian territory (*Nicias*, vi. 4 ff.).

424–423, Eighth Year.

In the early summer, Nicias leads an expedition against Cythera (*Nicias*, vi. 4), occupies the island, and then ravages the adjacent Laconian coasts, and slays or captures the Aeginetan refugees in Thyrea (*Nicias*, vi. 6); the Sicilian cities make peace with one another, and the Athenian fleet under Pythodorus, Eurymedon, and Sophocles, returns home, to the bitter disappointment of the party of war and conquest; in the late summer, Demosthenes and Hypocrates make an attempt to capture Megara, which is foiled by Brasidas, although Nisaea and the long walls are taken (*Nicias*, vi. 4); Brasidas

proceeds to Thrace in order to strip Athens of her choice dependencies there; in the autumn, the Athenian offensive against Boeotia results in a disastrous defeat at Delium (*Nicias*, vi. 3; *Alc.*, vii. 4); in the early winter, Amphipolis surrenders to Brasidas, and Thucydides son of Olorus, the Athenian general deputed to operate against Brasidas, is in consequence accused of treason and banished.

423–422, Ninth Year.

The defeat of the Athenians at Delium and their loss of Amphipolis weighing about evenly in the balance with the Spartan reverses in the war, in the early spring, a truce for one year is made between Athens and Sparta, during which negotiations for a definite peace are to be carried on (*Nicias*, ix. 5); before news of the truce can reach Thrace, Scione, on the Chalcidic peninsula, goes over to Brasidas, and even after news of the truce comes, Mende does likewise, and Brasidas will surrender neither town, so that hostilities continue in Thrace, though in Thrace only; during the summer, an expedition under Nicias recovers Mende and completely invests Scione (*Nicias*, vi. 4).

422–421, Tenth Year.

In the early spring, the truce expires, but there are no further hostilities on either side except in Thrace; early in the autumn, an expedition under Cleon is sent by the Athenians to Thrace, and before Amphipolis his army is disastrously defeated by Brasidas, but Brasidas and Cleon both lose their lives; the two men most eager for the continuance of the war being thus removed (*Nicias*, ix.), negotiations for a definite peace are renewed, continued through the winter, and concluded at the beginning of spring,

for fifty years. The principal conditions are that Sparta is to surrender to Athens Amphipolis, in Thrace, and Panactum, on the Boeotian frontier (*Nicias*, x. 3; *Alc.*, xiv. 4); the Athenians to Sparta Pylos, Cythera, and the captives from Sphacteria. In ten years of war, that is, the empire of Athens has been maintained, and the prestige of Sparta and her confederacy lowered. But neither the Corinthians, Boeotians, Megarians, nor Eleans will join Sparta and her other allies in making the peace.

421–412, Peloponnesian War, Second Period

421–420, Eleventh Year (see Thucydides, v. 26).

Even before the summer, dissatisfactions arise on both sides because conditions on which peace was made in the spring are not fulfilled; alarmed at the attitude of her recalcitrant allies, Sparta makes a special defensive alliance with Athens for herself alone (*Nicias*, x. 2), and thereby secures the release of the captives of Sphacteria (*Nicias*, x. 7; *Alc.*, xiv. 5), although on her part she cannot surrender Amphipolis (*Nicias*, x. 3); a threatened coalition of Mantinea, Elis, Argos, and Corinth against Sparta drives her to seek the favor and help of Argos at the risk of offending and losing Athens; to get possession of Panactum, which she must surrender to Athens, Sparta makes overtures to Boeotia, which demands a special defensive alliance like that between Athens and Sparta; early in the spring (March), the special defensive alliance between Sparta and Boeotia is made, and the Boeotians demolish the walls of Panactum before handing the place over to Sparta.

420–419, Twelfth Year.

When knowledge of the alliance between Sparta and Boeotia, and of the demolition of the walls of Panactum, reach Athens, the strength of the war party there is increased (*Nicias*, x. 3), and it is seen that the war party at Sparta is in the ascendant; Corinth now threatens to abandon the anti-Spartan league and go over to Sparta, leaving the three democratic states of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis in the lurch, unless they can secure an alliance with Athens; to the securing of such an alliance Alcibiades, who is now the most influential opponent of the conservative Nicias, directs his political talents; while the Athenians are enraged at Sparta's continued failure to comply with the conditions of the treaty, and while one embassy from Argos is at Sparta negotiating for a treaty of alliance, Alcibiades gets another embassy sent to Athens from Argos with proposals for alliance with Athens (*Nicias*, x. 4; *Alc.*, xiv. 3); the counter-embassy from Sparta, acting with Nicias and the peace party, is discredited by a clever political trick (*Nicias*, x. 4 ff.; *Alc.*, xiv. 6 ff.), and in midsummer, Athens joins the anti-Spartan Peloponnesian league, thus uniting the industrial and commercial democracy of Athens with the agricultural democracy of northern Peloponnesus; Corinth now sides definitely with Sparta.

419–418, Thirteenth Year.

In the spring (March-April), Alcibiades is elected one of the generals (*Nicias*, x. 8; *Alc.*, xv. 1), and during the summer traverses northern Peloponnesus with a small army, working zealously in the interests of the new alliance (at Patrae, *Alc.*, xv. 3), while Argos invades and devastates the territory of Epidaurus, an ally of Sparta;

Sparta twice starts to render aid to the Epidaurians, but twice retires, knowing that Athens is now pledged to assist Argos; during the winter, however, Sparta sends troops by sea to Epidaurus, and in retaliation Alcibiades prevails upon the Athenians to reëstablish Helots and Messenians in Pylos for the devastation of Laconian territory (*Nicias*, x. 8).

418–417, Fourteenth Year.

In the spring, the peace party regains ascendancy, and Nicias is elected general, with others like minded, instead of Alcibiades; in the early summer, the Lacedaemonians and their allies open operations against Argos, but, fearful of drawing Athens into war in support of her ally, the Spartan king withdraws his forces under a truce of four months with Argos; in half-hearted support of her ally, Athens sends a small force to Argos under Laches, accompanied by Alcibiades as special ambassador; the forces of the four anti-Spartan allies take the field, and are decisively defeated by the Lacedaemonians in the battle of Mantinea, towards the end of summer (*Alc.*, xv. 1); the victory restores the prestige of Sparta, and initiates a reaction against democracy and in favor of oligarchy in Peloponnesus and all Hellas; during the autumn and winter, Argos and Mantinea are forced back into alliance with Sparta, and the promising Peloponnesian policy of Alcibiades is wrecked.

417–416, Fifteenth Year.

In the spring, both Alcibiades and Nicias are elected generals; threatened with ostracism in his conflict with Nicias, Alcibiades secures the ostracism of Hyperbolus (*Nicias*, xi.; *Alc.*, xiii.); during the summer, Nicias conducts a fruitless expedition to Thrace (Thuc., v. 83; Busolt,

Griech. Gesch., iii. p. 1262); the oligarchical party in Argos is overthrown, and Sparta threatens the victorious democracy in the city with war, whereupon Athens and Argos, renewing the shattered policy of Alcibiades, make another defensive alliance, and the Argives begin the building of long walls to the sea (*Alc.*, xv. 2); these are destroyed by the Lacedaemonians during the winter, but the city is not taken.

416–415, Sixteenth Year.

In the spring, Nicias and Alcibiades are both reëlected generals, the former intent on preserving peace, the latter on renewing war with Sparta; while Alcibiades is busy in Argos, the Athenians send an expedition against Melos, an island colonized from Laconia; the city of Melos is enclosed with a wall and closely besieged; at the Olympic games, in the summer, Alcibiades astonishes the Hellenic world with his victories and lavish expenditures (*Alc.*, xi., xii.); during the winter, Melos capitulates, and the Athenians kill the male adults, and sell the women and children into slavery (*Alc.*, xvi. 5); an embassy from Egesta, in Sicily, seeks aid from Athens against the Selinuntians (*Nicias*, xii. 1), and an Athenian embassy is sent to investigate the situation.

415–414, Seventeenth Year.

In the spring, Nicias and Alcibiades are both reelected generals, and the parties of peace and war maintain their almost even balance; the Athenian embassy returns from Egesta with glowing reports, accompanied by fresh envoys from Egesta with alluring promises; a large expedition to Sicily is voted, with Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus as commanders; Nicias makes a vain attempt to dissuade the Athenians from the expedition (*Nicias*, xii.; *Alc.*, xviii. 2); during

the preparations for the expedition, the *Hermae* throughout the city are defaced by unknown vandals (*Nicias*, i. 3; xiii. 2; *Alc.*, xviii. 3); in midsummer, the expedition sets out, and at length establishes its base of operations at Catana; early in the autumn, Alcibiades is recalled for trial on the charge of religious desecration (*Nicias*, xiv. 4; *Alc.*, xx. 2; xxi. 5); in the late autumn, the Athenians land near Syracuse and defeat the Syracusans in battle, but withdraw to Naxos for winter quarters (*Nicias*, xvi.); during the winter, on the advice of Alcibiades at Sparta, the Spartans turn their thoughts towards the invasion of Attica, and decide to send Gylippus to take command of the Syracusans (*Alc.*, xxiii. 2).

414–413, Eighteenth Year.

Early in the spring (April), the Athenians make a successful landing north of Syracuse, and occupy the plateau of Epipolae, where they fortify themselves and proceed to enclose the city with a wall from sea to sea (*Nicias*, xvii.); Lamachus falls in an hour of victory, leaving Nicias in sole command (*Nicias*, xviii. 1–3); by midsummer, the greater part of the enclosing wall is completed, and the prospects of the besiegers are bright (*Nicias*, xviii. 4 f.); towards the end of the summer, Gylippus enters Syracuse with reënforcements, and the Syracusans take the offensive (*Nicias*, xviii. 6–xix.); at about the same time, an expedition from Athens ravages the coast of Laconia and thereby definitely breaks the peace with Sparta (Thuc., vi. 105); during the autumn, the Syracusans succeed in completing a cross wall which makes the enclosure of their city by the Athenian wall impossible (*Nicias*, xix. 6); the offensive power of the Athenians declines, and Nicias sends a

despondent letter to the home government (*Nicias*, xix. 7); another armament under Demosthenes and Eurymedon is voted for the coming spring (*Nicias*, xx. 1).

413–412, Nineteenth Year.

Early in the spring, the relief expedition under Demosthenes sets out; at about the same time, the Peloponnesians invade Attica, and fortify Deceleia; late in the spring, the Syracusans capture Plemmyrium, the naval base of Nicias, but the Athenians are victorious in the first great naval battle in the harbor (*Nicias*, xx. 2 f.); about midsummer, the Athenians are defeated in a second naval battle (*Nicias*, xx. 4 f.); shortly afterwards, Demosthenes arrives with the relief expedition (*Nicias*, xxi. 1); late in the summer, the Athenians suffer disastrous defeat in a night attack on Epipolae, and gradually come to favor an abandonment of their positions (*Nicias*, xxi., xxii.); on August 27th, an eclipse of the moon delays their departure (*Nicias*, xxiii.); early in the autumn, the Athenians are defeated in a third, and again, soon after, in a fourth and decisive naval battle (*Nicias*, xxiv., xxv.); two days after this, they set out on their retreat to Catana by land (*Nicias*, xxvi.); within nine days, and about the middle of the autumn, the entire army of the Athenians is either killed, scattered in flight, or taken prisoners, and Nicias and Demosthenes are put to death (*Nicias*, xxvii., xxviii.); tidings of the catastrophe make their way to Athens some time before the beginning of winter (*Nicias*, xxx.); in spite of their fear and "unutterable consternation", the Athenians determine under no circumstances to give way, and vote to build a new navy, and to make sure of their allies (Thuc., viii. 1).

412–404, Peloponnesian War, Third Period

412–411, Twentieth Year.

In the spring, the greater allies of Athens plan revolt, with encouragement from Sparta, and the Chians obtain promise of assistance first (*Alc.*, xxiv. 1); in the summer, encouraged by the presence in Ionian waters of a Lacedaemonian fleet with Alcibiades and a Spartan admiral, Chios and other allied cities revolt (*Alc.*, xxiv. 1); the Peloponnesians enter into alliance with Tissaphernes the Persian Satrap; in the autumn, a large Athenian expedition sails into Ionian waters, punishes and besets the Chians, and defeats the Peloponnesians and rebels near Miletus, but on the approach of another hostile fleet of Lacedaemonian and Sicilian ships, retires to Samos; Alcibiades, on learning that orders have been sent from Sparta to kill him, betakes himself to Tissaphernes at Miletus (*Alc.*, xxiv. 2 f.); during the winter, scheming to be recalled from exile, Alcibiades puts himself into communication with the oligarchs in the Athenian army at Samos, who plan a revolution at Athens, in order to get an alliance with Tissaphernes through the influence of Alcibiades (*Alc.*, xxv., xxvi. 1); the Athenian people commissions an embassy under Peisander to confer with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, but the conference shows the promises and pretensions of the latter to be vain (Thuc., viii. 54, 56); the oligarchs in the army at Samos now renounce all connection with Alcibiades, and send Peisander and others to Athens with orders to effect a revolution there and throughout the empire (Thuc., viii. 63, 64).

411–410, Twenty-first Year.

In midsummer, the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens is effected, and the democracy overthrown (*Alc.*, xxvi. 2); the army at Samos, however, crushes the oligarchs there, threatens the revolutionary government at home, and, believing as the oligarchs had in the influence of Alcibiades with Tissaphernes, recalls the exile and makes him their commander-in-chief (*Alc.*, xxvi. 3); in the early autumn, the Spartan fleet proceeds to the Hellespont, where Byzantium and other Athenian allies have revolted, and is followed closely by the Athenian fleet (*Alc.*, xxvii. 2); the Four Hundred are deposed at Athens (*Alc.*, xxvii. 1); the Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus defeats the Peloponnesian fleet off the promontory of Cynossema in the Hellespont (Thuc., viii. 104–106); in the late autumn, a fierce naval battle off Abydos is decided in favor of the Athenians by the timely arrival of Alcibiades (*Alc.*, xxvii. 2–4); not long after, Alcibiades pays a visit to Tissaphernes, who has come up to the Hellespont, is seized and imprisoned in Sardis by the Satrap, but makes his escape, late in the winter, and rejoins the Athenian fleet at Cardia (*Alc.*, xxvii. 5; xxviii. 1); early in the spring (March), the Athenian fleet under Alcibiades utterly destroys the Peloponnesian fleet off Cyzicus in the Propontis (*Alc.*, xxviii.).

410–409, Twenty-second Year.

In the spring (April), Alcibiades operates from the Hellespont against Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium, in order to obtain control of the Bosporus passage (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 21 f.); an expedition is sent under Thrasyllus to Ionia, which meets with defeat in the summer (Xen.,

Hell. i. 2, 1–10); in the autumn, Thrasyllus, with his defeated troops, joins Alcibiades at Sestos (*Alc.*, xxix. 1 f.); during the winter, the Athenians fortify Lampsacus, ravage the territories of Pharnabazus, and lay siege to Abydos (*Alc.*, xxix. 3).

409–408, Twenty-third Year.

In the spring, Alcibiades lays siege to Chalcedon, and defeats Pharnabazus in his attempt to relieve the city (*Alc.*, xxx. 1); Alcibiades goes back to the Hellespont to raise troops for the siege of Byzantium, and captures Selymbria (*Alc.*, xxx. 2 ff.); the Athenians make a treaty with Pharnabazus (*Alc.*, xxxi. 1 f.); during the winter, Byzantium is besieged and captured by the Athenians under Alcibiades (*Alc.*, xxxi. 2 ff.).

408–407, Twenty-fourth Year.

In the spring, now that the Hellespontine region is restored to Athens, the Athenians prepare for a renewal of their struggle to regain Ionia, and Alcibiades sails to Samos (Xen., *Hell.* i. 4, 8); chosen general at Athens with Thrasybulus and Conon, Alcibiades returns to his native city, about midsummer (*Alc.*, xxxii.); during his four months' delay at Athens, preparing for the Ionian campaign, Alcibiades conducts the Eleusinian mysteries in their due order (*Alc.*, xxxiv.); late in the autumn, Alcibiades proceeds with his fleet to Samos (*Alc.*, xxxv. 1–3); during the winter, Lysander, the new Spartan admiral, supported by Cyrus, the new Persian Satrap, prepares his fleet for effective service, and Alcibiades vainly tries to draw him out of the harbor of Ephesus.

407–406, Twenty-fifth Year.

In the spring, the fleet of Alcibiades, during his absence, is defeated by that of Lysander (*Alc.*, xxxv. 4–6); Alcibiades is deposed from office

and new generals are appointed, ten in number (*Alc.*, xxxvi. 1–3); during the ensuing summer and winter, the operations on both sides are desultory.

406–405, Twenty-sixth Year.

In the spring, Callicratidas, the admiral appointed from Sparta in place of Lysander, takes command of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus (Xen., *Hell.* i. 6, 1 ff.); early in the summer, Callicratidas operates against Lesbos, defeats Conon, the Athenian commander, and shuts him up in the harbor of Mitylene; with all the energies of despair the Athenians fit out a fleet for the relief of Conon, which sets out about midsummer (*Ibid.*, i. 6, 16–25); off the islands called Arginusae, in the late summer, the Athenians win a decisive victory over Callicratidas, who loses his life in the battle (*Ibid.*, i. 6, 26–33); during the autumn, the Athenian generals, who had not cared sufficiently for their dead and wounded in the battle, are tried and executed (*Ibid.*, i. 6, 34—7, 35); Cyrus and the Ionian cities favoring Sparta demand the return of Lysander as Spartan admiral (*Ibid.*, ii. 1, 6).

405–404, Twenty-seventh Year.

In the spring, Lysander is sent out by the Spartan authorities in virtual, though not technical command of the Peloponnesian fleet (Xen., *Hell.* ii. 1, 7); both sides spend the summer in preparations for a decisive battle; Lysander suddenly proceeds to the Hellespont, where he takes Lampsacus (Xen., *Hell.* ii. 1, 17–19); the Athenians follow him and take position at Aegospotami, over against Lampsacus (*Alc.*, xxxvi. 4–5); early in the autumn, Lysander destroys the Athenian fleet, and then, during the winter, blockades the Piraeus (*Alc.*, xxxvii. 1–3).

404–403, Twenty-eighth Year.

In the early spring (April), Athens capitulates (*Alc.*, xxxvii. 3); the thirty oligarchs appointed by the Assembly, under the influence and fear of Lysander, to draft a new constitution, usurp and hold power at Athens from the summer of 404 to the spring of 403, when they are defeated and deposed by the exiles under Thrasybulus (Xen., *Hell.* ii. 3, 1—4, 23); they are tools of Lysander, and coöperate with him in securing the death of Alcibiades, whose continued influence would be fatal to their plans (*Alc.*, xxxviii.).

III. THE SOURCES OF PLUTARCH IN HIS *NICIAS*, WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THIS *LIFE*

Of the twenty-two pairs, or " books ", of Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* which have come down to us, the first twelve, with their approximate order of composition, can be determined with tolerable certainty. Among these, the *Themistocles-Camillus* pair occupied the second place, the *Aristides-Cato Major* pair the eleventh place, the *Cimon-Lucullus* pair the third place, and the *Pericles-Fabius Maximus* pair the tenth place. The seventh place was given to the *Lysander-Sulla* pair, a fact of interest in the study of the *Alcibiades*, which has considerable material common also to the *Lysander*. Of the *Nicias-Crassus* and the *Alcibiades-Coriolanus* pairs, it is expedient to say only that they were composed after the first twelve pairs, and in the relative order of their mention. They represent, therefore, the great biographer's maturest work. See the Introduction to the *Themistocles and Aristides*, p. 9.

Plutarch's Introduction to the *Nicias* (chap. i.) has no such grace and charm as that to the *Cimon*, or even that to the *Pericles*, but it throws a clear, and a very unusual light on the question of the sources used in the composition of

the *Life*, and the manner of their use. Thucydides and Philistus, the historian of the Peloponnesian war and the historian of Sicily, are to be used as the principal and most authoritative sources, without, however, needlessly repeating their matchless and familiar stories. To the material supplied by these writers as a basis for the *Life*, Plutarch promises to add details which he has collected from writers making casual references to facts in the career of Nicias, or from antiquarian treatises giving inscriptions on votive offerings or in public decrees. Thucydides and Philistus were not biographers of Nicias, but historians, for whom the Sicilian expedition was a major episode. Their stories Plutarch will condense and combine, with the special aim of illustrating the "nature and disposition" of Nicias, and to such condensation and combination he will add sundry details which he has collected from other sources, again exercising his discretion in using only such as will illustrate the character of his hero.

It has been clearly shown by Busolt (*Plutarchs Nikias und Philistos*, Hermes, xxxiv. (1899), pp. 280 ff.) that the precise program here laid down by Plutarch is not mere literary mannerism, cloaking the use of a biography of Nicias already made to hand, wherein condensation and combination of Thucydides and Philistus, as well as the collection of sundry additional details, have already been done for Plutarch, only to be adopted and adapted by him for his purposes; but that the biographer has done exactly what and as he promised to do.

"The tale of the struggle between Athens and Syracuse," says Freeman, "has been more nobly told, not only than any other piece of Sicilian history, but than any other piece of the history of mankind." And since the career of Nicias is so largely identified with the Sicilian expedition, it might seem, at first blush, a needless and even a presumptuous task on the part of Plutarch to follow in the steps of Thucydides, wherein any follower must be painfully conscious of the interval at which he follows. But Plutarch was well aware of

his peril, and saved himself by an admirable restriction, for independent development and improvement, to scenes and episodes only which illustrate the character and disposition of Nicias. The main story of the expedition he assumed to be more or less familiar to his readers. Even had he done no more than condense the story of Thucydides, we could still be thankful to him for his effort. But he has done far more. He has enriched that story with many dramatic incidents of undoubted authenticity, and supplemented it with corroborative details of high antiquarian value. For Thucydides, though a contemporary, was not an eyewitness of the events of the Sicilian expedition either at Athens or Syracuse, and in spite of his magnificent detachment, his story shows an Athenian standpoint. Philistus, on the other hand, was an eyewitness of the events of the siege of Syracuse, and was on the Syracusan side. His story, had it come down to us, even though it did base itself on the earlier story of Thucydides, would have been a most welcome testimony *ex alterâ parte*. "It is hard to follow the story with the hopes and fears of a Syracusan. Yet this is what the historian of Sicily must do. With his Thucydides ever in his hand, he must strive to be his own Philistos. He must teach his heart to dwell in the besieged city and not in the besieging camp. . . . And surely, be it on Senlac or on Epipolai, it is a higher and more ennobling feeling when we fight in spirit, whether in defeat or in victory, with the men who are fighting for their own soil against unprovoked invasion" (Freeman, *Hist. of Sicily*, iii. p. 3). To a large extent we are enabled to do this through the manifold details which Plutarch gives us from Philistus, whose work, but for fragments thus preserved by Plutarch and others, has perished. And this fact renders the *Nicias*, as a historical document, over and above its literary charm, of priceless value, just as the *Cimon* and the *Pericles* are enhanced in historical value by the authentic material in them which supplements Thucydides. Plutarch mentions by name in his *Nicias* some nineteen authors. In some thirteen cases also, a vague phrase of reference like

"it is said", or "most writers", hides from us the particular source, or marks matter taken at second hand.

Of Thucydides and Philistus, enough has already been written in the chapter on primary sources (pp. 4–10). A brief characterization will now be given of the other principal sources for the material of the *Nicias*, whether named by Plutarch or not, arranged as nearly as possible in chronological order. Pindar need not be included, who is cited in i. 2 for mere literary embellishment; nor Euripides, who is cited for the same purpose in v. 4 and ix. 5, and for the higher purpose of historical corroboration in xvii. 4. After what has been said of Old Athenian Comedy as a primary source (pp. 1 f.), the detailed information needed concerning the contemporary rivals of Aristophanes, such as Eupolis, Phrynichus, Plato, and Telecleides, will best find a place in the current notes, as well as that concerning other authors alluded to or cited for literary rather than historical purposes. Of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* also, which is a primary source in so far as it incorporates oligarchical opinions prevalent during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, enough has been said already (pp. 3 f.). By adopting such opinions, Aristotle, of course, gave them the weight of his own name and authority.

Plutarch does not mention Theopompus in the *Nicias*, but it is possible, and even probable that he uses him, directly or indirectly, for some of the material found in chapters ii.–v., and occasionally elsewhere. The *Alcibiades* of Nepos is confessedly (xi. 1) based largely on the tradition of Theopompus. Theopompus of Chios, like his fellow student Ephorus of Cymé, was a pupil of the orator Isocrates, and applied to the narration of historical events the principles of formal rhetoric. With the rise of the Macedonian power to political supremacy in Greece, and with the remarkable domination of intellectual Greece by the orator Isocrates, a new political idea, and a new literary form became current, and forced into new lines the art of writing history. The new political idea was the unity of the Greeks against Persia, and the new lit-

erary form was rhetorical prose. Historical writing became national instead of sectional, and rhetorical devices ministered to the pleasure of hearers and readers as once epic poetry or epic prose narrative had done. One is tempted to call Ephorus the Herodotus of this period, and Theopompus its Thucydides. But in Ephorus particularly, and in Theopompus also, in spite of his erudition and industrious quest of the truth, the rhetorical element triumphs over the didactic. The form was of more importance than the substance, and freely shaped the substance to its needs. And besides, in Theopompus, a certain bigotry and bitterness of partisanship, together with a pessimistic scepticism and an undiscriminating censoriousness, combine to make him rather a soured and crabbed Herodotus, if that is conceivable, than a later Thucydides. A stern aristocrat, he devoted, like Thucydides, years of exile and great wealth to securing the most accurate knowledge possible of the periods which he chronicled, namely, the years 411 to 394 B.C. in his *Hellenica*, a continuation of the work of Thucydides; and the career of Philip of Macedon in his *Philippica*, which normally covered the period 360–336 B.C. Both works, particularly the latter with its fifty-eight books, were storehouses of erudition, and their loss is one of the severest that Greek literature has sustained. The tenth book of the *Philippica* was devoted, by way of learned excursus, to the statesmen, or demagogues of Athens. Here Plutarch evidently found, directly or indirectly, much biographical material for his *Themistocles*, *Cimon*, *Pericles*, *Nicias*, and *Alcibiades*. Theopompus had no sympathy with or proper appreciation of the Athenian democracy, and his judgments of its popular leaders were harsh and bitter. He was essentially pedantic, without that keen insight into affairs and the motives of men of affairs which characterizes such historians as Thucydides, Xenophon, and Polybius, who were themselves men of affairs.

Of Timaeus, Plutarch makes extensive use in the *Nicias*, though seldom with gratitude, and often with severe disapproval. The life of Timaeus fell between the years 350 and

250 B. C. A native of Tauromenium, in Sicily, and the son of the tyrant of that city, he was banished from Sicily by the tyrant Agathocles, of Syracuse, and spent a long exile at Athens, where he had been educated, and where he wrote a voluminous history of his native island from earliest times down to the year 264 B. C. Polybius, who made extended use of this work, accused its author of almost every fault that a bad historian can possess, and probably with some justice, although Cicero praises the learning and even the style of Timaeus. He was a bookish recluse, a learned, patient, and careful collector of the most heterogeneous historical material, and a harsh censor of the work of others. We know that he paid great attention to chronology, and introduced the practice of recording events by Olympiads. His work, like that of Theopompus, is known to us only in fragments. It seems to have been a great storehouse of learned research, but full of the gross perversions of ambitious rhetoric.

There was a long line of antiquarian writers who composed *Atthides*, or chronological histories of the customs, institutions, and monuments of Athens and Attica. The oldest of these, if Hellanicus be not included in the group, whose *Atthis* was of a more general character (see p. 42), was Cleidemus, or Cleitodemus (*Themistocles*, x. 4; *Aristides*, xix. 3). Phanodemus, from whom Plutarch cites in the *Cimon* (xii. 5; xix. 1), and Androtion, from whom Aristotle drew some of the material for the *Constitution of Athens*, and whom Plutarch cites in his *Solon* (xv.), were others. But the most important writer of this class was Philochorus, who summed up and perfected the work of his predecessors. He was a professional seer, and an official interpreter of oracles and portents at Athens in 306. He was slain at Athens by Antigonus Gonatas in 261. His chief work, an *Atthis*, carried the chronicles of Athens down to the year of his death, and the fragments of it which have reached us testify to the great learning and wisdom of its author. Plutarch cites him frequently in the *Theseus*, once in the *Nicias* (xxiii. 5), and probably uses him freely at other times,

directly or indirectly, without mentioning his name, as in the *Themistocles* (x. 3) and the *Nicias* (ii. 1), where he takes Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* as he found it cited in Philochorus. It is possible that the antiquarian material of *Nicias* iii. comes from Philochorus. His enormous literary activity belongs to the generation following Aristotle, whom he cites freely, as well as previous *Atthides*. It may well be, therefore, that Plutarch names the earlier *Atthis*-writers mainly as he finds them cited by Philochorus, or as he finds Philochorus cited in his biographical source.

Theophrastus, of Eresos in Lesbos, the most famous pupil and the successor of Aristotle, is cited twice in the *Nicias* (x. 1; xi. 7), and once in the *Alcibiades* (x. 3), where Plutarch calls him "the most versatile and learned of all the philosophers". The Peripatetic school of philosophers, in the historical and biographical work which they incidentally cultivated, seem to have culled from all sorts of sources striking anecdotes of historical personages, without showing much critical acumen, and rather for purposes of ethical and philosophical illustration. Their main work lay in other fields. A work of Theophrastus "On Lives" was a mine of citation for Plutarch in his *Aristides*, *Pericles*, *Nicias*, *Alcibiades* and other *Lives*. In this work, like Theopompus and Aristotle, Theophrastus betrays the bias of the oligarchical partisan. His main endeavor, however, was to supplement and complete the work of Aristotle in the field of natural history. Besides two great works on botany, we possess only his *Characters*, if that be an independent work, and not a collection of extracts from ethical writings. This contains thirty sketches of types of Athenian character in the age of Alexander. The life of Theophrastus fell between the years 373–284 B. C.

Craterus the Macedonian, a son of Alexander's famous general of that name, and half-brother of King Antigonus Gonatas, flourished in the early part of the third century B. C., and distinguished himself as a careful compiler of original historical documents bearing on the history of Athens. He

apparently wrote a political history of Athens based on these invaluable documents. He is much quoted by scholiasts and late lexicographers, and known to us principally in this way. Plutarch speaks of his collections, to which he may have had access, in his *Aristides* (xxvi. 2) and *Cimon* (xiii. 6), and doubtless often uses material furnished by him without mentioning his name, as in the *Nicias* (xii. 4). Some spurious documents may have crept into the collections of Craterus, but in general his work must have been of the highest value, and it is always cited with respect, often in the same class with the *Atthis*-writers.

After his Introduction (chap. i.), in which he excoriates Timaeus and lays down his own contrasting program of procedure, Plutarch describes at once, in chapters ii.–v., the "Character" of Nicias, with illustrations taken from the daily walk and conversation of the man, and from his use of the great wealth at his disposal. The two divisions of a *Life* usually devoted to "Birth and Family", and "Education and Training", are omitted, doubtless for lack of material, since very little was known, even in antiquity, on those topics. The material of the three chapters devoted to Character is gathered from a variety of sources, — antiquarian writers like Philochorus, the book of Theopompus devoted to the Athenian demagogues, the dialogue of Pasiphon entitled *Nicias*, and the comic poets, and is most skilfully blended into a literary whole. How far this resultant whole is due to Plutarch himself, and how far to Theopompus, or to learned comment on Theopompus and Pasiphon, cannot be known with any certainty. But Plutarch would clearly amend the verdict of Theopompus to the effect that Nicias made lavish use of his great wealth only to secure the favor of the people, by attributing such use rather to his reverent piety (iv. 1). These chapters give us an admirable picture of a timorous man of mediocrity forced, in the dearth of strong conservative leaders, to occupy a pinnacle of popular influence from which he looked down dizzily.

In chapters vi.–xxvii., Plutarch rehearses the "Deeds" of Nicias, usually the fourth division of a biography.

Chapters vi.–viii. cover the earlier part of the public activities of Nicias, from 433, or thereabout, down to 424 and the triumph of his political adversary, Cleon, at Sphacteria. Chapter vi., which enumerates his unbroken successes as a general and contrasts them with the reverses and calamities of others, reads like the independent work of Plutarch compiling widely and rather carelessly from Thucydides. Chapter vii. condenses most effectively a considerable part of the circumstantial account which Thucydides gives (iv. 2–28) of the affair of Pylos, and illustrates the crazy vanity of Cleon by an anecdote which probably comes from Theopompus, who lurks behind a vague "It is said". Chapter viii. concludes the effective condensation of Thucydides' story of Pylos (iv. 29–41), and adds, in all probability from Theopompus, Aristophanic skits reflecting popular opinion concerning Nicias' renunciation of office in favor of Cleon, and a vigorous sketch of Cleon in action.

Chapters ix.–xii. cover the political activities of Nicias from 424 down to 415 and the triumph of his adversary, Alcibiades, in the final decision of the Athenian people to send an armament of conquest to Sicily. Chapter ix. describes the triumph of Nicias as a peacemaker after Cleon has been exterminated, in language based upon or suggested by Thucydides (see the current notes), and enriched by literary citations. Chapter x. describes the parliamentary trick by means of which Alcibiades circumvents the slow Nicias and practically renews the war. It is based entirely upon Thucydides (see the current notes), but inserts a characteristic item from Theophrastus. Chapter xi., on the other hand, with its detailed account of the ostracism of Hyperbolus, contains material which is nowhere to be found in Thucydides, and which probably comes from the book on Athenian demagogues by Theopompus, to whom Plutarch alludes, in a fashion characteristic of ancient literary practice, by the indefinite "most writers" of § 7. The same

story is told in a different manner, when Plutarch is more under the influence of Theophrastus, in *Alcibiades*, xiii. Chapter xii., again, describing the steps by which the Athenian people came to vote the Sicilian expedition, is almost wholly Thucydidean (see the current notes), with genial "improvement" at the hands of Plutarch, and a notable item from the collections of Craterus.

Chapter xiii., forming a sort of transition to the story of the Sicilian expedition, is wholly taken up with oracles and omens unfavorable to the expedition. It forms no part of the narrative, and might be cut out without disturbing it. It is in all probability a compilation from Timaeus, who reveled in such material, as is clear from Plutarch's first chapter. Aside from the three items in xv. 4, xix. 4, and xxviii. 4, which are due to Timaeus, the material taken from him by Plutarch in this *Life* is all akin to that of this thirteenth chapter.

In chapters xiv.–xxviii., Plutarch describes the part taken by Nicias in the ill-starred Sicilian expedition, from the time when he was "gazing back homewards from his ship like a child", to the time when his poor body was "cast out at the prison door" in Syracuse, "and lay there in plain sight of all who craved the spectacle". In all these chapters, Thucydides is the constant and main source, blended often and most acceptably with Philistus, and supplemented, sometimes acceptably, sometimes controversially, but always interestingly, by Timaeus. The details of Plutarch's indebtedness to each of these three authors are fully given in the current notes, and need not be repeated here. It is seldom that Plutarch's sources can be determined so satisfactorily as in this group of chapters.

Chapters xxix. and xxx. form the sad epilogue to this *Life*, describing the fate of the imprisoned Athenians at Syracuse, and the receipt of the news of disaster at Athens. The first is a compound of Thucydides and Philistus, and the second is made up of anecdote taken from some collection at Plutarch's command, as is seen from his use of the same material elsewhere

On the whole, then, if we have not Plutarch at his best in the *Nicias*, we certainly have him at a very high level of excellence. He has followed in the footsteps of Thucydides admiringly and safely, and has added to the Thucydidean basis material, otherwise lost to us, which is generally authentic, often valuable even if not authentic, and always interesting. He has unrolled before us, with dramatic effects, the tragedy of a man of pious mediocrity who is intrusted with a great empire's fate.

Alphabetical List of Authors cited by Plutarch in his *Nicias*.

Anaxagoras . . . . XXIII. 2
Aristophanes . . IV. 6; VIII. 2
Aristotle . . . . . II. 1
Autocleides . . . . XXIII. 6
Diphilus . . . . . I. 2
Eupolis . . . . . IV. 5
Euripides . XVII. 4; V. 4; IX. 5
Pasiphon . . . . . IV. 2
Philistus . . I. 2 and 5; XIX. 5; XXVIII. 4
Philochorus . . . . XXIII. 5
Phrynichus . . . . . IV. 6
Pindar . . . . . I. 2
Plato Com. . . . . XI. 6
Plato Phil. . . . . XXIII. 4
Telecleides . . . . . IV. 4
Theophrastus . . . X. 1; XI. 7
Thucydides . . I. 1 and 5; IV. 1; XIX. 5; XX. 5; XXVIII. 4
Timaeus . . . I. 2–4; XIX. 4; XXVIII. 3 and 4
Xenarchus (?) . . . . . I. 3

IV. THE SOURCES OF PLUTARCH IN HIS *ALCIBIADES*, WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THIS *LIFE*

The *Alcibiades* lacks the Introduction and the preliminary comparison with the Roman selected as a parallel, which we find in the *Cimon*, *Pericles*, and, less fully developed, in the *Nicias*. As we find them also in nine other Greek *Lives*, followed by the full and formal "Comparison" at the close of the Roman *Life*, this may be called the normal method of Plutarch. But since the principle of paralleling a Greek with a Roman is acknowledged to be the least successful of Plutarch's contributions to biography, no apology is needed for compar-

ing and contrasting in each of the volumes of this series two Greeks who were intimately associated with each other and strong rivals of one another in a crucial period of their country's history. Themistocles and Aristides were the two opposing spirits in the incipient democracy of the period of the Persian invasions; Cimon and Pericles in the culminating democracy of the period of the *Pentecontaëtia;* and Nicias and Alcibiades in the decadent democracy of the Peloponnesian war. It is much more instructive, historically at least, to contrast such powerful political rivals as Themistocles and Aristides, or Cimon and Pericles, than to force comparisons between Themistocles and Camillus, Aristides and Marcus Cato, Cimon and Lucullus, or Pericles and Fabius Maximus; to contrast Nicias and Alcibiades, than to compare Nicias with Crassus, or Alcibiades with Coriolanus. The formal "Comparison" of Alcibiades and Coriolanus, like so many of the others, results in a series of contrasts. They were alike in one thing only: "so long as they remained and held command in their respective countries, they eminently sustained, and when they were driven into exile, yet more eminently damaged the fortunes of those countries" (chap. i.). In all other respects they were most unlike. Alcibiades, "in spite of the harm he occasioned, could not make himself hated;" and Coriolanus, "with all the admiration he attracted, could not succeed in being beloved by his countrymen" (chap. iii.). Coriolanus was simple and straightforward; Alcibiades unscrupulous and false. Alcibiades relented when he found the feelings of his countrymen to be changed towards him, and "did the very thing that Aristides is so commended for doing to Themistocles; he came to the generals who were his enemies, and pointed out to them what they ought to do." Coriolanus, on the other hand, by his obduracy, "showed that it had been to destroy and overthrow, not to recover and regain his country, that he had excited bitter and implacable hostilities against it" (chap. ii.). And yet, "for his temperance, continence, and probity, he claims to be compared with the best and

purest of the Greeks; not in any sort or kind with Alcibiades, the least scrupulous and most entirely careless of human beings in all these points" (chap. v.).

In his *Alcibiades*, as in his *Pericles*, Plutarch doubtless based his work upon a standard biography, or upon standard biographical material accessible to him in the works of the great schools of biography, philosophical and philological, which had flourished before him (see the chapter on *Biography before Plutarch*, in the Introduction to the *Themistocles and Aristides*). But this material is successfully fused with contributions of his own, so that it is often difficult to trace the dividing line between the work of the author and that of his "traditional biography". Hence the large margin of uncertainty which often encompasses the study of Plutarch's sources, from which it follows that no two critics will agree closely upon the extent of the "traditional biography" serving in any given case as the basis of Plutarch's work, nor upon the degree in which the genial writer adds to this from his known stores of learning. He cites by name in the *Alcibiades* some twenty-three authors. Many, perhaps most of these he finds already cited in his main source, the "traditional biography". But whether he names his source or not, and whether he draws from that source directly or indirectly, are matters which concern only the manner of Plutarch's procedure. The historical worth of the material which he gives us depends upon the worth of the ultimate sources for that material. In some sixteen cases an indefinite phrase of reference like "it is said", or "others say", hides from us the particular source, or marks material taken at second hand.

Of Thucydides, Xenophon, and Plato the philosopher, enough has been written in the chapter on primary sources (pp. 4–11), as well as of Aristophanes and Old Athenian Comedy in general (pp. 1 f.); on the various rivals of Aristophanes, the needful comment will be given in the current notes. For Theopompus, and Theophrastus, who are among the secondary sources for the *Nicias* also, see pp. 32 f., 35. It will scarcely be necessary to say anything of Demosthenes,

whose estimate of Alcibiades' eloquence is cited in x. 2, nor of Euripides, whom Plutarch here as always readily cites for purposes of literary embellishment, and occasionally, as in the *Nicias* xvii. 4 and the *Alcibiades* xi. 2, for the sake of historical corroboration. A brief characterization will now be given of the other principal sources for the material of the *Alcibiades*, arranged as nearly as possible in chronological order. On authors of minor importance, the needful comment will be given in the current notes.

Hellanicus, of Mitylene in Lesbos, lived during the greater part of the fifth century B. C., and was a voluminous writer of genealogical and chronological works. An "Attic History" of his, referred to by Thucydides (i. 97, 2), and used by that historian for the period of the *Pentecontaëtia* (see the Introduction to the *Cimon and Pericles*, p. 2), was an *Atthis*, or chronicle of events in Greek history by years of Athenian archonships. It was the only strictly historical work dealing with the events of this period composed by one who was contemporary with the events. Plutarch cites this writer in the *Alcibiades* (or finds him cited in his source) only for the genealogical item of xxi. 1.

A most important, because primary and contemporary source for events which profoundly affected the career of Alcibiades, namely, the mutilation of the *Hermae* and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries, is found in two speeches of Andocides, "On his Return", and "On the Mysteries". A spurious oration "Against Alcibiades", which has also come down to us among the speeches of Andocides, has some worth as a secondary source, as will be shown sufficiently in the current notes.

By birth and natural inclination, Andocides was an oligarch, but in consequence of his treacherous betrayal of friends in this party, he incurred its hatred, and sought, though vainly, to ingratiate himself with the democracy. He was born probably about 440 B. C., but we know nothing of his life until 415, when the mutilation of the *Hermae* and rumors of travesties in private houses of the ceremonies

of the Eleusinian Mysteries filled Athens with horror and fear. His name, like that of Alcibiades, was associated by his enemies with both sacrileges, but there is no good evidence that he was concerned with the latter, as there is none that Alcibiades was connected with the former. Imprisoned on the denunciations of the informers Teucrus and Diocleides, together with his father, his brother-in-law, and other relatives, Andocides turned state's evidence under promise of personal indemnity guaranteed by a public decree (*Alcibiades*, xxi.). But this decree was afterwards cancelled, and a new decree passed providing that those who had committed impiety and confessed it should be excluded from market place and temples, a punishment virtually equivalent to banishment. Andocides accordingly left Athens, and spent most of the years 415–402 in exile, with Cyprus as his headquarters, and merchandise in lumber as his occupation. He made an unsuccessful attempt to reëstablish himself in Athens during the government of the Four Hundred (411), and again in 410, just after the victory of the Athenians at Cyzicus. On this latter occasion he was allowed to plead his case before the Assembly, which he did in the speech "On his Return". After deprecating the malice and stupidity of his enemies, the oligarchs, in rejecting the good offices which he is anxious to render his native city, he speaks (§§ 5–9) of his former transgressions as misfortunes, due to youth, folly, and madness, and deserving of pity rather than of hatred. He had been brought by evil advisers into such a pass that he was compelled to denounce his associates in crime, or else suffer death himself and bring his innocent father to death. And the denunciations which he had made five years before had brought immediate and great relief to the city, though pain of long exile upon himself, who was deserving of gratitude instead of hatred. This is the important part of the speech for our present purposes. In what follows, he pleads that his services to the state during his exile ought to effect "the observance of the promise of immunity under which he originally laid his information,

but which was afterwards withdrawn under the influence of his enemies".

His plea was rejected, and he returned to his career in exile. In 402, however, under the general amnesty passed the year before, he returned to Athens, and resumed the duties and privileges of active citizenship. But the hatred of his enemies only slumbered, and in 399 he was brought to trial on a charge of impiety, because he had attended the services of the Eleusinian Mysteries, contrary to the decree of 415, which expressly excluded him from temples. His speech "On the Mysteries" is his defence before the appropriate law-court, and the first part of it (§§ 11–69) is taken up with reviews of the facts in the two cases wherein he had been accused of impiety in 415, namely, the mutilation of the *Hermae* and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. He proves conclusively (§§ 11–33) that he took no part in the latter, but in regard to the former he gives a version much at variance with what he said on the subject in 410, in the speech "On his Return". Eleven years had elapsed since that speech was made, and the memories of his hearers had been dimmed, "not by lapse of time only, but by that great wave of trouble which swept over Athens in 405, and which left all older memories faint in comparison with the memory of the Thirty Tyrants" (Jebb). In the speech of 410, Andocides pleaded guilty to certain transgressions due to youth, folly, madness, and evil advisers; in the speech of 399 he flatly and defiantly denies that he was in any way guilty, and gives what purports to be the substance of his deposition to the authorities in 415. He represents himself as having deposed that the mutilation of the *Hermae* was the work of the members of a club to which he belonged, and that the work had been done, against his protest, while he lay sick at home, at the instigation of a certain Euphiletus. This Euphiletus had assured his club-mates that Andocides had been won over to the scheme, and would take care of the mutilation of the Hermes in front of his house, which accounted for that particular figure's escape from out-

rage. Now we have not only Andocides' own admission of guilt in his speech of 410, but also the charge of one of his opponents at the trial of 399 ([Lysias] "Against Andocides", §§ 35 f., cf. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, I. p. 281), the words of Thucydides (vi. 60, 4), and of Plutarch (*Alc.* xxi. 4), to the effect that his deposition calumniated himself as well as others. In any case, then, the version of the affair given in the speech "On the Mysteries" is untrue as a representation of what he deposed in 415. The deposition itself may or may not have been true.

Andocides was acquitted at his trial in 399, but we hear nothing further about him until the winter of 391–390, when he was a member of an embassy sent to Sparta to treat for peace. On the return of the embassy, his speech "On the Peace with Lacedaemon" urged an acceptance of the terms proposed by the Spartans, with sound and statesmanlike arguments, which were not, however, effectual with the people. This is his last appearance in history. He seems never to have lost the hatred of the oligarchs whom he betrayed, nor to have gained the confidence of the democrats on whom he fawned. And yet he showed large talent in business, and no mean ability as an orator.

Ephorus, a native of the Aeolian city of Cymé, wrote a universal history of Greeks and Barbarians from the Return of the Heracleidae, or the "Dorian Invasion", down to the year 340 B. C. The work belonged distinctly to the time of Alexander the Great. Like Theopompus, Ephorus was a pupil of the orator Isocrates, and applied to the narration of historical events the principles of formal rhetoric (see p. 32). For the periods of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he used principally the material already furnished by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, but worked it over into a form which appealed to the rhetorical tastes of the fourth century. His work enjoyed an immense popularity, and became the standard history of the world down to its terminal date. It has reached us only in excerpts and fragments, and is principally known through the generous use

made of it by the compiler Diodorus Siculus, who prepared a compend of universal history down to the time of Cæsar's Gallic wars, writing under Augustus. In the twelfth and thirteenth books of this compend of Diodorus (xii. 30–xiii. 107) the period of the Peloponnesian war is treated, in the main after Ephorus, and therefore, ultimately, after Thucydides and Xenophon, though not without many and important variations on the part both of Ephorus and Diodorus. It is clear, for instance, that Ephorus added material from Philistus to what Thucydides gave him on the Sicilian expedition, and also that Diodorus, in excerpting Ephorus, added still further material from Timaeus. For the years of the war following the Sicilian expedition, Diodorus seems to have contented himself with excerpting Ephorus, who, for his part, had used Thucydides and Xenophon after his peculiar manner, making only slight additions of any historical value.

Diodorus excerpts Ephorus in large sections. But it is also probable that he condenses at times, and certain that he often adds some matter of his own composition, especially for purposes of juncture. In general, however, we may be reasonably confident that he reproduces Ephorus. Now Ephorus, though a diligent student and collector of new material, is a far less trustworthy guide than Thucydides, or even Xenophon, since he yields so much to the temptations of his rhetoric. His style is artificial in the extreme, diffuse and weak, and yet to his style he clearly sacrifices fidelity to facts and leading authorities. He invents outright where graphic details are wanting, and has stock descriptions of battles and sieges and storms which he carries over from century to century. Occasionally, however, he supplies us with authentic supplementary detail, which may come from Hellanicus, or some other reputable *Atthis*-writer. He was an extravagant admirer and partisan of Athens, going as far beyond the truth in praise or condonation of her as her enemies, like Theopompus, went in detraction. He did violence to chronology by arranging events in groups according to

their inner relationship, — a decided advance upon the pure annalistic method, wherein Thucydides had improved upon Hellanicus. But Diodorus, in excerpting him, proceeds as though each of these groups of events could be assigned to a single year in his own rigid annalistic system. The result is chronological confusion.

Athens was by no means alone in developing the class of antiquarian literature known as *Atthides* (see p. 34). Almost every Greek community of any importance had such treatises devoted to it, and we may assume that they were all utilized in the great collection of *Constitutions* of Greek states by Aristotle, of which the *Constitution of Samos* was one, and the *Constitution of Athens* the only one that has come down to us. Duris, a pupil of Theophrastus, historian and for a time tyrant of Samos, lived from about 350 to about 280 B. C., and besides a History of Greece from 370 to 281, wrote also an *Annals of Samos*, which is frequently referred to, and contained many incidents of the Peloponnesian war. His writings displayed the most elaborate rhetoric, and were full of sensational and manifestly unhistorical material. Plutarch disparages his style and doubts his veracity, but nevertheless finds some welcome material in his works. He cites him in the *Alcibiades* (chap. xxxii.) for material which he scorns as history but adopts for its color.

Without introduction of any kind, Plutarch treats in chapter i. of the birth and personal appearance of Alcibiades. The material is drawn, ultimately at least, from Herodotus, Plato, Antisthenes, and the comic poets, with a purely ornamental citation from Euripides. How far the blending of this material is due to Plutarch, and how far to his biographical source, cannot be determined.

Chapters ii.–ix. treat, without careful separation of the different topics, of the education and character of Alcibiades, and reveal the wealth of anecdotical material which had come to be associated with this darling of fortune.

Chapter ii. is an enlargement upon suggestions found in

Plato, with illustrative anecdotes from some current collection. Extensive collections of anecdotes and "memorable sayings" must have formed part of the literary apparatus of Plutarch. Chapter iii. gives us a pair of anecdotes drawn from an oration falsely attributed to Antiphon. Chapter iv., again, is based upon material found in dialogues of Plato, and enriched with anecdotes of source unknown. Chapter v. consists wholly of one such anecdote. Chapter vi., again, is based upon Platonic material, and is embellished with literary citations from Cleanthes and Thucydides. Chapter vii. also contains anecdotes of unknown source, and items furnished by Platonic dialogues. Chapter viii. furnishes another anecdote of unknown source, and material to be found also in the spurious oration "Against Alcibiades" attributed to Andocides. Chapter ix. consists of another stock anecdote.

Chapters x.–xxii. deal with that portion of the public career of Alcibiades which precedes his banishment for sacrilegious impiety, — the years 424(?)–415.

Chapter x. consists of a fatherless anecdote, and authentic testimony to the eloquence of Alcibiades drawn from the comic poets, Demosthenes, and Theophrastus. Chapter xi. descants upon the magnificence of his stables, with corroborative citations from Thucydides and Euripides. Chapter xii. blends material illustrating his unheard of splendor at the Olympic games which is found in Isocrates, [Pseudo-]Andocides, and Ephorus. Chapter xiii. tells anew, and in a manner at interesting variance with *Nicias*, xi., the story of the ostracism of Hyperbolus. As in the *Nicias*, the story is based substantially upon Theopompus, but has a stronger infusion of Theophrastus, though practically the same literary embellishments. Chapters xiv. and xv., describing the parliamentary triumph over Nicias by Alcibiades, and his activity in forming a North-Peloponnesian alliance against Sparta, correspond closely to chapter x. of the *Nicias*, and are evidently based upon Thucydides, with an occasional use of Ephorus, and some additional embellishment of a rhetorical nature. Chapter xvi., composed chiefly of anecdotes and items

found in [Pseudo-]Andocides, illustrates the wantonness and luxury in which Alcibiades allowed himself, and forms a suggestive transition to the story of the Sicilian expedition, like chap. xiii. of the *Nicias*. Chapters xvii. and xviii., describing the preparations for the Sicilian expedition down to the time of the mutilation of the *Hermae*, correspond closely with chapters xii. and xiii. of the *Nicias*, which were based mainly upon Thucydides and Timaeus. In retelling the story, Plutarch omits some features of his narrative in the *Nicias*, but adds also some noticeable material, taken probably from his biographical source for the *Alcibiades*. For chapters xix.–xxii., concerning the delay in the prosecution of Alcibiades for impiety, the departure of the fleet, the investigation of the *Hermae*-outrage, the confession of Andocides, the condemnation and recall of Alcibiades, Thucydides is the main source, supplemented by Andocides ("On the Mysteries"), by material from Craterus, and by ornamental literary citations. Again it is clearly impossible to decide how much of the resultant blend is due to Plutarch, and how much to his biographical source.

Chapters xxiii.–xxxiii. are devoted to the career of Alcibiades after his banishment, and until his return to Athens in 408.

Chapter xxiii., describing his life and doings at Sparta, his fatally good advice for the prosecution of the war against his native city, his marvellous power of adaptation to changing surroundings, his intrigue with Queen Timaea, is a compound of Thucydides, Theopompus, and Duris of Samos, with literary embellishment. Chapters xxiv.–xxvi., dealing with his activities in Asia Minor down to his recall by the Athenian army at Samos, show a free and admirable combination of material found in Thucydides, Theopompus, and Ephorus, but chiefly in Thucydides. Chapters xxvii.–xxxiii., devoted to his victorious career in the Hellespont and Propontis, in consequence of which the naval prestige of Athens was restored and her food supplies from the Euxine renewed, are mainly based upon Xenophon, with here and there an additional item

or alterations due to Ephorus and Theopompus. Duris the Samian is cited for highly colored details connected with the return of Alcibiades to Athens (xxxii. 3), which Plutarch rejects because "neither Theopompus nor Ephorus nor Xenophon mention these things".

Chapters xxxiv.–xxxvii. 2, occupied with the doings of Alcibiades from his return to Athens down to the disastrous defeat of the Athenian fleet, no longer under his command, at Aegospotami, have the same character, so far as their basis and development are concerned, as chapters xxvii.–xxxiii., *i. e.* they give us Xenophon blended with Ephorus and Theopompus. Nothing in Plutarch which contradicts Xenophon, or which merely decks out the simple narrative of Xenophon with rhetorical detail, has any independent historical value. Occasionally, however, Theopompus or Ephorus furnishes him with supplementary items from sources other than Xenophon. These, and these alone, are worthy of serious consideration.

Chapters xxxvii. 3–xxxix., dealing with the last days and the end of Alcibiades, subjects about which Xenophon is silent, are based mainly upon Theopompus, and contain much romantic invention.

It is, then, a brilliant mosaic which Plutarch has given us in his *Alcibiades*, a *Life* which must rank with such masterpieces as the *Themistocles* or the *Pericles*. And Plutarch evidently feels the spell which the fascinating villain cast upon all who came in contact with him. He condemns him with reluctance and parts from him with sorrow. For Alcibiades, as Adolf Holm has said, was the concentrated embodiment of all the brilliant powers and all the brilliant failings of the Athenians in the second half of the fifth century. "In hoc, quid natura efficere possit, videtur experta. Constat enim inter omnes, qui de eo memoriae prodiderunt, nihil illo fuisse excellentius vel in vitiis vel in virtutibus" (Nepos, *Alc.* i. 1).

Alphabetical List of Authors cited by Plutarch in his *Alcibiades.*

Andocides . . . . . XXI. 1–4
Antiphon . . . . . III.
Antisthenes . . . . . I. 2
Archestratus . . . . . XVI. 5
Archippus . . . . . I. 4
Aristophanes . . . I. 4; XVI. 2
Cleanthes . . . . . VI. 1
Critias . . . . . XXXIII. 1
Demosthenes . . . . . X. 2
Duris of Samos . . . . XXXII. 2
Ephorus . . . . . XXXII. 3
Eupolis . . . . . XIII. 2
Euripides . . . I. 3; XI. 1 and 2; XXIII. 6
Hellanicus . . . . . XXI. 1
Isocrates . . . . . XII. 3
Phaeax . . . . . XIII. 2
Phrynichus . . . . . XX. 4
Plato Com. . . . . XIII. 5
Plato Phil. . . . . I. 2; IV. 4
Theophrastus . . . . . X. 3
Theopompus . . . . . XXXII. 3
Thucydides . . . VI. 2; XI. 1; XIII. 3; XX. 4
Xenophon . . . . . XXXII. 3

NICIAS

NICIAS

I. I THINK that Nicias is a suitable parallel to Crassus, and the Sicilian to the Parthian disaster. I must therefore at once, and in all modesty, entreat my readers not to imagine for an instant that, in my narration of what Thucydides has inimitably set forth, surpassing even himself in pathos, vividness, and variety, I am so disposed as was Timaeus. He, 2
confidently hoping to excel Thucydides in skill, and to make Philistus seem altogether tedious and clumsy, pushes his history along through the conflicts and sea-fights and harangues which those writers had already handled with the greatest success, showing himself, in rivalry with them, not even so much as "by Lydian car a footman slowly plodding", to use Pindar's comparison, nay rather a perfect example of senile learning and youthful conceit, and, in the words of Diphilus, "obese, stuffed to the full with Sicilian grease". Indeed, he often lapses unawares into the manner of Xenarchus, as, for instance, when 3
he says he thinks it was a bad omen for the Athenians that Nicias, whose name was derived from victory, declined at first to head their expedition; also that by the mutilation of the *Hermae*, Heaven indicated to them in advance that by the hands of Hermocrates the son of Hermon they were to suffer most of their reverses during the war; and, further, that

it was fitting that Heracles should aid the Syracusans, for the sake of their patron goddess Cora, who delivered Cerberus into his hands, but should be angry with the Athenians, because they were trying to succor the Egestaeans, although they were descendants of the Trojans, whose city he had once destroyed because of the wrong done him by Laomedon their king.

4 As for Timaeus, he may possibly have been moved to write thus in the exercise of the same delicate taste which led him to correct the language of Philistus and abuse Plato and Aristotle; but as for me, I feel that jealous rivalry with other writers in matters of diction is altogether undignified and pedantic, and if it be practiced toward what is beyond all imitation, 5 utterly silly. At all events, those deeds which Thucydides and Philistus have set forth, — since I cannot entirely pass them by, indicating as they do the nature of my hero and the disposition which lay hidden beneath his many great sufferings, — I have run over briefly, and as I felt compelled to do in order to escape the reputation of utter carelessness and sloth; but those details which have escaped most writers, and which others have mentioned casually, or which are found on ancient votive offerings or in public decrees, these I have tried to collect, not massing together useless material of research, but handing on such as furthers the appreciation of character and temperament.

II. Accordingly, I may say of Nicias, in the first place, what Aristotle wrote, namely, that the three

best citizens of Athens, — men of a fatherly good will and friendship for the people, were Nicias the son of Niceratus, Thucydides the son of Melesias, and Theramenes the son of Hagnon. However, this was true of the last in lesser degree than of the other two, because, as an alien from Ceos, he was flouted for his inferior parentage; and on account of his not being steadfast, but ever trying to court both sides in his political program, was nicknamed "Cothurnus". Of the other two, Thucydides was the older man, and as 2 head of the aristocratic party, — the party of the "Good and True", often antagonized Pericles in his efforts to win the favor of the people. Nicias was a younger man. He was held in some repute even while Pericles was still living, so that he was not only associated with him as general, but frequently had independent command himself; after Pericles was dead, Nicias was at once put forward into the position of leader, especially by the party of the rich and notable. These made him their political buffer against the disgusting boldness of Cleon.

And yet, for that matter, the common people also 3 held him in favor and aided his ambitions. For although Cleon had great influence with them, "by coddling them, and giving frequent jobs for pay", yet the very men whose favor he thus sought to gain were aware of his rapacity and fierce effrontery, and for the most part preferred Nicias as their champion. The dignity of Nicias was not of the harsh, offensive sort, but was blended with much circumspection, and won control of the people from the very fact that he

4 was thought to be afraid of them. Timid as he was by nature, and distrustful of success, in war he managed to succeed in hiding his cowardice under a cloak of good fortune, for he was uniformly successful as a general; while in political life his nervousness, and the ease with which he could be put to confusion by accusers, actually tended to make him popular, and gave him in high degree that power which comes from the favor of the people, because they fear men who scorn them, but exalt men who fear them. The multitude can have no greater honor shown them by their superiors than not to be despised.

III. Now Pericles led the city by virtue of his native excellence and powerful eloquence, and had no need to assume any persuasive mannerisms with the multitude; but Nicias, since he lacked such powers, but had excessive wealth, sought by means of this to 2 win the leadership of the people. And since he despaired of his ability to vie successfully with the versatile buffoonery by which Cleon catered to the pleasure of the Athenians, he tried to captivate the people by choral and gymnastic exhibitions, and other like prodigalities, outdoing in the costliness and elegance of these all his predecessors and contem- 3 poraries. Of his dedicatory offerings there remain standing in my day not only the Palladium on the Acropolis, — the one which has lost its gilding, but also the temple surmounted by choregic tripods, in the precinct of Dionysus. For he was often victorious with choruses, and was never defeated. A story is told how, in one of his choral exhibitions, a house

servant of his appeared in the costume of Dionysus, very fair to see, and very tall, the down of youth still upon his face. The Athenians were delighted at the sight, and applauded for a long time. At last Nicias rose and said he deemed it an unholy thing that one who had been acclaimed as a god should be a slave, and gave the youth his freedom.

4 It is matter of record also how splendid and worthy of the god his lavish outlays at Delos were. The choirs which cities used to send thither to sing the praises of the god were wont to put in at the island in haphazard fashion. The throng of worshippers would meet them at the ship and bid them sing, not with the decorum due, but as they were hastily and tumultuously disembarking, and while they were actually donning their chaplets and vestments. But when 5 Nicias conducted the festal embassy, he landed first on the neighboring island of Rheneia, with his choir, sacrificial victims, and other equipment. Then, with the bridge of boats which he had brought along with him from Athens, where it had been made to measure and signally adorned with gildings and dyed stuffs and garlands and tapestries, he spanned during the night the strait between Rheneia and Delos, which is not wide. At break of day he led his festal procession in honor of the god, and his choir arrayed in lavish splendor and singing as it marched, across the bridge to land. After the sacrifices and the choral contests 6 and the banquets were over, he erected the famous bronze palm-tree as a thank offering to the god, and consecrated to his service a tract of land which he

bought at the price of ten thousand drachmas, the revenues from which the Delians were to expend in sacrificial banquets, at which many blessings should be invoked upon Nicias from the gods. This stipulation he actually had graven on the stone which he left in Delos to be as it were the sentry over his benefaction. The palm-tree, however, was torn away by the wind and fell against the colossal statue of the god which the Naxians erected, and overturned it.

IV. In this course it is clear that there was much ostentatious publicity, looking towards increase of reputation and gratification of ambition; and yet, to judge from the rest of the man's bent and character, one might feel sure that such favor and control of the people as he thus secured were rather a corollary to his reverent piety. For he was one of those who are excessively terrified at heavenly portents, and was
2 "addicted to divination", as Thucydides says. And in one of the dialogues of Pasiphon it is recorded that he sacrificed every day to the gods, and that he kept a diviner at his house, ostensibly for the constant enquiries which he made about public affairs, whereas most of his enquiries were really made about his own private matters, and especially about his silver mines; for he had large interests in the mining district of Laurium, and they were exceedingly profitable, although worked at great risks. He maintained a multitude of slaves in these mines, and the most of
3 his substance was in silver. For this reason he had a large retinue of people who wanted his money, and who got it too; for he gave to those who could work

him harm no less than to those who deserved his favors, and in general his cowardice was a source of revenue to the base as his liberality was to the good.

Witness to this can be had from the comic poets. 4
Telecleides composed the following verses on a certain public informer: —

"So then Charicles gave a mina that he might not tell of him
How he was his mother's first-born, — and her purse-born child at that.
Minas four he got from Nicias, son of rich Niceratus;
But the reason why he gave them, though I know it very well,
I'll not tell; the man 's my friend, and I think him wise and true."

And the personage who is held up to ridicule by 5
Eupolis, in his *Maricas*, fetches in a sort of lazy pauper, and says: —

(Maricas) "How long a time now since you were with Nicias?
(Pauper) I have not seen him, — saving just now on the Square.
(Maricas) The man admits he actually did see Nicias!
Yet what possessed him thus to see him? 'On the make'?
(Chorus?) O hear ye, hear, my comrades, O!
Our Nicias was taken in the very act!
(Pauper) What! you? O crazy-witted folk!
You catch a man so good in sin of any sort?"

And the Cleon of Aristophanes blusteringly says: — 6

"I'll laryngize the orators, and Nicias I'll rattle."

And Phrynichus gently hints at his lack of courage and his panic-stricken air in these verses: —

"He was a right good citizen, and I know it well;
He would n't cringe and creep as Nicias always does."

V. Since he was disposed to be thus cautious of public informers, he would neither dine with a fellow citizen, nor indulge in general interchange of views or

familiar social intercourse; indeed, he had no leisure for such pastimes, but when he was general, he remained at the War Department till night, and when he was councillor, he was first to reach and last to leave the Council. And even if he had no public business to transact, he was inaccessible and hard to come at, keeping close at home with his doors bolted.
2 His friends used to accost those who were in waiting at his door and beg them to be indulgent with Nicias, for he was even then engaged upon sundry urgent matters of public business.

The man who most aided him in playing this rôle, and helped him to assume his costume of pompous dignity, was Hiero. He had been reared in the household of Nicias, and thoroughly instructed by him in letters and literature. He pretended to be the son of Dionysius, surnamed Chalcus, whose poems are indeed extant, and who, as leader of the colonizing expedition to Italy, founded Thurii. This Hiero
3 it was who managed for Nicias his secret dealings with the seers, and who was forever putting forth among the people moving tales about the life of severe hardships which his patron led for the sake of the city. "Why!" said he, "even when he takes his bath and when he eats his dinner, some public business or other is sure to confront him; he neglects his private interests in his anxiety for the common good, and scarcely gets to sleep till others wake.
4 That's the reason why he is physically all run down, and is not affable or pleasant to his friends, nay, he has actually lost these too in addition to his sub-

stance, and all in the service of the city. Other public men not only win friends but enrich themselves through their influence as public speakers, and then fare sumptuously, and make a plaything of the service of the city." In point of fact, such was the life of Nicias that he could say of himself what Agamemnon did: —

> "Sooth, as master of my life
> My pomp I have, and to the populace I 'm a slave."

VI. He saw that the people, upon occasion, served their own turn with experienced men of eloquence or surpassing ability, but ever looked with suspicious and cautious eyes upon such powers, and tried to abate the pride and reputation to which they gave rise. This was manifest in their fining Pericles, and ostracising Damon, and discrediting, as most of them did, Antiphon the Rhamnusian, and finally, above all, in the fate of Paches the captor of Lesbos, who, while 2
he was giving the official account of his generalship, drew his sword in the very court-room and slew himself. Nicias therefore tried to evade commands which were likely to be laborious and long, and whenever he did serve as general made safety his chief aim, and so was successful for the most part, as was natural. He did not, however, ascribe his achievements to any wisdom or ability or valor of his own, but rather credited them to fortune, and took modest refuge in the divine ordering of events, relinquishing thereby part of his reputation because of the envy which would otherwise be awakened.

3 Events bore witness to his wisdom, for in the many great reverses which the city suffered at that period he had absolutely no share. It was under the leadership of Calliades and Xenophon that his countrymen met defeat at the hands of the Chalcidians in Thrace; the Aetolian disaster occurred when Demosthenes was in command; Hippocrates was general when a thousand citizens were sacrificed at Delium; and for the plague Pericles incurred the most blame, because he shut up the throng from the country in the city on account of the war, and the plague was the result of their change of abode and their un-
4 wonted manner of living. For all these things Nicias was free from blame, while as general he captured Cythera, an island favorably situated for the command of Laconia and inhabited by Lacedaemonians; he captured also many places in Thrace which had revolted, and brought them back to their allegiance; having shut up the Megarians in their city he straightway seized the island of Minoa, and shortly after, from this base of operations, got possession of Nisaea; he also made a descent upon the territory of Corinth, defeated the Corinthians in battle and slew many of them, including Lycophron their general.

5 Here it befell him, when his dead were taken up for burial, that two of his men were left unnoticed on the field. As soon as he was made aware of this, he halted his armament and sent a herald back to the enemy asking leave to take up his dead. And yet by usage and unwritten law the side which secured the right to take up its dead by a truce, was thought to

renounce all claims to victory, and for those who so obtained this right, the erection of a trophy of victory was unlawful, since they are victors who possess the field; but petitioners do not possess the field, since they cannot take what they want. Notwithstanding 6
this, Nicias endured rather to abandon the honor and reputation of his victory than to leave unburied two of his fellow citizens.

He also ravaged the coasts of Laconia, routed the Lacedaemonians who opposed him, captured Thyrea, which the Aeginetans held, and took his prisoners off alive to Athens.

VII. After Demosthenes had fortified Pylos, the Peloponnesians came up against it by land and sea, a battle was fought, and about four hundred Spartans were shut off on the island of Sphacteria. Then the Athenians considered that their capture would be a great achievement, as was true. But the siege was difficult and toilsome, since the region afforded no fresh water. Even in summer the shipping of the necessary supplies round Peloponnesus was a long and expensive process, while in winter it was sure to be perilous if not altogether impossible. The Athenians were therefore in bad humor, and repented them of having repulsed an embassy of the Lacedaemonians which had come to treat with them for a truce and peace. They had repulsed it because Cleon, chiefly 2
on account of Nicias, was opposed to it. He hated Nicias, and when he saw him zealously coöperating with the Lacedaemonians, persuaded the people to vote down the truce. So when the siege grew longer

and longer, and they learned that their forces were in terrible straits, they were angry with Cleon.

3 He, however, laid all the blame on Nicias, and denounced him, saying that it was through cowardice and weakness that he was letting the men on the island slip through his hands, whereas, had he himself been general instead of Nicias, they would not have held out so long. Thereupon it occurred to the Athenians to say: "It 's not too late! Why don't you sail yourself and fetch the men?" Nicias too rose in the Assembly and resigned his command of the expedition to Pylos in favor of Cleon, bidding him take as large a force as he wished, and not to vent his boldness in mere words which brought no peril with them, but to perform some deed for the city

4 which should be worth its notice. At first Cleon tried to draw back, confused by the unexpectedness of this offer; but the Athenians kept up the same cries of encouragement, and Nicias kept taunting him until, his ambition incited and on fire, he undertook the command, and, besides, declared in so many words that within twenty days after sailing he would either slay the men on the island or bring them alive to Athens. The Athenians were moved to hearty laughter at this rather than to belief in it, for they were already in the way of treating his mad vanity as a joke, and a pleasant one too.

5 It is said, for instance, that once when the Assembly was in session, the people sat out on the hill a long while waiting for him to address them, and that late in the day he came in all garlanded for dinner

and asked them to adjourn the Assembly to the morrow. "I'm busy to-day," he said, "I'm going to entertain some guests, and have already sacrificed to the gods." The Athenians burst out laughing, then rose up and dissolved the Assembly.

VIII. However, this time he had good fortune, served as general most successfully along with Demosthenes, and within the time which he had specified brought home as prisoners of war, their arms surrendered, all the Spartans on Sphacteria who had not fallen in battle. This success of Cleon's brought great discredit on Nicias. He was thought not merely to have cast away his shield, but to have done something far more disgraceful and base in voluntarily throwing up his command out of cowardice, and in abandoning to his enemy the opportunity for such a great success, — actually voting himself out of office. For this, Aristophanes again scoffs at him in his 2 *Birds*, in words like these: —

> "And lo! by Zeus! we can no longer doze about,
> — We have no time, — nor shilly-shally-niciasize;"

and in his *Farmers*, where he writes: —

> "I want to go a-farming."
> "Pray who hinders you?"
> "You people do. Come! Let me give a thousand drachms
> If you'll release me from my offices."
> "'Tis done!
> Yours make two thousand, with the ones that Nicias gave."

And besides, he wrought no little harm to the city 3 in allowing Cleon to have such an access of reputation and influence that he launched out into offensive

pride and ungovernable boldness and inflicted many mischiefs on the city, the bitter fruits of which he himself was by no means last to reap. Worst of all, Cleon stripped the bema of its decorum, setting the fashion of yelling when he harangued the people, of girding up his robe, slapping his thigh, and running about while speaking. He thus imbued the managers of the city's policies with that levity and contempt for propriety which soon after confounded the whole state.

IX. Just about that time Alcibiades was beginning to be a power at Athens. For a popular leader he was not such an unmixed evil as Cleon. The soil of Egypt, it is said, by reason of its very excellence, produces alike

"Drugs of which many are good, intermixed, but many are deadly".

In like manner the nature of Alcibiades, setting as it did with full and strong currents towards both good and evil, furnished cause and beginning for serious
2 innovations. And so it came to pass that even after Nicias was rid of Cleon, he did not get opportunity to lull the city into perfect rest and calm, but, when he had actually set the state fairly in the path of safety, was hurled from it by an impetuous onset of Alcibiades' ambition, and plunged again into war.

This was the way it came about. The men most hostile to the peace of Hellas were Cleon and Brasidas. Of these, war covered up the baseness of the one and adorned the excellence of the other; that is to say, it gave the one opportunities for great iniqui-

ties, the other for great achievements. After these 3
men had both fallen in one and the same battle before Amphipolis, Nicias found at once that the Spartans had long been eager for peace, and that the Athenians were no longer in good heart for the war; that both were, so to speak, unstrung, and glad to let their arms drop to their sides. He therefore strove to unite the two cities in friendship, and to free the rest of the Hellenes from ills, as well as to give himself a season of rest, and so to make secure for all coming time the name which he had for success. The men who were 4
well-to-do, and the elderly men, and most of the farmers, he found inclined to peace from the start; and after he had talked privately with many of the rest, taught them his views, and blunted the edge of their desire for war, then he at once held out hopes to the Spartans, and urgently invited them to seek for peace. They had confidence in him, not only because of his usual fairness towards them, but especially because he had shown kind attentions to those of their men who had been captured at Pylos and kept in prison at Athens, had treated them humanely, and so eased their misfortune. The two parties had 5
before this made a sort of stay of mutual hostilities for a year, and during this time they had held conferences with one another, and tasted again the sweets of security and leisure and intercourse with friends and kindred, so that they yearned for that old life which was undefiled by war, and listened gladly when choirs sang such strains as

"Let my spear lie unused for the spider to cover with webs,"

and gladly called to mind the saying, "In peace the speaker is waked not by the trumpet, but by the
6 cock." Accordingly, they heaped abuse on those who said that the war was fated to last thrice nine years, and then, in this spirit, debated the whole issue, and made peace. Most men held it to be a manifest release from ills, and Nicias was in every mouth. They said he was a man beloved of God, and that Heaven had bestowed on him, for his reverent piety, the privilege of giving his name to the greatest
7 and fairest of blessings. They really thought that the peace was the work of Nicias, as the war had been that of Pericles. The one, on slight occasion, was thought to have plunged the Hellenes into great calamities; the other had persuaded them to forget the greatest injuries and become friends. Therefore, to this day, men call that peace "The Peace of Nicias".

X. The articles of peace required that the strongholds and cities and prisoners of war which each party had taken from the other should be restored, and since that party was to make restoration first on whom the lot fell, the lot was secretly bought up by Nicias, so that the Lacedaemonians were the first to make restoration. This is the testimony of Theo-
2 phrastus. But when the Corinthians and Boeotians, who were vexed at the course things were taking, seemed likely, by their accusations and complaints, to revive the war, Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedaemonians to make the general peace secure by the mighty bond of a mutual alliance,

whereby they should become more formidable to all seceders and better assured of each other.

Such being the course of events, Alcibiades, who 3
was naturally indisposed to be quiet, and who was
incensed at the Lacedaemonians because they scorn-
fully ignored him in their fond attachment to
Nicias, promptly opposed and obstructed the general
peace. At the outset he made no headway; but a
little while after, seeing that the Athenians were not
so well pleased as before with the Lacedaemonians,
but thought they had wronged them in making a
separate alliance with the Boeotians, and in not re-
storing Panactum with its walls intact, nor Amphi-
polis at all, he laid great stress on these grounds of
complaint, and tried to incense the people over each
one of them. Finally he managed to have an em- 4
bassy sent from Argos to Athens, and tried to effect
a separate alliance between these two cities. Am-
bassadors came at once from Sparta with full powers
to treat all issues, and at their preliminary audience
with the Council were thought by that body to come
with nothing but just proposals. But Alcibiades was
afraid they would bring the Assembly over to their
views with the same arguments which had won the
Council. He therefore circumvented them by deceit-
fully swearing that he would coöperate with them
fully in the Assembly if they would only not claim
nor even admit that they had come with full powers
to treat all issues; for thus, he declared, they would
most surely attain their desires. After they were 5
persuaded by him, and had put themselves out of the

guiding hands of Nicias and into his, he introduced them to the Assembly, and asked them first whether they had come with full powers to treat all issues. On their saying "No" to this, he surprised them by changing front and calling on the members of the Council who were present to bear witness to what they had said before that body. He then urged the people not to follow, much less trust, men who were such manifest liars, and who said now "Yes" and
6 now "No" to the same question. The ambassadors were overwhelmed with confusion, naturally, and Nicias was unable to say a word, — struck dumb with amazement and anguish. Therefore the people were at once eager to call in the Argive embassy and make the alliance it desired, but there came a slight earthquake shock just then, luckily for Nicias, and the Assembly was dissolved. On the following day, when the people had assembled again, by dint of great effort and much talking Nicias succeeded, with difficulty, in persuading them to refrain from the action desired with Argos, and to send him on an embassy to the Lacedaemonians, assuring them that everything would thus turn out well.

7 But when he came to Sparta, though in other ways he was honored by them as a true man and one who had been zealous in their behalf, still, he accomplished nothing that he purposed, but was beaten by the party there which had Boeotian sympathies, and so came back home, not merely with loss of reputation and under harsh abuse, but actually in bodily fear of the Athenians. They were vexed and indig-

nant because they had been persuaded by him to restore so many eminent prisoners of war; for the men who had been brought to the city from Pylos belonged to the leading families of Sparta, and the most influential men there were their friends and kinsmen. However, the Athenians took no very harsh measures 8
in their anger against Nicias, but elected Alcibiades general, made an alliance with the Mantineans and Eleans, who had seceded from the Lacedaemonians, as well as with the Argives, sent freebooters to Pylos to ravage Laconia, and thus plunged again into war.

XI. At last the feud between Nicias and Alcibiades became so intense that recourse was had to the process of ostracism. This the people used to institute from time to time when they wished to remove for ten years, by the ostrakon-ballot, any one man who was an object of suspicion generally because of his great reputation, or of jealousy because of his great wealth. Both the rivals were thus involved in great confusion and peril, since one or the other must in any event succumb to the ostracism. In the case 2
of Alcibiades, men loathed his manner of life and dreaded his boldness, as will be shown more at length in his biography; and in the case of Nicias, his wealth made him an object of jealousy. Above all else, his way of life, which was not genial nor popular but unsocial and aristocratic, seemed alien and foreign; and since he often opposed the people's desires and tried to force them against their wishes into the way of their advantage, he was burdensome to them. To tell the simple truth, it was a struggle 3

between the young men who wanted war and the elderly men who wanted peace; one party proposed to ostracise Nicias, the other Alcibiades.

"But in a time of sedition, the base man too is in honor,"

and so in this case also the people divided into two factions, and thereby made room for the most aggressive and mischievous men. Among these was Hyperbolus of the deme Perithoedae, a man whose boldness was not due to any influence that he possessed, but who came to influence by virtue of his boldness, and became, by reason of the very credit which he had in
4 the city, a discredit to the city. This fellow at that time thought himself beyond the reach of ostracism, since, forsooth, he was a likelier candidate for the stocks; but he expected that when one of the rivals had been banished he might himself become the antagonist of the one who was left, and so it was plain that he was pleased at their feud, and that he was inciting the people against both of them. Accordingly, when Nicias and Alcibiades became aware of his baseness, they took secret counsel with one another, united and harmonized their factions, and carried the day, so that neither of them was ostracised, but Hyperbolus instead.

5 For the time being this delighted and amused the people, but afterwards they were vexed to think that the ordinance of ostracism had been degraded by its application to so unworthy a man. They thought there was a certain dignity in chastisement, or rather, they regarded the ostracism as a chastisement in the

cases of Thucydides and Aristides and such men, but in the case of Hyperbolus as an honor, and as good ground for boasting on his part, since for his baseness he had met with the same fate as the best men. And so Plato the comic poet somewhere said of 6
him: —

> "Indeed he suffered worthy fate for men of old;
> A fate unworthy though of him and of his brands.
> For such as him the ostrakon was ne'er devised."

And in the end no one was ever ostracised after Hyperbolus, but he was the last, as Hipparchus of Cholargus, a kinsman of the famous tyrant Peisistratus, was the first to be so banished.

Verily fortune is an uncertain thing, and incalcu- 7
lable. Had Nicias run the risk with Alcibiades of being ostracised, he had either carried the day, expelled his rival, and then dwelt safely in the city; or, defeated, he had himself gone forth from the city before his last misfortunes, and had preserved the reputation of being a most excellent general.

I am well aware that Theophrastus says that Hyperbolus was ostracised when Phaeax, and not Nicias, was striving against Alcibiades, but most writers state the case as I have done.

XII. It was Nicias, at any rate, who, when an embassy came from Egesta and Leontini seeking to persuade the Athenians to undertake an expedition against Sicily, opposed the measure, only to be defeated by the ambitious purposes of Alcibiades. Before the Assembly had met at all, Alcibiades had already corrupted the multitude and got them into

his power by means of his sanguine promises, so that the youth in their training-schools and the old men in their work-shops and lounging-places would sit in clusters drawing maps of Sicily, charts of the sea about it, and plans of the harbors and districts of the
2 island which look towards Libya. For they did not regard Sicily itself as the prize of the war, but rather as a mere base of operations, purposing therefrom to wage a contest with the Carthaginians and get possession both of Libya and of all the sea this side the Pillars of Heracles.

Since, therefore, their hearts were fixed on this, Nicias, in his opposition to them, had few men of influence to contend on his side. The well-to-do citizens feared accusations of trying to escape contributions for the support of the navy, and so, despite their better judg-
3 ment, held their peace. But Nicias did not faint nor grow weary. Even after the Athenians had actually voted for the war and elected him general first, and after him Alcibiades and Lamachus, in a second session of the Assembly he rose and tried to divert them from their purpose by the most solemn adjurations, and at last accused Alcibiades of satisfying his own private greed and ambition in thus forcing the city
4 into grievous perils beyond the seas. Still, he made no headway, nay, he was held all the more essential to the enterprise because of the experience from which he spoke. There would be great security, his hearers thought, against the daring of Alcibiades and the roughness of Lamachus, if his well known caution were blended with their qualities. And so he

succeeded only in confirming the previous vote. For Demostratus, the popular leader who was most active in spurring the Athenians on to the war, rose and declared that he would stop the mouth of Nicias from uttering vain protests; so he introduced a decree to the effect that the generals have full and independent powers in counsel and in action, both at home and at the seat of war, and persuaded the people to vote it.

XIII. And yet the priesthood also is said to have offered much opposition to the expedition. But Alcibiades had other diviners in his private service, and from sundry oracles reputed ancient he cited one saying that great fame would be won by the Athenians in Sicily. To his delight also certain envoys who had been sent to the shrine of Ammon came back with an oracle declaring that the Athenians would capture all the Syracusans; but utterances of opposite import the envoys concealed, for fear of using words of ill omen. For no signs could deter the people from the 2 expedition, were they ever so obvious and clear, such as, for instance, the mutilation of the *Hermae*. These statues were all disfigured in a single night, except one, called the Hermes of Andocides, a dedication of the Aegeïd tribe, standing in front of what was at that time the house of Andocides. Then there was the affair of the altar of the Twelve Gods. An unknown man leaped upon it all of a sudden, bestrode it, and then mutilated himself with a stone.

At Delphi, moreover, there stood a Palladium, 3 made of gold and set upon a bronze palm-tree, a ded-

ication of the city of Athens from the spoils of her valor in the Persian wars. Ravens alighted on this image and pecked it for many days together; they also bit off the fruit of the palm-tree, which was of
4 gold, and cast it down to the ground. The Athenians, it is true, said that this whole story was an invention of the Delphians, at the instigation of the Syracusans; but at any rate when a certain oracle bade them seek the priestess of Athena at Clazomenae, they sent and fetched the woman, and lo! her name was Peace. And this, as it seemed, was the advice which the divinity would give the city at that time, namely, to seek peace.

5 It was either because he feared such signs as these, or because, from mere human calculation, he was alarmed about the expedition, that the astrologer Meton, who had been given a certain station of command, pretended to be mad and set his house on fire. Some, however, tell the story in this way: Meton made no pretence of madness, but burned his house down in the night, and then came forward publicly in great dejection and begged his fellow citizens, in view of the great calamity which had befallen him, to release from the expedition his son, who was
6 about to sail for Sicily in command of a trireme. To Socrates the wise man also, his divine guide, making use of the customary tokens for his enlightenment, indicated plainly that the expedition would make for the ruin of the city. Socrates let this be known to his intimate friends, and the story had a wide circulation.

7 Not a few also were somewhat disconcerted by the

character of the days in the midst of which they dispatched their armament. The women were celebrating at that time the festival of Adonis, and in many places throughout the city little images of the god were laid out for burial, and funeral rites were held about them, with wailing cries of women, so that those who cared anything for such matters were distressed, and feared lest that powerful armament, with all the splendor and vigor which were so manifest in it, should speedily wither away like funeral herbs.

XIV. Now that Nicias should oppose the voting of the expedition, and should not be so buoyed up by vain hopes nor so crazed by the magnitude of his command as to change his real opinion, — this marked him as a man of honesty and discretion. But when he availed naught either in his efforts to divert the people from the war or in his desire to be relieved of his command, — the people as it were picking him up bodily and setting him over their forces as general, — then it was no longer a time for the exceeding caution and hesitation which he displayed, gazing back homewards from his ship like a child, and many times resuming and dwelling on the thought that the people had not yielded to his reasonings, till he took the edge from the zeal of his colleagues in command and lost the fittest time for action. He ought rather at once to have engaged the enemy at close quarters and put fortune to the test in struggles for the mastery. In stead of this, while Lamachus urged that they sail direct to Syracuse and give battle

close to the city, and Alcibiades that they rob the Syracusans of their allied cities first and then proceed against them, Nicias proposed and urged in opposition that they make their way quietly by sea along the coasts of Sicily, circumnavigate the island, make a display of their troops and triremes, and then sail back to Athens, after having first culled out a small part of their force to give the Egestaeans a taste of succor. In this way he soon relaxed the resolution and depressed the spirits of his men.

4 After a little while the Athenians summoned Alcibiades home to stand his trial, and then Nicias, who nominally had still a colleague in the command, but really wielded sole power, made no end of sitting idle, or cruising aimlessly about, or taking deliberate counsel, until the vigorous hopes of his men grew old and feeble, and the consternation and fear with which the first sight of his forces had filled his enemies slowly subsided.

5 While Alcibiades was yet with the fleet, sixty ships sailed for Syracuse, of which fifty lay out in the offing, drawn up so as to command the harbor, while ten rowed in to reconnoiter. These made formal proclamation by voice of herald that the people of Leontini should return to their homes. They also captured a ship of the enemy with tablets on board in which the Syracusans had recorded lists of their citizens by tribes. These lists had been deposited at some distance from the city, in the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus, but had been sent for at that time with a view to determining and enrolling those who

had come to military age. Now when these had 6
been captured by the Athenians and brought to
their generals, and the number of names was seen,
the soothsayers were in distress lest in this circum-
stance lie the fulfillment of what was predicted by
the oracle which said: "The Athenians shall take
all the Syracusans." However, they say that it was
in another circumstance altogether that this proph-
ecy was fulfilled for the Athenians, namely, at the
time when Callippus the Athenian slew Dion and
got possession of Syracuse.

XV. A little while after this Alcibiades sailed
away from Sicily, and then Nicias took the entire
command. Lamachus was, it is true, a sturdy and
honorable man, one who put forth his might without
stint in battle, but so poor and petty that in every
campaign where he served as general he would
charge up to the Athenian people certain trifling
moneys for his own clothes and boots. Nicias, on 2
the contrary, was a man of great dignity and im-
portance, especially because of his wealth and repu-
tation. It is said that once at the War Department,
when his fellow commanders were deliberating on
some matter of general moment, he bade Sophocles
the poet state his opinion first, as being the senior
general on the Board. Thereupon Sophocles said:
"I am the oldest man, it is true, but you are the
senior general."

So also in the present case he brought Lamachus 3
under his orders, although more of a general than
himself, and, always using his forces in a cautious

and hesitating manner, he first gave the enemy courage by cruising around Sicily as far as possible from them, and then, by attacking the diminutive little city of Hybla, and going off without taking
4 it, he won their supreme contempt. Finally, he went back to Catana without effecting anything at all except the overthrow of Hyccara, a barbarian fastness. From this place it is said that Lais the courtesan was sold as a prisoner of war, being still a girl, and brought into Peloponnesus.

XVI. The summer was now spent when Nicias learned that the Syracusans had plucked up courage and were going to take the initiative and come out against him. Their horsemen already had the insolence to ride up to the Athenian camp and ask its occupants whether they had come to share the homes of the Catanians or to restore the Leontines to their old homes. At last, therefore, and reluctantly, Nicias set out to sail against Syracuse.
2 Wishing to establish his forces there deliberately and without fear of interruption from the enemy, he secretly sent on a man of Catana with a message for the Syracusans. If they wished to find the camp and equipment of the Athenians abandoned of defenders, they must come in full force to Catana on a given day, for that the friends of the Syracusans in the city, where the Athenians spent most of their time, had determined, on perceiving their approach, to seize the gate and set fire to the Athenian fleet; the conspirators were already many and awaited their coming.

This was the best generalship that Nicias displayed 3
in Sicily. He brought his enemy out of their city
in full force, thereby almost emptying it of defend-
ers, while he himself put out to sea from Catana,
got control of the enemy's harbors, and seized a spot
for his camp where he was confident that he would
suffer least injury from that arm of the service in
which he was inferior, the cavalry, and meet no
hindrance in fighting with that arm whereon he most
relied. When the Syracusans hurried back from 4
Catana and drew up in order of battle before their
own city, Nicias led his Athenians swiftly against
them and carried the day. He did not slay many of
the enemy, it is true, for their horsemen prevented
his pursuit; he had to content himself with cutting
to pieces and destroying the bridges over the river,
and thus gave Hermocrates occasion to say, as he
sought to encourage the Syracusans, that Nicias was
ridiculous in maneuvering so as not to give battle,
as though it was not for battle that he had crossed
the seas. However, he did infuse fear and mighty 5
consternation into the Syracusans, so that in place
of their fifteen generals then in office they elected
three others, to whom the people pledged them-
selves under oath that they would suffer them to
command with full and independent powers.

The Olympieum was hard by, and the Athenians 6
set out to seize it, inasmuch as it contained many
offerings of gold and silver. But Nicias purposely
delayed operations until it was too late, and allowed
a garrison from Syracuse to enter in, because he

thought that if his soldiers plundered the temple's treasures the commonwealth would get no advantage from it, and he himself would incur the blame for
7 the sacrilege. Of his victory, which was so noised about, he made no use whatever, but after a few days had elapsed withdrew again to Naxos, and there spent the winter, making large outlays on his vast armament, but effecting little in his negotiations with the few Sicels who thought of coming over to his side. The Syracusans therefore plucked up courage again, marched out to Catana, ravaged the fields, and burnt what had been the Athenian camp.

8 These things all men laid to the charge of Nicias, since, as they said, by his excessive calculation and hesitation and caution he let the proper time for action go by for ever. When he was once in action no one could find fault with the man, for after he had set out to do a thing he was vigorous and effective; but in venturing out to do it he was hesitating and timid.

XVII. At any rate, when he moved his armament back to Syracuse, he showed such generalship, and made his approach with such speed and security, that he put in at Thapsus with his fleet and landed his men unobserved, seized Epipolae before the enemy could prevent, defeated the picked companies which came to its rescue with a loss of three hundred men, and even routed the cavalry of the enemy, which was thought to be invincible.

2 But what most of all filled the Sicilians with terror and the Hellenes with incredulity was the

fact that in a short time he carried a wall around Syracuse, a city fully as large as Athens, although the unevenness of the territory about it, its proximity to the sea, and its adjacent marshes, made the task of surrounding it with such a wall very difficult. But he came within an ace of bringing this 3
great task to completion, — a man who did not even have sound health for such great concerns, but was sick of a disease in the kidneys. To this it is only fair to ascribe the unfinished part of the work. I can but admire the watchful care of the general and the noble valor of his soldiers in what they did accomplish. Euripides, after their defeat and de- 4
struction, composed an epitaph for them, in which he said: —

"These men at Syracuse eight times were triumphant as victors;
Heroes they were while the gods favored both causes alike."

And not eight times only, nay, more than that you 5
will find that the Syracusans were beaten by them, until the gods, as the poet says, or fortune, became hostile to the Athenians at the very pinnacle of their power.

XVIII. Now in most actions Nicias took part, despite his bodily infirmity. But once, when his weakness was extreme, he was lying in bed within the walls, attended by a few servants, while Lamachus with the soldiery was fighting the Syracusans. These were trying to run a wall from their city out to that which the Athenians were building, to intersect it and prevent its completion. The Athenians 2
prevailed, and hurried off in pursuit with more or

less disorder, so that Lamachus was isolated, and then had to face some Syracusan horsemen who made an onset upon him. Foremost of these was Callicrates, a man skilled in war and of a high courage. Lamachus accepted his challenge to single combat, fought him, got a mortal blow from him, but gave him back the like, and fell and died along with him.
3 The Syracusans got possession of the body of Lamachus, with its armor, and carried it off. Then they made a dash upon the Athenian walls where Nicias was, with none to succor him. He nevertheless, necessity compelling him, rose from his bed, saw his peril, and ordered his attendants to bring fire and set it to all the timbers that lay scattered in front of the walls for the construction of siege-engines, and to the engines themselves. This brought the Syracusans to a halt, and saved Nicias as well as the walls and stores of the Athenians. For when the Syracusans saw a great flame rising between them and the walls, they withdrew.
4 Thus it came to pass that Nicias was left sole general; but he was in great hopes. Cities were inclining to take his side, and ships full of grain came to his camp from every quarter. Everybody hastens to join a successful cause. Besides, sundry proposals were already coming to him from those Syracusans who
5 despaired of their city. At this time, too, Gylippus, who was sailing from Sparta to their aid, when he heard on his voyage how they were walled up and in sore distress, held on his way, it is true, but with the belief that Sicily was as good as taken, and that he

could only save the cities of the Italian Greeks, if haply even that. For the opinion gained ground and strength that the Athenians were all powerful, and had a general who was invincible by reason of his judgment and good fortune.

And Nicias himself, contrary to his nature, was 6
straightway so emboldened by the prevalent momentum of his good fortune, and, most of all, by the secret messengers sent to him from the Syracusans so fixed in his belief that the city was just on the point of surrendering conditionally, that he made no sort of account of Gylippus at his approach. He did not even set an adequate watch against him. Wherefore, finding himself completely overlooked and despised, the man sailed stealthily through the straits, made a landing at the farthest remove from Syracuse, and collected a large force, the Syracusans being not so much as aware of his presence, nor even expecting him. On the contrary, they had actually called 7
an assembly to discuss the agreements to be made with Nicias, and some were already on their way to it, thinking that the terms of peace should be made before their city was completely walled up. For that part of the work which remained to be done was quite small, and all the material required for it lay strewn along the line.

XIX. But in this nick of time and crisis of their peril Gongylus came to them from Corinth with a single trireme. All flocking to meet him, as was natural, he told them that Gylippus would come speedily, and that other ships of war were sailing

2 to their aid. Ere yet they could put implicit faith in what Gongylus told them, there came a messenger from Gylippus bidding them come out to meet him. Then they plucked up heart and donned their arms. No sooner had Gylippus come up than he led his men in battle array against the Athenians. But when Nicias arrayed his men too over against him, Gylippus halted under arms, and sent a herald with the message that he offered the Athenians safe conduct if they would depart from Sicily.

3 Nicias deigned no answer to this; but some of his soldiers mocked, and asked the herald if the presence of a single Spartan cloak and staff had made the prospects of the Syracusans on a sudden so secure that they could afford to deride the Athenians, who had restored to the Lacedaemonians, out of prison and fetters, three hundred men far sturdier than
4 Gylippus, and longer haired. Timaeus says that the Sicilians also made no account of Gylippus, later on, indeed, because they learned to know his base greed and penuriousness; but as soon as they set eyes upon him they jeered at his cloak and his long hair. Then, however, Timaeus himself says that as soon as Gylippus showed himself, for all the world like an owl among birds, many flocked to him, with ready offers of military service. This latter statement has more truth in it than his first, for in the staff and cloak of Gylippus men beheld the symbols of the majesty of Sparta, and rallied round
5 them. Moreover, that the whole achievement of deliverance was his, is the testimony not only of Thucyd-

ides, but also of Philistus, who was a Syracusan, and an eyewitness of the events thereof.

Well then, in the first battle the Athenians were victors and slew some few of the Syracusans, and also Gongylus the Corinthian; but on the day following Gylippus showed what a great thing experience is. Although he had the same infantry and the same cavalry and the same localities to deal with, he did not do it in the same way as before, but changed his tactics, and thereby conquered the Athenians. And as they fled to their camp, he halted his Syra- 6
cusans in their pursuit, and with the very stones and timbers which his enemies had brought up for their own use, he carried on the cross wall until it intersected the besiegers' wall of enclosure, so that their superior strength in the field really availed them naught.

After this the Syracusans plucked up heart and went to manning their ships, while their own horsemen and those of their allies would ride about and cut off many of their besiegers. Gylippus also went 7
out in person to the cities of Sicily and roused up and united them all into vigorous and obedient concert with him. Nicias therefore fell back again upon those views of the undertaking which he had held at the outset, and, fully aware of the reversal which it had suffered, became dejected, and wrote a dispatch to the Athenians urging them to send out another armament, or else to recall the one already in Sicily, begging them also in any case to relieve him of his command because of his disease.

XX. Even before this the Athenians had started to send another force to Sicily, but the leading men among them felt some jealousy of the extraordinary good fortune of Nicias, and so had induced many delays. Now, however, they were all eagerness to send aid. It was therefore determined that Demosthenes should sail with a large armament in the spring, and while it was yet winter Eurymedon preceded him with a smaller fleet, bringing money, and announcing the selection of colleagues for Nicias from among the members of the expedition there, — to wit, Euthydemus and Menander.

2 But in the mean time Nicias was suddenly attacked by land and sea. With his fleet, though vanquished at first, he yet succeeded in repulsing the enemy, and sank many of their ships; but he was not prompt enough in sending aid to his garrison at Plemmyrium, and so Gylippus, who had fallen upon it suddenly, captured it. Large naval stores and moneys were in deposit there, all of which Gylippus secured, besides 3 killing many men and taking many prisoners. What was most important of all, he robbed Nicias of his easy importation of supplies. These had been safely and speedily brought in past Plemmyrium as long as the Athenians held that post; but now that they had been driven from it, the process was a difficult one, and involved fighting with the enemy who lay at anchor there. And besides all this, the Syracusans felt that their fleet had been defeated, not through any superior strength in their enemy, but by reason of their own disorderly pursuit of that enemy. Ac-

cordingly, they were making still more vigorous preparations to try the issue again.

But Nicias did not wish a sea fight. He said it 4
would be great folly, when such a large armament was sailing to their aid and hurrying up fresh troops under Demosthenes, to fight the issue out with inferior forces, and those wretchedly supplied. Menander and Euthydemus, however, who had just been appointed to their offices, were moved by an ambitious rivalry with both the other generals: they longed to anticipate Demosthenes in some brilliant exploit, and to eclipse Nicias. They therefore made much of their city's reputation. 5
This, they declared again and again, would be altogether ruined and dissipated if they should show fear when the Syracusans sailed out to attack them; and so they forced a decision to give battle by sea. But they were simply out-maneuvered by Ariston, the Corinthian captain, in the matter of the noon-day meal, as Thucydides relates, and then worsted in action, with the loss of many men. And so a great despair encompassed Nicias; he had met with disaster while in sole command, and was now again brought to grief by his colleagues.

XXI. But at this juncture Demosthenes hove in sight off the harbors, most resplendent in his array, and most terrifying to the enemy. He brought five thousand hoplites on seventy-three ships of war, besides darters and archers and slingers to no less a number than three thousand. What with the gleam of his arms and the insignia of his triremes and the multitude of his coxswains and pipers, he made a spectacular dis-

play and one which smote the enemy with dismay.
2 Again, then, as was natural, fear reigned among the Syracusans. They saw before them no final release from their perils, but only useless toils and vain self-destruction.

But the joy of Nicias at the presence of this fresh force was not long lived. Nay, at the very first council of war, when Demosthenes urged an immediate attack upon the enemy, a settlement of the whole struggle by the speediest hazard, and either the capture of Syracuse or else a return home, he was in fearful amaze at such aggressive daring, and begged
3 that nothing be done rashly or foolishly. Delay, he said, was sure to work against the enemy; they no longer had money to spend, and their allies would not longer stand by them; let them only be really distressed by the straits they were in, and they would soon come to him again for terms, as they had done before. For not a few of the men of Syracuse were in secret communication with Nicias. They urged him to bide his time, on the ground that even now they were worn out by the war and weary of Gylippus, and that if their necessities should but increase
4 a little, they would give over altogether. At some of these matters Nicias could only hint darkly, of others he was unwilling to speak in public, and so he made the generals think him cowardly. It was the same old story over again with him, they would say, — delays, postponements, and hairsplitting distinctions; he had already forfeited the golden moment by not attacking the enemy at once, but rather going

stale and winning their contempt. So they sided with Demosthenes, and Nicias, with great reluctance, was forced to yield.

Therefore Demosthenes, with the infantry, made a 5
night attack upon Epipolae. He took some of the enemy by surprise, and slew them; others, who tried to make a stand, he routed. Victorious, he did not halt, but pressed on farther, until he fell in with the Boeotians. These were the first of the enemy to form in battle array, and dashing upon the Athenians with spears at rest and with loud shouts, they repulsed them and slew many of them there. Through 6
the whole army of attack there was at once panic and confusion. The part that was still pressing on victoriously was presently choked up with the part that fled, and the part that was yet coming up to the attack was beaten back by the panic-stricken and fell foul of itself, supposing that the fugitives were pursuers, and treating friends as foes. Their huddling 7
together in fear and ignorance, and the deceitfulness of their vision, plunged the Athenians into terrible perplexities and disasters. For the night was one which afforded neither absolute darkness nor a steady light. The moon was low on the horizon, and was partially obscured by the numerous armed figures moving to and fro in her light, and so she naturally made even friends suspicious through fear of foes by not distinguishing their forms clearly. Besides, it 8
somehow happened that the Athenians had the moon at their backs, so that they cast their shadows on their own men in front of them, and thus obscured

their number and the brilliancy of their weapons; while in the case of the enemy, the reflection of the moon upon their shields made them seem far more numerous than they really were, and more resplendent to the eye.

9 Finally, when the Athenians gave ground, the enemy attacked them on all sides and put them to flight. Some of them died at the hands of their pursuers, others by one another's hands, and others still by plunging down the cliffs. The scattered and wandering fugitives, when day came, were overtaken and cut to pieces by the enemy's horsemen. The dead amounted in all to two thousand; and of the survivors, few saved their armor with their lives.

XXII. Nicias was of course overwhelmed by this disaster, though it did not take him wholly by surprise, and he accused Demosthenes of rashness. That general defended himself on this score, and then urged that they sail away as soon as they could. No other force would come to their aid, he declared, and with the one they had they could not finally master the enemy, since, even if they were victorious in bat-
2 tle, they would be forced to change their base and abandon their present position; this was always, as they heard, a grievous and unwholesome spot for encampment, and now particularly, as they saw, it was actually deadly on account of the season of the year. For it was the beginning of autumn; many were sick already, and all were in low spirits.

But Nicias could not bear to hear of sailing off in flight, not because he had no fear of the Syracusans,

but because he was more afraid of the Athenians with their prosecutions and denunciations. Nothing 3
dreadful, he would say, was to be expected where they were, and even if the worst should come, he chose rather to die at the hands of his enemies than at the hands of his fellow citizens. In this he was not like minded with Leon of Byzantium, who, at a later time, said to his fellow citizens: "I would rather be put to death by you than with you." However, regarding the exact spot to which they should remove their camp, Nicias said they would deliberate at their leisure. When he took this stand, Demos- 4
thenes, who had not been successful in his previous plan, ceased trying to carry his point, and so led the rest of the generals to believe that Nicias must have confident expectations from his correspondents in the city in making such a sturdy fight against the proposed retreat; they therefore sided with him. However, a fresh army came to the aid of the Syracusans, and sickness kept spreading among the Athenians, so that at last Nicias also decided in favor of a change of base, and ordered the soldiers to hold themselves in readiness to sail away.

XXIII. But just as everything was prepared for this and none of the enemy were on the watch, since they did not expect it at all, there came an eclipse of the moon by night. This was a great terror to Nicias and all those who were ignorant or superstitious enough to quake at such a sight. The obscuration of the sun towards the end of the month was already understood, even by the common folk, as

2 caused somehow or other by the moon; but what it was that the moon encountered, and how, being at the full, she should on a sudden lose her light and emit all sorts of colors, this was no easy thing to comprehend. Men thought it uncanny, — a sign sent from God in advance of divers great calamities.

The first man to put in writing the clearest and boldest of all doctrines about the changing phases of the moon was Anaxagoras. But he was no ancient authority, nor was his doctrine in high repute. It was still under seal of secrecy, and made its way slowly among a few only, who received it with a certain caution rather than with implicit confidence.
3 Men could not abide the natural philosophers and "visionaries", as they were then called, for that they reduced the divine agency down to irrational causes, blind forces, and necessary incidents. Even Protagoras had to go into exile, Anaxagoras was with difficulty rescued from imprisonment by Pericles, and Socrates, though he had nothing whatever to do with such matters, nevertheless lost his life because of his
4 philosophy. It was not until later times that the radiant repute of Plato, because of the life the man led, and because he subjected the compulsions of the physical world to divine and more sovereign principles, took away the obloquy of such doctrines as these, and gave their science free course among all men. At any rate, his friend Dion, although the moon suffered an eclipse at the time when he was about to set out from Zacynthus on his voyage against Dionysius, was in no wise disturbed, but put to sea, landed at Syracuse, and drove out the tyrant.

However, it was the lot of Nicias at this time to be 5
without even a soothsayer who was expert. The one
who had been his associate, and who used to set him
free from most of his superstition, Stilbides, had died
a short time before. For indeed the sign from Heaven,
as Philochorus observed, was not an obnoxious one to
fugitives, but rather very propitious; concealment is
just what deeds of fear need, whereas light is an
enemy to them. And besides, men were wont to be on 6
their guard against portents of sun and moon for three
days only, as Autocleides has remarked in his *Exegetics*; but Nicias persuaded the Athenians to wait for
another full period of the moon, as if, forsooth, he did
not see that the planet was restored to purity and
splendor just as soon as she had passed beyond the
region which was darkened and obscured by the
earth.

XXIV. Abandoning almost every thing else, Nicias
lay there sacrificing and divining until the enemy
came up against him. With their land forces they
laid siege to his walls and camp, and with their fleet
they took possession of the harbor round about.
Not only the men of Syracuse in their triremes, but
even the striplings, on board of fishing smacks and
skiffs, sailed up from every side with challenges and
insults for the Athenians. To one of these, a boy of 2
noble parentage, Heracleides by name, who had driven
his boat well on before the rest, an Attic ship gave
chase, and was like to capture him. But the boy's
uncle, Pollichus, concerned for his safety, rowed out
to his defense with the ten triremes which were under

his orders, and then the other commanders, fearing in turn for the safety of Pollichus, likewise put out for the scene of action. A fierce sea fight was thus brought on, in which the Syracusans were victorious, and slew Eurymedon along with many others.

3 Accordingly the Athenians could no longer endure to remain there, but cried out loudly upon their generals and bade them withdraw by land; for the Syracusans, immediately after their victory, had blocked up and shut off the mouth of the harbor. But Nicias could not consent to this. He said it would be a terrible thing to abandon so many transports, and triremes almost two hundred in number.

4 So he embarked the best of his infantry and the most efficient of his darters to man a hundred and ten triremes; the rest lacked oars. Then he stationed the remainder of his army along the shore of the harbor, abandoning his main camp and the walls which connected it with the Heracleum. And so it was that the Syracusans, who had so long been unable to offer their customary sacrifice to Heracles, offered it then, priests and generals going up to the temple for this purpose while their triremes were a-manning.

XXV. Presently their diviners announced to the Syracusans that the sacrifices indicated a splendid victory for them if only they did not begin the fighting, but acted on the defensive. Heracles also, they said, always won the day because he acted on the defensive and suffered himself to be attacked first. Thus encouraged, they put out from shore.

This proved the greatest and hottest sea fight they had yet made, and roused as many tumultuous emotions in those who were mere spectators as in those who did the fighting, because the entire action was in plain sight, and took on shifts and turns which were varied, unexpected, and sudden. Their own 2
equipment wrought the Athenians no less harm than it did their enemy; for they fought against light and nimble ships, which bore down upon them from different directions at once, while their own were heavy and clumsy and crowded together at that. Besides, they were bombarded with stones, whose blow is just as effective however they light; whereas they could only reply with javelins and arrows, whose proper cast was disturbed by the tossing water, so that they did not all fly head on to their mark. This method of fighting was taught the Syracusans by Ariston the Corinthian captain, who fought zealously while the battle lasted, only to fall just as the Syracusans were victorious.

The Athenians suffered such great rout and loss 3
that they were cut off from flight by sea. Even by land they saw that their salvation was a difficult matter, so that they neither tried to hinder the enemy from towing away their ships under their very eyes, nor did they ask the privilege of taking up their dead. These, forsooth, could go unburied; the survivors were confronted with a more pitiful sight in the abandonment of their sick and wounded, and thought themselves more wretched still than their dead, since they were sure to come with more sorrows than they to the same end after all.

XXVI. They purposed to set out during the night, and Gylippus, who saw that the Syracusans were given over to sacrificial revels because of their victory and their festival of Heracles, despaired of persuading or compelling them to rise up from their pleasures at once and attack their enemy as he departed. But Hermocrates, all on his own account, concocted a trick to put upon Nicias, and sent certain companions to him with assurances that they were come from those men who before this had often held secret conferences with him. They advised Nicias not to set out during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had laid snares for him and preoccupied the ways of
2 escape. Nicias was completely out-generaled by this trick, and so ended by suffering in very truth at the hands of his enemies what their lies had made him fear. For the Syracusans set forth at break of day, occupied the difficult points in the roads, fortified the river fords, cut away the bridges, and posted their cavalry in the smooth open spaces, so that no spot was left where the Athenians could go forward without fighting.

3 They waited therefore all that day and the following night, and then set out, for all the world as though they were quitting their native city and not an enemy's country, with wailings and lamentations at their lack of the necessaries of life and their enforced abandonment of helpless friends and comrades. And yet they regarded these present sorrows as lighter than those which they must expect to come.
4 Many were the fearful scenes in the camp, but the

most pitiful sight of all was Nicias himself, undone by his sickness, and reduced, as he little deserved, to a scanty diet, and to the smallest supply of those personal comforts whereof he stood so much in need because of his disease. And yet, for all his weakness, he persisted in doing what many of the strong could barely endure, and all saw plainly that it was not for his own sake or for any mere love of life that he was faithful to his tasks, but that for their sakes he would not give up hope. The rest, for very fear and dis- 5
tress, had recourse to lamentations and tears; but whenever he was driven to this pass, it was plainly because he was contrasting the shameful dishonor to which his expedition had now come with the great and glorious successes which he had hoped to achieve.

Besides, it was not merely the sight of him now, 6
but also the memory of the arguments and exhortations with which he had once tried to prevent the sailing of the expedition, that led men to think him all the more unworthy to suffer such hardships now; and they had no courage to hope for aid from the gods when they reflected that a man so devout as he, and one who had performed so many great and splendid religious services, now met with no seemlier fortune than the basest and most obscure man in his army.

XXVII. However, it was this very Nicias who tried, both by words and looks and kindly manner, to show himself superior to his dreadful lot. And during all the march which he conducted for eight successive days, though sorely harassed by the enemy, he yet

succeeded in keeping his own forces from defeat, until Demosthenes and his detachment of the army were captured. These fell behind as they fought their way along, and were surrounded on the estate of Polyzelus.
2 Demosthenes himself drew his sword and gave himself a thrust; he did not, however, succeed in killing himself, since the enemy quickly closed in upon him and seized him.

When the Syracusans rode up and told Nicias of this disaster, he first sent horsemen to make certain that the force of Demosthenes was really taken, and then proposed to Gylippus a truce permitting the Athenians to depart from Sicily after giving hostages to the Syracusans for all the moneys which they had
3 expended on the war. But they would not entertain the proposal. Nay, with insolent rage they reviled and insulted him, and kept pelting him with missiles, destitute as he was of all the necessaries of life. However, through that night and the following day he managed to hold out, and finally came, under constant fire, to the river Asinarus.

There some of his men were crowded along by the enemy and hurled into the stream, while others, in advance of pursuit, were impelled by their thirst to
4 cast themselves in, and an exceeding great and savage carnage raged in the river itself, men being butchered as they drank. At last Nicias fell down at the feet of Gylippus and cried: "Have pity, Gylippus, now that you are victorious, not on me at all, who am notorious for my great good fortune, but on the rest of these Athenians. Remember that the fortunes of war are

common to all, and that the Athenians, when they were in good fortune, used it with moderation and gentleness toward you."

So spake Nicias, and Gylippus felt some compunc- 5
tion, both at the sight of him, and at what he said. For he knew that the Lacedaemonians had been well treated by him when the peace was made, and, besides, he thought it would increase his own fame if he should bring home alive the generals who had opposed him. Therefore he raised Nicias up, gave him words of cheer, and issued command to take the rest of his men alive. But the command made its way slowly along, so that the spared were far fewer than the slain. And yet many were stolen and hidden away by the soldiery.

The public prisoners were collected together, the 6
fairest and tallest trees along the river bank were hung with the captured suits of armor, and then the victors crowned themselves with wreaths, adorned their own horses splendidly while they sheared and cropped the horses of their conquered foes, and so marched into the city. They had brought to successful end a struggle which was the most brilliant ever made by Hellenes against Hellenes, and had won the completest of victories by the most overwhelming and impetuous display of valor.

XXVIII. At a general assembly of the Syracusans and their allies Eurycles, the popular leader, brought in a written motion, first, that the day on which they had taken Nicias be made a holy day, with sacrifices and abstention from labor, and that the festival be

called "Asinaria", from the river Asinarus (the day was the twenty-sixth of the month Carneius, which the Athenians call Metageitnion); and second, that the serving men of the Athenians and their immediate allies be sold into slavery, while the freemen and the Sicilian Hellenes who had joined them be cast into the stone quarries for watch and ward, — all except the generals, who should be put to death.

2 These propositions were adopted by the Syracusans. When Hermocrates protested that there was something better than victory, to wit, a noble use of victory, he was met with a tumult of disapproval; and when Gylippus demanded the Athenian generals as his prize, that he might take them alive to the Lacedaemonians, the Syracusans, now grown insolent with their good
3 fortune, abused him roundly. They were the more ready to do this because, all through the war, they had found it hard to put up with his harshness and the Laconian style with which he exercised his authority. Timaeus says, moreover, that they denounced his exceeding penuriousness and avarice, — an ancestral infirmity, it would seem, since his father, Cleandridas, was convicted of taking bribes and had to flee his country. And Gylippus himself, for abstracting thirty talents from the thousand which Lysander had sent to Sparta, and hiding them in the roof of his house, — as an informer was prompt to show, — was banished in the deepest disgrace. But this has been told with more detail in my life of Lysander.

4 Timaeus denies that Demosthenes and Nicias were put to death by the orders of the Syracusans, as Phi-

listus and Thucydides state; but rather, Hermocrates sent word to them of the decision of the Assembly while it was yet in session, and with the connivance of one of their guards they took their own lives. Their bodies, however, he says, were cast out at the prison door, and lay there in plain sight of all who craved the spectacle. And I learn that down to this day 5 there is shown among the treasures of a temple in Syracuse a shield which is said to have been the shield of Nicias. It is a welded mosaic of gold and purple interwoven with rare skill.

XXIX. Most of the Athenians perished in the stone quarries of disease and evil fare, their daily rations being a pint of barley meal and a half-pint of water; but not a few were stolen away and sold into slavery, or succeeded in passing themselves off for serving men. These, when they were sold, were branded in the forehead with the mark of a horse, — yes, there were some freemen who actually suffered this indignity in addition to their servitude.

But even these were helped by their restrained and 2 decorous bearing; some were speedily set free, and some remained with their masters in positions of honor. Some also were saved for the sake of Euripides. For the Sicilians, it would seem, more than any other Hellenes outside the home land, had a yearning fondness for his poetry. They were forever learning by heart the little specimens and morsels of it which visitors brought them from time to time, and imparting them to one another with fond delight. In the present 3

case, at any rate, they say that many Athenians who reached home in safety greeted Euripides with affectionate hearts, and recounted to him, some that they had been set free from slavery for rehearsing what they remembered of his works; and some that when they were roaming about after the final battle they had received food and drink for singing some of his choral hymns. Surely then one need not wonder at the story that the Caunians, when a vessel of theirs would have put in at the harbor of Syracuse to escape pursuit by pirates, were not admitted at first, but kept outside, until, on being asked if they knew any songs of Euripides, they declared that they did indeed, and were for this reason suffered to bring their vessel safely in.



XXX. The Athenians, they say, put no faith in the first tidings of the calamity, most of all because of the messenger who brought them. A certain stranger, as it would seem, landed at the Piraeus, took a seat in a barber's shop, and began to discourse of what had happened as if the Athenians already knew all about it. The barber, on hearing this, before others learned of it, ran at the top of his speed to the upper city, accosted the Archons, and spread the story
2 right in the market place. Consternation and confusion reigned, naturally, and the Archons convened an assembly and brought the man before it. But, on being asked from whom he had learned the matter, he was unable to give any clear answer, and so it was decided that he was a story-maker, and was trying to throw the city into an uproar. He was therefore

fastened to the wheel and racked a long time, until messengers came with the actual facts of the whole disaster. So hard was it for the Athenians to believe that Nicias had suffered the fate which he had often foretold to them.

ALCIBIADES

ALCIBIADES

I. The family of Alcibiades, it is thought, may be traced back to Eurysaces, the son of Aias, as its founder; and on his mother's side he was an Alcmaeonid, being the son of Deinomache, the daughter of Megacles. His father, Cleinias, fitted out a trireme at his own cost and fought it gloriously at Artemisium. He was afterwards slain at Coroneia, fighting the Boeotians, and Alcibiades was therefore reared as the ward of Pericles and Ariphron, the sons of Xanthippus, his near kinsmen.

It is said, and with good reason, that the favor and 2
affection which Socrates showed him contributed not a little to his reputation. Certain it is that Nicias, Demosthenes, Lamachus, Phormio, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes were prominent men, and his contemporaries, and yet we cannot so much as name the mother of any one of them ; whereas, in the case of Alcibiades, we even know that his nurse, who was a Spartan woman, was called Amycla, and his tutor Zopyrus. The one fact is mentioned by Antisthenes, the other by Plato.

As regards the beauty of Alcibiades, it is perhaps 3
unnecessary to say aught, except that it flowered out with each successive season of his bodily growth,

and made him, alike in boyhood, youth, and manhood, lovely and pleasant. The saying of Euripides, that "beauty's autumn, too, is beautiful", is not always true. But it was certainly the case with Alcibiades, as with few besides, because of his excel-
4 lent natural parts. Even the lisp that he had became his speech, they say, and made his talking persuasive and full of charm. Aristophanes notices this lisp of his in the verses wherein he ridicules Theorus: —

(Sosias) "Then Alcibiades said to me with a lisp, said he,
'Cwemahk Theocwus? What a cwaven's head he has!'"
(Xanthias) "That lisp of Alcibiades hit the mark for once!"

And Archippus, ridiculing the son of Alcibiades, says: "He walks with utter wantonness, trailing his long robe behind him, that he may be thought the very picture of his father, yes,

"He slants his neck awry, and overworks the lisp."

II. His character, in later life, displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes, as was natural in view of his vast undertakings and varied fortunes. He was naturally a man of many strong passions, the strongest of which were the love of rivalry and the love of preëminence. This is clear from the stories recorded of his boyhood.

2 He was once hard pressed in wrestling, and to save himself from getting a fall, set his teeth in his opponent's arms, where they clutched him, and was like to have bitten through them. His adversary, letting go his hold, cried: "You bite, Alcibiades, as women do!" "Not I," said Alcibiades, "but as lions do."

While still a small boy, he was playing knuckle-3
bones in the narrow street, and just as it was his turn to throw, a heavy-laden waggon came along. In the first place, he bade the driver halt, since his cast lay right in the path of the waggon. The driver was a boorish fellow, and paid no heed to him, but drove his team along. Whereupon, while the other boys scattered out of the way, Alcibiades threw himself flat on his face in front of the team, stretched himself out at full length, and bade the driver go on if he pleased. The fellow pulled up his beasts sharply, in terror; the spectators, too, were affrighted, and ran with shouts to help the boy.

At school, he usually paid due heed to his teachers,4
but he refused to play the flute, holding it an ignoble and illiberal thing. The use of the plectrum and the lyre, he argued, wrought no havoc with the bearing and appearance which were becoming to a gentleman; but let a man go to blowing on a flute, and even his own kinsmen could scarcely recognize his features. Moreover, the lyre blended its tones with the voice or5
song of its master; whereas the flute closed and barricaded the mouth, robbing its master both of song and speech. "Flutes, then," said he, "for the sons of Thebes; they know not how to converse. But we Athenians, as our fathers say, have Athena for foundress and Apollo for patron, one of whom cast the flute away in disgust, and the other flayed the presumptuous flute-player." Thus, half in jest and6
half in earnest, Alcibiades emancipated himself from this discipline, and the rest of the boys as well. For

word soon made its way to them that Alcibiades loathed the art of flute-playing and scoffed at its disciples, and rightly, too. Wherefore the flute was dropped entirely from the program of a liberal education, and was altogether despised.

III. Among the calumnies which Antiphon heaps upon him, it is recorded that, when he was a boy, he ran away from home to Democrates, one of his lovers, and that Ariphron was all for having him proclaimed by town crier as a castaway. But Pericles would not suffer it. "If he is dead," said he, "we shall know it only a day the sooner for the public proclamation; whereas, if he is alive, he will, in consequence of such a proclamation, be as good as dead for the rest of his life." Antiphon says also that with a blow of his stick he slew one of his attendants in the palaestra of Sibyrtius. But these things are perhaps unworthy of belief, coming as they do from one who admits that he hated Alcibiades, and abused him accordingly.

IV. It was not long before many men of high birth clustered about him and paid him their attentions; they were plainly smitten with the brilliant youth, and fondly courted him. But it was the love which Socrates had for him that bore strong testimony to the boy's native excellence and good parts. These Socrates saw radiantly manifest in his outward person, and, fearful of the influence upon him of wealth and rank and the throng of citizens, foreigners, and allies who sought to preëmpt his affections by flattery and favor, he was fain to protect him, and not suffer such a fair flowering plant to cast its native fruit to perdition.

There is no man whom Fortune so envelops and 2
compasses about with the so-called good things of life, that he cannot be reached by the bold and caustic reasonings of philosophy, and pierced to the heart. And so it was that Alcibiades, although at the start he put on airs, and was prevented by the companions who sought only to please him from giving ear to one who would instruct and train him, nevertheless, through the goodness of his parts, at last saw all that was in Socrates, and clave to him, putting away his rich and famous lovers. And speedily, from having 3
such an associate, and giving ear to the words of a lover who was in the chase for no unmanly pleasures, and begged no kisses and embraces, but sought to expose the weakness of his soul and rebuke his vain and foolish pride,

"He crouched, though warrior bird, like slave, with drooping wings."

And he came to think that the work of Socrates was really a kind provision of the gods for the care and salvation of youth. Thus, from despising him- 4
self, admiring his friend, loving that friend's kindly solicitude, and revering his excellence, he insensibly acquired an "image of love", as Plato says, "to match love," and all were amazed to see him eating, exercising, and tenting with Socrates, while he was harsh and stubborn with the rest of his lovers.

Some of these he actually treated with the greatest insolence, as, for example, Anytus, the son of Anthemion. This man was a lover of his, who, enter- 5
taining some friends, asked Alcibiades also to the dinner. Alcibiades declined the invitation, but after

having drunk deep at home with some friends, went in revel rout to the house of Anytus, took his stand at the door of the men's chamber, and, observing the tables full of gold and silver beakers, ordered his slaves to take half of them and carry them home for
6 him. He did not deign to go in, but played this prank and was off. The guests were naturally indignant, and declared that Alcibiades had treated Anytus with gross and overweening insolence. "Not so," said Anytus, "but with seemly consideration; he might have taken all there were: he has left us half."

V. He treated the rest of his lovers also after this fashion. There was one man, however, a resident alien, as they say, and not possessed of much at that, who sold all that he had, and brought the hundred staters which he got for it to Alcibiades, begging him to accept them. Alcibiades burst out laughing with delight at this, and invited the man to dinner. After feasting him and showing him every kindness, he gave him back his gold, and charged him on the morrow to compete with the farmers of the public reve-
2 nues and outbid them all. The man protested, because the purchase demanded a capital of many talents; but Alcibiades threatened to have him scourged if he did not do it, because he cherished some private grudge against the ordinary publicans. In the morning, accordingly, the alien went into the market place and increased the usual bid for the public lands by a talent. The publicans clustered angrily about him and bade him name his surety, supposing that he could find none. The man was confounded and

began to draw back, when Alcibiades, standing afar off, cried to the magistrates, "Put my name down; he is a friend of mine; I will be his surety." When 3 the publicans heard this, they were at their wit's end, for they were in the habit of paying what they owed on a first purchase with the profits of a second, and saw no way out of their difficulty. Accordingly they besought the man to withdraw his bid, and offered him money so to do; but Alcibiades would not suffer him to take less than a talent. On their offering the man the talent, he bade him take it and withdraw. To this lover he was of service in this way.

VI. The love of Socrates, though it had many powerful rivals, somehow mastered Alcibiades. He was of good natural parts, and the words of his teacher took hold of him and wrung his heart and brought tears to his eyes. But sometimes he would surrender himself to the flatterers who tempted him with many pleasures, and slip away from Socrates, and suffer himself to be actually hunted down by him like a runaway slave. And yet he feared and reverenced Socrates alone, and despised the rest of his lovers.

It was Cleanthes who said that any one beloved of 2 him must be "downed", as wrestlers say, by the ears alone, though offering to rival lovers many other "holds" which he himself would scorn to take, — meaning the various lusts of the body. And Alcibiades was certainly prone to be led away into pleasure. That "lawless self-indulgence" of his, of which Thucydides speaks, leads one to suspect this. However, 3

it was rather his love of distinction and love of fame to which his corrupters appealed, and they plunged him all too soon into ways of presumptuous scheming, persuading him that he had only to enter public life, and he would straightway cast into total eclipse the ordinary generals and public leaders, and not only that, he would even surpass Pericles in power and reputation among the Hellenes.

4 Accordingly, just as iron, which has been softened in the fire, is hardened again by cold water, and has its particles compacted together, so Alcibiades, whenever Socrates found him filled with vanity and wantonness, was reduced to shape by the Master's discourse, and rendered humble and cautious. He learned how great were his deficiencies and how incomplete his excellence.

VII. Once, as he was getting on past boyhood, he accosted a school-teacher, and asked him for a book of Homer. The teacher replied that he had nothing of Homer's, whereupon Alcibiades fetched him a blow with his fist, and went his way. Another teacher said he had a Homer which he had corrected himself. "What!" said Alcibiades, "are you teaching boys to read when you are competent to edit Homer? You should be training young men."

2 He once wished to see Pericles, and went to his house. But he was told that Pericles could not see him; he was studying how to put in his accounts to the Athenians. "Were it not better for him", said Alcibiades, as he went away, "to study how not to put in his accounts to the Athenians?"

While still a stripling, he served as a soldier in the 3
campaign of Potidaea, and had Socrates for his tent-
mate and comrade in action. A fierce battle took
place, wherein both of them distinguished themselves;
but when Alcibiades fell wounded, it was Socrates
who stood over him and defended him, and with the
most conspicuous bravery saved him, armor and all.
The prize of valor fell to Socrates, of course, on the
justest calculation; but the generals, owing to the
high position of Alcibiades, were manifestly anxious
to give him the glory of it. Socrates, therefore, wish-
ing to increase his pupil's honorable ambitions, led
all the rest in bearing witness to his bravery, and in
begging that the crown and the suit of armor be
given to him.

On another occasion, in the rout of the Athenians 4
which followed the battle of Delium, Alcibiades, on
horseback, saw Socrates retreating on foot with a
small company, and would not pass him by, but rode
by his side and defended him, though the enemy were
pressing them hard and slaying many. This, how-
ever, was a later incident.

VIII. He once gave Hipponicus a blow with his
fist, — Hipponicus, the son of Callias, a man of great
reputation and influence owing to his wealth and fam-
ily, — not that he had any quarrel with him, or was
a prey to anger, but simply for the joke of the thing,
as he had agreed with some companions. The wanton
deed was soon noised about the city, and everybody
was indignant, as was natural. Early the next
morning Alcibiades went to the house of Hipponicus,

knocked at his door, and on being shown into his presence, laid off the cloak he wore and bade Hip-
2 ponicus scourge and chastise him as he would. But Hipponicus put away wrath and forgave him, and afterwards gave him his daughter Hipparete to wife.

Some say, however, that it was not Hipponicus, but Callias, his son, who gave Hipparete to Alcibiades, with a dowry of ten talents; and that afterwards, when she became a mother, Alcibiades exacted other ten talents besides, on the plea that this was the agreement, should children be born. And Callias was so afraid of the scheming of Alcibiades to get his wealth, that he made public proffer to the people of his property and house in case it should befall him to die without lineal heirs.

3 Hipparete was a decorous and affectionate wife, but being distressed because her husband would consort with courtezans, native and foreign, she left his house and went to live with her brother. Alcibiades did not mind this, but continued his wanton ways, and so she had to put in her plea for divorce to the magistrate, and that not by proxy, but in her own
4 person. On her appearing publicly to do this, as the law required, Alcibiades came up and seized her and carried her off home with him through the market place, no man daring to oppose him or take her from him. She lived with him, moreover, until her death, and she died shortly after this, when Alcibiades was on a voyage to Ephesus.

5 Such violence as this was not thought lawless or cruel at all. Indeed, the law prescribes that the

wife who would separate from her husband shall go to court in person, to this very end, it would seem, that the husband may have a chance to meet and gain possession of her.

IX. Possessing a dog of wonderful size and shape, which had cost him seventy minas, he had its tail cut off, and a beautiful tail it was, too. His comrades chided him for this, and declared that everybody was furious about the dog, and abusive of its owner. Alcibiades burst out laughing and said, "That's just what I want; I want Athens to talk about this, that it may say nothing worse about me."

X. His first entrance into public life, they say, was connected with a contribution of money to the state, and was not of design. He was passing by when the Athenians were applauding in their Assembly, and asked the reason for the applause. On being told that a contribution of money to the state was going on, he went forward to the bema and made a contribution himself. The crowd clapped their hands and shouted for joy, — so much so that Alcibiades forgot all about the quail which he was carrying in his cloak, and the bird flew away in a fright. Thereupon the Athenians shouted all the more, and many of them sprang to help him hunt the bird. The one who caught it and gave it back to him was Antiochus, the sea captain, who became in consequence a great favorite with Alcibiades.

Though great doors to public service were opened to him by his birth, his wealth, and his personal bravery in battle; and though he had many devoted friends, he

thought that nothing should give him more influence with the people than the charm of his discourse. And that he was a powerful speaker, not only do the comic poets testify, but also the most powerful of orators himself, who says, in his speech "Against Meidias", that Alcibiades was a most able speaker in
3 addition to his other gifts. And if we are to trust Theophrastus, the most versatile and learned of all the philosophers, Alcibiades was of all men the most capable of discovering and understanding what was required in a given case. But since he strove to find not only the proper thing to say, but also the proper words and phrases in which to say it; and since in this last regard he was not a man of large resources, he would often stumble in the midst of his speech, come to a stop, and pause a while, a particular phrase eluding him. Then he would resume, and proceed with all the caution in the world.

XI. His breeds of horses were famous the world over, and so was the number of his racing-chariots. No one else ever entered seven of these at the Olympic games, — no commoner nor king, but he alone. And his coming off first, second, and fourth victor (as Thucydides says; third, according to Euripides), transcends in the splendor of its renown all that am-
2 bition can aspire to in this field. The ode of Euripides to which I refer runs thus: —

"Thee will I sing, O child of Cleinias;
A fair thing is victory, but fairest is what no other Hellene has achieved,
To run first, and second, and third in the contest of racing-chariots,
And to come off unwearied, and, wreathed with the olive of Zeus,
To furnish theme for herald's proclamation."

XII. Moreover, this splendor of his at Olympia was made even more conspicuous by the emulous rivalry of the cities of the empire in his behalf. The Ephesians equipped him with a tent of magnificent adornment; the Chians furnished him with provender for his horses and with innumerable animals for sacrifice; the Lesbians with wine and other provisions for his unstinted entertainment of the multitude. However, a grave calumny — unless there was actual malpractice on his part in connection with this rivalry — was even more in the mouths of men.

It is said, namely, that there was at Athens one 2
Diomedes, a reputable man, a friend of Alcibiades, and eagerly desirous of winning a victory at Olympia with his horses. He learned that there was a racing-chariot at Argos which was the property of that city, and knowing that Alcibiades had many friends and was very influential there, got him to buy the chariot. Alcibiades bought it for his friend, and then entered 3
it in the racing lists as his own, bidding Diomedes go hang, who was full of indignation, and called on gods and men to witness his wrongs. It appears also that a law-suit arose over this matter, and a speech was written by Isocrates for the son of Alcibiades "Concerning the Team of Horses". In this speech, however, it is Tisias, not Diomedes, who is the plaintiff.

XIII. On entering public life, though still a mere stripling, he immediately humbled all the other popular leaders except Phaeax, the son of Erasistratus, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus. These men made him

fight hard for what he won. Nicias was already of mature years, and had the reputation of being a most excellent general; but Phaeax, like himself, was just beginning his career, and, though of illustrious parentage, was inferior to him in other ways, and par-
2 ticularly as a public speaker. He seemed affable and winning in private conversation rather than capable of conducting public debates. In short, he was, as Eupolis says,

"A prince of talkers, but in speaking most incapable."

There is extant a certain speech written by Phaeax "Against Alcibiades", wherein, among other things, it is written that the city's numerous ceremonial utensils of gold and silver were all used by Alcibiades at his regular table as though they were his own.

3 Now there was a certain Hyperbolus, of the deme Perithoedae, whom Thucydides mentions as a base fellow, and who afforded all the comic poets, without any exception, constant material for jokes. But he was unmoved by abuse, and insensible to it, owing to his contempt for public opinion. This feeling some may call courage and valor, but it is really mere shamelessness and folly. No one liked him, but the people often made use of him when they were eager to besmirch and calumniate men of rank and station.
4 Accordingly, at the time of which I speak, persuaded by this man, they were about to exercise the vote of ostracism, by which they cripple and banish whatever man from time to time may have too much reputation and influence in the city to please them, assuaging thus their envy rather than their fear.

When it was clear that the ostracism would fall on one of three men, — Phaeax, Alcibiades, or Nicias, — Alcibiades had a conference with Nicias, united their two parties into one, and turned the vote of ostracism upon Hyperbolus.

Some say, however, that it was not Nicias, but Phaeax, with whom Alcibiades had the conference which resulted in winning over that leader's party and banishing Hyperbolus. The latter could not have had so much as an inkling of his fate. For no 5 worthless or disreputable fellow had ever before fallen under this condemnation of ostracism. As Plato, the comic poet, has somewhere said, in speaking of Hyperbolus,

> "And yet he suffered worthy fate for men of old;
> A fate unworthy though of him and of his brands.
> For such as he the ostrakon was ne'er devised."

However, the facts which have been ascertained about this case, have been stated more at length elsewhere.

XIV. Alcibiades was sore distressed to see Nicias no less admired by his enemies than honored by his fellow citizens. For although Alcibiades was Consul Resident for the Lacedaemonians at Athens, and had ministered to their men who had been taken prisoners at Pylos, still, they felt that it was chiefly due to 2 Nicias that they had obtained peace and the final surrender of those men, and so they lavished their regard upon him. And Hellenes everywhere said that it was Pericles who had plunged them into war, but Nicias who had delivered them out of it, and most men called the peace the "Peace of Nicias".

Alcibiades was therefore distressed beyond measure, and in his envy resolved upon a violation of the
3 solemn treaty. To begin with, he saw that the Argives hated and feared the Spartans, and sought to be rid of them. So he secretly held out hopes to them of an alliance with Athens, and encouraged them, by conferences with the chief men of their popular party, not to fear nor yield to the Lacedaemonians, but to look to Athens and await her action, since she was now all but repentant, and desirous of abandoning the peace which she had made with Sparta.

4 And again, when the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance with the Boeotians, and delivered Panactum up to the Athenians not intact, as they were bound to do by the treaty, but dismantled, he took advantage of the Athenians' wrath at this to embitter them yet more. He raised a tumult in the Assembly against Nicias, and slandered him with accusations
5 all too plausible. Nicias himself, he said, in his capacity as general, had refused to capture the enemy's men who were cut off on the island of Sphacteria, and when others had captured them, he had released and given them back to the Lacedaemonians, whose favor he sought; and then he did not persuade those same Lacedaemonians, tried friend of theirs as he was, not to make separate alliance with the Boeotians or even the Corinthians, and yet whenever any Hellenes wished to be friends and allies of Athens, he prevented it, unless it were the good pleasure of the Lacedaemonians.

Nicias was reduced to great straits by all this, but 6
just then, by rare good fortune as it were, an embassy
came from Sparta, with reasonable proposals to be-
gin on, and with assurances that they came with full
powers to adopt any additional terms that were con-
ciliatory and just. The Council received them favor-
ably, and the people were to hold an Assembly on the
following day for their reception. But Alcibiades
feared a peaceful outcome, and managed to secure a
private conference with the embassy. When they were 7
convened he said to them: "What is the matter with
you, men of Sparta? Why are you blind to the fact that
the Council is always moderate and courteous towards
those who have dealings with it, while the people's
Assembly is haughty, and has great ambitions? If
you should say to them that you were come with
unlimited powers, they would lay their commands
and compulsions upon you without any feeling. Come
now, put away such simplicity as this, and if you
wish to get moderate terms from the Athenians, and
to suffer no compulsion at their hands which you can-
not yourselves approve, then discuss with them what
would be a just settlement of your case, assuring
them that you have not full powers to act. I will
coöperate with you, out of my regard for the Lace-
daemonians." After this speech he gave them his 8
oath, and so seduced them wholly away from the in-
fluence of Nicias. They trusted him implicitly, ad-
mired his cleverness and sagacity, and thought him
an extraordinary man.

On the following day the people convened in As-

sembly, and the embassy was introduced to them. On being asked by Alcibiades, in the most courteous tone, with what powers they had come, they replied that they were not come with full and independ-
9 ent powers. At once, then, Alcibiades assailed them with angry shouts, as though he were the injured party, not they, calling them faithless and fickle men, who were come on no sound errand whatever. The Council was indignant, the Assembly was enraged, and Nicias was filled with consternation and shame at the men's change of front. He was unaware of the deceitful trick which had been played upon him.

XV. After this fiasco on the part of the Lacedaemonians, Alcibiades was appointed general, and straightway brought the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans into alliance with Athens. The manner of this achievement of his no one approved, but the effect of it was great. It divided and agitated almost all Peloponnesus; it arrayed against the Lacedaemonians at Mantinea "so many warlike shields upon a single day"; it set at farthest remove from Athens the struggle, with all its risks, in which, when the Lacedaemonians conquered, their victory brought them no great advantage, whereas, had they been defeated, the very existence of Sparta had been at stake.

2 After this battle of Mantinea, the oligarchs of Argos, "The Thousand", set out at once to depose the popular party and make the city subject to themselves. The Lacedaemonians also came and

took part in this deposition of the democracy. But the populace took up arms again and got the upper hand. Then Alcibiades came and made the people's victory secure. He also persuaded them to run long walls down to the sea, and so to attach their city completely to the naval dominion of Athens. He actually brought carpenters and masons from Athens, and displayed all manner of zeal, thus winning favor and power for himself no less than for his city.

In like manner he persuaded the people of Patrae to attach their city to the sea by long walls. Thereupon some one said to the Patrensians, "Athens will swallow you whole!" "Perhaps so," said Alcibiades, "but you will go slowly, and feet first; whereas Sparta will swallow you head first, and at one gulp."

However, he counseled the Athenians to assert dominion on land also, and to maintain in very deed the oath regularly propounded to their young warriors in the sanctuary of Agraulus. They take oath that they will regard wheat, barley, the vine, and the olive as the natural boundaries of Attica, and they are thus trained to consider as their own all the habitable and fruitful earth.

XVI. But all this statecraft and eloquence and lofty purpose and cleverness was interspersed with great luxuriousness of life, with wanton drunkenness and lewdness, with effeminacy in dress, — he would trail long purple robes through the market place, — and with prodigal expenditures. He would have the decks of his triremes cut away that he might

sleep more softly, his bedding being slung on cords rather than spread on the hard planks. He had a golden shield made for himself, bearing no ancestral device, but an Eros armed with a thunderbolt.

2 The reputable men of the city looked on all these things with loathing and indignation, and feared his contemptuous and lawless spirit. They thought such conduct as his tyrant-like and monstrous. How the common folk felt towards him has been well set forth by Aristophanes in these words: —

> "It yearns for him, and hates him too, but wants him back;"

and again, veiling a yet greater severity in his metaphor: —

> "A lion is not to be reared within the state;
> But, once you 've reared him up, consult his every mood."

3 And indeed, his voluntary contributions of money, the public exhibitions which he gave, his unsurpassed munificence towards the city, the glory of his ancestry, the power of his eloquence, the comeliness and vigor of his person, together with his experience and prowess in war, made the Athenians lenient and tolerant towards everything else. They were forever giving the mildest of names to his failings, calling them the product of youthful spirit and ambition.

4 He once imprisoned the painter Agatharchus in his house until he had adorned it with paintings for him, and then dismissed his captive with a handsome present. Taureas, too, who was giving a rival exhibition to the people, he gave a box on the ear, so eager was he for the victory. And he picked out a

woman from among the prisoners of Melos to be his mistress, and reared a son she bore him. This may 5 have been an instance of what they called his kindness of heart, but the execution of all the grown men of Melos was chiefly due to him, since he supported the decree therefor.

Aristophon painted Nemea seated and holding Alcibiades in her arms; whereat the people were delighted, and ran in crowds to see the picture. But the elders were indignant at this too. They said it smacked of tyranny and lawlessness. And it would seem that Archestratus, in his verdict on the painting, did not go wide of the mark. He said that Hellas could not endure more than one Alcibiades.

Timon the misanthrope once saw Alcibiades, after a 6 successful day of it, being publicly escorted home from the Assembly. He did not pass him by nor avoid him, as his custom was with others, but met him and greeted him, saying, "It's well you're growing so, my child; you'll grow big enough to ruin all this rabble." At this, some laughed, and some railed, and some gave much heed to the saying. So undecided was public opinion about him, by reason of the unevenness of his nature.

XVII. On Sicily the Athenians had cast longing eyes even while Pericles was living; and after his death they actually tried to lay hands upon it. The lesser expeditions which they sent thither from time to time, ostensibly for the aid and comfort of their allies on the island who were being wronged by the Syracusans, they regarded merely as stepping stones

2 to the greater expedition of conquest. But the man who finally fanned this desire of theirs into flame, and persuaded them not to attempt the island any more in part and little by little, but to sail thither with a great armament and subdue it utterly, was Alcibiades. He persuaded the people to have great hopes, and he himself had greater aspirations still. Such were his hopes that he regarded Sicily as a mere beginning, and 3 not, like the rest, as an end of the expedition. So while Nicias was trying to divert the people from the capture of Syracuse as an undertaking too difficult for them, Alcibiades was dreaming of Carthage and Libya, and, after winning these, of encompassing Italy and Peloponnesus. He almost regarded Sicily as the ways and means provided for his greater war. The young men were at once carried away on the wings of these hopes of his, and would listen eagerly as their elders recounted to them the wonders of the projected expedition. Many were they who sat in the palaestras and lounging-places mapping out in the sand the shape of Sicily and the position of Libya and Carthage.

4 Socrates the philosopher, however, and Meton the astrologer, are said to have had no hopes that any good would come to the city from the expedition; Socrates, as it is likely, because he got an inkling of the future from the divine guide who was his familiar. Meton — whether his fear of the future arose from mere calculation or from his use of some sort of divination — feigned madness, and seizing a blazing torch, was like 5 to have set fire to his house. Some say, however, that Meton made no pretense of madness, but actually

did burn his house down in the night, and then, in the morning, came before the people begging and praying that, in view of his great calamity, his son might be released from the expedition. He succeeded in cheating his fellow citizens, and obtained his desire.

XVIII. Nicias was elected general against his will, and he was anxious to avoid the command most of all because of his fellow commander. For it had seemed to the Athenians that the war would go on better if they did not send out Alcibiades unblended, as it were, and sheer, but rather tempered his rash daring with the prudent forethought of Nicias. As for the third general, Lamachus, though advanced in years, he was thought, age notwithstanding, to be no less fiery than Alcibiades, and quite as fond of taking risks in battle. Even during the deliberations of the 2 people on the extent and character of the armament, Nicias again tried to oppose their wishes and put a stop to the war. But Alcibiades answered all his arguments and carried the day, and then Demostratus, the orator, formally moved that the generals have full and independent powers in the matter of the armament and of the whole war.

After the people had adopted this motion and all things were made ready for the departure of the fleet, there were some unpropitious signs and portents, especially that of the festival, namely, the Adonia. This fell at that time, and little images like dead folk 3 carried forth to burial were everywhere exposed to view by the women, who mimicked burial rites, beat

their breasts, and sang dirges. Moreover, the mutilation of the *Hermae*, most of which, in a single night, had their faces and forms disfigured, confounded the hearts of many, even among those who usually set small store by such things. It was said, it is true, that Corinthians had done the deed, Syracuse being a colony of theirs, in the hope that such portents would
4 stay or stop the war. The multitude, however, were not moved by this reasoning, nor by that of those who thought the affair no terrible sign at all, but rather one of the common results of winebibbing, when dissolute youth, in mere sport, are carried away into wanton acts. They looked on the occurrence with wrath and fear, thinking it the sign of a bold and dangerous conspiracy. They therefore scrutinized narrowly every suspicious circumstance, the Council and the Assembly convening for this purpose many times within a few days.

XIX. During this time Androcles, the popular leader, produced sundry aliens and slaves who accused Alcibiades and his friends of mutilating other sacred images, and of making a parody of the mysteries of Eleusis in a drunken revel. They said that one Theodorus played the part of the Herald, Pulytion that of the Torch-bearer, and Alcibiades that of the High Priest, and that the rest of his companions were there
2 in the rôle of initiates, and were dubbed *Mystae*. Such indeed was the purport of the impeachment which Thessalus, the son of Cimon, brought in to the Assembly, impeaching Alcibiades of impiety towards the Eleusinian goddesses. The people were exasperated, and

felt bitterly towards Alcibiades, and Androcles, who was his mortal enemy, egged them on.

At first Alcibiades was confounded. But perceiving that all the seamen and soldiers who were going to sail for Sicily were friendly to him, and hearing that the Argive and Mantinean men-at-arms, a thousand in number, declared that it was all because of Alcibiades that they were making their long expedition across the seas, and that if any wrong should be done him they would at once abandon it, he took courage, and insisted on an immediate opportunity to defend himself before the people. His enemies were now in their turn dejected. They feared lest the people be too lenient in their judgment of him because they needed him so much. 3

Accordingly, they devised that certain orators who were not looked upon as enemies of Alcibiades, but who really hated him no less than his avowed foes, should rise in the Assembly and say that it was absurd, when a general had been set, with full powers, over such a vast force, and when his armament and allies were all assembled, to destroy his beckoning opportunity by recourse to any paltry jury service or court-room procedure. "Nay," they said, "let him sail now, and Heaven be with him! But when the war is over, then let him come and make his defense. The laws will be the same then as now." Of course the malice in this postponement did not escape Alcibiades. He declared in the Assembly that it was a terrible misfortune to be sent off at the head of such a vast force with his case still in suspense, leaving behind 4 5

him vague accusations and slanders; he ought to be put to death if he could not refute them; but if he could refute them and prove his innocence, he ought to proceed against the enemy without any fear of the public informers at home.

XX. He could not carry his point, however, but was ordered to set sail. So he put to sea along with his fellow generals, having not much less than one hundred and forty triremes; fifty-one hundred men-at-arms; about thirteen hundred archers, slingers, and light-armed folk; and the rest of his equip-
2 ment to correspond. On reaching Italy and taking Rhegium, he proposed a plan for the conduct of the war. Nicias opposed it, but Lamachus approved it, and so he sailed to Sicily. He secured the allegiance of Catana, but accomplished nothing further, since he was presently summoned home by the Athenians to stand his trial.

At first, as I have said, sundry vague suspicions and calumnies against Alcibiades were advanced by
3 aliens and slaves. Afterwards, during his absence, his enemies went to work more confidently. They brought the wanton treatment of the *Hermae* and of the Eleusinian mysteries under one and the same design; both were fruits of a conspiracy to subvert the government, and all who were accused of any complicity whatsoever therein were cast into prison without trial. The people were provoked with themselves for not bringing Alcibiades to trial and judgment on such grave charges when they had the
4 chance, and any kinsman or friend or comrade of his

who fell foul of their wrath against him, found them exceedingly severe.

Thucydides omitted mention of the informers by name, but others give their names as Diocleides and Teucer. For instance, Phrynichus the comic poet referred to them thus: —

> "Look out, too, dearest Hermes, not to get a fall,
> And mar your looks, and so equip with calumny
> Another Diocleides bent on wreaking harm."

And the Hermes replies: —

> "I'm on the watch; there's Teucer, too; I would not give
> A prize for lying to an alien of his ilk."

And yet there was nothing sure or steadfast in the 5
statements of the informers. One of them, indeed, was asked how he recognized the faces of the *Hermae*-defacers, and replied, "By the light of the moon." This vitiated his whole story, since there was no moon at all when the deed was done. Sensible men were troubled thereat, but even this did not soften the people's attitude towards the slanderous stories. As they had set out to do in the beginning, so they continued, haling and casting into prison any one who was denounced.

XXI. Among those thus held in bonds and imprisonment for trial, was Andocides the orator, whom Hellanicus the historian included among the descendants of Odysseus. He was held to be a foe to popular government, and an oligarch, but what most made him suspected of the mutilation of the *Hermae*, was the tall Hermes which stood near his house, a dedication of the Aegeïd tribe. This was almost the 2

only one among the very few statues of like prominence to remain unharmed. For this reason it is called to this day the Hermes of Andocides. Everybody gives it that name, in spite of the adverse testimony of its inscription.

Now it happened that, of all those lying in prison with him under the same charge, Andocides became most intimate and friendly with a man named Timaeus, of less repute than himself, it is true, but of
3 great sagacity and daring. This man persuaded Andocides to turn state's evidence against himself and a few others. If he confessed, — so the man argued, — he would have immunity from punishment by decree of the people; whereas the result of the trial, while uncertain in all cases, was most to be dreaded in that of influential men like himself. It was better to save his life by a false confession of crime, than to die a shameful death under a false charge of that crime. One who had an eye to the general welfare of the community might well abandon to their fate a few dubious characters, if he could thereby save a multitude of good men from the wrath of the people.

4 By such arguments of Timaeus, Andocides was at last persuaded to bear witness against himself and others. He himself received the immunity from punishment which had been decreed; but all those whom he named, excepting such as took to flight, were put to death, and Andocides added to their number some of his own household servants, that he might the better be believed.

Still, the people did not lay aside all their wrath at 5
this point, but rather, now that they were done with
the *Hermae*-defacers, as if their passion had all the
more opportunity to vent itself, they dashed like a
torrent against Alcibiades, and finally dispatched the
Salaminian state-galley to fetch him home. They
shrewdly gave its officers explicit command not to
use violence, nor to seize his person, but with all
moderation of speech to bid him accompany them
home to stand his trial and satisfy the people. For 6
they were afraid that their army, in an enemy's land,
would be full of tumult and mutiny at the summons.
And Alcibiades might easily have effected this had he
wished. For the men were cast down at his depart-
ure, and expected that the war, under the conduct
of Nicias, would be drawn out to a great length by
delays and inactivity, now that the goad to action, so
to speak of Alcibiades, had been taken away. Lama-
chus, it is true, was a good soldier and a brave man;
but he lacked authority and prestige because he was
so poor.

XXII. Alcibiades had no sooner sailed away than
he robbed the Athenians of Messene. There was a
party there who were on the point of surrendering
the city to the Athenians, but Alcibiades knew them,
and gave the clearest information of their design to
the friends of Syracuse in the city, and so brought
the thing to naught. Arrived at Thurii, he left his tri-
reme and hid himself so as to escape all quest. When 2
some one recognized him and asked, "Can you not
trust your country, Alcibiades?" "In all else," he

said, "but in the matter of my life I would n't trust even my own mother not to mistake a black for a white ballot when she cast her vote." And when he afterwards heard that the city had condemned him to death, "I 'll show them", he said, "that I 'm alive."

3 His impeachment is on record, and runs as follows: "Thessalus, son of Cimon, of the deme Laciadae, impeaches Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, of the deme Scambonidae, for wronging the goddesses of Eleusis, Demeter and Cora, by mimicking the mysteries and showing them forth to his companions in his own house, wearing a robe such as the High Priest wears when he shows forth the sacred secrets to the disciples, and calling himself High Priest, Pulytion Torch-bearer, and Theodorus, of the deme Phegaea, Herald, and hailing the rest of his companions as *Mystae* and *Epoptae*, contrary to the laws and institutions of the Eumolpidae, Heralds, and Priests of Eleusis."

4 His case went by default, his property was confiscated, and besides that, it was also decreed that his name should be publicly cursed by all priests and priestesses. Theano, the daughter of Menon, of the deme Agraulé, they say, was the only one who refused to obey this decree. She declared that she was a praying, not a cursing priestess.

XXIII. When these great judgments and condemnations were passed upon Alcibiades, he was tarrying in Argos, for as soon as he had made his escape from Thurii, he passed over into Peloponnesus. But fearing his foes there, and renouncing his country alto-

gether, he sent to the Spartans, demanding immunity and confidence, and promising to render them aid and service greater than all the harm he had previously done them as an enemy. The Spartans granted his re- 2
quest, and received him among them. No sooner was he come than he zealously brought one thing to pass: they had been delaying and postponing assistance to Syracuse; he roused and incited them to send Gylippus thither for a commander, and to crush the force which Athens had there. A second thing he did was to get them to stir up the war against Athens at home; and the third, and most important of all, to induce them to fortify Deceleia. This more than anything else wrought ruin and destruction to his native city.

At Sparta, he was held in high repute publicly, 3
and privately was no less admired. The multitude was completely under his influence, and was actually bewitched by his assumption of the Spartan mode of life. When they saw him with his hair untrimmed, taking cold baths, and on terms of intimacy with their coarse bread and black porridge, they could scarcely trust their eyes, and doubted whether such a man as he now was had ever had a cook in his own house, had even so much as looked upon a perfumer, or endured the touch of Milesian wool. He had, as 4
they say, one power which transcended all others, and proved a veritable implement of his chase for men: that of assimilating and adapting himself to the pursuits and lives of others, thereby assuming more violent changes than the chameleon. That animal, how-

ever, as it is said, is utterly unable to assume one color, namely white; but Alcibiades could associate with good and bad alike, and found naught that he
5 could not imitate and practice. In Sparta, he was all for bodily training, simplicity of life, and severity of countenance; in Ionia, for luxurious ease and pleasure; in Thrace, for drinking deep; in Thessaly, for riding hard; and when he was thrown with Tissaphernes the Satrap, he outdid even Persian magnificence in his pomp and lavishness. It was not that he could so easily pass entirely from one manner of man to another, nor that he actually underwent in every case a change in his real character; but when he saw that his natural manners were likely to be annoying to his associates, he was quick to assume
6 any counterfeit exterior which might in each case be suitable for them. At all events, in Sparta, so far as the outside was concerned, it was possible to say of him, "'No child of Achilles he, but Achilles himself'; such a man as Lycurgus might have trained"; but judging by what he actually felt and did, one might have cried with the poet, "'Tis the selfsame woman still!"

7 While Agis the king was away on his campaigns, Alcibiades corrupted Timaea his wife so that she was with child by him and made no denial of it. When she had given birth to a male child, it was called Leotychides, in public, but in private the name which the boy's mother whispered to her friends and attendants, was Alcibiades. Such was the passion that possessed the woman. But he, in his mocking way,

said he had not done this thing for a wanton insult, nor at the behest of mere pleasure, but in order that descendants of his might be kings of the Lacedaemonians.

Such being the state of things, there were many to tell the tale to Agis, and he believed it, more especially owing to the lapse of time. There had been an earthquake, and he had run in terror out of his chamber and the arms of his wife, and then for ten months had had no further intercourse with her. And since Leotychides had been born at the end of this period, Agis declared that he was no child of his. For this reason Leotychides was afterwards refused the royal succession.

XXIV. After the Athenian disaster in Sicily, the Chians, Lesbians, and Cyzicenes sent embassies at the same time to Sparta, to discuss a revolt from Athens. But though the Boeotians supported the appeal of the Lesbians, and Pharnabazus that of the Cyzicenes, the Spartans, under the persuasion of Alcibiades, elected to help the Chians first of all. Alcibiades actually set sail in person and brought almost all Ionia to revolt, and, in constant association with the Lacedaemonian generals, wrought injury to the Athenians.

But Agis was hostile to him because of the wrong he had suffered as a husband, and he was also vexed at the repute in which Alcibiades stood. Most of the successes won were due to him, as report had it. The most influential and ambitious of the other Spartans also were envious and tired of him, and soon grew

strong enough to induce the magistrates at home to send out orders to Ionia that he be put to death.

3 His timely discovery of this put him on his guard, and while in all their undertakings he took part with the Lacedaemonians, he sedulously avoided coming into their hands. Then resorting to Tissaphernes, the King's Satrap, for safety, he was soon first and foremost 4 in that grandee's favor. His versatility and surpassing cleverness was the admiration of the Barbarian, who was no straightforward man himself, but malicious and fond of evil company. And indeed no disposition could resist and no nature escape Alcibiades, so full of grace was his daily life and conversation. Even those who feared and hated him felt the rare and 5 winning charm of his society and presence. And thus it was that Tissaphernes, though otherwise the most ardent of the Persians in his hatred of the Hellenes, so completely surrendered to the flatteries of Alcibiades as to outdo him in reciprocal flatteries. The most beautiful park he had, both for its refreshing waters and grateful lawns, with resorts and retreats decked out in regal and extravagant fashion, he named "Alcibiades"; everyone always called it by that name.

XXV. Alcibiades now abandoned the cause of the Spartans, since he distrusted them and feared Agis, and began to malign and slander them to Tissaphernes. He advised him not to aid them very generously, and yet not to put down the Athenians completely, but rather by niggardly assistance to the one and lukewarm hostility to the other, to make both

easy victims for the King when they had weakened and exhausted each other. Tissaphernes was easily 2 persuaded, and all men saw that he loved and admired his new adviser, so that Alcibiades was looked up to by the Hellenes on both sides, and the Athenians repented themselves of the sentence they had passed upon him, now that they were suffering for it. Alcibiades himself also was presently burdened with the fear that if his native city were altogether destroyed, he might come into the power of the Lacedaemonians, who hated him.

At this time almost all the forces of Athens were 3 at Samos. From this island as their naval base of operations they were trying to win back some of their Ionian allies who had revolted, and were watching others who were disaffected. In some way or other they still managed to cope with their enemies on the sea, but they were afraid of Tissaphernes and of the fleet of one hundred and fifty Phoenician triremes which was said to be all but at hand; if this once came up, no hope was left for their city.

Alcibiades was aware of this, and sent secret mes- 4 sages to the influential Athenians at Samos, in which he held out the hope that he might bring Tissaphernes over to be their friend. He did not seek, he said, the favor of the multitude, nor trust them, but rather that of the aristocrats, in case they would venture to show themselves men, put a stop to the wantonness of the people, take the direction of affairs into their own hands, and save their cause and city.

Now the rest of the aristocrats were much inclined 5

to Alcibiades. But one of the generals, Phrynichus, of the deme Deirades, suspected (what was really the case) that Alcibiades had no more use for an oligarchy than for a democracy, but merely sought in one way or another a recall from exile, and therefore inveighed against the people merely to court betimes the favor of the aristocrats, and ingratiate himself with them. He therefore opposed him. When his opinion had been overborne and he was now become an open enemy of Alcibiades, he sent a secret message to Astyochus, the enemy's naval commander, bidding him beware of Alcibiades and arrest him, for that he was playing a
6 double game. Without his knowing it, he was a traitor dealing with a traitor. For Astyochus was much in awe of Tissaphernes, and seeing that Alcibiades had great power with the Satrap, he disclosed the message of Phrynichus to them both. Alcibiades at once sent men to Samos to denounce Phrynichus. All the Athenians there were incensed and banded themselves together against Phrynichus, who, seeing no other escape from his predicament, attempted to cure
7 one evil by another and a greater. He sent again to Astyochus, chiding him indeed for his disclosure of the former message, but announcing that he stood ready to deliver into his hands the fleet and army of the Athenians.

However, this treachery of Phrynichus did not harm the Athenians at all, because of the fresh treachery of Astyochus. This second message of
8 Phrynichus also he delivered to Alcibiades. But Phrynichus knew all the while that he would do so,

and expected a second denunciation from Alcibiades. So he got the start of him by telling the Athenians himself that the enemy were going to attack them, and advising them to have their ships manned and their camp fortified. The Athenians were busy doing 9
this when again a letter came from Alcibiades bidding them beware of Phrynichus, since he had offered to betray their fleet to the enemy. This letter they disbelieved at the time, supposing that Alcibiades, who must know perfectly the equipment and purposes of the enemy, had used his knowledge in order to calumniate Phrynichus falsely. Afterwards, how- 10
ever, when Hermon, one of the frontier guard, had smitten Phrynichus with a dagger and slain him in the open market place, the Athenians tried the case of the dead man, found him guilty of treachery, and awarded crowns to Hermon and his accomplices.

XXVI. But at Samos the friends of Alcibiades soon got the upper hand, and sent Peisander to Athens to change the form of government. He was to encourage the upper class to overthrow the democracy and take control of affairs, with the plea that on these terms alone would Alcibiades make Tissaphernes their friend and ally. This was the pretense and this the pretext of those who then established the oligarchy at Athens. But as soon as 2
the so-called Five Thousand (they were really only four hundred) got the power and took control of affairs, they at once neglected Alcibiades entirely, and waged the war with less vigor, partly because they distrusted the citizens, who still looked askance at

the new form of government, and partly because they thought the Lacedaemonians, who always looked with favor on an oligarchy, would be more lenient towards
3 them. The popular party in the city was constrained by fear to keep quiet, because many of those who openly opposed the Four Hundred had been slain. But when the army in Samos learned what had been done at home, they were enraged, and started to sail forthwith to the Piraeus, and sending for Alcibiades, they appointed him general, and bade him lead them in putting down the tyrants.

4 An ordinary man, thus suddenly raised to great power by the favor of the multitude, would have been full of love for them, thinking that he must at once gratify them in all things and oppose them in nothing, since they had made him, instead of a wandering exile, leader and general of such a fleet and of so large an armed force. But Alcibiades, as became a great leader, felt that he must oppose them in their career of madness, and prevented them from making such a fatal mistake. Therefore in this instance, at
5 least, he was the manifest salvation of the city. For had they sailed off home, their enemies might at once have occupied all Ionia, the Hellespont, and the islands, without a battle, while Athenians were fighting Athenians and making their own city the seat of war. Such a war Alcibiades, more than any other one man, prevented, not only persuading and instructing the multitude together, but also, taking them man by man, supplicating some and constrain-
6 ing others. He had a helper, too, in Thrasybulus of

Steiris, who went along with him and did the shouting, for he had, it is said, the biggest voice of all the Athenians.

A second honorable proceeding of Alcibiades was his promising to bring over to their side the Phoenician ships which the King had sent out and the Lacedaemonians were expecting, — or at least to see that those expectations were not realized, — and his sailing off swiftly on this errand. The ships were 7
actually seen off Aspendus, but Tissaphernes did not bring them up, and thereby played the Lacedaemonians false. Alcibiades was credited with this diversion of the ships by both parties, and especially by the Lacedaemonians. It was charged that he instructed the Barbarian to suffer the Hellenes to destroy one another. For it was perfectly clear that the side to which such a naval force attached itself would rob the other altogether of the control of the sea.

XXVII. After this the Four Hundred were overthrown, the friends of Alcibiades now zealously assisting the party of the people. Then the city willingly ordered Alcibiades to come back home. But he thought he must not return with empty hands and without achievement, through the pity and favor of the multitude, but rather in a blaze of glory. So, to begin with, he set sail with a small fleet from Samos and cruised off Cnidus and Cos. There he heard 2
that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, had sailed off to the Hellespont with his entire fleet, followed by the Athenians, and so he hastened to the assistance of

their generals. By chance he came up, with his eighteen triremes, at just that critical point when both parties, having joined battle with all their ships off Abydos, and sharing almost equally in victory and defeat, had kept up a desperate struggle till evening.
3 The appearance of Alcibiades inspired both sides with a false opinion of his coming: the enemy were emboldened and the Athenians were confounded. But he quickly hoisted Athenian colors on his flagship and darted straight upon the victorious and pursuing Peloponnesians. Routing them, he drove them to land, and following hard after them, rammed and shattered their ships. Their crews swam ashore, and here Pharnabazus came to their aid with his infantry and fought along the beach in defense of their
4 ships. But finally the Athenians captured thirty of them, rescued their own, and erected a trophy of victory.

Taking advantage of a success so brilliant as this, and ambitious to display himself at once before Tissaphernes, Alcibiades supplied himself with gifts of hospitality and friendship and proceeded, at the head
5 of an imperial retinue, to visit the Satrap. His reception, however, was not what he expected. Tissaphernes had for a long time been accused by the Lacedaemonians to the King, and being in fear of the King's condemnation, it seemed to him that Alcibiades had come in the nick of time. So he arrested him and shut him up in Sardis, hoping that such an outrage upon him as this would dispel the calumnies of the Spartans.

XXVIII. After the lapse of thirty days Alcibiades ran away from his guards, got a horse from some one or other, and made his escape to Clazomenae. To repay Tissaphernes, he alleged that he had escaped with that Satrap's connivance, and so brought additional calumny upon him. He himself sailed to the camp of the Athenians, where he learned that Mindarus, along with Pharnabazus, was in Cyzicus. Thereupon he roused the spirits of the soldiers, de- 2
claring that they must now do sea-fighting and land-fighting and even siege-fighting too against their enemies, for poverty stared them in the face unless they were victorious in every way. He then manned his ships and made his way to Proconnesus, giving orders at once to seize all small trading craft and keep them under guard, that the enemy might get no warning of his approach from any source so ever.

Now it chanced that copious rain fell all of a sud- 3
den, and thunder-peals and darkness coöperated with him in concealing his design. Not only did he elude the enemy, but even the Athenians themselves had given up all expectation of fighting, when he suddenly ordered them aboard ship and put out to sea. After a little the darkness cleared away, and the Peloponnesian ships were seen hovering off the harbor of Cyzicus. Fearing then lest they catch sight of the 4
full extent of his array and take refuge ashore, he ordered his fellow commanders to sail slowly and so remain in the rear, while he himself, with only forty ships, bore down and challenged the foe to battle. The Peloponnesians were utterly deceived, and scorn-

ing what they deemed the small numbers of their enemy, put out to meet them, and closed at once with them in a grappling fight. Presently, while the battle was raging, the Athenian reserves bore down upon their foe, who were panic stricken and took to flight.

5 Then Alcibiades with twenty of his best ships broke through their line, put to shore, and disembarking his crews, attacked his enemy as they fled from their ships, and slew many of them. Mindarus and Pharnabazus, who came to their aid, he overwhelmed; Mindarus was slain fighting sturdily, but
6 Pharnabazus made his escape. Many were the dead bodies and the arms of which the Athenians became masters, and they captured all their enemy's ships. Then they also stormed Cyzicus, which Pharnabazus abandoned to its fate when he saw that the Peloponnesians were annihilated. Thus the Athenians not only had the Hellespont under their sure control, but even ejected the Lacedaemonians from the rest of the sea. A dispatch was captured announcing the disaster to the Ephors in true Laconic style: "Our ships are lost; Mindarus is gone; our men are starving; we know not what to do."

XXIX. But the soldiers of Alcibiades were now so elated and filled with pride that they disdained longer to mingle with the rest of the army, since it had often been vanquished, while they were unconquered. For not long before this, Thrasyllus had suffered a reverse at Ephesus, and the Ephesians had erected their bronze trophy of victory, to the everlasting disgrace of the

Athenians. This was what the soldiers of Alcibiades 2
cast in the teeth of Thrasyllus' men, vaunting themselves and their general, and refusing to share either training or quarters in camp with them. But when Pharnabazus with much cavalry and infantry attacked the forces of Thrasyllus, who had made a raid into the territory of Abydos, Alcibiades sallied out to their aid, routed Pharnabazus, and pursued him till nightfall, along with Thrasyllus. Thus the two factions were blended, and returned to their camp with mutual friendliness and delight.

On the following day Alcibiades set up a trophy of 3
victory, and plundered the territory of Pharnabazus, no one venturing to defend it. He even captured some priests and priestesses, but let them go without ransom. On setting out to attack Chalcedon, which had revolted from Athens and received a Lacedaemonian garrison and governor, he heard that its citizens had collected all their goods and chattels out of the country and committed them for safe keeping to the Bithynians, who were their friends. So he marched to the confines of Bithynia with his army, and sent on a herald with accusations and demands. The Bithynians, in terror, gave the booty up to him, and made a treaty of friendship.

XXX. While Chalcedon was being walled in from sea to sea, Pharnabazus came to raise the siege, and at the same time Hippocrates, the Spartan governor, led his forces out of the city and attacked the Athenians. But Alcibiades arrayed his army so as to face both enemies at once, put Pharnabazus to shameful

flight, and slew Hippocrates together with many of
2 his vanquished men. Then he sailed in person into the Hellespont and levied moneys there.

He also captured Selymbria, where he exposed himself beyond all bounds. There was a party in the city which offered to surrender it to him, and they had agreed with him upon the signal of a lighted torch displayed at midnight. But they were forced to give this signal before the appointed time, through fear of one of the conspirators, who suddenly changed his mind. So the torch was displayed before his army was ready, but Alcibiades took about thirty men and ran to the walls, bidding the rest of his force follow
3 with all speed. The gate was thrown open for him and he rushed into the city, his thirty men-at-arms reënforced by twenty targeteers, but he saw at once that the Selymbrians were advancing in battle array to attack him. In resistance he saw no safety, and for flight, undefeated as he was in all his campaigns down to that day, he had too much spirit. He therefore had the trumpet signal silence, and then ordered formal proclamation to be made that Selymbria must
4 not bear arms against Athens. This proclamation made some of the Selymbrians less eager for battle, if, as they supposed, their enemies were all inside the walls; and others were mollified by hopes of a peaceful settlement. While they were thus parleying with one another, up came the army of Alcibiades. Judging now, as was really the case, that the Selymbrians were disposed for peace, he was afraid that his Thra-
5 cian soldiers might plunder the city. There were

many of these, and they were zealous in their service, through the favor and good will they bore Alcibiades. Accordingly he sent them all out of the city, and then, at the plea of the Selymbrians, did their city no injury whatever, but merely took a sum of money from it, set a garrison in it, and went his way.

XXXI. Meanwhile the Athenian generals who were besieging Chalcedon made peace with Pharnabazus on condition that they receive a sum of money, that Chalcedon be subject again to Athens, that the territories of Pharnabazus be not ravaged, and that the said Pharnabazus furnish safe escort for an Athenian embassy to the King. Accordingly, when 2
Alcibiades came back from Selymbria, Pharnabazus demanded that he too take oath to the treaty; but Alcibiades refused to do so until Pharnabazus had taken his oath to it.

After the oaths had been taken, he went up against Byzantium, which was in revolt against Athens, and compassed the city with a wall. But after Anaxilaus, Lycurgus, and certain men besides had agreed to surrender the city to him on condition that it be not plundered, he spread abroad the story that threatening complications in Ionia called him away. Then he 3
sailed off in broad daylight with all his ships; but in the night time stealthily returned. He disembarked with the men-at-arms under his own command, and quietly stationed himself within reach of the city's walls. His fleet, meanwhile, sailed to the harbor, and forcing its way in with much shouting and tumult and din, terrified the Byzantians by the unex-

pectedness of its attack, while it gave the party of Athens in the city a chance to admit Alcibiades in all security, since everybody else had hurried off to
4 the harbor and the fleet. However, the day was not won without a battle. The Peloponnesians, Boeotians, and Megarians who were in garrison at Byzantium, routed the ships' crews and drove them back on board again. Then, perceiving that the Athenians were inside the city, they formed in battle array and advanced to attack them. A desperate battle followed, but Alcibiades was victorious with the right wing, as well as Theramenes with the left, and they took prisoners no less than three hundred of the enemy who survived.

5 Not a man of the Byzantians was put to death or sent into exile after the battle, for it was on these conditions that the men who surrendered the city had acted, and this was the agreement with them. They exacted no special grace for themselves. Therefore it was that when Anaxilaus was prosecuted at Sparta for treachery, his words showed clearly that his deeds had not been disgraceful. He said that he was not a Lacedaemonian, but a Byzantian, and it was not
6 Sparta that was in peril. Considering therefore the case of Byzantium, he saw that the city was walled up, that no help could make its way in, and that the provisions already in the city were being consumed by Peloponnesians and Boeotians, while the Byzantians were starving, together with their wives and children. He had, therefore, not betrayed the city to its enemies, but set it free from war and its horrors,

therein imitating the noblest Lacedaemonians, in whose eyes the one supremely honorable and righteous thing is their country's good. The Lacedaemonians, on hearing this, were moved with sincere respect, and acquitted the men.

XXXII. But Alcibiades, yearning at last to see his home, and still more desirous of being seen by his fellow citizens, now that he had conquered their enemies so many times, set sail. His Attic triremes were adorned all round with many shields and spoils of war; many that he had captured in battle were towed along in his wake; and still more numerous were the figure-heads he carried of triremes which had been overwhelmed and destroyed by him. There were not less than two hundred of these all together.

Duris the Samian, who insists that he was a descend- 2
ant of Alcibiades, gives some additional details. He says that the oarsmen of Alcibiades rowed to the music of a flute blown by Chrysogonus the Pythian victor; that they kept time to a rhythmic call from the lips of Callipides the tragic actor; that both these artists were arrayed in the long tunics, flowing robes, and other adornment of their profession; and that the commander's ship put into harbors with a sail of purple hue, as though, after a drinking bout, he were off on a revel. But neither Theopompus, nor Ephorus, 3
nor Xenophon mentions these things, nor is it likely that Alcibiades put on such airs for the Athenians, to whom he was returning after he had suffered exile, and they many great calamities. Nay, he was in actual fear as he put into the harbor, and once in, he

did not leave his trireme until, as he stood on deck, he caught sight of his cousin Euryptolemus on shore, with many other friends and kinsmen, and heard their cries of welcome.

4 When he landed, however, people did not deign so much as to look at the other generals whom they met, but ran in throngs to Alcibiades with shouts of welcome, escorting him on his way, and putting wreaths on his head as they could get to him, while those who could not come to him for the throng, gazed at him from afar, the elderly men pointing him out to the young.

Much sorrow, too, was mingled with the city's joy, as men called to mind their former misfortunes and compared them with their present good fortune, counting it certain that they had neither lost Sicily, nor had any other great expectation of theirs miscarried if they had only left Alcibiades at the head of that enterprise and the armament therefor. For now he had taken the city when she was almost banished from the sea, when on land she was hardly mistress of her own suburbs, and when factions raged within her walls, and had raised her up from this wretched and lowly plight, not only restoring her dominion over the sea, but actually rendering her victorious over her enemies everywhere on land.

XXXIII. The decree for his recall had been passed before this, on motion of Critias, the son of Callaeschrus, as Critias himself has written in his elegies, where he reminds Alcibiades of the favor in these words: —

"Mine was the motion that brought thee back; I made it in public;
Words and writing were mine; task like this I performed;
Signet and seal of words that were mine give warrant as follows."

At this time, therefore, the people had only to meet 2 in assembly, and Alcibiades addressed them. He lamented and bewailed his own lot, but had only little and moderate blame to lay upon the people. The entire mischief he ascribed to a certain evil fortune and baleful genius of his own. Then he descanted at great length upon the vain hopes which their enemies were cherishing, and wrought them up to courage. At last they crowned him with crowns of gold, and elected him general with sole powers by land and sea. They 3 voted also that his property be restored to him, and that the Eumolpidae and Heralds revoke the curses wherewith they had cursed him at the command of the people. The others revoked their curses, but Theodorus the High Priest said: "Nay, I invoked no evil upon him if he does no wrong to the city."

XXXIV. But while Alcibiades was thus prospering brilliantly, some were nevertheless disturbed at the particular season of his return. He had put into harbor on the very day when the Plynteria of the goddess Athena were being celebrated. The Praxiergidae celebrate these rites on the twenty-fifth day of Thargelion, in strict secrecy, removing the robes of the goddess and covering up her image. Wherefore the Athenians regard this day as the unluckiest of all days for business of any sort. The goddess, 2 therefore, did not appear to welcome Alcibiades with kindly favor and good will, but rather to veil herself

from him and repel him. However, all things fell out as he wished, and one hundred triremes were manned for service, with which he was minded to sail off again. But a great and laudable ambition took possession of him and detained him there until the Eleusinian mysteries.

3 Ever since Deceleia had been fortified, and the enemy, by their presence there, commanded the approaches to Eleusis, the festal rite had been celebrated with no splendor at all, being conducted by sea. Sacrifices, choral dances, and many of the sacred ceremonies usually held on the road, when Iacchus is conducted forth from Athens to Eleusis, had 4 of necessity been omitted. Accordingly, it seemed to Alcibiades that it would be a fine thing, enhancing his holiness in the eyes of the gods and his good repute in the minds of men, to restore its ancestral fashion to the sacred festival by escorting the rite with his infantry along past the enemy by land. He would thus either thwart and humble Agis, if the King kept entirely quiet, or would fight a fight that was sacred and approved by the gods, in behalf of the greatest and holiest interests, in full sight of his native city, and with all his fellow citizens eye-witnesses of his valor.

5 When he had determined upon this course and made known his design to the Eumolpidae and Heralds, he stationed sentries on the heights, sent out an advance-guard at break of day, and then took the priests, *mystae*, and mystagogues, encompassed them with his men-at-arms, and led them over the road to

Eleusis in decorous and silent array. So august and devout was the spectacle which, as general, he thus displayed, that he was hailed by those who were not unfriendly to him as High Priest, rather, and Mystagogue. No enemy dared to attack him, and he conducted the procession safely back to the city.

At this he was exalted in spirit himself, and exalted his army with the feeling that it was irresistible and invincible under his command. People of the humbler and poorer sort he so captivated by his leadership that they were filled with an amazing passion to have him for their tyrant, and some proposed it, and actually came to him in solicitation of it. He was to rise superior to envy, abolish decrees and laws, and stop the mouths of the babblers who were so fatal to the life of the city, that he might bear an absolute sway and act without fear of the public informer.

XXXV. What thoughts he himself had about a tyranny, is uncertain. But the most influential citizens were afraid of it, and therefore anxious to have him sail away as soon as he could. They even voted him, besides everything else, the colleagues of his own choosing. Setting sail, therefore, with his one hundred ships, and assaulting Andros, he conquered the islanders in battle, as well as the Lacedaemonians who were there, but he did not capture the city. This was the first of the fresh charges brought against him by his enemies.

And it would seem that if ever a man was ruined by his own exalted reputation, that man was Alcibi-

ades. His continuous successes gave him such repute for unbounded daring and sagacity, that when he failed in anything, men suspected his inclination; they would not believe in his inability. Were he only inclined to do a thing, they thought, naught could escape him. So they expected the Chians also to be taken and reduced to obedience, along with the
3 rest of Ionia. They were therefore incensed to hear that he had not accomplished every thing at once and speedily, to meet their wishes. They did not stop to consider his lack of money. This compelled him, since he was fighting men who had an almoner of bounty in the Great King, to leave his camp frequently and sail off in quest of money for rations and wages. The final and prevailing charge against him was due to this necessity.

4 Lysander, who had been sent out as admiral by the Lacedaemonians, paid his sailors four obols a day instead of three, out of the moneys he received from Cyrus; while Alcibiades, already hard put to it to pay even his three obols, was forced to sail for Caria to levy money. The man whom he left in charge of his fleet, Antiochus, was a brave captain, but other-
5 wise a foolish and low-lived fellow. Although he had received explicit commands from Alcibiades not to hazard a general engagement even though the enemy sailed out to meet him, he fell so wantonly contemptuous of them as to man his own trireme and one other and stand for Ephesus, indulging in many shamelessly insulting gestures and cries as he cruised
6 past the prows of the enemy's ships. At first Ly-

sander put out with a few ships only, and gave him chase. Then, when the Athenians came to the aid of Antiochus, Lysander put out with his whole fleet, won the day, slew Antiochus himself, captured many ships and men, and set up a trophy of victory. As soon as Alcibiades heard of this, he came back to Samos, put out to sea with his whole armament, and challenged Lysander to battle. But Lysander was satisfied with his victory, and would not put out to meet him.

XXXVI. There were those who hated Alcibiades in the camp, and of these Thrasybulus, the son of Thraso, his particular enemy, set sail for Athens to denounce him. He stirred up the city against him by declaring to the people that it was Alcibiades who had ruined their cause and lost their ships by his wanton conduct in office. He had handed over — so Thrasybulus said — the duties of commander to men who had won his confidence merely by drinking deep and reeling off sailors' yarns, in order that he himself 2 might be free to cruise about collecting moneys and committing excesses of drunkenness and revelry with courtezans of Abydos and Ionia, and this while the enemy's fleet lay close to him. His enemies also found ground for accusation against him in the fortress which he had constructed in Thrace, near Bisanthe. It was to serve, they said, as a refuge for him in case he either could not or would not live at home.

The Athenians were persuaded, and chose other 3 generals in his place, thus displaying their passionate

ill will towards him. On learning this, Alcibiades was afraid, and departed the camp altogether, and assembling mercenary troops made war on his own account against the Thracians who acknowledge no king. He got together much money from his captives, and at the same time afforded security from barbarian inroads to the Hellenes on the neighboring frontier.

4 Tydeus, Menander, and Adeimantus, the generals, who had all the ships which the Athenians could finally muster in station at Aegospotami, were wont to sail out every morning against Lysander, who lay with his fleet at Lampsacus, and challenge him to battle. Then they would sail back again, to spend the rest of the day in disorder and unconcern, since,
5 forsooth, they despised their enemy. Alcibiades, who was near at hand, could not see such conduct with calmness or indifference, but rode up on horseback and read the generals a lesson. He said their anchorage was a bad one; the place had no harbor and no city, but they had to get their supplies from Sestos, a long way off; and they permitted their crews, whenever they were on land, to wander and scatter about at their own sweet wills, while there lay at anchor over against them an armament which was trained to do everything silently at a word of absolute command.

XXXVII. In spite of what Alcibiades said, and in spite of his advice to change their station to Sestos, the generals paid no heed. Tydeus actually insulted him by bidding him begone: he was not general

now, but others. So Alcibiades departed, suspecting that some treachery was on foot among them. He told his acquaintances who were escorting him out of the camp that, had he not been so grievously insulted by the generals, within a few days he would have forced the Lacedaemonians to engage them whether they wished to do so or not, or else lose their ships. Some thought that what he said was arrant boasting; 2 but others that it was likely. He had merely to bring up his troops of mounted Thracian archers to assault by land and confound the enemy's camp.

However, that he saw only too well the errors of the Athenians, the event soon testified. Lysander suddenly and unexpectedly fell upon them, and only eight of their triremes escaped with Conon; the rest, something less than two hundred, were captured and taken away. Three thousand of their crews were 3 taken alive, and executed by Lysander. In a short time he also captured Athens, burned her ships, and tore down her long walls.

Alcibiades now feared the Lacedaemonians, who were supreme on land and sea, and betook himself into Bithynia, carrying much treasure with him, and securing much as he went, but leaving even more behind him in the fortress where he had been living. In 4 Bithynia he lost much of his substance, being plundered by the Thracians there, and so he determined to go up to the court of Artaxerxes. He thought to show himself not inferior to Themistocles if the King made trial of his services, and superior in his pretext for offering them. For it was not to be

against his fellow countrymen, as in the case of that great man, but in behalf of his country that he would assist the King and beg him to furnish forces against a common enemy. Thinking that Pharnabazus could best give him facilities for making this journey up to the King, he went to him in Phrygia, and continued there with him, paying him court and receiving marks of honor from him.

XXXVIII. The Athenians were greatly depressed at the loss of their supremacy. But when Lysander robbed them of their freedom too, and handed the city over to thirty men of his own mind, then, their cause being lost, their eyes were opened to the course they should have taken when salvation was yet in their power. They sorrowfully rehearsed all their mistakes and follies, the greatest of which they considered to be their second outburst of wrath
2 against Alcibiades. He had been cast aside for no fault of his own; but they got angry because a subordinate of his lost a few ships disgracefully, and then they themselves, more disgracefully still, robbed the city of its ablest and most experienced general.

And yet, in spite of their present plight, a vague hope still prevailed that the cause of Athens was not lost so long as Alcibiades was alive. He had not, in times past, been satisfied to live his exile's life in idleness and quiet; nor now, if his means allowed, would he tolerate the insolence of the Lacedaemonians and the madness of the Thirty.

3 It was not strange that the multitude indulged in such dreams, when even the Thirty were moved to

anxious thought and inquiry, and made the greatest account of what Alcibiades was planning and doing. Finally, Critias tried to make it clear to Lysander that as long as Athens was a democracy the Lacedaemonians could not have safe rule over Hellas; and 4
that Athens, even though she were very peacefully and well disposed towards oligarchy, would not be suffered, while Alcibiades was alive, to remain undisturbed in her present condition. However, Lysander was not persuaded by these arguments until an official message came from the authorities at home bidding him put Alcibiades out of the way; either because they too were alarmed at the vigor and enterprise of the man, or because they were trying to gratify Agis.

XXXIX. Accordingly, Lysander sent to Pharnabazus and bade him do this thing, and Pharnabazus commissioned Magaeus, his brother, and Sousamithras, his uncle, to perform the deed. At that time Alcibiades was living in a certain village of Phrygia, where he had Timandra the courtezan with him, and in his sleep he had the following vision. He thought 2
he had the courtezan's garments upon him, and that she was holding his head in her arms while she adorned his face like a woman's with paints and pigments. Others say that in his sleep he saw Magaeus cutting off his head and burning his body. All agree in saying that he had the vision not long before his death.

The party sent to kill him did not dare enter his house, but surrounded it and set it on fire. When 3

Alcibiades was aware of this, he gathered together most of the garments and bedding in the house and cast them on the fire. Then, wrapping his cloak about his left arm, and drawing his sword with his right, he dashed out, unscathed by the fire, before the garments were in flames, and scattered the Barbarians, who ran at the mere sight of him. Not a man stood ground against him, or came to close quarters with him, but all held aloof and shot him with jav-
4 elins and arrows. Thus he fell, and when the Barbarians were gone, Timandra took up his dead body, covered and wrapped it in her own undergarments, and gave it such brilliant and honorable burial as she could provide.

This Timandra, they say, was the mother of that Lais who was called the Corinthian, although she was a prisoner of war from Hyccara, a small city of
5 Sicily. And some, while agreeing in all other details of the death of Alcibiades with what I have written, say that it was not Pharnabazus who was the cause of it, nor Lysander, nor the Lacedaemonians, but Alcibiades himself. He had corrupted a girl belonging to a certain well known family, and had her with him; and it was the brothers of this girl who, taking his wanton insolence much to heart, set fire by night to the house where he was living, and shot him down, as has been described, when he dashed out through the fire.

NOTES ON THE *NICIAS*

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I. 1. **Nicias a parallel to Crassus**: as in the Cimon-Lucullus pair, it is probable that Plutarch selected his Roman first, and then his Greek to match. When Plutarch resided in Rome, during the reign of Domitian (81–96 A. D.), he found men's minds still occupied with the careers of the protagonists in the drama of the revolution which had ushered in the empire of the world. No less than thirteen of his great Romans were "party chiefs in the constitutional struggles which ended on the fields of Pharsalia and Philippi" (George Wyndham, *Introduction* to North's Plutarch, "Tudor" Translations, i. pp. x. f.). In the *Nicias and Crassus*, as in many other of his *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch's object is to remind the too complacent Romans that, though the world was now in their strong hands, subject Greece could show on her roll of honor men with whom the greatest Romans might be proud to be compared.

In his *Cimon* (chap. iii.), as in his *Pericles* (chap. ii. 4), Plutarch makes brief preliminary comparisons of Cimon with Lucullus, and of Pericles with Fabius Maximus, thereby forestalling to some extent the more elaborate and formal "Comparison" at the close of each of those pairs. This preliminary comparison is wanting in the *Nicias*. In the formal "Comparison" of Nicias with Crassus which closes this pair of *Lives*, as in those of Cimon with Lucullus and of Pericles with Fabius, contrasts rather than similarities between Greek and Roman are the rule. Nicias and Crassus were alike only in the magnitude of their wealth and of the catastrophic disasters in which their lives went out. And even in wealth and disaster they were different. Nicias won his wealth more honorably and spent it with greater public spirit; but in disaster Crassus was the braver man. In public life Nicias was honest, just, and considerate;

Crassus was fickle, mean, and wanton. In splendid courage Crassus far outshone Nicias, who was timorous and cringing in spirit, but still, "his desire of peace, and of finishing the war, was a divine and truly Grecian ambition, nor in this respect would Crassus deserve to be compared to him, though he had enlarged the Roman empire to the Caspian Sea or the Indian Ocean" (Dryden-Clough translation). Nicias weakly brought his rival, Cleon, into undeserved power; Crassus boldly vied with such men as Caesar and Pompey. Nicias sought to avoid command and responsibility; Crassus had a passion for them. Athens sent out Nicias to his death against his will; Crassus led out the Romans to theirs against their will. Still, "over caution better deserves forgiveness than self-willed and lawless transgression."

The Parthian disaster: in the year 53 B. C., Crassus, as proconsul of Syria, attempted to rival the conquests of Lucullus, Pompey, and Caesar, in an invasion of Parthia. He lost his own life, that of his son Publius, and more than three fourths of an army of forty thousand Roman legionaries, in a disaster which shook the foundations of Roman power in the East.

I. 2. **Thucydides, Philistus, Timaeus**: see the Introduction, pp. 4 ff.; 10; 33 f.

Conflicts, sea fights, harangues: the set speech is here included in the natural and necessary work of a historian. Of course the speeches in Timaeus, since he wrote of events that were a century old, can have had no authentic elements, except so far as he used material furnished him by the contemporary witnesses, Thucydides and Philistus. But the set speech as pure literary ornament, regardless of authentic elements, had become fixed in the technique of the ancient historian.

Pindar's comparison: Plutarch uses it also in his *Quom. adul. etc.*, 24 = *Morals*, p. 65 B: "But the false, bastard, and counterfeit friend cringes with fear before his betters, vying with them not even so much as 'by Lydian car a footman slowly plodding', nay rather, as Simonides puts it, 'to com-

pare with refined gold having not even pure lead.'" It is one of the *Fragmenta Incerta* of Pindar (Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, i.[4] p. 450).

Diphilus: a prominent poet of the New Comedy (336–250 B. C.), contemporary with Menander. Some of his plays, like those of Menander, were adapted for the Roman stage by Plautus and Terence. Thus the *Casina* of Plautus was an adaptation of the Κληρούμενοι (*Sortitores*) of Diphilus. As many as one hundred comedies are attributed to him, of which only titles and fragments have come down to us (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, ii. p. 576).

Obese: probably used of a parasite by Diphilus; as applied to Timaeus by Plutarch, it would mean "thick-witted".

Xenarchus: no historian of this name is known, and yet the language implies a historian. Coraës suspects the text.

I. 3. **Name derived from victory**: *νίκη, victory*; Νικίας, *Victorious*.

Declined to head their expedition: he was elected general against his will, and tried to dissuade the Athenians from the enterprise (chap. xii. 3; *Alcibiades*, xviii. 1).

Mutilation of the Hermae: see chap. xiii. 2; *Alcibiades*, xviii. 3.

Hermocrates: the principal Syracusan commander (chap. xvi. 4 *et passim*), a Sicilian patriot whom Thucydides delights to honor.

Delivered Cerberus into his hands: to fetch the dog Cerberus from Hades was the twelfth and last labor imposed upon Heracles by the tyrant Eurystheus. As the story is told in Apollodorus (ii. 5, 12), Heracles asked Pluto for Cerberus, and was told that he could have him if he would take him without using weapons. Heracles clasped the three-headed monster in his arms, and took him to the upper world, whence, after having shown him to Eurystheus, he brought him back to Hades. Timaeus evidently had a version of the story in which Cora, or Persephone, the daughter of Demeter and wife of Pluto, assisted the hero in securing the monster.

Succor the Egestaeans: Segesta, as its own inhabitants called it, or Egesta, as the Greeks called it, was a little fortress-city in the northwestern part of Sicily which had a feud of long standing with Selinus in the south-western part. The Selinuntians got aid from Syracuse, and in 416 B. C. their united forces were pressing Egesta hard. An appeal from Egesta to Athens for aid came when the passion of the Athenians for the conquest of Sicily was rising, and furnished a plausible pretext for the fatal expedition against Syracuse (Thuc., vi. chaps. 6 and 8). See the fuller note on xii. 1.

Descendants of the Trojans: "After the capture of Troy, some Trojans who had escaped from the Achaeans came in ships to Sicily; they settled near the Sicanians, and both took the name of Elymi. The Elymi had two cities, Eryx and Egesta" (Thuc., vi. 2, 3).

The wrong done him by Laomedon: the legend runs that Heracles saved Hesione, the daughter of Laomedon, from a sea-monster to which she had been devoted, and was then cheated of his promised reward, namely, the immortal horses which Zeus had given Tros as recompense for Ganymedes (Apollodorus, ii. 5, 9). Tlepolemus, a son of Heracles, thus boasts to Sarpedon, Lycian son of Zeus (*Iliad*, v. 639–643, Chapman's translation): —

> "My father Hercules
> Was Jove's true issue: he was bold; his deeds did well express
> They sprung out of a lion's heart. He whilom came to Troy,
> (For horse that Jupiter gave Tros, for Ganymed, his boy)
> With six ships only, and few men, and tore the city down,
> Left all her broad ways desolate, and made the horse his own."

I. 4. **Abuse Plato and Aristotle**: the censoriousness of Timaeus won him the surname of "Epitimaeus", or "Fault-finder". See the Introduction, pp. 33 f.

I. 5. **Most writers**: *i. e.* historians, like Thucydides, Philistus, and Timaeus.

Others . . . . casually: not historians, writing of the Sicilian expedition, nor even biographers, but philosophers per-

haps, writers of Socratic dialogues, who used historical material merely as literary setting and embellishment. So Plato in his *Laches*, and Pasiphon in his *Nicias*. See the Introduction, pp. 11 f.

Found on ancient votive offerings: as, for instance, the inscription at Delos, mentioned in iii. 6.

In public decrees: in xii. 4, Plutarch probably controlled a copy of the decree mentioned, in the collection of Craterus. See the Introduction, pp. 35 f.

II. 1. **In the first place**: as a rule, Plutarch begins by describing his hero's birth and training, and then passes to his character and achievements. These topics determine the usual four divisions of a *Life* by Plutarch. But the *Nicias* has only the last two divisions, — those treating of the character and achievements of the man. It has been inferred from this that Plutarch found no special biography of Nicias available for use. However fair such an inference may be, it is certainly true that in his opening chapter, as we have seen, Plutarch gives an unusually precise program of his procedure in the composition of this *Life*, in words which imply independence. Whether Plutarch was independent or not, it may safely be inferred that Nicias was not a man of noble, or even of high birth, otherwise we should certainly have been told of it. He was a contracting capitalist, like his father, whose wealth he had inherited. He was probably descended from some metic, or alien-resident of Athens, who was admitted to the citizenship after, and in consequence of the reforms of Cleisthenes (508–500 B. C.). Socially, therefore, he was in the same class as Cleon and Hyperbolus, whereas Pericles and Alcibiades belonged to the oldest and most famous patrician family. See the note on ii. 3.

What Aristotle wrote: "The best Athenian statesmen, after the ancients, would seem to have been Nicias, Thucydides, and Theramenes. As regards Nicias and Thucydides, there is almost universal agreement that they were not only good and true men, but also statesmen who served the entire state with all the affection of a father towards a child;

but as regards Theramenes, from the fact that political affairs in his time were full of convulsion, there is debate about the final estimate of him. To those, however, who pronounce no cursory opinion, he appears not to have destroyed all the forms of government under which he lived, as is slanderously said of him, but rather to have furthered them as long as they transgressed no law, with the feeling that he could serve his country under all forms of government, — which is the sign of a good citizen; as soon as they ran counter to the laws, he no longer gave them allegiance, but incurred their hate" (*Constitution of Athens*, xxviii. 5).

It is clear that Plutarch reproduces very imperfectly the testimony of Aristotle, — so imperfectly that his words can hardly be called a "careless paraphrase". In this, as in other citations which he makes of the *Constitution of Athens* (*e. g. Themistocles*, x. 3; *Cimon*, x. 2), Plutarch is using Aristotle at second hand, as he finds him cited in some such author as Philochorus (Introduction, pp. 34 f.). See J. H. Wright, *American Journal of Philology*, xii. pp. 313–317.

The three best citizens: Aristotle said they were thought to be the three best statesmen after the ancients.

In lesser degree: this is not Aristotle's estimate of Theramenes, but that of his detractors. Philochorus, or the author in whom Plutarch finds the citation from Aristotle, probably dissented from Aristotle's encomium on Theramenes, and Plutarch reproduces the dissent in place of Aristotle's justification of his encomium.

An alien from Ceos: Theramenes was a legitimate son of Hagnon, and a rightful Athenian citizen, but a taunt of Eupolis (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 322, *Frag.* 237) and a jest of Aristophanes (*Frogs*, 970) led to a false assumption that he was only an adoptive son of Hagnon, and a native of Ceos. See Rogers' Note on the *Frogs*, 970. Ceos was one of the twelve Cyclades islands, and lay about thirteen miles southeast of the promontory of Sunium. Its capital city was the birth-place of the lyric poets Simonides and Bacchylides, and of Prodicus the sophist.

Cothurnus: a buskin, or high boot, worn by tragic actors. Since it could be worn indifferently on either foot, its name was used to designate a political turn-coat.

Theramenes was prominent as a naval commander (411–408 B. C.); in the revolution of the Four Hundred (411); at the battle of the Arginusae (406); and among the "Thirty Tyrants" (404). From this office he was deposed by his colleague, Critias, and outrageously put to death. His character, as was natural in the case of one who sought to avoid political extremes, has been much defamed. See *American Historical Review*, ix. pp. 649–669.

II. 2. **Thucydides**: distinguished as the son of Melesias from Thucydides the historian, who was the son of Olorus. He succeeded Cimon as leader of the aristocratic party. His powerful opposition to Pericles ceased with his ostracism in 442 B. C. See the *Pericles*, chaps. xi. and xiv.

Associated with him as general: this is not unlikely, but rests on the sole authority of Plutarch. Thucydides first mentions him (iii. 51) as general commanding a successful expedition to capture and fortify Minoa, an island lying before Megara. This was in the summer of 427.

The party of the rich and notable: Nicias was therefore the political successor, not of Pericles, but of Thucydides son of Melesias, as leader of the aristocratic or oligarchical party. "In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist," says Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, v. p. 199, ed. in ten vols.), "we shall see that during the interval between Thucydides (son of Melesias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendancy, that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Sicilian expedition and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive. . . . But Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of

common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city."

II. 3. **Cleon**: the successor of Pericles in the leadership of the radical democracy. He is introduced to us by Thucydides in connection with the case of the revolted and conquered people of Mitylene. "In the former assembly, Cleon the son of Cleaenetus had carried the decree condemning the Mitylenaeans to death. He was the most violent of the citizens, and at that time exercised by far the greatest influence over the people" (iii. 36). Of course he must have acquired this influence gradually, and there is good evidence (*Pericles*, xxxiii. 6) that he was active during the last years of Pericles. After the death of Pericles, in 429, Eucrates the "tow-dealer" (Aristophanes, *Knights*, 129) assumed for a brief space the rôle of popular leader, and then Lysicles the "sheep-dealer" (*Ib.*, 132). The latter perished in Caria early in the winter of 428, on an expedition to collect money from the allies (Thuc., iii. 19). Cleon also was a merchant, — a "leather-dealer" (Aristophanes, *Knights*, 136). "Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiraeus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seems to have grown up; men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of Mediaeval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had formerly resided" (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, v. pp. 160 f.). Cleon was so mercilessly caricatured by Aristophanes, and so scornfully judged even by Thucydides, that it is hard for us not to do him some injustice.

By coddling them, etc.: an iambic trimeter from an un-

known comic poet (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, iii. p. 400). It is a parody of a verse from the *Peleus* of Sophocles (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2], p. 239), "To nurse his age, and educate him up again", which is more closely parodied in Aristophanes, *Knights*, 1099, where Demus intrusts himself to the victorious rival of Cleon "to coddle me, and educate me up again". Plutarch uses this same anonymous verse in his *Praecepta ger. reip.*, 13 = *Morals*, 807 A, where also he is characterizing Cleon, who joined himself "with the meanest and most distempered of the people against the best".

II. 4. **Timid as he was by nature, etc.**: this excellent characterization of Nicias accords with that of Thucydides, who, in the case of Nicias, departs from his usual custom of letting deeds portray character. "Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus the Athenian, who had been the most fortunate general of his day, became more eager than ever to make an end of the war. Nicias desired, whilst he was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his good fortune; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give his people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought disaster on the city. He thought that the way to gain his wish was to trust as little as possible to fortune, and to keep out of danger; and that danger would be best avoided by peace" (v. 16, 1).

III. 1. **Native excellence and powerful eloquence**: Pericles, "deriving authority from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also a man of transparent integrity, was able to control the multitude in a free spirit; he led them rather than was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled and awed them; and, when they were depressed by groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. Thus Athens, though still in

name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen" (Thuc., ii. 65, 8 f.).

III. 2. **Choral and gymnastic exhibitions**: the Athenian state imposed certain public services, or "liturgies", on its wealthy citizens, at stated times and in regular rotation. The principal ordinary, or regular liturgies were three in number. The *Choregia* involved the equipment of a trained chorus for competition at a public festival; the *Gymnasiarchia*, the maintenance and training of the competitors in a public gymnastic contest, as well as the arrangement and decoration of the place of contest; the *Architheoria*, the superintendence and conduct of a sacred embassy to one of the national games, or to such holy places as Delos or Delphi. An extraordinary liturgy was the *Trierarchia*, or fitting out of a trireme in time of war. Citizens ambitious of securing popular favor were lavish in their expenditures when regularly appointed to these services, and sometimes volunteered for them. See the *Themistocles*, v. 4 and the *Aristides*, i. 2, with the notes.

III. 3. **The Palladium**: a small figure of Pallas Athena in armor, and of an archaic type, after the manner of representations in the most ancient art of the sacred image taken from Troy by Odysseus and Diomedes (Virgil, *Aen.* ii. 163 ff.; Pausanias, i. 28, 9). A similar figure was dedicated at Delphi (chap. xiii. 3), possibly by Cimon.

Temple surmounted by tripods: each of the ten Attic tribes was represented by a chorus in the dithyrambic contests of the greater Dionysiac festival (held in the great theatre), and the prize awarded by the state to the victorious choregus was a bronze tripod, which he was permitted to dedicate in some public place. A street leading from the Prytaneium to the theatre of Dionysus, and skirting the eastern slope of the Acropolis, was lined with such dedications, and called the "Street of Tripods" (see Pausanias, i. 20, 1, and Frazer's notes). The usual support of the tripod in the dedications of the fifth century B. C. was a low-stepped base, and it is probable that the row of choregic tripods dedicated in the

precinct of Dionysus by Nicias and his brothers (Plato, *Gorgias*, 472 A) were mounted in this way. After the completion of the stone theatre by Lycurgus (about 340 B. C.), there was a marked increase in the display of wealth by the victorious choregi. Small temples or shrines took the place of more simple bases for the tripods, like, for instance, the elegant " choregic monument of Lysicrates ", still *in situ*. In 320–319 B. C., a Nicias, son of Nicodemus, of the deme Xypete (as the dedicatory inscription on the front architrave of the temple shows), built a small Doric temple in the precinct of Dionysus to support his own choregic tripod, and also, as we must infer from the explicit language of Plutarch, the tripods of the elder Nicias. These were perhaps displaced by the temple, which Plutarch carelessly attributes to the elder Nicias, and given a new and better place upon it, along with that of the younger Nicias. The tripods, like most valuable bronze dedications, have disappeared. But the temple of the younger Nicias was in later times taken down and built into the so-called Beulé Gate of the Acropolis, which was uncovered in 1852. In 1885 Professor Doerpfeld began the analysis of the remains of the temple, and its theoretical restoration. The subject has been much discussed (see Frazer's *Pausanias*, ii. p. 250; Harrison and Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Athens*, pp. 344–346; D'Ooge, *Acropolis of Athens*, pp. 262 ff.), but approaches final solution in W. B. Dinsmoor's paper on *The Choragic Monument of Nicias*, American Journal of Archaeology, xiv. (1910), pp. 459–484 (cf. xv. pp. 168 f.).

In the costume of Dionysus: not an actor in a play, but the leading, or solo singer in a Dionysiac dithyramb.

III. 4 f. **Outlays at Delos**: when performing the *Architheoria* (§ 5), or conducting an official embassy from the city to the sacred isle. Delos was the central and smallest island in the Cyclades group. As the reputed birth-place of Apollo, it had been from early times the seat of a national festival of the Ionians of Asia and the islands. The character of the festival is seen from Thucydides, iii. 104, and especially from

the verses of the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* there cited. "Musical and gymnastic contests were held there, and the cities celebrated choral dances." The Athenians had at one time participated in this festival, but it had been for a long while neglected, "owing to the misfortunes of Ionia". In the winter of 426 B. C., "the Athenians, by command of an oracle, purified the island. They took away the dead out of all the sepulchres which were in Delos, and passed a decree that henceforward no one should die or give birth to a child there, but that the inhabitants when they were near the time of either should be carried across to Rheneia. Now Rheneia is near to Delos, so near indeed that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who for a time had a powerful navy, attached this island, which he conquered with the rest of the islands and dedicated to the Delian Apollo, by a chain to Delos. After the purification, the Athenians for the first time celebrated the Delian games, which were held every four years." Possibly it was this newly instituted quadrennial festival which Nicias conducted with such lavish expenditures (Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. p. 1080). Boeckh, however (*Staatshaushaltung*[3], ii. p. 85), thought that Plutarch's language implied at least two celebrations before that which Nicias conducted, and assigned the year 418 to the latter. So Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*[2], p. 202.

From this great quadrennial festival, at which a trained chorus from Athens vied with choruses from other cities (Xen., *Mem.* iii. 3, 12), the annual *theoria*, or sending of the sacred ship of Theseus to Delos, must be distinguished. This was an embassy conveying thank offerings to Apollo for the victory of Theseus over the Minotaur, and the delivery of Athens from her novennial tribute of seven youths and seven maidens. According to Plutarch (*Theseus*, xxiii.), the vessel sent was the very one in which Theseus had sailed, though so repaired and restored as to have lost its material identity. It was the absence of this vessel on its annual mission which gave Socrates a month's reprieve from death (Plato, *Phaedo*, 58 A).

The strait between Rheneia and Delos: about half a mile wide, and interrupted by two bare rocks. The bridge of Nicias would seem to have been imitated in later celebrations (Hicks and Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 205).

III. 6. **Bronze palm-tree**: Odysseus compares Nausicaa to the sacred palm which he saw on Delos, near the altar of Apollo (*Od.*, vi. 162 f.). This palm became one of the traditional features of the sacred isle, and was still shown in Cicero's time. "It was believed to be the oldest palm-tree in the world and to have sprung up when Latona landed in Delos; in the act of giving birth to Apollo and Artemis she laid one hand on the palm-tree and the other hand on an olive. From this same sacred palm Theseus broke the branch wherewith he crowned the victors in the games which he celebrated at Delos" (Frazer, on Pausanias, viii. 48, 2).

Ten thousand drachmas: about $2000, or £400, with four or five times the present purchasing power of money. The drachma was a silver coin of about the worth of the French franc. In weight and value it was the hundredth part of a mina, and contained six obols. An obol, therefore, corresponded in value nearly to the English penny. Sixty minas made a talent, which was equivalent to about $1200, or £225.

Graven on the stone: fulfilling his promise in i. 5 of collecting material "found on ancient votive offerings", Plutarch gives us the gist of this Delian inscription. He may well have found it in Philochorus (Introd. p. 34).

Colossal statue of the god: excavations have brought to light the base of this statue of Apollo *in situ*, and adjacent to it sundry fragments of the statue itself. See Baedecker's *Greece* (1894), p. 144, and *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, xvii. (1893), pp. 129–144.

IV. 1. **Ostentatious publicity**: reading *πανηγυρικόν*, with Madvig.

As Thucydides says: in describing the effect upon the Athenian army at Syracuse of an eclipse of the moon (vii.

50, 4). Much of the sternness of the historian's judgment is lost in Plutarch's citation. Nicias was "far too much addicted to divination and similar religious practices". See chap. xxiii. and notes.

IV. 2. **One of the dialogues of Pasiphon**: a dialogue entitled "Nicias", though sometimes attributed to Phaedo, the disciple of Socrates, was probably the work of Pasiphon the Eretrian, a notorious imitator of the Socratic disciples, to whom he attributed his own compositions. See the Introduction, pp. 11 f.

Silver mines in Laurium: the peninsula forming the south-eastern extremity of Attica furnished the Athenian state with most of the silver which it coined so abundantly during the fifth century B. C. It was the revenue from the mines here which enabled Athens to become the foremost maritime power in Greece. "The Athenians, having a large sum of money in their treasury, the produce of the mines at Laureium, were about to share it among the full-grown citizens, who would have received ten drachmas apiece, when Themistocles persuaded them to forbear the distribution, and build with the money two hundred ships, to help them in their war against the Eginetans. It was the breaking out of the Eginetan war which was at this time the saving of Greece, for hereby were the Athenians forced to become a maritime power. The new ships were not used for the purpose for which they had been built, but became a help to Greece in her hour of need" (Herod., vii. 144). See the note on the *Themistocles*, iv. 2. The mines were the property of the state, and were leased to private individuals, who paid the price of the lease and one twenty-fourth of the produce into the public treasury. During the Peloponnesian war they continued to yield the state a revenue, but gradually declined in productiveness. By the time of Augustus they were abandoned. In recent times, however, the mines have been actively worked again, and modern processes have made the refuse of the ancient mining operations valuable. Lead, and not silver, is the chief product of the modern mining.

A multitude of slaves: "It is an old story, trite enough to those of us who have cared to attend to it, how once on a time Nicias, the son of Niceratus, owned a thousand men in the silver mines, whom he let out to Sosias, a Thracian, on the following terms. Sosias was to pay him a net obol a day, without charge or deduction, for every slave of the thousand, and be responsible for keeping up the number perpetually at that figure" (Xen., *On Revenues*, iv. 14, Dakyns' translation). "What say you, Antisthenes?— have friends their values like domestic slaves? One of these latter may be worth perhaps two minae, another only half a mina, a third five, and a fourth as much as ten; while they do say that Nicias, the son of Niceratus, paid a whole talent for a superintendent of his silver mines" (Xen., *Mem.* ii. 5, 2). See on iii. 6.

IV. 4. **Telecleides**: one of the older poets of Old Comedy (Introd., pp. 1 f.), but partly contemporary with Aristophanes. His ridicule of Pericles is cited by Plutarch in the *Pericles*, iii. 4 and xvi. 2. The title of the play from which the following extract is taken is not known (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 219).

Public informer: Athenian law permitted any person to bring information against public offenders, and prosecute them in the courts. The privilege came to be much abused, and innocent men would often pay liberally to escape the annoyance of a public prosecution. Rich men in particular found it expedient to be on good terms with the professional informer. See the art. *Sycophantes* in Smith's *Dict. of Antiquities* (third ed.).

Charicles: prominent in 415 B. C. in the official efforts to discover the authors of the *Hermae*-outrage; strategus in 414–413; and afterwards, in 404, one of the "Thirty Tyrants".

IV. 5. **Eupolis**: one of the younger poets of Old Comedy, like Aristophanes. As Aristophanes had lampooned the demagogue Cleon in his *Knights*, of the year 424, so Eupolis caricatured the demagogue Hyperbolus in his *Maricas*, of the year 421. Aristophanes accuses Eupolis of plagiarism

(*Clouds*, 553–556). For the verses here cited, see Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 308.

IV. 6. **The Cleon of Aristophanes**: in the *Knights* (v. 358), in which Nicias and Demosthenes are represented as slaves in the household of the Athenian Demus, and terrorized by a newly purchased Paphlagonian slave (Cleon) until rescued by a rampant sausage-seller, it is not the Paphlagonian (Cleon), but the sausage-seller, Agoracritus, who utters the verse here cited. He will out-bawl the orators bawl they ever so loudly, and confound the timid Nicias.

Phrynichus: also one of the younger poets of Old Comedy. He won the third place in 414, when Aristophanes was second with his *Birds*, and the second place in 405, when Aristophanes was first with his *Frogs*. The name of the play from which the verses here cited come, is not certain (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 385).

V. 1. **Would neither dine, etc.**: from very different motives Pericles also is said to have held himself aloof from social life (*Pericles*, vii. 4).

General: there were ten of these, one from each of the ten tribes, elected annually by show of hands in the Ecclesia, or General Assembly. "Originally nothing more than the commanders of the tribal regiments, ... the strategi came to be the most important officials of the state. In addition to their command of the army, they came to conduct the foreign policy of Athens, while as guardians of the state in time of peace as well as of war, they were responsible not only for keeping open supplies of food from abroad, but for protecting the state from treasonable attacks on the part of her own children" (Gardner-Jevons, *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, pp. 468 ff.).

Councillor: member of the Council of Five Hundred, created by Cleisthenes (510–508 B.C.), and composed of fifty men from each of the ten tribes, elected annually and by lot from a body of citizens nominated by their demes, or townships, for this post. The Council really served as a large executive committee for the Ecclesia, or General As-

sembly, and all its members were also members of the Ecclesia (Gardner-Jevons, *op. cit.*, pp. 484 ff.).

V. 2. **Hiero**: not otherwise known. The details of his relations to Nicias are probably taken from the dialogue of Pasiphon mentioned in iv. 2, and Pasiphon (or whoever the author is from whom Plutarch directly or indirectly draws this material) probably got them from the comic poets (Introduction, pp. 1 f.). There is therefore much allowance to be made for exaggeration.

Dionysius: Athenaeus (xv. p. 669 d) speaks of him as orator and poet, and explains his surname of *Chalcus*, or "The Copper", from his having advised the Athenians to mint a small copper coin of the value of ⅛ of an obol, or less than a farthing. His poems are often referred to, and sometimes cited. Seven fragments appear in Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*[4], ii. pp. 262 ff. They are of light, symposiac nature. He must, however, have been a man of influence, since he was one of the commission of ten appointed by Athens (scholiast on Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 332) to lead the colonizing expedition to Thurii, in 444 B.C. To this commission Lampon the Seer, whom Pericles favored, belonged (see the *Pericles*, vi. 2 and note). There was probably something of the seer and prophet in Dionysius also, since Hiero wished to be believed his son.

V. 4. **Could say what Agamemnon did**: this ornamental citation from the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* of Euripides (vv. 445 f.), is probably Plutarch's own supplement to the material derived from Pasiphon's dialogue. Kirchhoff corrects the MSS. of Euripides into agreement with the citation in Plutarch (reading, however, τε for δε in both clauses).

VI.–XXVII. Having discussed the "nature" and "character" of Nicias in chapters ii.–v., Plutarch now begins the recital of his "deeds", in the second main division of the *Life*. See the first note on ii. 1.

VI. 1. **Fining Pericles**: in the autumn of 430, Pericles was deposed from his office of general, tried before a court of fifteen hundred jurors, found guilty of a misuse of the public

funds, and fined fifty talents. The sentence was purely political in its bearing. See the *Pericles*, xxxii. 2, xxxv. 4, and notes.

Ostracising Damon: the institution of ostracism, devised by Cleisthenes the reformer (510–508), provided that every year, if the Assembly of the people so desired, the citizens of Athens might vote in the agora by tribes, each citizen placing in an urn a potsherd (*ostrakon*) inscribed with the name of the person whom he wished to be "ostracised". The voting was not valid unless six thousand votes at least were cast (according to Philochorus, *Frag.* 79 b, unless the person ostracised had at least six thousand votes), and whoever had most *ostraka* inscribed with his name was condemned to leave Attica within ten days for ten years. He was allowed, however, to receive the revenues from his property, and remained a citizen *in absentiâ*. Originally intended to put into the hands of the people the means of removing an ambitious noble who was scheming to restore the "tyranny", and twice so employed in the ostracisms of Hipparchus (487) and Megacles (486), the institution came, as early as 484, when Xanthippus, and 482, when Aristides was ostracised, to be used for the removal of a powerful opposition to the wishes of a majority of the people. In a way, therefore, it led to a tyranny of the majority, which is the worst of all tyrannies. Grote defended this peculiar institution as a necessary safeguard of democracy during the gradual development at Athens of a "constitutional morality" (*Hist. of Greece*, iii. pp. 372 ff.).

Damon was a celebrated musician, philosopher, and statesman, to whose teachings many of the most advanced democratic ideas of Pericles were ascribed. His political activity was afterwards obscured, like that of Ephialtes, by the more eminent services of Pericles. The real grounds for his ostracism therefore remain unknown. We cannot believe what Plutarch says (*Aristides*, i. 5), that it was "because he was thought to be rather extraordinary in his wisdom", nor does the great biographer come much nearer the truth when he

says (*Pericles*, iv. 2) that Damon "was ostracised for being a great schemer and a friend of tyranny". The Damonides of Oea, who, according to Aristotle (*Const. of Athens*, xxvii. 4), was ostracised because he was thought to have suggested most of his political innovations to Pericles, was in all probability the same person (see the note on the *Pericles*, iv. 2). It is possible that in some reaction against the more radical measures of Pericles, of which we have no definite record, Damon (Damonides) was ostracised to make way for more conservative counsels, or to rebuke a too presumptuous administration. The most probable date for this ostracism is between 450 and 446 B. C.

Discrediting Antiphon: though a man of the greatest gifts and powers, highly educated, and a trained rhetorician and orator, Antiphon never won the confidence of the people. He was born during the great Persian wars, not far from 480, and was always aristocratic in his political sympathies. He was placed first among the ten orators of the Attic canon, and some fifteen orations reputed to be his have come down to us, but the genuineness of many of these is disputed. He first took active and open part in politics during the revolution of the Four Hundred (411), and on the failure of this, was tried and executed. Thucydides departs from his usual impersonal methods to pay him a most remarkable tribute (viii. 68, 1–2). In it is a sentence which is the best commentary on the words of Plutarch: "To the multitude, who were suspicious of his great abilities, he was an object of dislike." Of course the condemnation of Antiphon cannot be referred to by Plutarch here, because that was subsequent to the death of Nicias.

VI. 2. **The fate of Paches**: this is included in another list of the shortcomings of the people in dealing with their leaders, — "the exile of Themistocles, the imprisonment of Miltiades, the fine of Pericles, the death of Paches in the court-room (he slew himself on the rostrum when he saw that he was convicted)", — given by Plutarch in his *Aristides*, xxvi. 3. Paches was the conqueror of the revolted

Mitylenaeans, in 427. Thucydides describes his expedition at great length, but says nothing of his death. Nor does Diodorus (Ephorus), though his account of the subjugation of Lesbos is somewhat detailed (xii. 55). The context of both passages in Plutarch implies that it was the ungrateful attitude of the people which drove Paches to the fatal deed, and this is doubtless true, although there is an epigram of Agathias (*floruit circa* 575 A. D.), preserved in the Palatine Anthology (vii. 614), which makes his death due to the testimony before the Athenian people of two beautiful women of Mitylene, to the effect that he had murdered their husbands in order to get them into his power for base uses. The story may, or may not be true. It was no uncommon thing at Athens for a successful general to be tried on his return from a campaign for malversation in office. The list of generals thus brought to trial is a long one. It begins with Miltiades, the victor of Marathon, and contains the names of Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Phormio, Paches, Thucydides the historian, and Alcibiades. "Whether the punishment of bad generals did the state good in any proportion to the evil wrought by the unjust accusation of faithful servants, is a question which may perhaps be debated. What is beyond the possibility of doubt is the injurious effect which the fear of accusation had on generals in the conduct of their campaigns" (Gardner-Jevons, *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, p. 469). We shall soon find this eminently true in the case of Nicias himself, before Syracuse (chap. xxii. 3; Thuc., vii. 48).

VI. 3. **Many great reverses**: the list is carelessly thrown together, and shows slight regard for chronological sequence, together with some inaccuracies.

Calliades: an error for Callias, the son of Calliades, who should not be associated with a "reverse". On the revolt of Potidaea, in 432, the Chalcidians also revolted and swore alliance with them. The Corinthians sent some two thousand troops to aid them, whereupon the Athenians "sent against the revolted towns forty ships and two thousand

of their own hoplites under the command of Callias the son of Calliades, and four others". In a battle under the walls of Potidaea, the Athenians were victorious, "raised a trophy, and granted the Potidaeans a truce for the burial of their dead. Of the Potidaeans and their allies, there fell somewhat less than three hundred; of the Athenians, a hundred and fifty, and their general Callias" (Thuc., i. 58–63).

Xenophon: in the summer of 429, the third year of the war, Potidaea being in the possession of the Athenians, they "sent an expedition against the Chalcidians of Thrace . . . . consisting of two thousand heavy-armed troops of their own and two hundred horsemen under the command of Xenophon the son of Euripides, and two others". They were outmaneuvered and put to flight by their enemies. "At length they escaped to Potidaea, and having recovered their dead under a flag of truce, returned to Athens with the survivors of their army, out of which they had lost four hundred and thirty men and all their generals" (Thuc., ii. 79). Xenophon was one of the generals to whom Potidaea had surrendered in 430 (Thuc., ii. 70).

The Aetolian disaster: in the summer of 426, the sixth year of the war, Demosthenes and Procles were sent with thirty ships round Peloponnesus. They were joined by a large armament in an attack upon the island and city of Leucas. But from this undertaking, which promised success, Demosthenes was lured away by the Messenians of Naupactus into an invasion of Aetolia, in the bold hope of penetrating by way of this country into Phocis and attacking Boeotia. Abandoned by the Acarnanians and Corcyraeans, "with the remainder of his army, which consisted of Cephallenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred marines belonging to the Athenian fleet," he set out on his rash march. In the heart of the wild Aetolian country his army was surrounded by the light-armed Aetolian mountaineers, defeated and dispersed. "Many of the allies fell, and of the Athenian heavy-armed about a hundred and twenty, all in the flower of their youth; they were the very finest men whom the city

of Athens lost during the war. Procles, one of the two generals, was also killed. When they had received the bodies of their dead under a flag of truce from the Aetolians, they retreated to Naupactus, and returned in their ships to Athens. Demosthenes remained behind in Naupactus and the neighborhood; for, after what had happened, he feared the anger of the Athenians" (Thuc., iii. 91, 94–98).

At Delium: in the summer of 424, the eighth year of the war, a plot for the betrayal of Boeotia into the hands of Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, was frustrated, and Hippocrates, who "had called out the whole force of Athens, metics as well as citizens, and all the strangers who were then in the city", fortified Delium, a temple of Apollo in Boeotia, and after leaving a garrison there, set out homewards with the rest of his army. The light-armed troops went on ahead, but the heavy-armed, some seven thousand in number, and the cavalry, halted to rest. They were attacked by the Boeotian army of seven thousand heavy-armed and ten thousand light-armed troops, and routed with great slaughter. "The Boeotians lost somewhat less than five hundred; the Athenians not quite a thousand, and Hippocrates their general. Delium was captured seventeen days after the battle" (Thuc., iv. 89–101).

The plague: in the winter of 427, "the plague, which had never entirely disappeared, although abating for a time, again attacked the Athenians. It continued on this second occasion not less than a year, having previously lasted for two years. To the power of Athens certainly nothing was more ruinous; not less than four thousand four hundred Athenian hoplites who were on the roll died, and also three hundred horsemen, and an incalculable number of the common people" (Thuc., iii. 87). For the details of the first visitation, see Thucydides, ii. 47–58, and Plutarch, *Pericles*, xxxiv.–xxxvi.

VI. 4. The list of Nicias' successes is even more careless, irregular, and inaccurate than that of the city's reverses. But this fact does not lessen materially the effectiveness of Plutarch's portraiture. Nicias took no chances, and was invari-

ably successful. This truth, emphasized also by Thucydides, deepens the tragedy of his final failure (*cf.* Thuc., v. 16, 1; vii. 77, 2).

Captured Cythera: in the summer of 424, the eighth year of the war, to offset, in some measure, the triumph of Cleon in the capture of Sphacteria (chap. viii.). The loss of Cythera, coming so soon after that of Pylos and Sphacteria, brought the Spartans to the verge of despair (Thuc., iv. 53–55). The reputed advice of Demaratus to Xerxes, that he seize this island of Cythera as a menace to Sparta (Herod., vii. 235), may well have been invented under the tremendous impression produced in the Hellenic world by this triumphant success of Nicias.

Captured many places in Thrace: this must refer to the expedition of Nicias and Nicostratus, in 423, to the Chalcidic peninsula, where they captured Mende, blockaded Scione, made favorable terms with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, who had previously been coöperating with the Spartan Brasidas, and then returned home (Thuc., iv. 129–133).

Minoa . . . . Nisaea: in this sentence Plutarch blends incidents of two entirely different expeditions, one under command of Nicias, in 427, the fifth year of the war, "against the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara" (Thuc., iii. 51); and one under command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, in 424, the eighth year of the war, which narrowly failed in an attempt to capture Megara, but did succeed in taking Nisaea, its harbor-city, connected with it by long walls (Thuc., iv. 66–69).

Descent upon Corinth: immediately after the surrender of Sphacteria, in the summer of 425, the seventh year of the war, "the Athenians attacked the Corinthian territory with eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and cavalry to the number of two hundred conveyed on horse transports. They were accompanied by allies from Miletus, Andros, and Carystus. Nicias the son of Niceratus, and two others, were in command" (Thuc., iv. 42, 1). The Athenians gained a partial victory only, on their left wing, where the Corinthians in-

curred a heavy loss, and where Lycophron, their general, was slain. The Athenian right wing was defeated and driven back to their ships. When reënforcements for the Corinthians came up, "the united army then advanced against the Athenians, who, fancying that a reinforcement had come from the neighbouring states of Peloponnesus, quickly retreated to their ships, taking their spoils and their own dead, with the exception of two whom they could not find; they then embarked and sailed to the neighbouring islands. Thence they sent a herald asking for a truce, and recovered the two dead bodies which were missing. The Corinthians lost two hundred and twelve men; the Athenians hardly so many as fifty" (Thuc., iv. 44).

VI. 5. **Left unnoticed on the field**: the tenor of the story is quite different from that of Thucydides, just cited, and aims to enhance the credit of Nicias, who really did nothing more than his plain duty.

VI. 6. **Ravaged the coasts of Laconia**: this was in 424, the eighth year of the war, immediately after the capture of Cythera (§ 4), from which island the Athenians "sailed away, made descents upon Asiné, Helos, and most of the other maritime towns of Laconia, and, encamping wherever they found convenient, ravaged the country for about seven days" (Thuc., iv. 54).

Captured Thyrea: in the summer of 431, the Athenians had "expelled the Aeginetans and their families from Aegina, alleging that they had been the main cause of the war. . . . The Lacedaemonians gave the Aeginetan exiles the town of Thyrea to occupy and the adjoining country to cultivate, partly in order to annoy the Athenians, partly out of gratitude to the Aeginetans, who had done them good service at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The Thyrean territory is a strip of land coming down to the sea on the borders of Argolis and Laconia. There some of them found a home; others dispersed over Hellas" (Thuc., ii. 27). Now, in 424, those who had found a home at Thyrea were either slain in battle by the Athenians, or

carried alive to Athens and put to death there (Thuc., iv. 57, 4). Of those who, in 431, had "dispersed over Hellas", as many as could be collected together were restored to their island by Lysander, after the fall of Athens, in 404 (see the note on the *Themistocles*, iv. 1).

VII. In iv. 2–41, Thucydides relates, in his most circumstantial and graphic manner, the campaign at Pylos and Sphacteria, a major episode of the war, second perhaps in importance only to the Sicilian expedition. It is impossible to condense this narrative of Thucydides without some loss of clarity and vigor. How poorly it can be done, may be seen in the pages of Diodorus (Ephorus), xii. 61–63; how well, in this seventh chapter of the *Nicias* (together with one sentence of the eighth), where one third of the space occupied by Diodorus serves to give us what is, on the whole, an admirable résumé of the famous Thucydidean episode.

VII. 1. **Demosthenes fortified Pylos**: Pylos was an ancient, ruined citadel, on the precipitous promontory of Coryphasium, at the north-western edge of a great harbor on the western coast of Messenia, — the modern bay of Navarino. In front of the harbor, running north and south, lay the narrow island of Sphacteria, leaving entrances into the harbor at its two extremities. In the spring of 425 B. C., the Athenians sent a fleet of forty ships under Eurymedon and Sophocles to reënforce their fleet already operating about Sicily under Pythodorus. Demosthenes, who had partially redeemed by subsequent successes his defeat in Aetolia (see on vi. 3), obtained permission to go with this fleet, and to make such use of it on the coast of Peloponnesus as he desired. A storm drove the fleet into the harbor of Pylos. "Instantly Demosthenes urged them to fortify the place; this being the project which he had in view when he accompanied the fleet" (Thuc., iv. 3, 2). Neither generals nor soldiers would listen to him at first, but being detained there by bad weather, they at last began the work, and in six days completed it, and then left Demosthenes there with five ships to defend it. Good results followed immediately. The Spar-

tans withdrew their army of invasion from Attica, and closed in upon Pylos with fleet and army. Their fleet occupied the harbor of Pylos, and they posted a large detachment of hoplites on the island of Sphacteria.

A battle was fought: the Lacedaemonians tried in vain to storm the position of Demosthenes, and the main Athenian fleet, returning from Zacynthus in answer to his summons, crushed the Spartan fleet and blockaded on the island of Sphacteria a detachment of four hundred and twenty hoplites, "besides the Helots who attended them" (Thuc., iv. 8, 9). This produced the utmost consternation at Sparta, whose magistrates "decided that with the consent of the Athenian generals they would suspend hostilities at Pylos, and sending ambassadors to ask for peace at Athens, would endeavour to recover their men as soon as possible" (Thuc., iv. 15, 2).

VII. 2. **Vote down the truce**: he persuaded them to make extravagant demands, and then to refuse the request of the Spartan envoys for the appointment of special commissioners to discuss with them the terms of agreement. Unwilling to plead their cause before the whole Assembly, the Spartan envoys returned home (Thuc., iv. 21–22). Thucydides says nothing about Cleon's being actuated by hatred of Nicias, and it is not necessary, though it may be natural, to infer this. And in judging Cleon's course it will be well to remember the words of Grote, who speaks of him (v. p. 240) as "a man who — like leading journals in modern times — often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences".

Angry with Cleon: according to Thucydides (iv. 27, 3), Cleon knew "that he was an object of general mistrust because he had stood in the way of peace".

VII. 3. **It 's not too late, etc.**: "Nicias perceived that the multitude were murmuring at Cleon, and asking 'why he did not sail — now was his time if he thought the cap-

ture of Sphacteria to be such an easy matter'" (Thuc., iv. 28, 1).

VII. 4. **Tried to draw back**: "Cleon at first imagined that the offer of Nicias was only a pretence, and was willing to go; but finding that he was in earnest, he tried to back out, and said that not he but Nicias was general. . . . At length, not knowing how to escape from his own words, he undertook the expedition" (Thuc., iv. 28).

Moved to laughter: "His vain words moved the Athenians to laughter; nevertheless the wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected that of two good things they could not fail to obtain one — either there would be an end of Cleon, which they would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed, he would put the Lacedaemonians into their hands" (Thuc., *ibid.*).

VII. 5. **It is said**: the ultimate source of the anecdote may well have been some comic poet, though it is first found in Theopompus (*Frag.* 99). Plutarch alludes to it also in his *Praec. ger. reip.*, 3 = *Morals*, p. 799 D.

On the hill: in the Pnyx, "about a quarter of a mile to the west of the Acropolis, on the north-eastern slope of the low rocky hill which rises between the Museum hill (to the south), the Areopagus (to the north-east), and the Hill of the Nymphs (to the north). The place is a huge artificial platform or terrace in the form of a semicircle. . . . It is well adapted to be a place of public assembly, and could easily accommodate far more than the six or seven thousand persons who seem occasionally to have gathered to vote" (Frazer, *Pausanias*, ii. pp. 375 ff.). After the year 332 B. C., the theatre of Dionysus became the regular place of assembly for the people.

VIII. 1. The first sentence summarizes the detailed and graphic story of Thucydides in iv. 29–39. The rest of the paragraph is natural inference, though not expressly stated by Thucydides. To atone for his mistake, Nicias became feverishly active, and his campaigns against Cythera and Corinth were meant to be an offset to the success of Cleon at Sphacteria.

Served as general. . . . with Demosthenes: Demosthenes had learned by a bitter experience in Aetolia, the year before, that heavy-armed troops could not cope with light-armed in a wooded country. He was still general, though without stated command, except as he had been given permission to utilize the passage of the Athenian fleet round Peloponnesus, on its way to Sicily, for his own secret purposes. Now that his plans had been so signally successful, he saw that the Lacedaemonians on Sphacteria must be overwhelmed by direct attack, but found that Nicias, who, as head of the college of generals, was directing the campaign from Athens, was unwilling to have the risks of such tactics taken. Demosthenes therefore (in all probability) came to some understanding with Cleon, and fully explained to him the needs of the unusual case. It is not unlikely that in the Assembly Cleon really outwitted Nicias. At any rate, he finally agreed to assume the command against Pylos "if he were allowed to have the Lemnian and Imbrian forces now at Athens, the auxiliaries from Aenus, who were targeteers, and four hundred archers from other places. With these and with the troops already at Pylos he gave his word that within twenty days he would either bring the Lacedaemonians alive or kill them on the spot" (Thuc., iv. 28, 4). Then, having been formally authorized by the Assembly to make the attempt, — apparently so rash, but really so carefully considered and planned by Demosthenes, — "he made choice of Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylos, to be his colleague, and proceeded to sail with all speed" (Thuc., iv. 29, 1). Thucydides, in his contempt for Cleon, does some injustice also to Demosthenes in not making clear that enterprising general's part in the plans which resulted in such complete success. Demosthenes probably made the plans, and executed them, but Cleon's coöperation in the Assembly alone made it possible for him to get the light-armed troops necessary for the execution of them, and unimpeded authority as general in the use of all his forces. Being a vainglorious man, Cleon claimed and received more

credit for the eventual capture of the Lacedaemonians on Sphacteria than he deserved. And the comic poets, especially Aristophanes, in his *Knights*, go to the other extreme and deny that he deserved any credit at all. Demosthenes had the Spartan cake at Pylos all kneaded and baked, when Cleon stole it away and served it up at Athens (*Knights*, vv. 54–57).

Prisoners of war: "The number of the dead and the prisoners was as follows: Four hundred and twenty hoplites in all passed over into the island; of these, two hundred and ninety-two were brought to Athens alive, the remainder had perished. Of the survivors the Spartans numbered about a hundred and twenty. . . . On the arrival of the captives the Athenians resolved to put them in chains until peace was concluded, but if in the meantime the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica, to bring them out and put them to death" (Thuc., iv. 38, 5; 41, 1). The captives were surrendered on the conclusion of peace in 421 (Thuc., v. 24, 1). The Spartans among them were for a time deprived of the rights of citizenship (*Ibid.*, 34, 2).

Cast away his shield: the mark of cowardice in a common soldier. "A man does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his shield; he may be only the loser of his arms" (Plato, *Laws*, p. 944 B).

VIII. 2. **Again scoffs at him**: Aristophanes has already been cited against Nicias in iv. 6. The *Birds* was brought out in the spring of 414, while Nicias was absent on the Sicilian expedition. The verses here cited (vv. 638 f.) are spoken by the Hoopoe, after Peisthetaerus has propounded to the birds his scheme for a cloud-city, and they have eagerly adopted it. The next verse continues: "But just as soon as ever may be, we must act." The reference is therefore either to the hesitating conduct of Nicias in getting the expedition under way, or, perhaps, to his failure to accomplish anything important since the expedition started, six months before. In no case can the reference be to his treatment of the Sphacteria problem.

Only fragments of the *Farmers* have come down to us. It would seem to have been brought out shortly after the campaign at Pylos, judging from the verses here cited (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 416), and other citations bespeak for it the same general character as that of the *Acharnians*, — a plea for peace. One of the rural population imprisoned within the walls of the city by the Spartan invasions, wants to revisit his farm in the country, and buys the privilege of doing so from the Assembly.

VIII. 3. **Stripped the bema of decorum**: of Cleon, Aristotle says (*Const. of Athens*, xxviii. 3): "He seems most of all to have corrupted the people by his wild schemes, and he was the first to yell upon the bema, and to resort to coarse abuse, and to harangue with his robe girt high up, whereas others spoke with decorum." However, Plutarch is not using Aristotle here, but Theopompus, who drew from the same source as Aristotle (Introd., p. 4). Plutarch's citations from Aristophanes also are probably due to Theopompus.

The bema was a cube of rock about eleven feet square, resting on a three-stepped platform which projected from the wall of rock forming the chord of the semi-circular Pnyx terrace (see the note on vii. 5). The orators ascended this bema to address the Assembly.

IX. 1. **Alcibiades a power**: from 425 onwards he is prominent enough in Athenian life to be a mark for the raillery of Aristophanes; by 421 he has a political following. See the *Alcibiades*, chap. xiii.

Drugs . . . deadly: a verse from the *Odyssey*, iv. 230.

IX. 2. **The way it came about**: The phrase covers the narrative following as far as the close of chap. x., which condenses Thucydides v. 18–56, and shows that Plutarch regarded the war as reopened in 419, when the Athenians put Helots back in Pylos to ravage Laconian territory from there. But the "doubtful truce", as Thucydides characterizes the Peace of Nicias (v. 26, 3), lasted, according to him, until the Spartans renewed their invasions of Attica, in 414, as retaliation for Athenian ravaging of Laconian territory

(v. 25, 3; vi. 105; vii. 18). "Including the first ten years' war, the doubtful truce which followed, and the war which followed that, he who reckons up the actual periods of time will find that the war lasted twenty-seven years. If any one argue that the interval during which the truce continued should be excluded, he is mistaken. The term 'peace' can hardly be applied to a state of things in which . . . . there were violations of the treaty on both sides."

Cleon and Brasidas: "When Athens had received a second blow at Amphipolis, and Brasidas and Cleon, who had been the two greatest enemies of peace, — the one because the war brought him success and reputation, and the other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries would be more transparent and his slanders less credible, — had fallen in the battle, the two chief aspirants for political power at Athens and Sparta, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the son of Niceratus the Athenian, who had been the most fortunate general of his day, become more eager than ever to make an end of the war" (Thuc., v. 16, 1).

IX. 3. **The battle before Amphipolis**: in the autumn of 422. A graphic description of it is given in Thucydides, v. 8–11.

To give himself rest: See the citation from Thucydides in the note on ii. 4.

IX. 4. **Held out hopes to the Spartans**: no such prominence is given to Nicias in the account of the negotiations which Thucydides has (v. 17), but it is reasonable inference and individualization on the part of Plutarch.

IX. 5. **Stay of hostilities for a year**: in the spring of 423, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians made a preliminary truce for a year. Each party was to remain within its own territory and retain what it had. During the year of truce, ambassadors were to go from one state to the other with proposals for a definite peace. But Brasidas in Thrace refused to be bound by the truce, and hostilities therefore continued in that quarter (Thuc., iv. 117–135). After the

truce had expired, early in 422, Cleon made his fatal expedition for the recapture of Amphipolis (Thuc., v. 1–11).

Let my spear, etc.: The first verse of a beautiful fragment of the *Erechtheus* of Euripides (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*^{2}, p. 474), which continues: —

> "And let me come in peace to dwell with hoary age;
> And let me wreathe my hoary head with wreaths and sing,
> My Thracian shield upon Athena's pillared house hung high,
> And let me hear from out the tablets' folds the words that wise men utter."

The context in Plutarch is thought to give a clue to the date of the lost play.

The saying: a folk-proverb, probably. Polybius, in his tirade against Timaeus (xii. 25 *fin.*, 26 *init.*), accuses him of putting into the mouth of Hermocrates, the Syracusan general, "certain sentences of which one could scarcely believe that any commonplace youth would have been capable. For first he 'thinks that he should remind the congress that in war sleepers are woke at dawn by bugles, in peace by cocks'. Next he remarks that 'war is like disease, peace like health. . . . Moreover, in time of peace, the old are buried by the young as nature directs, while in war the case is reversed' — and so on. I wonder what other arguments would have been employed by a youth who had just devoted himself to scholastic exercises and studies in history, and who wished, according to the rules of the art, to adapt his words to the supposed speakers? Just these, I think, which Timaeus represents Hermocrates as using" (Schuckburgh's translation).

IX. 6. **Thrice nine years**: "For I well remember how, from the beginning to the end of the war, there was a common and often-repeated saying that it was to last thrice nine years. This was the solitary instance in which those who put their faith in oracles were justified by the event" (Thuc., v. 26, 4).

IX. 7. **Peace the work of Nicias**: Nicias is not specially prominent in Thucydides' account of the actual peace nego-

tiations. He was one of the three Athenians appointed to ratify by oath the one year's truce (iv. 119, 2), and one of the seventeen to ratify the fifty year peace, one year later (v. 19, 2). Still, there is no doubt that, after the death of Cleon, Nicias was the most influential man at Athens. In v. 43, 2, Thucydides speaks of the Lacedaemonians as negotiating the peace through Nicias and Laches, and in v. 46, 4 of Nicias as being held responsible at Athens for the peace. Andocides speaks of the peace as "the one which Nicias the son of Niceratus effected for us" (iii. 8, delivered about 391 B.C.).

X. 1. **Articles of peace**: they are given in full by Thucydides in v. 18. Amphipolis and Panactum were the principal places to be restored by the Lacedaemonians; Coryphasium and Cythera by the Athenians. But of course the main object of Sparta was the recovery of the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. Panactum was a fortress on the northern Athenian frontier which had been betrayed to the Boeotians in 422 (Thuc., v. 3 *fin.*).

First to make restoration: "The Lacedaemonians — for the lot having fallen upon them they had to make restoration first — immediately released their prisoners, and sending three envoys to Chalcidice, commanded Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians" (Thuc., v. 21, 1). The charge of Theophrastus (Introd., p. 35) that Nicias bought up the lot, is absurd. It is characteristic of the spirit of the Peripatetic school of biography.

X. 2. **A mutual alliance**: the fifty years' peace was between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and their respective allies. But the vote for it was by no means unanimous. The Boeotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleans were bitterly dissatisfied (Thuc., v. 17, 2). Their special grievances against Athens were far from being healed by the general peace. They therefore refused to accept the treaty, whereupon "the Lacedaemonians proceeded on their own account to make an alliance with the Athenians" (Thuc., v. 22, 2). They hoped by this step to isolate the powerful

state of Argos. A truce for thirty years which they had made with Argos had recently expired, and the Argives were unwilling to renew it except on terms which Sparta would not grant. "The Lacedaemonians deemed it impossible to fight against the Argives and Athenians combined. They suspected also that some of the Peloponnesian cities would secede and join the Argives, which proved to be the case" (Thuc., v. 14, 4).

X. 3. **A separate alliance with the Boeotians**: finding that the Argives were forming a Peloponnesian alliance hostile to Sparta, and that Panactum could not be restored to the Athenians without the consent of the Boeotians who were in possession of it, the Lacedaemonians yielded to the request of the Boeotians for a separate alliance, although they knew that this involved a breach of faith with the Athenians. A strong party which wished the peace with Athens broken "were zealous on behalf of the Boeotians. So they made the alliance about the end of winter and the beginning of spring [420]. The Boeotians at once commenced the demolition of Panactum" (Thuc., v. 39).

Nor Amphipolis at all: the Lacedaemonians had withdrawn their troops from this city, but could not force it back into Athenian possession. They protested, however, that "they had neglected nothing which lay within their power" (Thuc., v. 35, 5).

X. 4. **An embassy from Argos to Athens**: Alcibiades had opposed the general peace on the ground that Sparta's object in making it was to enable her to crush Argos before attacking Athens again. "As soon as the rupture occurred he promptly dispatched a private message to the Argives, bidding them send an embassy as quickly as they could, together with representatives of Mantinea and Elis, and invite the Athenians to enter the alliance" (Thuc., v. 43, 3). Argive ambassadors were at that very time trying to negotiate a peace with Sparta, and a written treaty had actually been drawn up, but not ratified. The message of Alcibiades showed the Argives that the Spartan alliance with Boeotia

had been made without the knowledge of Athens, and that Athens and Sparta were again at odds. "They reflected that Athens was a city which had been their friend of old; like their own it was governed by a democracy, and would be a powerful ally to them at sea, if they were involved in war. They at once sent envoys to negotiate an alliance with the Athenians; the Eleans and Mantineans joined in the embassy. Thither also came in haste three envoys from Lacedaemon. . . . They were sent because the Lacedaemonians were afraid that the Athenians in their anger would join the Argive alliance. The envoys, while they demanded the restoration of Pylos in return for Panactum, were to apologize for the alliance with the Boeotians, and to explain that it was not made with any view to the injury of Athens" (Thuc., v. 44).

Circumvented them: the story of Alcibiades' parliamentary trick upon Nicias, which now follows (§§ 4–8) is, on the whole, a very good condensation of Thucydides, v. 45–46. The aim of Alcibiades was to alienate the Spartan envoys from Nicias, "and to bring about an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, which he hoped to effect, if he could only discredit them in the assembly, and create the impression that their intentions were not honest, and that they never told the same tale twice."

X. 6. **The Assembly was dissolved**: when a "sign from Zeus" occurred, such as thunder and lightning, earthquakes, or prodigies of any kind, it was in the power of any member of the Assembly to insist that it be dissolved.

Send him on an embassy: "He prevailed on them to send envoys, of whom he was himself one, requiring the Lacedaemonians . . . to restore Amphipolis, to rebuild and restore Panactum, and to renounce their alliance with the Boeotians" (Thuc., v. 46, 2).

X. 7. **The party which had Boeotian sympathies**: "The Lacedaemonians refused to give up their Boeotian alliance, Xenares, the Ephor, with his friends and partisans, carrying this point" (Thuc., v. 46, 4).

To the leading families of Sparta: of the two hundred and ninety-two captives brought alive to Athens (Thuc., iv. 38, 5, cited in the note on viii. 1), only about a hundred and twenty were Spartans, *i. e.* full citizens and descendants of the ancient Dorian conquerors. The term "Lacedaemonians" includes the Perioeci, or freemen without rights of citizenship. Much the same statement about these Spartans is apparently made in a corrupt passage of Thucydides (v. 15, 1).

X. 8. **Elected Alcibiades general**: this was probably not until the spring of the following year (419), as is implied by Thucydides, v. 52, 2. Plutarch is careless of chronological sequence in a group of events.

An alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans, Argives: to continue for a hundred years. The terms are given in full by Thucydides in v. 47. It was merely a defensive alliance.

Sent freebooters to Pylos: in the summer of 421, the Athenians had been persuaded by the Spartans to withdraw from Pylos the Messenians, Helots, and Lacedaemonian deserters with whom the place was garrisoned, and hold it themselves. The objectionable garrison was settled by the Athenians in the island of Cephallenia (Thuc., v. 35, 7 f.). In the winter of 419, by the advice of Alcibiades, who was now one of the generals, these marauders were sent back to Pylos (Thuc., v. 56, 3).

Plunged again into war: see the note on ix. 2.

XI. 1. **At last**: in 417, after the so-called Argive war had ended in the defeat of the Argives and their Athenian allies at Mantinea, and Sparta had regained her old prestige in the Hellenic world. Then the peace party, headed by Nicias, got the upper hand again, and the far-reaching schemes of Alcibiades suffered eclipse.

The process of ostracism: see the note on vi. 1.

From time to time: the privilege of ostracism had been exercised only eight times before this. The first four cases are mentioned in the note on vi. 1. Themistocles was ostracised about 472, Cimon in 461, Damon, or Damonides of

Oea, perhaps between 450 and 446, and Thucydides son of Melesias in 442.

An object of suspicion or jealousy: Plutarch almost invariably fails to give the true object of ostracism. He has no conception of its political significance. See the *Themistocles*, xxii. 2; the *Aristides*, vii. 2; the *Cimon*, xvii. 2, with the notes. In the first sentence of § 3 below, he seems to grasp, for a moment, the real principle of this peculiar political institution, as it came at last to be operated. The people ostracised a man when a sufficient number of them preferred that the party which he opposed should be no longer obstructed in its policies.

XI. 2. **In his biography**: see especially chapter xvi. of the *Alcibiades*.

Nicias' way of life: see chapter v.

XI. 3. **In a time of sedition, etc.**: a proverb in hexameter verse, attributed to Callimachus, the Alexandrian poet and scholar (310–235 B. C.). Plutarch uses it also in his *De fraterno amore*, 2 = *Morals*, p. 479 A.

Hyperbolus: as in the case of Cleon, it is difficult to form a just opinion of this his successor in the leadership of the advanced democracy, because he is so mercilessly lampooned by the comic poets, and so scornfully condemned by Thucydides (see below on § 4). Like Cleon, Hyperbolus was a manufacturer, and not a man of ancient family. The industrial and commercial class found in him a fervid advocate of its favorite measures, especially of extended wars of conquest. But the brilliant Alcibiades was displacing him as a leader of the people, so that there were really two representatives of extreme democracy opposed to the conservative and peace-loving Nicias. Hyperbolus was glad to have the people resort to the process of ostracism, hoping that they would choose between Nicias and Alcibiades. But Alcibiades shrewdly managed to have the choice made between Nicias and Hyperbolus. He was probably aided in this political maneuver by Phaeax and a body of young aristocrats under his guidance, who favored war measures. See below on § 7.

XI. 4. **Took secret counsel with one another**: it is doubtful whether Nicias was privy to the maneuver. The collapse of Alcibiades' plans for an alliance of Peloponnesian states against Sparta, coupled with the distrust which was felt towards him on account of his wanton life, makes it seem probable, so far as we can now judge the political situation, that the ostracism would have fallen upon him, but for the coalition which he effected with a section of the aristocratic party led by Phaeax.

Hyperbolus instead: Thucydides makes no mention of this ostracism at the time it occurred. But in describing the revolution of the Four Hundred, in 411, he says that a body of oligarchic conspirators in the Athenian army, then at Samos, plotted to support their political brethren in Athens, "and prepared to attack the rest of the popular party who had previously been their comrades. There was a certain Hyperbolus, an Athenian of no character, who, not for any fear of his power and influence, but for his villainy, and because the city was ashamed of him, had been ostracised. This man was assassinated by them" (Thuc., viii. 73, 3). A scholiast on Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1007, apparently puts the assassination of Hyperbolus six years after his ostracism. At Samos, then, six years after his banishment from Athens, Hyperbolus was a leader of the advanced democracy in the Athenian army, and, as such, had to be put out of the way by oligarchical plotters. It is safe to say also, in spite of Thucydides, that it was in consequence of his great political influence that he was ostracised, and not because "the city was ashamed of him", as Thucydides was.

XI. 5. **Thucydides**: the son of Melesias, the able opponent of Pericles. He was the last victim of the ostracism before Hyperbolus, in 442. His removal from Athens gave Pericles a free hand in carrying out his imperial policies. See the *Pericles*, xiv. 2 and note.

Aristides: Aristotle (*Const. of Athens*, xxii. 7) tells us that the ostracism of Aristides was coincident with the passage of the naval bill of Themistocles (483–482 B. C.). The removal

of Aristides, that is to say, was not due to any "envious dislike of his reputation", as Plutarch puts it (*Aristides*, vii. 2), but to the wish of the Athenian people that Themistocles should have his way in the creation of a great navy.

XI. 6. **Plato the comic poet**: a contemporary and rival of Aristophanes. He took the third prize with a "Cleophon" when Aristophanes took the first with his "Frogs" (405 B. C.). The name of the play from which the following verses are taken, is uncertain (Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 654).

For men of old: reading Kock's *τῶν προτέρων* for *τῶν τρόπων*.

He was the last: heretofore the ostracism had been employed by the people (1) to remove a powerful noble suspected of designs for the restoration of the "tyranny", as in the cases of Hipparchus and Megacles; (2) to remove powerful opposition to the will of the majority, as in the cases of Xanthippus, Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, and Thucydides son of Melesias; or (3) to rebuke and weaken a too aggressive administration by the removal of a devoted counselor and supporter, as in the case of Damonides. In all these cases the ostracism had fallen upon men of high birth or distinction. But now, in consequence of a shrewd political maneuver, it had fallen upon a vulgar demagogue, and apparently left the issue of war or peace, on which the citizens were divided, as uncertain as before. No wonder then that later historians like Ephorus and Theopompus, whom Plutarch echoes, were led by the scornful words of Thucydides to speak of the last ostracism as a fiasco, so shameful as to bring the Athenians to abandon thenceforth the institution itself. In his *Aristides*, vii. 3, Plutarch says that by the ostracism of Hyperbolus the people "felt that the institution had been insulted and abused, and so they abandoned it utterly and put an end to it." But this is in all probability Plutarch's own inference from the fact that the process of the ostracism was never resorted to again. The reasons for this lay rather in the loss of imperial power by Athens, and of freedom from foreign influence, so that her politics never

again developed such acute internal crises as to make an ostracism seem desirable. It had been employed at ever increasing intervals, and now lapsed.

But even this last ostracism was by no means the political fiasco which later writers represented it to be. The elimination of Hyperbolus led to greater unity in the war party which was opposing Nicias, so that in less than two years the vote for the Sicilian expedition could be adopted by an overwhelming majority, and its opponents held their peace for fear of being thought unpatriotic (Thuc., vi. 24, 4). A fourth principle in the exercise of the ostracism had therefore been introduced, even if it was without design, that of strengthening the opposition to a powerful administration by removing a factious and unworthy member of that opposition.

Hipparchus of Cholargus: this deme belonged to the Acamantid tribe. According to Aristotle (*Const. of Athens*, xxii. 3), Hipparchus belonged to the deme Collytus, of the Aegeïd tribe, and was ostracised in 488–487, in the first application of the law made by Cleisthenes "because Peisistratus, being a leader of the people and a general, had made himself tyrant. It was on account of Hipparchus especially, since he was a kinsman of Peisistratus, that Cleisthenes made the law, wishing to banish him."

XI. 7. **Theophrastus says**: this philosopher (Introd., p. 35) is not a good authority in a question of this sort, and it is possible to show that he was misled into this statement. Plutarch gives a brief account of the ostracism of Hyperbolus in his *Aristides*, vii. 3, which agrees substantially with that just given in the *Nicias*. In his *Alcibiades*, xiii., however, Phaeax is brought into the story as a politician in rivalry with Alcibiades, and liable with him and Nicias to the sentence of ostracism. Plutarch (or his source, possibly Ephorus) has also been misled, and by the same document which misled Theophrastus. This was the speech "Against Alcibiades" which has come down to us among the orations of Andocides (iv.). It is clearly a fictitious speech, put by its unknown author into the mouth of Phaeax (*cf.* §§ 2 and 41). Plu-

tarch alludes to it as the work of Phaeax in the *Alcibiades*, xiii. 2. It argues that Alcibiades and not Phaeax should be ostracised, purports to be addressed to the Athenian people, and involves throughout a complete misconception of the nature and process of ostracism. It assumes a situation which could never have existed. See Jebb, *Attic Orators*, i. p. 137 ; Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iv. p. 492. Ivo Bruns (*Das Literarische Portraet der Griechen*, pp. 514 ff.) has made it seem probable that this literary fiction was composed about the middle of the fourth century B. C., by some rhetorical sophist, at a time when the relative merits and demerits of Alcibiades had become matter of heated controversy, and when a simulated invective against Alcibiades would tend rather to enhance his fame.

Phaeax: our earliest glimpse of this son of Erasistratus is given by Aristophanes in his *Knights* (vv. 1377–1380), which was brought out in 424.

> " Phaeax is sharp — he made a good come-off,
> And saved his life in a famous knowing style.
> I reckon him first-rate; quite capital
> For energy and compression; so collected,
> And such a choice of language! Then to see him
> Battling against a mob — it 's quite delightful !
> He 's never cowed ! He bothers 'em completely " (Frere).

The peculiar diction of the original characterizes Phaeax as a public speaker who affected a fluent and ornamental style, in a conversational manner, and so Plutarch speaks of him in the *Alcibiades*, xiii. 2, citing a verse of the comic poet Eupolis in confirmation. In 422, Phaeax was sent on a mission to Sicily " to warn the Sicilians that the Syracusans were aiming at supremacy, and to unite the allies of Athens, and if possible the other cities, in a war against Syracuse " (Thuc., v. 4, 5–6). He met with indifferent success. This is all that is known about him. He could not have been a candidate for ostracism himself, and yet he must have been prominent enough in the process which resulted in the ostracism of Hyperbolus to afford some basis for the mistake

of the author of the speech "Against Alcibiades". He probably controlled the votes of a coterie of the younger members of the aristocratic party who favored war rather than peace, and particularly war in Sicily, and was induced by Alcibiades to throw these votes in favor of the ostracism of Hyperbolus, on the plea that in this way Nicias would not be harmed, and Alcibiades would be saved. Thus again, as already in the matter of the embassy from Sparta (chap. x.), when the political game seemed completely in the hands of Nicias, the tables were turned upon him by a clever ruse of his unscrupulous young opponent.

Most writers: *i. e.* the source which Plutarch is using, probably Theopompus.

XII. 1. **An embassy from Egesta and Leontini**: in the spring of 415. As early as the middle of the century the commercial relations of Athens with the western Greeks were supplemented by closer political relations. In 454–453 Egesta, hard pressed by Selinus, had sought help from Athens, but that city was then unable to do more than enter into treaty relations. However, as the industrial and commercial interests of the Athenian democracy increased, covetous eyes were cast upon the rich island of Sicily, and a policy of western conquest became popular. This policy was doubtless among the reasons which led to the alliance of Athens with Corcyra in 433. The Athenians "considered that Corcyra was conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily" (Thuc., i. 44 *fin.*). As long as Pericles lived, however, this policy of western conquest was held in check. He "told the Athenians that if they would be patient and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war [with Sparta] was going on, nor imperil the existence of their city, they would be victorious" (Thuc., ii. 65, 7). But after his death there was no one who could keep the policy of western conquest from developing into a passion, and Alcibiades, his pupil and political heir, fanned the passion into flame. In the summer of 427 a felicitous time for intervention in the affairs of Sicily seemed once

more to have come, and a fleet of twenty ships was sent thither under the command of Laches and Charoeades.

The situation in the island, according to Thucydides (vi. 2–5), was as follows. Of the earlier barbarian peoples occupying it, the Sicanians were in the southern and western parts; the Elymi, with their two cities Eryx and Egesta, in the north-western part; and the Sicels in the central and southern regions. The Phoenicians at one time had settlements all round the island, but had retired before the Hellenes to the western shore, at the point where the passage from Carthage is shortest. The first Hellenic city in the island was Naxos, founded in 735 B. C. by colonists from Chalcis in Euboea. From Naxos, two more Chalcidic cities were founded about 730, Leontini and Catana. These three cities, with Rhegium of Italy, were usually friendly to Athens and hostile to the Dorian cities of Sicily. Of these the chief were Syracuse, founded from Corinth in 734; Gela, founded from Rhodes and Crete in 690; Agrigentum (Acragas), founded from Gela in 582; and Selinus, founded from Megara in 728–628. Messene, originally called Xancle, and a Chalcidian colony, was now occupied by "a mixed multitude".

In 427, Syracuse was at war with Leontini, and all the Dorian cities but one were in alliance with Syracuse, all the Chalcidian cities with Leontini. The Dorian cities were part of the Lacedaemonian confederacy, but had taken no active part in the Peloponnesian war. "The Leontines and their allies sent to Athens, and on the ground, partly of an old alliance [of which we know nothing], partly of their Ionian descent, begged the Athenians to send them ships, for they were driven off both sea and land by their Syracusan enemies. The Athenians sent the ships, professedly on the ground of relationship, but in reality because they did not wish the Peloponnesians to obtain corn from Sicily. Moreover they meant to try what prospect they had of getting the affairs of Sicily into their hands" (Thuc., iii. 86). In 426, Charoeades was killed in battle, and Laches took entire command of the

expedition (Thuc., iii. 90). Not succeeding well, the allies of the Athenians in Sicily called for larger forces to aid them, and in 425 an additional fleet of forty ships was sent out under Eurymedon, Sophocles, and Pythodorus (Thuc., iv. 2), — the fleet with which Demosthenes operated to secure Pylos. This force also met with indifferent success in Sicily, and on the establishment of peace between the Sicilian cities, came home in 424. "When the generals returned the Athenians punished two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, with exile, and imposed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, believing that they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed to go away" (Thuc., iv. 65). It was just after the dazzling success at Sphacteria, and "they expected to accomplish everything, possible or impossible, with any force, great or small". But the disaster of Delium and the loss of Amphipolis in this year had humbled them, and the embassy of Phaeax to Sicily in 422, on the renewal of war between Syracuse and Leontini and the destruction of the latter city, had been a failure (see the note on xi. 7).

In 416, the old hopes of conquering the island were revived by a second embassy from Egesta requesting aid against Syracuse and Selinus. The Athenians "virtuously professed that they were going to assist their own kinsmen and their newly acquired allies, but the simple truth was that they aspired to the empire of Sicily" (Thuc., vi. 6). The chief argument of the Egestaeans was "that if the Syracusans were not punished for the expulsion of the Leontines, but were allowed to destroy the remaining allies of the Athenians, and to get the whole of Sicily into their own hands, they would one day come with a great army, Dorians assisting Dorians, who were their kinsmen, and colonists assisting their Peloponnesian founders, and would unite in overthrowing Athens herself". The Egestaeans pressed their case before the Assembly of Athens, and promised to provide money sufficient for the war. At length the Assembly voted to send envoys to ascertain whether the Egestaeans really had the means which they professed to have, and to report on the state of

the war with Selinus. The Athenian envoys returned in the spring of 415, accompanied by another embassy from Egesta with a large sum of ready money. Both Athenian and Egestaean envoys assured the people of Athens "that there was abundance of money lying ready in the temples and in the treasury of Egesta".

It is this last embassy from Egesta to which Plutarch alludes in the opening sentence of chapter xii. The Leontines are not mentioned by Thucydides as actually forming part of the embassy, but their reinstatement in their city was to be one of the objects of the expedition, and at the second Assembly to consider the question "certain Leontine exiles" joined their entreaties with those of the Egestaeans (vi. 19). In the account of Diodorus (Ephorus), xii. 83, 2, they are joint ambassadors with the Egestaeans.

Drawing maps of Sicily: the imaginative picture which Plutarch gives of the infatuation of the Athenians is fully justified by Thucydides, vi. 24.

XII. 2. **A mere base of operations**: in his speech at Sparta, after his condemnation and banishment, Alcibiades says (Thuc., vi. 90), "We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to conquer the Sicilian cities; then to proceed against the Hellenes of Italy; and lastly, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage itself."

XII. 3. **Voted for the war, etc.**: "they passed a vote that sixty ships should be sent to Sicily; Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes were appointed commanders. They were told to assist Egesta against Selinus; if this did not demand all their military strength they were empowered to restore the Leontines, and generally to further in such manner as they deemed best the Athenian interest in Sicily" (Thuc., vi. 8, 2). Apparently the three generals had an equal vote in a council of war (Thuc., vi. 47–50).

A second session of the Assembly: "five days afterwards another assembly was called to consider what steps should be taken for the immediate equipment of the expedition, and

to vote any additional supplies which the generals might require. Nicias, who had been appointed general against his will, thought that the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that upon slight and flimsy grounds they were aspiring to the conquest of Sicily, which was no easy task. So, being desirous of diverting the Athenians from their purpose, he came forward and admonished them" (Thuc., vi. 8, 3–4). In the following chapters (9–14), Thucydides puts into the mouth of Nicias a speech in which all the arguments against such an expedition to Sicily are massed in the most dignified and effective manner. It contains this scathing allusion to Alcibiades (chap. 12, 2): "I dare say there may be some young man here who is delighted at holding a command, and the more so because he is too young for his post; and he, regarding only his own interest, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, and wants to make something out of his command which will maintain him in his extravagance."

In chapters 15–18, Thucydides first gives a lively pen-portrait of Alcibiades, and then puts into his mouth a speech in reply to Nicias which defends his ostentatious life and his daring projects with all the grace of sophistry. Both speeches, that of Nicias and that of Alcibiades, are character-speeches, in the best manner of Thucydides, and present vividly the sentiments actuating the two parties in conflict with each other, — the old men who wanted peace, and the young men who wanted war.

XII. 4. **The experience from which he spoke**: this is shown especially in a second speech put into the mouth of Nicias by Thucydides, not replying to Alcibiades, but, seeing that the people were resolved upon the war, insisting on the difficulties of the undertaking and the magnitude of the forces which would be required (Thuc., vi. 20–23). "He meant either to deter the Athenians by bringing home to them the vastness of the undertaking, or to provide as far as he could for the safety of the expedition if he were compelled to proceed. The result disappointed him. Far from losing their

enthusiasm at the disagreeable prospect, they were more determined than ever; they approved of his advice, and were confident that every chance of danger was now removed. All alike were seized with a passionate desire to sail" (Thuc., vi. 24, 1–3).

Roughness of Lamachus: correcting the πραότητα (*mildness*) of the text to θρασύτητα, or some equivalent word, as would seem to be demanded by the epithets applied to Lamachus in the *Alcibiades*, xviii. and xxi., and in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, *passim*.

Lamachus had accompanied Pericles on his Pontic expedition as early as 436 (?), as is seen from Plutarch's *Pericles*, xxi. 1. He also commanded independently another Pontic expedition in 424, clearly in consequence of his experience with Pericles (Thuc., iv. 75, 1). In the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, brought out in 425, he is the comic representative of the blustering "Jingo". But he was made one of the commanders of the Sicilian expedition because of his practical military experience and great ability. He advocated an immediate attack upon Syracuse (Thuc., vi. 49), which would in all probability have been successful. His untimely death in battle was the severest of many severe blows to the Athenian cause. In the *Frogs*, brought out in 405, Aristophanes pays his memory an honorable amend for the lampoons of the *Acharnians*, — "But others, many and brave, he taught, of whom was Lamachus, hero true" (verse 1039, Rogers' translation).

Demostratus: in Thucydides (vi. 25–26), "an Athenian came forward, and calling upon Nicias, said that they would have no more excuses and delays; he must speak out and say what forces the people were to vote him." Nicias thereupon gave the magnificent estimate of one hundred triremes of their own and more from their allies; not less than five thousand heavy-armed troops, "and more if they could possibly have them"; and the rest of the armament in proportion, including archers and slingers. He thought to deter his hearers from their project by the magnitude of his esti-

mates. But "the Athenians at once decreed that the generals should be empowered to act as they thought best in the interest of the state respecting the numbers of the army and the whole management of the expedition."

To this decree Plutarch doubtless had access, directly or indirectly, in the collection of Craterus (Introd., p. 35), and took from it the name of the mover. That the name is correct is made probable by the passage from Aristophanes cited in the note on xiii. 7, where Demostratus is the mover of other decrees relating to the expedition.

XIII. 1. **Is said**: that much of the material in this chapter is derived, ultimately at least, from Cleitodemus (Introd., p. 34), is clear from Pausanias, x. 15, 4–5. Describing the votive offerings at Delphi, he says: "The bronze palm-tree and the gilt image of Athena on it were dedicated by the Athenians out of the spoils of the two battles — the battle on land and the naval battle on the river — which they won on the same day at the Eurymedon. I observed that in some places the gilding on the image was damaged. I laid the blame on evil-doers and thieves. But Cleitodemus, the oldest of all the writers who have described Attica, says in his work on Attica, that when the Athenians were fitting out their armament to attack Sicily, an innumerable flock of crows flew to Delphi, pecked this image, and tore the gold off it with their beaks. He says, too, that they broke off the spear and the owls and the mimic fruit on the palm. He also describes other omens which warned the Athenians not to sail for Sicily." Judging from chap. i. 3 of the *Nicias*, it was Timaeus who collected this and other material which Plutarch uses here.

Sundry oracles: when the war began, "many were the prophecies circulated and many the oracles chanted by diviners, not only in the cities about to engage in the struggle, but throughout Hellas" (Thuc., ii. 8, 2). And after the expedition to Sicily had met with destruction, the Athenians "were furious with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, and with the soothsayers, and prophets, and all who

by the influence of religion had at that time inspired them with the belief that they would conquer Sicily" (Thuc., viii. 1, 1).

The shrine of Ammon: in an oasis of the Libyan desert. Croesus consulted this oracle among many others (Herod., i. 46); it was consulted by the Lacedaemonians more frequently than by the rest of the Greeks (Paus., iii. 18, 2); Cimon, who was of known Laconian sympathies, sent envoys to it just before his death (Plutarch, *Cimon*, xviii. 6); and the visit of Alexander the Great to the oracle is well known.

Would capture all the Syracusans: for the supposed fulfillment of this prophecy, see chap. xiv. 5 f. Another deceptive oracle is given by Pausanias (viii. 11, 12): "Again, the Athenians received an oracle from Dodona bidding them to colonize Sicily; now this Sicily is a small hill not far from Athens. But they, not understanding the meaning, were lured into foreign campaigns."

XIII. 2. **Mutilation of the Hermae**: quadrangular pillars of marble, about the height of the human figure, surmounted by an archaic bust of the god Hermes, and with the significant mark of the male sex in front, stood "everywhere at the doorways both of temples and private houses" in Athens, according to Thucydides (vi. 27, 1). They stood also near the most frequented porticoes, at the intersection of cross-ways, and in the public agora. "They were thus present to the eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either for business or pleasure, with his fellow citizens. The religious feeling of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood, so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermes, became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, political, social, commercial, or gymnastic" (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vi. pp. 4 f.).

In the *Alcibiades*, xviii. 3, Plutarch notes the report that the Corinthians were at the bottom of the sacrilege, in the hope of stopping the expedition against Syracuse, their colony. This explanation of the outrage came from Philochorus

(schol. on Aristophanes, *Lysist.* 1094), and is adopted by Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen*, ii. p. 113), who is followed by Bury (*Hist. of Greece*, p. 469). Many at the time thought that the outrage was merely the wanton work of young men flown with wine (*Alcibiades*, xviii. 4), and many are of that opinion to-day (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iv. p. 503). But more held it to be "ominous of the fate of the expedition", the work of "conspirators who wanted to effect a revolution and to overthrow the democracy" (Thuc., vi. 27). Whichever view is correct, "no one knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders were" (Thuc., vi. 60, 2), and this seems to deny more than a mere knowledge of the names of the offenders.

Andocides: see the Introd., pp. 42 ff., as well as the *Alcibiades*, xxi., and notes.

The altar of the Twelve Gods: this was in the agora, and was dedicated by Peisistratus the Younger, a grandson of the Tyrant, during his archonship (Thuc., vi. 54, 6), sometime between 523 and 515 B.C. From it the Athenians reckoned all distances in Greece, as the Romans from the *miliarium aureum*.

XIII. 3. **A Palladium**: see on iii. 3.

XIII. 4. **Seek peace**: it is impossible to reproduce perfectly in English the play on words here. They were bidden *τὴν ἱέρειαν ἄγειν, to fetch the priestess;* they were meant *τὴν ἡσυχίαν* (Ἡσυχίαν) *ἄγειν, to keep the peace* (*Peace*).

XIII. 5. **The astrologer Meton**: the most famous mathematician and astronomer of his time. In 432, he published a new calendar with a cycle of nineteen years, intended to reconcile the lunar and the solar years. It was not adopted, however, until a century later. His wisdom and fame are attested by Aristophanes in the *Birds*, vv. 998 ff. The first version of the story about his attitude towards the Sicilian expedition is found with greater detail in Aelian, *Varia Historia*, xiii. 12. In this, he feigns madness to save himself. The variant version remarked by Plutarch makes him commit arson to save his son.

XIII. 6. **Socrates**: the story bears all the marks of inferential invention. The "divine guide" never gave Socrates positive information or instruction, but simply withheld him from certain courses of action.

XIII. 7. **The festival of Adonis**: in mid-summer, when the first fruits ripen, this beloved husband of Aphrodite was believed to wither away and die, but to be restored to her in the following spring. He was, then, "a type of vegetation, which after a brief blossoming, always dies again." With the little images of the god, the "gardens of Adonis" — pots holding all kinds of herbs that come out quickly and as quickly fade, were finally committed to the water. A splendid celebration of the festival at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus in Alexandria is commemorated in the famous fifteenth *Idyll* of Theocritus.

Thucydides says that the expedition sailed about the middle of summer (vi. 30, 1), and a passage in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes (vv. 387 ff.) represents the demagogue Demostratus as pushing sundry motions for the equipment and sailing of the expedition through the Assembly, while the cries of women on the house-tops could be heard lamenting Adonis. Still, in spite of all adverse omens and anxious fears, the great armament left the Piraeus with a confidence and an enthusiasm to which Thucydides (vi. 30–34) bears the most eloquent testimony. "Never had a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land; never was there an enterprise in which the hope of future success seemed to be better justified by actual power."

XIV. 2. **Gazing back homewards, etc.**: there is nothing of this detail in Thucydides, but it is natural inference from the situation and the man. The Athenians and their allies collected at Corcyra, and crossed in three squadrons to Rhegium in Italy. There were one hundred and thirty-four triremes in all, besides two fifty-oared Rhodian vessels, and one horse transport, and they conveyed fifty-one hundred hoplites, four hundred and eighty archers, seven hundred slingers, one hundred and twenty light-armed troops, and thirty

horsemen. The crews of the triremes must have numbered at least twenty-five thousand. One hundred and thirty merchant ships and smaller vessels conveyed provisions, bakers, masons, carpenters, and siege-tools.

Rhegium would not receive them within its walls, but allowed them to encamp on the shore, and furnished them with a market. Here the ships sent on in advance to prepare the way reported that the Egestaeans had only a trifling sum of money with which to defray the expenses of the war in their behalf, as they had deceitfully promised to do. This disappointment, together with the unexpected conduct of the Rhegians, on whose alliance they had counted, cooled the spirits of commanders and men. The generals then held a council of war (Thuc., vi. 42–46).

XIV. 3. **Lamachus . . . Alcibiades . . . Nicias**: Thucydides gives the opinions of the three generals in full, but in reverse order (vi. 47–49). Plutarch gives the merest gist of the opinions. Lamachus, after urging a course of action which, had it been adopted, would in all probability have resulted in the capture of Syracuse, gave his vote for the proposals of Alcibiades, and a war of diplomacy was at once begun. Messene refused, and Naxos accepted alliance; the city and harbor of Syracuse were reconnoitered; Catana was seized and made headquarters for operations against Syracuse. From Catana Alcibiades was summoned home (about September, 415).

XIV. 4. **To stand his trial**: even before his departure "a party who were jealous of his influence over the people . . . . took up and exaggerated the charges against him, clamorously insisting that both the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the mysteries [see the *Alcibiades*, xix.-xxi.] were part of a conspiracy against the democracy, and that he was at the bottom of the whole affair" (Thuc., vi. 28 *fin.*). Alcibiades had insisted in vain upon an immediate trial. His enemies succeeded in persuading the people to vote "that he should sail now and not delay the expedition, but should return and stand his trial within a certain num-

ber of days. Their intention was that he should be recalled and tried when they had stirred up a stronger feeling against him, which they could do better in his absence" (Thuc., vi. 29 *fin.*). Now, "from every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, and the Athenian people were determined to have him tried and executed; so they sent the ship Salaminia to Sicily bearing a summons to him and to others against whom information had been given. He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself" (Thuc., vi. 61, 4 f.).

Nicias wielded sole power: "The two Athenian generals who remained in Sicily now divided the fleet between them by lot, and sailed towards Selinus and Egesta" (Thuc., vi. 62, 1). This was in accordance with the policy of Nicias (see § 3), and shows that Lamachus could not prevail against him.

The hopes of his men: reading *αὐτῶν*, with the Sintenis (Teubner) text. The Bekker (Tauchnitz) text has *αὐτῷ*, "his hopes".

XIV. 5. **Made proclamation, etc.**: "On their approaching the city a herald was to proclaim from the decks that the Athenians had come to restore their allies and kinsmen the Leontines to their homes, and that therefore any Leontines who were in Syracuse should regard the Athenians as their friends and benefactors, and join them without fear. When the proclamation had been made, and the fleet had taken a survey of the city, and harbours, and of the ground which was to be the scene of operations, they sailed back to Catana" (Thuc., vi. 50, 4 f.).

In 422, there had been a political revolution in Leontini. The oligarchs had driven out the democrats, with the aid of the Syracusans, and had then deserted the city, and settled in Syracuse as citizens. A few of them afterwards became discontented, left Syracuse, and occupied strongholds in the Leontine territory. "Here they were joined by most of the common people who had been previously driven out, and from their strongholds they carried on a continual warfare

against Syracuse" (Thuc., v. 4, 4). The Athenian proclamation, therefore, must have been made for effect upon the Leontine oligarchs still in Syracuse.

Captured a ship with tablets: there is nothing of this in Thucydides. The item probably comes from Philistus (Introd., pp. 10, 31), an eyewitness perhaps of the event.

XIV. 6. **The oracle**: see xiii. 1.

They say: this is in all probability the fanciful comment of Timaeus (Introd., p. 34), as is clear from the date (353 B. C.), of the event in which he finds the oracle fulfilled. Dion the Syracusan, a friend and son-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I., was banished by Dionysius II., and took up residence in Athens. He returned to Sicily in 357 and expelled Dionysius from Syracuse. Here he soon roused hostility by his harsh measures, and was slain by conspirators instigated by Callippus, an Athenian friend who had accompanied him from Greece. See Plutarch's *Dion*, liv.-lvii.

In another circumstance: reading ἑτέρῳ, with the Bekker (Tauchnitz) text and the MSS; the Sintenis (Teubner) text adopts the conjecture ἕτεροι of Reiske, "others say", etc.

XV. 1. **Alcibiades sailed away**: see the *Alcibiades*, xxi. 1, and note.

Nicias took entire command: not officially, but as a matter of fact. See the note on xiv. 4.

Lamachus: see the note on xii. 4. The details of his pettiness here given may well have come primarily from the jibes of contemporary comedy. "And as for Lamachus, he always put down in his bill of charges, when he was general, the money laid out for his shoes and coat" (Plutarch, *Praec. reip. ger.*, 31 = *Morals*, p. 822 E).

XV. 2. **It is said, etc.**: neither source nor authenticity of the following anecdote can be determined. We have no good evidence that Sophocles the poet was ever general except with Pericles in the Samian war (440–439). He was not too young a man then to give point to such an anecdote as this, and Nicias was young enough, if his serving as a colleague of Pericles (see the note on ii. 2) could possibly be re-

ferred to this same Samian war. All the possibilities of the case are discussed by Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. p. 576, note.

XV. 3 f. The events briefly, and rather unfairly, summarized in these paragraphs are given in full detail by Thucydides in vi. 62. In the following chapter, however, wishing to give the impression produced upon the Syracusans by the Athenian campaign, he says: "when they found that their enemies did not assail them at once, as in their first panic they had expected, day by day their spirits rose. And now the Athenians, after cruising about at the other end of Sicily, where they seemed to be a long way off, had gone to Hybla, and their attack upon it had failed. So the Syracusans despised them more than ever" (vi. 63, 1 f.). It is this resumptive sentence of Thucydides which has most influenced Plutarch's account. The operations of the expedition were really not wholly insignificant. On the way towards Egesta and Selinus, whose war with each other had been the ostensible cause of the expedition, they touched at Himera, a Hellenic city which refused to receive them, and took Hyccara, a city of the Sicanians which was hostile to the Egestaeans, reducing its inhabitants to slavery. Then, dividing their forces, the ships sailed round the island (in accordance with the plan of Nicias, Thuc., vi. 47), conveying the prisoners and reconnoitering Selinus, back to Catana, on the eastern coast above Syracuse; while the troops (probably under Lamachus) marched back thither through the interior of the island, where they counted on finding the Sicels willing allies. Nicias himself sailed in advance from Hyccara to Egesta, obtained there a meager thirty talents, and rejoined his fleet. At Catana, the sale of the captives brought in one hundred and twenty talents. From Catana the Sicels were again visited and asked for reënforcements, while with half the army Hybla, a small city a few miles west of Catana, was attacked, but not taken.

XV. 4. **It is said**: by Timaeus (Introd., p. 34), as is plain from Athenaeus, p. 589 a. According to the scholiast on Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 179, Lais was seven years of age, and was

bought by a Corinthian and sent as a present to his wife at Corinth. On the road from Cenchreae to Corinth Pausanias saw her tomb, "which is surmounted by a lioness holding a ram in her fore-paws. There is another tomb in Thessaly which claims to be the tomb of Lais; for she went to Thessaly, too, for love of Hippostratus. It is said that she was a native of Hycara in Sicily, that she was captured as a child by the Athenians under Nicias, and that being sold to a Corinthian purchaser she surpassed in beauty all the courtesans of the age, and was so much admired by the Corinthians that they still claim her as a native of Corinth" (ii. 2, 4).

If some of the most romantic incidents connected with the death of Alcibiades could be believed, we might assume that Timandra (or Damasandra), the mother of Lais, was captured with her at Hyccara (Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, xxxix. 4). Learned men have been much interested in the story of the beautiful Lais, as may be seen in Freeman's *History of Sicily*, iii. pp. 157 f., and Note x., pp. 650 ff.

XVI. 1. **The summer was spent, etc.**: "Early in the ensuing winter the Athenians made preparations for an attack upon Syracuse; the Syracusans likewise prepared to take the offensive. . . . Syracusan horsemen, who were always riding up to the Athenian army and watching their movements, would ask insultingly whether, instead of resettling the Leontines in their old home, they were not themselves going to settle down with their good friends the Syracusans in a new one" (Thuc., vi. 63).

XVI. 2. **He secretly sent**: this is natural individualization in the biographical narrative. In Thucydides (vi. 64) it is "the Athenians" and "the generals" who are aware of the purpose of the Syracusans, and concoct the plan to decoy them out of their city. Otherwise the paragraph is a good condensation of the historian's long chapter.

XVI. 3. This paragraph is a brief summary of Thucydides, vi. 65, without, however, any of the interesting military details. It was at dawn of day that the Athenian forces disembarked "opposite the temple of Olympian Zeus", on

the western shore of the great harbor, south of the river Anapus. At this very time the Syracusan horse, advancing before their main army to Catana, "discovered that the whole Athenian army had put out to sea, whereupon they returned and told the infantry; and then all together hurried back to protect the city."

The enemy's harbors: Syracuse had two harbors, the lesser harbor, on the north of the island Ortygia (the site of the most ancient part of the city); and the Great Harbor, on the south. The latter was a spacious bay of about five miles in circumference. Its entrance, between the island Ortygia and the headland Plemmyrium, was about twelve hundred yards wide. The lesser harbor plays no particular part in the story of the Athenian operations.

XVI. 4. **Led swiftly against them**: Plutarch has been misled by the opening sentence of Thucydides, vi. 69, which describes the opening of a battle on the day following the return of the Syracusan forces from Catana. The distance from Catana to Syracuse was considerable, and a day was occupied by the Syracusans in returning and by the Athenians in fortifying themselves. When the Syracusans at last got back, they marched up to the Athenian position and offered battle, but the offer was not accepted, "so they retired and encamped on the other side of the Helorine road" (Thuc., vi. 66). On the following day the battle took place, as described at great length and with minute detail by Thucydides in vi. 67–70. The Syracusans were surprised after all by the suddenness of the Athenian attack, but made a stubborn resistance. They were put to flight, but were not pursued far, since their cavalry interposed successfully. They re-formed after their defeat, and sent some of their forces to guard the Olympieum. The rest of them returned to the city. "The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple at all, but collecting their dead, and laying them on a pyre, they passed the night where they were" (Thuc., vi. 71, 1).

Did not slay many: "There had fallen of the Syracusans and their allies about two hundred and sixty; of the

Athenians and their allies not more than fifty" (Thuc., *ibid.*).

Destroying the bridges: there was but one, and that had been destroyed by the Athenians on the previous day, as part of their measures of defense (Thuc., vi. 66, 2).

Gave Hermocrates occasion to say, etc.: doubtless an authentic item from Philistus (Introd. p. 10), but pertinent to the previous day, when the Athenians kept close behind their intrenchments and declined battle.

XVI. 5. This paragraph, too, is out of place. It was not till after the Athenians had sailed back to Catana, on the day after the battle, that the Syracusans called an assembly, and on the advice of Hermocrates substituted three generals with full powers for the fifteen they had had before. "The division of authority had produced disorganization and disorder among the troops" (Thuc., vi. 72 f.).

XVI. 6. This paragraph is an enlargement and distortion (probably by Timaeus, Introd. p. 33), of the simple facts given by Thucydides in vi. 70 *fin.*; 71, 1 (cited above on § 4). The Athenians had had ample opportunity to seize the Olympieum on the day before, if they desired to do so.

XVI. 7. **After a few days**: on the day after the battle, according to Thucydides (vi. 71, 1), the Athenians "took with them the spoils of their enemies and sailed back to Catana". Winter had set in, they lacked horsemen, money, and food, and therefore decided to go into winter quarters and prepare for an attack upon Syracuse in the spring. "Accordingly they sailed away to Naxos and Catana, intending to winter."

Spent the winter: after an unsuccessful attempt on Messene, the Athenians went to Naxos, "and having surrounded their camp with a palisade, proposed to pass the winter there. They also despatched a trireme to Athens for money and cavalry, which were to arrive at the beginning of spring" (Thuc., vi. 74).

Burnt the Athenian camp: after fortifying their city and the Olympieum, knowing that the Athenians were win-

tering at Naxos, the Syracusans "marched with their whole army to Catana, ravaged the country and burnt the huts and camp of the Athenians". They then took measures to counteract the Athenian attempts to win over Camarina to their side (Thuc., vi. 75).

XVI. 8. This criticism of Nicias is discriminating and fair. There is, however, little doubt that he acted wisely in retiring to Naxos and Catana and waiting for cavalry and supplies. But it would have been the part of good generalship to attack Syracuse earlier in the season, as Lamachus had urged him to do (chap. xiv. 3).

XVII. 1. **Moved back to Syracuse**: early in the spring of 414, as described minutely by Thucydides in vi. 97. During the winter the Athenians had tried to win over as many of the Sicels in the interior as they could; had moved from Naxos to Catana and reconstructed there the camp which the Syracusans had destroyed; had sent triremes to Carthage and Tyrrhenia with proposals of friendship; had levied horsemen from the Sicels and from Egesta, and prepared materials and tools for siege operations in the spring. At the very beginning of spring, before the arrival of the horsemen summoned from Athens, they had made successful forays along the coast of Sicily between Catana and Syracuse. Returning to Catana they found that horsemen, archers, and money had arrived from Athens. They at once started for Syracuse with all their forces (Thuc., vi. 88, 94, 97).

The Syracusans, on their part, besides fortifying their city and the immediate neighborhood, had sent envoys to Corinth and Lacedaemon with an appeal for aid. A Corinthian embassy accompanied the Syracusan envoys to Lacedaemon, and there they found Alcibiades and his fellow exiles. In consequence of the advice and arguments of Alcibiades, the Lacedaemonians determined to fortify Deceleia in Attica, and to send Gylippus the Spartan to command the Syracusan forces. The Corinthians were to send ships (Thuc., vi. 75, 88–93).

Thapsus: "a peninsula with a narrow isthmus not far

from Syracuse either by land or water", to the north of the city.

Landed his men: at a place called Leon, about a mile north of Syracuse. Thence the fleet returned and cast anchor at Thapsus, while the troops "ran to Epipolae, and gained the summit before the Syracusans saw them or could come up to them from the meadow where the review was going on". For at dawn of the very day on which the Athenians came, "the whole people went out to the meadow skirting the river Anapus, and proceeded to hold a review of their forces. A selection was at once made of six hundred hoplites, who were appointed to guard Epipolae, and to run in a body to any point at which they were needed" (Thuc., vi. 96).

Epipolae: a triangular plateau, rising gradually to the westwards of the city of Syracuse (which originally occupied only the jutting peninsula or island of Ortygia), visible from the interior of the city, and surrounded by precipitous cliffs.

With a loss of three hundred men: reading *ἀνελεῖν*, the proposal of Coraës, for *ἑλεῖν*.

Routed the cavalry: Thucydides says nothing of a cavalry engagement in this day's fighting. The six hundred picked hoplites of the Syracusans hurried up Epipolae to meet the Athenians, who had made their ascent at its western extremity, where the plateau narrows to a tongue (called Euryelus). They were "accompanied by the rest of the army, each man running as fast as he could". But the distance which they had to traverse was not less than three miles, they were in disorder when they joined battle, were defeated, and retired into the city. On the following day the Athenians went down to the city itself and offered battle, but the offer was not accepted. The Athenians then retired to the northern edge of Epipolae and built a fort at Labdalum. "Not long afterwards", according to Thucydides (vi. 98), the number of their cavalry being raised to six hundred and fifty, they left a garrison in Labdalum, and rapidly built a circular fort at about the center of Epipolae, from which they purposed to run a wall to the sea on either side

of Syracuse. The Syracusans led out their forces to check these operations, but did not venture to join battle, and at last retired into the city, leaving a detachment of their cavalry to molest the Athenians. This body of cavalry was routed by the Athenians "with one division of their hoplites and all their cavalry". It is this victory which Plutarch has transposed to the first day's battle.

XVII. 2–4. A brief summary of operations described at great length by Thucydides in the course of vi. 99—vii. 2. The wall was run from the circular fort on Epipolae to Trogilus, a point on the sea shore nearest Epipolae on the north, and also over to the great harbor on the south, *i. e.* from sea to sea behind the city of Syracuse, not around it. Plutarch reverts to many incidents of this long process in the following chapter.

Adjacent marshes: between the plateau of Epipolae and that on which the Olympieum stood. Through these marshes the river Anapus made its way into the great harbor.

Within an ace: when Gylippus arrived at Syracuse, "the Athenians had all but finished their double wall, nearly a mile long, reaching [from the southern cliff of Epipolae] to the Great Harbour; there remained only a small portion toward the sea, upon which they were still at work. Along the remainder of the line of wall, which extended [across Epipolae] towards Trogilus and the northern sea, the stones were mostly lying ready; a part was half finished, a part had been completed and left. So near was Syracuse to destruction" (Thuc., vii. 2, 4).

A disease in the kidneys: "You should also send a general to succeed me," writes Nicias to the Athenians at the close of the second summer's campaign, "for I have a disease in the kidneys and cannot remain here" (Thuc., vii. 15, 1).

XVII. 4. **An epitaph**: *i. e.* an elegiac distich, composed of a dactylic hexameter, and a so-called pentameter verse. See Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graeci*[4], ii. p. 265. It was probably inscribed on the monument in the outer Cerameicus of which

Pausanias speaks (i. 29, 9), and introduced a list of the names of those who perished.

More than that: the narrative of Thucydides speaks of nine.

XVIII. 1–3. Plutarch here singles out two of the many incidents connected with the Athenian investment of Syracuse, *viz.* the death of Lamachus and the straits of Nicias. They are narrated by Thucydides in vi. 101 f.

Within the walls: *i. e.* within the circular fort which the Athenians had built in the center of Epipolae (see the last note on xvii. 1).

Syracusans . . . . trying to run a wall, etc.: they made three attempts in all to intersect the Athenian wall of investment. The first was by a wall running from the fortified western outpost of the city across Epipolae to the south of the Athenian circular fort. Its destruction by the Athenians is described in Thucydides, vi. 100. The second, of which Plutarch here speaks, was run out through the marshes of the Anapus, to the south of Epipolae, in order to prevent the Athenian wall from reaching the great harbor. Hastening to tell of the fate of Lamachus, Plutarch omits to state that this wall too was totally destroyed by the Athenians. A third cross wall of the Syracusans, run out across Epipolae to the north of the Athenian circular fort, was successful, and put a stop to the building of the Athenian wall to Trogilus on the north of Syracuse (Thuc., vii. 4 and 6).

XVIII. 2. **Lamachus was isolated**: Lamachus was hastening from his victorious left wing, before which the Syracusans had fled back into the city, to the succor of his right wing, which had been thrown into temporary confusion by an unexpected rally and onslaught of the Syracusan cavalry. "But pressing forward across a certain ditch he and a few who had followed him were cut off from the rest, and he fell with five or six others. The Syracusans hastily snatched up their bodies, and carried them across the river out of the reach of the enemy. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian army advancing towards them they retreated"

(Thuc., vi. 101). Lamachus fell, therefore, in a petty skirmish which made only a slight halt in his well earned victory. He was a seasoned and successful soldier, and his untimely death was nothing less than a catastrophe for the Athenians. For a time they carried on their investment of Syracuse with the momentum due to the efforts of Lamachus, but the work soon slackened when Nicias was left alone in command.

Callicrates: this detail is not even hinted at by Thucydides, and doubtless comes ultimately from Philistus (Introd. p. 10), though the story of the duel has a Homeric flavor probably due to Timaeus (Introd. p. 33).

XVIII. 3. **Made a dash upon the Athenian walls**: not those Syracusans who had thrown the right wing of Lamachus into temporary confusion, but those who had fled into the city before his victorious left (Thuc., vi. 102, 1). They attacked the circular fort in the center of Epipolae. The previous fighting had been in the marshes by the Anapus.

With none to succor him: there is much pathos in the story of Plutarch which finds no place in Thucydides. The Syracusans "did indeed take and demolish the outwork; but Nicias, who happened to have been left there because he was ill, saved the fort itself" (Jowett, "the lines themselves").

XVIII. 4. **Was in great hopes**: this seems to be an abrupt and illogical transition from the feelings natural after the portentous vigor shown by the Syracusans and the crippling death of Lamachus. But it is fully justified by the narrative of Thucydides. The Athenian army in the plain of the Anapus quickly recovered from its confusion, repulsed the Syracusans in front of it, and then sent aid to the harassed Nicias. The entire fleet at the same time entered the great harbor, coming from its station at Thapsus, and all the Syracusans, "seeing this combined movement, quickly retreated into the city, thinking that with their present force they were no longer able to prevent the completion of the line of wall towards the sea" (vi. 102, 3 f.).

Ships full of grain, etc.: "Provisions came to their army in abundance from various parts of Italy. Many of the Sicel tribes who had hitherto been hesitating now joined the Athenians, and three penteconters came from the Tyrrhenians. Everything began to answer to their hopes" (Thuc., vi. 103, 2).

Proposals from the Syracusans: "The Syracusans despaired of saving the city by arms, for no help reached them even from Peloponnesus. Within the walls they were talking of peace, and they began to enter into communication with Nicias, who, now that Lamachus was dead, had the sole command" (Thuc., vi. 103, 3).

XVIII. 5. **Gylippus**: in consequence of the urgent advice of Alcibiades to the Spartans (Thuc., vi. 91), a Spartan commander was chosen and sent out to organize and lead the Syracusan forces. The choice fell upon Gylippus, probably because of his intimate acquaintance with the affairs of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks. His father, Cleandridas, had been banished from Sparta in 445, on the charge of having taken Athenian bribes, and had then become a citizen of Thurii (see on xxviii. 3). "Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the ships from Corinth were already at Leucas. They were alarmed at the reports which were continually pouring in, all false, but all agreeing that the Athenian lines round Syracuse were now complete. Gylippus had no longer any hope of Sicily, but thought that he might save Italy" (Thuc., vi. 104, 1).

XVIII. 6. **Made no account of Gylippus**: "Nicias heard of his approach, but despised the small number of his ships. He thought that he had come on a mere privateering expedition, and for some time set no watch" (*Ibid.*).

Sailed through the straits: Gylippus and Pythen the Corinthian with four ships had hurried on in advance of the main fleet at Leucas, and, after experiencing a disabling storm, had reached Locri in Italy. "Nicias, when he heard that they were at Locri, although he had despised them at first, now sent out four Athenian ships to intercept them; but

these came too late." So Gylippus sailed through the strait to Himera, raised a force of about three thousand men there, and then marched towards Syracuse, having learned that the city was not yet completely invested, but that an army might enter by way of Epipolae (Thuc., vii. 1).

XVIII. 7. **Called an assembly**: see the citation from Thucydides in the note on xix. 1.

Quite small: see the citation from Thucydides in the note on xvii. 2–4.

XIX. 1. **In this nick of time**: the Corinthian ships which Gylippus and Pythen had left at Leucas (see on xviii. 6) were finally ready, and started with all speed for Syracuse. "Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who started last in a single ship, arrived at Syracuse before the rest of the fleet, and a little before Gylippus. He found the citizens on the point of holding an assembly at which the question of peace was to be discussed. From this intention he dissuaded them" (Thuc., vii. 2).

XIX. 2. **Donned their arms**: unless ἐξωπλίζοντο can be rendered by "sallied forth under arms". By the tidings of Gongylus the Syracusans were reassured, "and at once went forth with their whole army to meet Gylippus, who, as they were informed, was now close at hand. He . . . . came to Epipolae, taking the path by the Euryelus, where the Athenians had found a way before him [see the last note on xvii. 1]. Having formed a junction with the Syracusans, he marched against the Athenian lines. He arrived just at the time when the Athenians had all but finished, etc.", as cited in the third note on xvii. 2–4.

This was the turning point in the fortunes of the Athenian expedition. "Few incidents", says Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, vi. pp. 100 f.), "throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias." Gylippus "had first to march all across Sicily, during which march he

might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated; and could then approach Syracuse only by one road, — over the high ground of Euryalus in the Athenian rear, through passes few in number, easy to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise. Yet Nikias leaves these passes unoccupied and undefended; he takes not a single new precaution; the relieving army enters Syracuse as it were over a broad and free plain." The same negligence was shown by the Athenian guard-ships in allowing Gongylus to get into Syracuse. There is partial but still insufficient explanation in the facts that Lamachus was dead, and that Nicias was a sick man.

Sent a herald, etc.: the Athenians were disconcerted by the sudden advance upon them of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but formed in order of battle. Gylippus "halted as he approached, and sent a herald to them offering a truce if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days taking what belonged to them. But they despised his offer, and sent away the herald without an answer. Whereupon both armies set themselves in order of battle" (Thuc., vii. 3, 1 f.).

XIX. 3. **Some of his soldiers mocked**: this chaffing of the herald by the Athenian soldiery is not indicated by Thucydides. It may well have been reported by Philistus (Introd. p. 10).

Restored three hundred men: the captives of Sphacteria (see viii. 1 and note), two hundred and ninety-two in number.

XIX. 4. **Timaeus says**: Plutarch seldom if ever mentions this writer with approval (Introd. p. 33). Here he convicts him of self-contradiction in a desire to belittle the services of Gylippus.

XIX. 5. **The first battle**: it is not the purpose of Plutarch to give a history of all the operations before Syracuse, as he explains in his first chapter. Several days elapsed between the coming of Gylippus and this battle. In the mean time important and significant events had happened. Labdalum,

the Athenian fort on the northern edge of Epipolae (see the last note on xvii. 1), was captured by the Syracusans, as well as an Athenian trireme which was watching the entrance of the great harbor (Thuc., vii. 3, 5). A third cross wall was started by the Syracusans (see on xviii. 1–3), and carried rapidly across Epipolae to the north of the Athenian circular fort, while the investing wall of the Athenians was constantly threatened. Most important of all, Nicias fortified Plemmyrium, "a promontory which runs out opposite the city and narrows the entrance to the Great Harbour." Thither he transferred his ships, a portion of his army, and his stores. Twenty ships were sent out to intercept the approaching Corinthian fleet. At last, after some days of threatening maneuvers, Gylippus offered battle, and was defeated, because he had chosen a field where the Syracusan cavalry was useless, *viz.* the space between the Athenian and the Syracusan walls. He magnanimously took all the blame for the defeat upon himself, and promised better things in the next engagement (Thuc., vii. 4 and 5).

And also Gongylus: this item, given by Plutarch in true Herodotean spirit, is not found in Thucydides, and probably comes from Philistus (Introd. p. 10).

On the day following: "on the first opportunity", says Thucydides (vii. 6, 1), who gives minute details of this second battle. The whole Athenian army was driven within its lines, and on the following night the Syracusans carried their cross wall past the enclosing wall of the Athenians, who were thus deprived of all hope of completely investing the city.

XIX. 6. **Manning their ships**: not long after the victory of the Syracusans the Corinthian fleet eluded the Athenian guard-ships and sailed into the harbor of Syracuse. The Corinthians were able seamen, having been the first ship-builders among the Greeks, and found willing pupils in the Syracusans (Thuc., i. 13, 2; vii. 7, 4).

XIX. 7. **Nicias became dejected**: "he now thought the situation so critical that, if the Athenians did not at once

recall them or send another considerable army to their help, the expedition was lost" (Thuc., vii. 8, 1).

Wrote a dispatch: Thucydides gives (in vii. 11–15) what purports to be the contents of this letter of Nicias. Like many of the speeches, it is probably composed of "the sentiments proper to the occasion", expressed as Thucydides thought Nicias "would be likely to express them" (i. 22, 1), and so amounts to a graphic commentary on the situation by Thucydides. To his mind the Athenians, now that the Syracusans had succeeded in intersecting their line of enclosing walls, were rather the besieged than the besiegers (vii. 11, 4).

XX. 1. **The leading men**: representatives of the most advanced and radical democracy, like Peisander and Androcles. With Alcibiades in banishment and Nicias in Sicily there was none to oppose them. Of their delaying a second expedition through jealousy of Nicias, we read only here, but it is not improbable.

Demosthenes: the real hero of Pylos and Sphacteria, and the most experienced and able general of his time, although less fortunate than others. He had been reappointed general in 424, and had been partially successful in one campaign of that year against Megara, but totally unsuccessful in that against Boeotia, which ended with the disaster of Delium. See the notes on vi. 3 and 4. He was one of the seventeen Athenians chosen to ratify the peace in 421, but does not appear again in history until now.

Eurymedon: one of the commanders of the expedition to Sicily in 425–424. He had been fined on his return after the conclusion of peace between the Sicilian cities (see on xii. 1), but his experience rendered him invaluable now. No abler or more fitting colleagues for Nicias than Demosthenes and Eurymedon could have been chosen. "Eurymedon was despatched immediately to Sicily about the winter solstice; he took with him ten ships conveying a hundred and twenty talents of silver, and was to tell the army in Sicily that they should receive assistance and should not be neg-

lected. Demosthenes remained behind, and was busied in getting ready the expedition which he was to bring out in the spring" (Thuc., vii. 16, 2; 17, 1).

Colleagues for Nicias: to serve only until the regular colleagues, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, should arrive. The Athenians did not wish Nicias "to bear the burden in his sickness alone". Eurymedon, after performing his errand, returned as far as Corcyra, where he met Demosthenes, and coöperated thereafter with him (Thuc., vii. 31, 3).

XX. 2–3. **In the mean time**: a vague phrase. It was in the opening spring of the year 413, when the Lacedaemonians had invaded Attica and were fortifying Deceleia (Thuc., vii. 19, 1); while merchant ships laden with heavy-armed troops to reënforce the Syracusans were sailing from Peloponnesus (*Ibid.*); while Demosthenes was assembling his armament at Aegina (Thuc., vii. 20, 3); and after Gylippus had returned to Syracuse with reënforcements from the Sicilian cities which he had won over (Thuc., vii. 21, 1).

By land and sea: graphic details of this combined attack upon the Athenians by the Syracusans are given by Thucydides in vii. 22–24. "The loss of Plemmyrium was one of the greatest and severest blows which befell the Athenians. For now they could no longer even introduce provisions with safety, but the Syracusan ships lay watching to prevent them, and they had to fight for the passage. General discouragement and dismay prevailed throughout the army." Eurymedon heard of the loss of Plemmyrium on his voyage homewards, and reported it to Demosthenes at Corcyra (Thuc., vii. 31, 3). Plutarch made no mention in its proper place of the occupation of Plemmyrium by Nicias (see the note on xix. 5). Of the marvellous activity on the part of the Syracusans which followed their successes, Thucydides gives a glowing picture in vii. 25. From this is taken the statement in Plutarch that the Syracusans considered themselves to blame for their naval defeat.

XX. 4–5. **Menander and Euthydemus**: there is nothing in Thucydides of their rivalry with Demosthenes and Nicias,

or of their forcing a decision to fight another sea fight. It was the Syracusans who forced this upon Nicias, as it was good policy for them to do before the arrival of Demosthenes (Thuc., vii. 36, 1). Plutarch is probably drawing here upon Philistus, who is good authority for what pertains to the Syracusan side of the struggle, but not so good for the Athenian side. And the Syracusans had every reason for taking the offensive. "Hitherto the Sicilian cities had only watched the course of events, but now the whole island, with the exception of Agrigentum, which was neutral, united with the Syracusans against the Athenians" (Thuc., vii. 33, 2).

Out-maneuvered by Ariston: this is the crowning incident in a three days' struggle, which is fully described by Thucydides in vii. 36–41. After strengthening their fleet and perfecting their plans, the Syracusans attacked the Athenians again both by land and sea. On the first day neither side could gain any decisive advantage. On the second, the Syracusans remained quiet, while the Athenians repaired their ships and made special preparations for defense. On the third day the Syracusans attacked again by land and sea. The day was wearing away, like the first, without a decisive engagement, when the Syracusans put in to shore and disembarked for the mid-day meal. The Athenians took this as a confession of defeat, and themselves retired and disembarked, thinking there would be no more fighting that day. But food had been brought down to the shore by the Syracusans, so that their crews took their meal close by the ships, and then suddenly reëmbarked and bore down on the Athenian ships. The Athenians were thus compelled to put out for battle in great disorder and most of them fasting. They were defeated and driven to their moorings, where they could with difficulty keep the Syracusans from destroying their ships. The Syracusans at last retired, flushed with victory, and confident of superiority over their foes on sea now as well as on land. They had damaged many of the Athenian ships, and sunk seven, either killing their crews or taking them prisoners.

XXI. 1. This paragraph is essentially the same as Thucydides, vii. 42, 1. The number three thousand for the darters, archers, and slingers takes the place of "not a few" in Thucydides, and some rhetoric is devoted to the spectacular entry of Demosthenes upon the scene.

XXI. 2. **Fear reigned among the Syracusans**: this also is Thucydidean (vii. 42, 2). The historian adds by way of contrast that "the first Athenian army regained a certain degree of confidence after their disasters".

XXI. 2–4. **The joy of Nicias . . . . forced to yield**: this whole passage is clearly a transfer by Plutarch into terms appropriate to Nicias, the subject of his biography, of what Thucydides gives (vii. 42, 3 — 43, 1) in terms appropriate to Demosthenes. Thucydides, that is, speaks from the standpoint of Demosthenes, and Plutarch transposes the material to the standpoint of Nicias, with more or less freedom.

Demosthenes determined that he would not duplicate the failures of Nicias, and so planned to destroy the Syracusan cross wall, now that the Athenians had regained their former superiority both by land and sea. But his frontal attacks upon this wall were repulsed by the Syracusans, and he therefore determined to carry out a cherished plan of attacking Epipolae and the enemy's camp there by way of Euryelus, where the Athenians had once ascended (see the last note on xvii. 1). If successful in the attempt, the Syracusan cross wall could then be taken by attacks in flank and rear. To this course he succeeded in persuading Nicias and his colleagues.

In communication with Nicias: see on xviii. 4.

XXI. 5–9. This is, on the whole, a fair paraphrase of three wonderful chapters in Thucydides (vii. 43–45). Some minor variations suggest, though they do not necessarily demand, the use of another source also, like Philistus (Introd. p. 10), who may have been an eyewitness of the events. More detail would doubtless have been adopted by Plutarch had Nicias been engaged in the undertaking. But he

remained in camp. Rather surprising, even so, is the omission of the perplexities caused the Athenians by the misuse of their watchword, and by the singing of the Paean, a Dorian battle-hymn, on both sides. An additional item or two, like the number two thousand for the Athenian dead, may come from Philistus. Diodorus (Ephorus) puts the number at twenty-five hundred (xiii. 11, 5). Thucydides speaks only of "a considerable number" (vii. 45). The Athenians received their dead under a flag of truce.

XXII. This chapter is, on the whole, a good condensation of Thucydides, vii. 47–50, 3. Some details might be clearer. The Athenian generals held a formal council of war. Demosthenes was for returning home while it was still possible, to wage war upon the Peloponnesians in Attica. But Eurymedon, who had already tasted the displeasure of the Athenians at his failure to accomplish their wishes, seems to have sided with Nicias against this proposal. He was, however, in full accord with Demosthenes in urging a change of base to Thapsus or Catana, but Nicias opposed even this, and so a fatal delay ensued. For the fear of Athenian displeasure which actuated Nicias, see the note on vi. 2.

XXII. 3. **Leon of Byzantium**: this item is an addition of Plutarch's, and probably comes from some standard collection of "memorable sayings". Leon was a rhetorician and historian of Byzantium in the time of Philip of Macedon, who besieged the city in 340, but did not capture it, owing to relief sent from Athens. The anecdote may be connected with this siege.

XXII. 4. **A fresh army**: collected by Gylippus in the interior of Sicily, and including some sixteen hundred heavy-armed troops sent from Peloponnesus (see the note on xx. 2–3), who had made a roundabout journey to Selinus by way of Libya, under stress of weather (Thuc., vii. 50, 2).

Nicias decided . . . . ordered: in Thucydides, the generals in council do the deciding and ordering, Nicias only stipulating that there should be no voting on the question by the subordinate officers.

XXIII. 1. **A great terror, etc.**: "The mass of the army was greatly moved, and called upon the generals to remain" (Thuc., vii. 50, 4).

XXIII. 2–6. These paragraphs are a compilation from various sources other than Thucydides. Plutarch had already written (*De superstitione*, 8 = *Morals*, p. 169 A): "And perhaps it had been better if the Athenian general, Nicias, had been eased of his folly the same way that Midas and Aristodemus were [these had made away with themselves], than for him to sit still for fear of a lunar eclipse, while he was invested by an enemy. . . . There was nothing formidable in the interposition of the earth betwixt the sun and the moon, neither was there anything dreadful in the shadow's meeting the moon at the proper time. No, the dreadfulness lay here, that the darkness of ignorance should blind and befool a man's reason at a time when he had most occasion to use it."

XXIII. 2. **Anaxagoras**: a native of Clazomenae in Ionian Asia Minor. He was born about 500 B.C., and came to Athens about 460, where he had great influence on advanced thinkers like Pericles and Euripides. The enemies of Pericles secured the banishment of Anaxagoras about 432, and he died at Lampsacus in 428. Two of his doctrines anticipated some of the noblest phases of modern thought, — the doctrine of Mind as the source of order in the universe, and the doctrine of "rotation", our "Nebular Hypothesis". See the note on the *Themistocles*, ii. 3.

XXIII. 3. **Protagoras**: of Abdera, in Thrace, the first to call himself a "sophist" and to teach for pay, an occupation in which he amassed wealth. The excitement caused by his second visit to Athens, bringing in his train many disciples won in other Greek cities, is playfully described in Plato's *Protagoras*, pp. 309–315. At a later visit (not far from 411 B.C.) he was accused of impiety and, to escape certain condemnation, fled, but only to perish on the sea.

XXIII. 4. **Dion**: see the note on xiv. 6. The ardent devotion of Dion to Plato, and his desire to have Syracuse governed according to the political philosophy of his teacher,

was the cause of his downfall. The eclipse of the moon as he was on the point of setting out from Zacynthus against Dionysius did not disturb Dion, "who understood the revolutions of eclipses, and the way in which the moon is overshadowed and the earth interposed between her and the sun." His soldiers, however, had to have the portent explained to them as foreshadowing the eclipse of the splendid sovereignty of Dionysius (Plutarch, *Dion*, xxiv.).

XXIII. 5. **A soothsayer who was expert**: there was no lack of soothsayers, according to Thucydides (vii. 50, 4). "Nicias himself, who was too much under the influence of divinations and omens, refused even to discuss the question of their removal until they had remained thrice nine days, as the soothsayers prescribed."

Stilbides: so eminent that his name became representative of the whole profession to the comic poets (Aristophanes, *Peace*, 1031, and scholia). His relations with Nicias must have been established by the Hiero of whom we read in chap. v.

Philochorus: see the Introd. p. 34. It is he who notes the presence and death of Stilbides in Sicily, as is clear from the scholia on Aristophanes referred to in the last note.

XXIII. 6. **Autocleides**: an Athenian of unknown date, author of a work on sacrificial ritual and tradition (Athenaeus, xi. p. 473 b). Plutarch probably finds him cited by Philochorus.

Nicias persuaded the Athenians: see the citation from Thucydides above on § 5. When, however, the Syracusans began to close the mouth of the great harbor, the council of generals decided to attempt departure at once (Thuc., vii. 60), by sea if possible, otherwise by land.

XXIV. At this point in the story Thucydides has recourse to his most epic manner, as a brief summary of the chapters in his history which are covered by this single chapter of Plutarch will show:

vii. 51. The Syracusans, hearing of the intention of the Athenians to depart, resume the offensive, practicing their

ships for another engagement, and attacking the Athenian lines on land.

52–54. In a third sea fight the Syracusans are completely victorious, cutting off and destroying Eurymedon with a division of ships, and threatening the safety of the rest of the Athenian fleet. In their attack upon the Athenian camp, however, they are repulsed.

55. By this brilliant success of the Syracusans on the sea the Athenians are plunged into despair. "They had failed at almost every point, and were already in great straits."

56. The Syracusans, on the other hand, elated by their success, think no longer merely of achieving their own deliverance, but of destroying the Athenians and their allies by land and sea, and of thus becoming the leading city of Hellas.

57–58. Detailed epic review of all the forces arrayed on both sides.

59. The Syracusans begin to close up the mouth of the great harbor, and prepare for a fourth and decisive sea fight.

60. The Athenians on their part also prepare for another sea fight, which should secure their departure in their fleet. They concentrate their lines on land, and man one hundred and ten ships for battle, adopting new and special devices.

61–64. Speech of Nicias to his men.

65. The Syracusans include in their preparations special precautions against the new and special devices of the Athenians.

66–68. Speech of Gylippus and his generals to their men.

69. After a pathetic supplementary appeal to his trierarchs, Nicias disposes his land forces along the shore, while Demosthenes and his colleagues proceed towards the mouth of the harbor with their ships, intending to force their way out.

XXIV. 2. The particular incidents leading up to the third sea fight are additions to the account of Thucydides, probably coming from Philistus (Introd. p. 10).

XXIV. 3. **Bade them withdraw by land**: this is undue anticipation by Plutarch of the effects of the third sea fight.

According to Thucydides (chap. 60), the generals and officers met in council, considered the difficulties of the situation, and decided to fight a decisive battle with their ships, "and, if they conquered, go to Catana; but if not, they would burn their ships, and retreat by land in good order."

XXIV. 4. **The Heracleum**: on the high grounds of Epipolae, near the city. Thucydides is silent on this matter, which probably comes to Plutarch through Timaeus (Introd. p. 33).

XXV. 1. The first part of this paragraph probably comes from Timaeus (Introd. p. 33), being a continuation of xxiv. 4. The second part is the briefest possible compendium of two of the most vividly descriptive chapters in the whole work of Thucydides (vii. 70 and 71). Here, if anywhere, he "surpasses himself in vividness, pathos, and variety" (i. 1), and Plutarch does well to avoid comparisons.

XXV. 2. The details of this paragraph, while not inconsistent at all with the story of Thucydides, are not taken from it, but, in all probability, from that of Philistus (Introd. p. 10). Ariston the Corinthian captain had already been the author of one victory for the Syracusans (xx. 5).

XXV. 3. "The Athenians, overwhelmed by their misery, never so much as thought of recovering their wrecks or of asking leave to collect their dead. Their intention was to retreat that very night" (Thuc., vii. 72, 2). Then follows a significant detail for which Plutarch might well have found a place. Demosthenes proposed to Nicias that at daybreak they make another attempt, with their remaining vessels, which still outnumbered those of the Syracusans, to force a passage at the mouth of the harbor. Nicias approved, but the sailors were paralyzed by their defeat and refused to embark. "So the Athenians all made up their minds to escape by land."

XXVI. This chapter is an admirable condensation and improvement of Thucydides, vii. 73–77. Certain slight variations may be noted, and one or two important omissions supplied.

XXVI. 1. **Gylippus**: of him there is no mention here in Thucydides. It is Hermocrates who goes to the Syracusan authorities and proposes to march out that very night and obstruct the way of the Athenians. The authorities decide that this is impossible, whereupon Hermocrates concocts his stratagem.

XXVI. 2. Thucydides gives the significant detail of the capture by the Syracusans of all the ships of the Athenians except a few which were burned (vii. 74, 2).

XXVI. 3. **And then set out**: "They seemed, not like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city captured after a siege; and of a great city too. For the whole multitude who were marching together numbered not less than forty thousand" (Thuc., vii. 75, 5).

Lighter than those to come: "having suffered calamities too great for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in the unknown future" (Thuc., vii. 75, 4).

XXVI. 4–6. This pathetic picture of Nicias is fair inference from and improvement of the material of the speech which Thucydides here puts into his mouth for the encouragement and consolation of his men (vii. 76 f.).

XXVII. 1. **For eight successive days**: minutely described, day by day, in Thucydides, vii. 78–85. Plutarch passes over the events of the first five days, and takes up the story at the surrender of Demosthenes, on the sixth day.

The estate of Polyzelus: the detail of the name undoubtedly comes from Philistus (Introd. p. 10). Thucydides speaks of it as "a walled enclosure, having a road on both sides and planted thickly with olive trees" (vii. 81, 4). The division of Demosthenes, forming the rear guard, and comprising the larger half of the army, "got severed from the other division, and marched in less order" (Thuc., vii. 80, 4). This was during the night following the fifth day. By noon of the sixth day some six miles separated the two divisions, and the Syracusans came upon that of Demosthenes "marching slowly and in disorder" (Thuc., vii. 81, 2). Nicias, on the other hand, "marched faster, thinking that

their safety depended at such a time, not in remaining and fighting, if they could avoid it, but in retreating as quickly as they could, and resisting only when they were positively compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, who had been more incessantly harassed throughout the retreat, because marching last he was first attacked by the enemy, now, when he saw the Syracusans pursuing him, instead of pressing onward, had ranged his army in order of battle. Thus lingering he was surrounded" (Thuc., vii. 81, 3 f.).

XXVII. 2. **Gave himself a thrust**: Thucydides says nothing of this attempt at suicide on the part of Demosthenes, but it is known to have been reported by Philistus (Introd. p. 10). Pausanias, speaking of a monument on the road to the Academy "raised to the men who fell in Euboea and Chios, and who perished in the farthest regions of Asia and in Sicily", says (i. xxix. 9): "Inscribed are the names of the generals, except Nicias, and the names of the soldiers, both citizens and Plataeans. According to Philistus, whose account I follow, the reason why Nicias was left out was that he surrendered voluntarily, whereas Demosthenes made terms for every one but himself, and tried to kill himself when he was taken." The terms which Demosthenes made for his men were, according to Thucydides (vii. 82, 2), that "their arms were to be surrendered, but no one was to suffer death, either from violence or from imprisonment, or from want of the bare means of life. So they all surrendered, being in number six thousand."

Told Nicias: on the following (seventh) day.

XXVII. 3–5. These paragraphs are essentially Thucydidean. Plutarch omits the minor detail of a night march attempted in vain by Nicias. He omits also many realistic details of the bloody carnage in the river Asinarus, where "the water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, though muddy and dyed with blood, and the crowd fought for it" (Thuc., vii. 84, 5). Also, Plutarch is much more dramatic than Thucydides in his account of the final surrender of Nicias, although he clearly says nothing that may not

have been suggested by Thucydides, or naturally inferred from the well known circumstances of the case.

XXVII. 6. These details, and the note of triumph at the close of the paragraph, undoubtedly come from Philistus (Introd. p. 10). Thucydides simply says: "The Syracusans and their allies collected their forces and returned with the spoil, and as many prisoners as they could take with them, into the city" (vii. 86, 1). And when he sums up his marvelous story of the expedition, it is from an impartial, but still distinctly Athenian standpoint that he says (vii. 87 *fin.*): "Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this war, or indeed of all Hellenic actions which are on record, this was the greatest — the most glorious to the victors, the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth; nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home."

XXVIII. 1. These details come, doubtless, from Philistus (Introd. p. 10). Thucydides says (vii. 86, 2): "The captive Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries, which they thought would be the safest place of confinement. Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, although against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought that to carry home with him to Lacedaemon the generals of the enemy, over and above all his other successes, would be a brilliant triumph. One of them, Demosthenes, happened to be the greatest foe, and the other the greatest friend of the Lacedaemonians, both in the same matter of Pylos and Sphacteria. For Nicias had taken up their cause, and had persuaded the Athenians to make the peace which set at liberty the prisoners taken in the island. The Lacedaemonians were grateful to him for the service, and this was the main reason why he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to him." See chap. xxvii. 4–5 of the *Nicias*.

Carneius, Metageitnion: Dorian and Ionian names, respectively, for the month corresponding to the latter half of August and the first half of September.

XXVIII. 2. **Hermocrates protested**: an item from Philistus (Introd. p. 10).

XXVIII. 3. **Timaeus says**: *cf.* chap. xix. 4.

Cleandridas: the guardian and adviser of the Spartan king Pleistoanax, on the invasion of Attica in 446. He was believed to have been bribed by Pericles to induce Pleistoanax to withdraw. "When the army had withdrawn and had been disbanded to their several cities, the Lacedaemonians, in indignation, laid a heavy fine upon their King, the full amount of which he was unable to pay, and so betook himself out of Lacedaemon, while Cleandridas, who had gone into voluntary exile, was condemned to death. He was the father of that Gylippus who overcame the Athenians in Sicily. And nature seems to have imparted covetousness to the son, as it were a congenital disease, owing to which he too, after noble achievements, was caught in base practices and banished from Sparta in disgrace. This story, however, I have told at length in my life of Lysander (*Pericles*, xxii. 3). Cleandridas betook himself to Magna Graecia, became a citizen of Thurii (Thuc., vi. 104, 2), and distinguished himself in his adopted home as a soldier (Frontinus, *Strat.*, ii. 3, 12).

In my life of Lysander: chapters xvi. f.

XXVIII. 5. **The shield of Nicias**: with this item, possibly taken from Timaeus, Plutarch takes his leave of Nicias. He has already, in xxvi. 6, anticipated the memorable words with which Thucydides takes his leave of him (vii. 86, 5): "No one of the Hellenes of my time was less deserving of so miserable an end; for he lived in the practice of every virtue" (Jowett); or, "in the entire practice of what men regarded as virtue" (*διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν*). I find no sarcasm, much less malice, in these words, as Professor Bury does, who interprets: "In my opinion, says Thucydides, Nicias deserved such an end less than any other Athenian, considering his conventional virtue. In other words, a man of such conventional virtue was unsuited for such an unconventional end" (*Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 119). In his last speech to the army Thucydides

has Nicias say (vii. 77, 2): "My days have been passed in the performance of many ordained religious rites, and of many just and blameless services to mankind" (Jowett has "of many a religious duty, and of many a just and blameless action").

XXIX. This chapter, again, is a compound of material furnished by Thucydides and Philistus (Introd. p. 10). The corresponding passage in Thucydides is best given in full: "Those who were imprisoned in the quarries were at the beginning of their captivity harshly treated by the Syracusans. There were great numbers of them, and they were crowded in a deep and narrow place. At first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature engendered violent disorders. Being cramped for room they had to do everything on the same spot. The corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure to the weather, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. The smells were intolerable; and they were at the same time afflicted by hunger and thirst. During eight months they were allowed only about half a pint of water and a pint of food a day. Every kind of misery which could befall man in such a place befell them. This was the condition of all the captives for about ten weeks. At length the Syracusans sold them, with the exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilian or Italian Greeks who had sided with them in the war. The whole number of the public prisoners is not accurately known, but they were not less than seven thousand" (vii. 87).

The rations allowed their captives in the quarries by the Syracusans were only half the regular rations of a slave. The Athenians allowed the Lacedaemonians to send to the besieged on Sphacteria "two Attic quarts of barley-meal for each man, and a pint of wine, and also a piece of meat; for an attendant, half these quantities" (Thuc., iv. 16, 1).

XXIX. 1. **The mark of a horse**: an emblem of Syracuse, as the owl was of Athens. The Athenians were said to have

branded Samian prisoners with the mark of an owl. See on the *Pericles*, xxvi. 3.

XXIX. 3. **The Caunians**: Caunus was a city of Caria, belonging to the Rhodians. It joined the Ionians in their revolt from Persia in 499. It had dockyards, and a noted harbor which could be closed. Browning has made an artistic use of the incident here narrated as an introduction to his transcription of the *Alcestis* of Euripides, in *Balaustion's Adventure*.

XXX. **They say**: the story which follows has no authority, and smacks of romantic invention. It is given more at length by Plutarch in his *De garrulitate*, 13 = *Morals*, p. 509: "It was a barber that first reported the news of the great overthrow which the Athenians received in Sicily; for being the first that heard the relation of it in the Piraeus, from a servant of one of those who had escaped out of the battle, he presently left his shop at sixes and sevens, and flew into the city as fast as his heels could carry him,

> 'For fear some other should the honor claim
> Of being first, when he but second came' (*Iliad*, xxii. 207).

Now you may be sure that the first spreader of this news caused a great hubbub in the city, insomuch that the people, thronging together in the market-place, made diligent enquiry for the first divulger. Presently the barber was brought by head and shoulders to the crowd, and examined; but he could give no account of his author, only one that he never saw or knew in his life before had told him the news. Which so incensed the multitude, that they immediately cried out, 'To the rack with the traitor, tie the lying rascal neck and heels together. This is a mere story of the rogue's own making. Who heard it? Who gave any credit to it beside himself?' At the same instant the wheel was brought out, and the poor barber stretched upon it, — not to his ease, you may be sure. And then it was, and not before, that the news of the defeat was confirmed by several that had made a hard shift to escape the slaughter. Upon which the people

scattered every one to his own home, to make their private lamentation for their particular losses, leaving the unfortunate barber bound fast to the wheel; in which condition he continued till late in the evening, before he was let loose. Nor would this reform the impertinent fool; for no sooner was he at liberty but he would needs be enquiring of the executioner, what news, and what was reported of the manner of Nicias the general's being slain. So inexpugnable and incorrigible a vice is loquacity."

Another story connected with the arrival of the news at Athens is told by Athenaeus (ix. p. 407) on the authority of Chamaeleon of Pontus, an immediate disciple of Aristotle. Hegemon, the famous inventor of parody, was reciting in the theater his parody of the Gigantomachy, and was moving the Athenians to excessive laughter, when the news was brought to the audience of the disaster in Sicily. "No one left his place, although almost every one had lost kindred. They veiled their faces and wept in secret, but did not leave their places, that men from other cities who were at the spectacle might not see that they were overwhelmed by their calamity. And they continued to listen to the recital, but Hegemon, when he heard the news, decided to hold his peace."

XXX. 2. **Messengers came**: members of the expedition who had made their escape from Sicily. "The news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians could not believe that the armament had been so completely annihilated, although they had the positive assurances of the very soldiers who had escaped from the scene of action. At last they knew the truth; and then they were furious with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition — as if they had not voted it themselves — and with the soothsayers, and prophets, and all who by the influence of religion had at the time inspired them with the belief that they would conquer Sicily" (Thuc., viii. 1, 1).

NOTES ON THE *ALCIBIADES*

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I. 1. **The family of Alcibiades**: on his father's side Alcibiades belonged to the noble family of the Eupatridae (a specific clan name to be distinguished from the same name used generically for all Athenians of noble birth), and his grandfather, Alcibiades the Elder, had been associated with Cleisthenes the reformer in the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (510 B. C., *cf.* Isoc., xvi. 26). For political reasons this Alcibiades renounced the office of Proxenus, or Consul Resident, for Sparta at Athens, which his more famous grandson tried to resume (Thuc., v. 43, 2). The name itself was Spartan, and had early passed over into the Athenian family (Thuc., viii. 6, 3).

To Eurysaces: in the *Alcibiades I.*, a dialogue attributed to Plato, p. 121, Socrates is made to draw from Alcibiades the boast that his race goes "back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus". To this Socrates playfully rejoins, "And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus." But there was no noble family of Eurysacidae at Athens, as some have thought (see Toepffer, *Attische Genealogie*, pp. 175 ff., 278).

An Alcmaeonid . . . . Megacles: this was the most famous, and at different times the most powerful clan at Athens, successfully rivalling that of the Philaïdae. To the latter Cimon belonged, to the former Pericles. It traced its origin through an Alcmaeon to Neleus, the father of the Homeric Nestor. Megacles was the third of that name in the family line, the nephew of Cleisthenes the reformer, and brother of Agariste the mother of Pericles.


At his own cost: the State usually furnished the trierarch with hull, mast, and pay and rations for the crew.

At Artemisium: in 480 B. C. At the close of the third day of fighting the Persian and Greek fleets drew apart for

the night. "On the side of the Greeks the Athenians bore off the meed of valour; and among them the most distinguished was Cleinias, the son of Alcibiades, who served at his own charge with two hundred men, on board a vessel which he had himself furnished" (Herod., viii. 17).

At Coroneia: In 447 B. C., the Athenians under Tolmides invaded Boeotia, but were most disastrously defeated. See the *Pericles*, xviii., and *cf.* Isoc., xvi. 28; Plato, *Alcibiades I.*, p. 112.

His near kinsmen: they were first cousins once removed, through Agariste, the mother of Pericles, as shown by the following genealogical table.



From Plato's *Protagoras*, p. 320, we learn that Cleinias, the younger brother of Alcibiades, was also a ward of Pericles, who placed him with Ariphron to be educated, fearing that he would be corrupted by Alcibiades. "But before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him."

I. 2. **The favor which Socrates showed him**: if the story told by Xenophon (*Mem.* i. 2, 40) is authentic, Alcibiades was a follower of Socrates shortly before the death of Pericles (429 B. C.), and Plato (*Symp.* p. 215 A) represents him as still a warm admirer of the Master more than a dozen years later, just before the Sicilian expedition. But Socrates carefully disavowed being any man's teacher, and never spoke of his "pupils", but of his "associates".

Prominent men: the first three of the list were associated in the Sicilian expedition (see the *Nicias*, xviii. 2; xx. 1 and *passim*). Phormio served Athens successfully as general on various occasions from 440 to 429. He is most famous for his remarkable naval victories in the Corinthian gulf during the last year. These are vividly described by Thucydides (ii. 83–92). Thrasybulus came into prominence as a naval commander after the Sicilian expedition, and was the hero of the restoration of the democracy in 403, after the rule of the "Thirty Tyrants". For Theramenes, see on the *Nicias*, ii. 1.

His nurse . . . . a Spartan woman: as a result of the athletic training of Spartan women, they were acknowledged to be the most beautiful and healthy in Greece, and were generally sought for by well-to-do families as nurses for children. They gave the limbs of infants free play, instead of wrapping them tightly in swaddling bands.

His tutor: the παιδαγωγός, or Greek tutor, was merely a sort of guardian of the boy, conducting him to and from school or palaestra, and holding him to his regimen. See Plato's *Lysis*, p. 223, for a picture of tutors in function. "The law", says St. Paul (*Gal.* iii. 24), "was our παιδαγωγός," our tutor, "to bring us unto Christ" the teacher.

Antisthenes: one of the most devoted followers of Socrates, and, after his Master's death, the founder of the Cynic school of philosophy. According to Diogenes Laertius (ii. 7, 3) he was the author of a dialogue entitled *Alcibiades*, and in one of his works entitled *Cyrus* he is known to have vehemently attacked Alcibiades (Athen., p. 220 c).

Plato: "whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work" (*Alcibiades I.*, p. 122, Jowett's trans.).

I. 3. **The saying of Euripides**: the story is given in Aelian, *Var. Hist.* xiii. 4. At a symposium given by Archelaus king of Macedon, Euripides, who was reclining on a couch with Agathon the tragic poet, then forty years of age, embraced and kissed him. When Archelaus asked if he was still a lover of Agathon, Euripides answered, "Yes

indeed! It is not the spring time only of beauty which is very beautiful, but also the autumn." In his *Apophtheg. reg. et imp.*, p. 177, telling the same story, Plutarch has Archelaus say to his friends, anent the action of Euripides, "Be not surprised; beauty's autumn, too, is beautiful."

The case with Alcibiades: the *Protagoras* of Plato opens thus: "Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the question, as I know that you have been in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man, — and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was still very charming." And at the beginning of the *Alcibiades I.* (p. 104) Socrates is made to say to Alcibiades: "You think that you are the fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has eyes sees to be true." Antisthenes, who was no friend of Alcibiades (see on § 2), said he was vigorous and manly, undisciplined and bold, and fair to look upon in every period of his life (Athen., p. 534 c).

I. 4. **Aristophanes notices this lisp**: in the *Wasps* (422 B. C.), vv. 44 ff. Sosias is telling his fellow slave, Xanthias, his wonderful vision of Cleon speaking to the Athenians in the Pynx: —

(Sosias) "Methought beside him, on the ground, I saw
Theorus seated, with a raven's head.
Then Alcibiades lisped out to me,
Cwemark! Theocwus has a cwaven's head.
(Xanthias) Well lisped! and rightly, Alcibiades!" (Rogers' trans.)

The "lisp" of Alcibiades turned his r's into l's, and the play is on the Greek words *κόραξ*, *raven*, and *κόλαξ*, *flatterer*, — or *craven*, as the exigencies of translation will have it. Theorus is thus pilloried as one of the innumerable flatterers and minions of the great demagogue, Cleon.

Archippus: a minor poet of Old Comedy. His most famous play was "The Fishes", in which the Athenians, as excessive eaters of fish, were attacked and brought to terms

by the animals themselves. The passage which is partly paraphrased and partly quoted here, cannot be assigned to any definite play. See Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 688.

The son of Alcibiades: by Hipparete, daughter of Hipponicus (chap. viii. 2–4). He seems to have been dissolute and weak. We have an oration of Isocrates in his defense (xvi.); and two orations of Lysias attacking him for military cowardice (xiv. and xv.). These are described more at length in the Introduction, p. 3. He came into unenviable political notice for a short time during the Corinthian war (395–390 B. C.).

II. 2. The source of the wrestling story is unknown. Plutarch has it again in *Apophtheg. reg. et imp.*, p. 186 D, and also, of an unnamed Spartan, in *Apophtheg. Lacon.*, p. 234 E.

II. 3. The knuckle-bones story is found only here. The astragalus, or knuckle-bone, came from the hind ankle-joint of such cloven-footed animals as sheep and goats, and owing to their peculiar squareness and smoothness, were used as playthings by children, and as dice by men, women, and children. *Cf.* the *Alcibiades I.*, p. 110.

II. 4. **Refused to play the flute**: in the *Alcibiades I.*, p. 106, Socrates says, "According to my recollection, Alcibiades, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn." The Boeotians, and especially the Thebans, led all Greece in the art of flute-playing. "Their lawgivers," says Plutarch (*Pelopidas*, xix.), "designing to soften, whilst they were young, their natural fierceness, brought the pipe into great esteem, both in serious and sportive occasions." The Athenians, on the other hand, held that the music of the flute was too exciting, and its moral effects, therefore, bad. Much, however, must have depended on the style of music played. The objection of Alcibiades, in this story, to the art, is wholly aesthetic. See W. Rhys Roberts, *Ancient Boeotians*, pp. 33 ff.

II. 5. **Athena . . . . Apollo, etc.**: "Athena is said to have invented the pipes or double flute. But as she played on them in the forest of Mt. Ida, she saw her puffed and swollen

cheeks reflected in the water of a spring. Disgusted at the sight, she threw away the pipes with a curse on whoever should pick them up. They were found by the satyr Marsyas, who picked them up and practiced on them. At last he challenged Apollo to a musical contest, he to play on his flutes, and Apollo to play on his lyre. Being vanquished, Marsyas was tied up to a pine-tree and flayed alive" (Frazer, on Pausanias, i. 24, 1 and ii. 7, 9). The skin of Marsyas was to be seen in historical times at Celaenae in Phrygia (Herod., vii. 26; Xen., *Anab.* i. 2, 8).

III. **Antiphon**: the Rhamnusian. See on the *Nicias*, vi. 1. An abusive oration of his against Alcibiades is cited in Athenaeus, p. 525 b. It was in all probability a fabrication, by some unknown sophist, dating from about the middle of the fourth century B. C., when the growing cult of Alcibiades' memory roused much hostile literary activity. The oration was falsely attributed by its unknown author to Antiphon, but has not come down to us among his writings, as the similar oration against Alcibiades attributed to Andocides has. See on the *Nicias*, xi. 7, and Bruns, *Literarisches Portraet*, pp. 510 f.

Ariphron: one of his guardians (i. 1).

If he is dead, etc.: this should perhaps be added to the list of "memorable sayings" attributed to Pericles, given in the note on the *Pericles*, viii. 6.

IV. 1. **By flattery and favor**: "his influence in the state and among the allies exposed him to the corruption of many an adept in the art of flattery" (Xen., *Mem.*, i. 2, 24).

IV. 2. **That he cannot be reached by . . . philosophy**: "that philosophie should not take holde on him with her free, severe, and quicke reasons" (North).

Saw all that was in Socrates and clave to him: so Plato always represents the attachment of Alcibiades to Socrates, particularly in the long and ardent eulogium of Socrates which he puts into the mouth of Alcibiades in the *Symposium*, pp. 215 ff. A different idea is given by Xenophon

(*Mem.* i. 2, 12–48), in rescuing the memory of Socrates from the odium of his having been the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades. Neither of these young men, according to Xenophon, associated with Socrates because they found him or the life he led really pleasing to them. Rather, they sought thereby to make their own his marvelous powers of argument, his independence and self-control, that they might prevail among professed politicians, and obtain the headship of the state. When Alcibiades can out-argue Pericles, he has no further use for Socrates. "As soon as the desired superiority over the politicians of the day seemed to be attained, Critias and Alcibiades turned their backs on Socrates. They found his society unattractive, not to speak of the annoyance of being cross-questioned on their own shortcomings. Forthwith they devoted themselves to those affairs of state but for which they would never have come near him at all." Plato's conception of the relation between Socrates and Alcibiades is far more reasonable. In youth and early manhood Alcibiades may well have felt with Socrates that virtue, rather than royal power, must be the aim of individuals or states, if they would be happy (Plato, *Alcibiades I.* p. 135), and may have sincerely said to him: "From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master." Afterwards, the deceitfulness of ambition and the cares of the world brought on estrangement from and neglect of the great teacher.

IV. 3. **He crouched, etc.**: this iambic trimeter, of unknown authorship, is cited by Plutarch also in the *Pelopidas*, xxix., and the *Amatorius*, 18 = *Morals*, p. 762 F.

IV. 4. **As Plato says**: "when he is with the lover, both cease from their pain, but when he is away, then he longs as he is longed for, and has love's image, love for love (Anteros), lodging in his breast" (*Phaedrus*, p. 255).

Tenting with Socrates: during an expedition to Potidaea, 432/431 B. C. (Thuc., i. 64, 2). "All this", Alcibiades is made to say in the *Symposium*, p. 219 E, "happened before he and I

went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together." See on vii. 3.

IV. 5 f. **Anytus**: a wealthy tanner, who became prominent as general and politician during the last decade of the century. He once belonged to the circle of Socrates, but became embittered against the Master, and at last, with Meletus and Lycon, headed the prosecution which resulted in his death (399). When the Athenian people repented of this judicial murder, Anytus was banished, and betook himself to Heracleia, on the Euxine sea, where he is said to have been stoned to death by the enraged populace. This story of Alcibiades' drunken frolic at his house is told by Plutarch also in the *Amatorius*, 17 = *Morals*, p. 762 C, and by Satyrus in Athenaeus, p. 534 e, f. In this last version, it is to Thrasyllus, an indigent companion, that Alcibiades has the golden booty carried. For Satyrus, see on xii. 1.

V. A variant of this story, with much less detail, is found in the comments of Proclus (412–485 A. D.) on Plato's *Alcibiades I.* (p. 108): "To a lover of his who sold his farm for a hundred drachmas, Alcibiades, they say, managed to have ten talents given by the farmers of the public revenues." Here the money values differ widely from those which Plutarch gives. The gold coin most commonly called a stater was worth twenty drachmas (silver coins of about the value of a franc), and corresponded to the modern napoleon. It took three hundred of them to make the value of a talent. The talent was equivalent to about $1200, or £250, though the purchasing power of money was at least five times greater then than now. The farmers of the public revenues, in this case, probably, were thought of as men who leased certain public lands. The anecdote cannot be regarded as a source for exact economic detail. The best description of the financial system of Pericles is now to be found in Ed. Meyer's *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iv. pp. 28 ff.

V. 1. **A resident alien**: a metic (*μέτοικος*), enjoyed commercial privileges, paid certain taxes and performed many civic duties, but had no civic rights. See Gardner-Jevons,

Manual of Greek Antiquities, pp. 454 ff. In the summer of 431, when the entire Athenian force, including the metics, was called into service, the citizen hoplites numbered thirteen thousand, and the metic hoplites three thousand (Thuc., ii. 31).

VI. 1. **Wrung his heart, etc.**: "Thus Socrates humbled Alcibiades, forced him into unfeigned tears, and turned his heart, when he argued the case with him" (Plutarch, *Quomodo adulator etc.*, 29 = *Morals*, p. 69 F). See also the passages from Plato's *Symposium* cited below on § 4.

Hunted down by him: this is also the metaphor of Plato in the passage from the opening of the *Protagoras* cited on i. 3.

VI. 2. **Cleanthes**: of Assos in the Troad, an ardent devotee of philosophy in spite of poverty (300–220 B. C.), was long a disciple of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school at Athens, and succeeded him about 260 B. C. as head of the school. He was a man of the simplest life and sternest morality. Of all his writings only a striking hymn to Zeus is still extant.

Of which Thucydides speaks: in his terse characterization of Alcibiades (vi. 15). "The people feared the extremes to which he carried his lawless self-indulgence."

VI. 4. **As iron, etc.**: "For as we first soften iron in the fire and then dip it in water, to harden it into a due consistence; so, after we have warmed and mollified our friend by a just commendation of his virtues, we may then safely temper him with a moderate reprehension of his vices" (Plutarch, *Quomodo adulator etc.*, 36 = *Morals*, p. 73 C).

In the *Symposium* of Plato (pp. 215 f.), Alcibiades is made to say to, and of, Socrates, "When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, his words produce absolutely no effect upon us in comparison, whereas the very fragments of you and your words, even at second hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. . . . My heart leaps within me more than that of any Cory-

bantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. . . . He is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might not think to be my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me."

VII. 1. The first of the two stories in this paragraph is told by Plutarch also in his *Apophthegmata reg. et imp.*, p. 186 E, where, however, more correctly, it is a *rhapsody* of the Iliad for which Alcibiades asks.

VII. 2. This story is also told by Plutarch in the same place as the first, and as it is told here. A much more dramatic form of it is found in Diodorus (Ephorus), xii. 38, 3. Alcibiades finds Pericles in despair over the accounts which he has been bidden to put in, and advises him to devise some way of not putting them in at all; whereupon Pericles plunges his country into the Peloponnesian war to distract attention from his accounts! This form of the story is found also in Valerius Maximus, iii. 1, 3, with the additional detail that it was the accounts for expenditures on the Propylaea which had been demanded of Pericles. For the motives of Pericles in favoring the Peloponnesian war, see the *Pericles*, xxxii. 3.

VII. 3. **The campaign of Potidaea**: see on iv. 4. In the *Symposium* of Plato (p. 220), Alcibiades is made to say of Socrates, "I will also tell, if you please — and indeed I am bound to tell — of his courage in battle; for who but he saved my life? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valour: for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms; and he ought to have received the prize of valour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize." *Cf.* also the opening of the *Charmides*, p. 153. In Isoc. xvi. 29 there is no mention of Socrates, and Athenaeus

has a long tirade against the credibility of Plato's testimony to the soldierly exploits of the Master (p. 215).

VII. 4. **The battle of Delium**: see on the *Nicias*, vi. 3. Continuing the citation from Plato's *Symposium* in the preceding note, Alcibiades says, "There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very noticeable — in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, where he served among the heavy-armed, and I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea, as I was myself on horseback, and therefore comparatively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating as the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them. And there you might see him, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped — for persons of this class are never touched in war; those only are pursued who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind." In Plato's *Laches*, p. 181, Laches says Socrates was his companion in the retreat from Delium, and highly praises his bravery. And in Plato's *Apology*, p. 28 e, Socrates speaks of his serving also in the campaign against Amphipolis, in 422. See the Introd., p. 11.

VIII. 1. **Hipponicus**: the third of the name in this wealthy family. He is mentioned by Thucydides (iii. 91) as a general who successfully coöperated with Nicias in an incursion into the territory of Tanagra, in Boeotia, in 426. According to [Pseudo-]Andocides, iv. 13, he was killed at the battle of Delium, in 424 (see on the *Nicias*, vi. 3), serving there also as general. His father, Callias II., bore the surname of "Pit-wealthy" (see on the *Aristides*, v. 4); his son, Callias III., dissipated the vast wealth of the family on sophists, flatterers, and women. It is at his house that the scene is laid in Plato's *Protagoras* and Xenophon's *Symposium*.

VIII. 2–4. **Some say**: that Callias and not Hipponicus gave Hipparete to Alcibiades in marriage, looks like an unwarranted inference from the language of [Pseudo-]Andocides in iv. 13–15, where the details of this and the two following paragraphs are to be found. The story of § 1 is not now to be found elsewhere. For the character of the oration against Alcibiades attributed to Andocides, see on the *Nicias*, xi. 7.

A dowry of ten talents: about $12000, or £2500 (see on v.), an enormous dowry, as dowries went. The state awarded the daughters of Aristides a dowry of half a talent each (see on the *Aristides*, xxvii. 1).

VIII. 5. This paragraph is evidently Plutarch's own defense, and a questionable one, of Alcibiades' conduct. [Pseudo-]Andocides calls it a shameless defiance of the magistrates, the laws, and his fellow citizens.

IX. This anecdote is found also, in briefer form, in Plutarch's *Apophth. reg. et. imp.*, p. 186 D. There, however, the price of the dog is put at 6000 drachmas, or a talent. In re-telling the story Plutarch has increased the sum to seventy minas, or 7000 drachmas. This is the way with good story-tellers.

Three obols was a low living wage at Athens for a man of family. The obol corresponded closely to the English penny, though it had several times its purchasing power, as did all ancient money when compared with sums equivalent now. There were six obols in a drachma, one hundred drachmas in a mina, and sixty minas in a talent.

X. 1. **Contributions to the state**: aside from the regular public services, or "liturgies", imposed by the state upon wealthy citizens (see on the *Nicias*, iii. 2), voluntary contributions of money, weapons, or ships were often called for in the public assembly, when the expenses of the state were greater than its revenue. "Those who were willing to contribute then rose and mentioned what they would give; while those who were unwilling to give anything remained silent or retired privately from the assembly. The names of

those who had promised to contribute, together with the amount of their contributions, were written on tablets, which were placed before the statues of the Eponymi [statues of the heroes from whom the ten Athenian tribes were named, standing near the Council House in the market place], where they remained till the amount was paid" (Smith's *Dictionary of Antiquities*, 3d ed., art. *Epidoseis;* see also Boeckh's *Staatshaushaltung*, i.[3] pp. 685 f.). The "Mean Man" of Theophrastus (*Char.* xxv., Jebb), "when subscriptions for the treasury are being made, will rise in silence from his place in the Ecclesia, and go out from the midst."

Made a contribution: much later forms of the story (Proclus on Plato, *Alcibiades I.* p. 110, cited by Baehr) give the amount as ten talents, and make Alcibiades the merest boy at the time. Plutarch alludes to the incident of the quail in the *Praec. reip. ger.*, 3 = *Morals*, p. 799 D, as though Alcibiades were making a speech at the time. *Cf.* chap. xvi. 3.

The quail which he was carrying: quail- and cock-fights were very popular at Athens, and the birds were trained with the greatest care. In Plato's *Alcibiades I.* p. 120, Socrates is made to refer Alcibiades "to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics." For the fashionable amusement of quail-filliping, see Mr. Rogers' note on Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1299.

Antiochus: afterwards the means of Alcibiades' undoing (xxxv. 4–6).

X. 2. **The most powerful of orators**: Demosthenes, who, in his speech "Against Meidias", § 145, after enumerating some of the great services which Alcibiades had rendered the state, adds, "and he was held to be the most able of all speakers."

X. 3. **Theophrastus**: see the Introd., p. 35. Plutarch cites this testimony also in the *Quomodo quis suos etc.*, 9= *Morals*, p. 80 D, and the *Praec. reip. ger.*, 8=*Morals*, p. 804 A. This tribute of Theophrastus to Alcibiades is not unlike that of Thucydides to Themistocles (see on the *Themistocles*, ii. 1).

XI. 1. **His breeds of horses**: in characterizing Alcibiades Thucydides says (vi. 15, 3), "He had a great position among the citizens and was devoted to horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his means." And in the memorable debate in the Assembly over the Sicilian expedition he has Nicias say (vi. 12, 2), boldly attacking Alcibiades, "I dare say there may be some young man here who is delighted at holding a command, and the more so because he is too young for his post; and he, regarding only his own interest, may recommend you to sail; he may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, and wants to make something out of his command which will maintain him in his extravagance."

At the Olympic games: the great quadrennial festival at Olympia, in Elis, in which the whole Hellenic world participated. It was probably the festival of the year 416 at which Alcibiades thus eclipsed all records, after his Peloponnesian politics had brought him into national prominence. "He wished to win fame and honor for himself, and at the same time to present before the eyes of the whole Hellenic world a dazzling picture of the wealth and power of his native city. The ambitious and self-seeking representative of an Athenian policy of war and conquest celebrated the most splendid triumph. Influential cities of the Athenian empire sought his favor with costly gifts. In the stately race of four-horse chariots he won the victory, was proclaimed second also, and secured the third or fourth place besides. With the greatest generosity he entertained the festival assemblage. His fellow citizens bestowed upon him the honor of public maintenance in the Prytaneium. Euripides composed a hymn of victory" (Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. p. 1269).

Thucydides makes Alcibiades reply to the taunts of Nicias (vi. 16), "These doings of mine for which I am so much cried out against are an honour to myself and to my ancestors, and a solid advantage to my country. In consequence of the distinguished manner in which I represented the state at Olympia, the other Hellenes formed an idea of our power which even exceeded the reality, although they had

previously imagined that we were exhausted by war. I sent into the lists seven chariots, — no other private man ever did the like; I was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; and I ordered every thing in a style worthy of my victory. The general sentiment honours such magnificence; and the energy which is shown by it creates an impression of power." In a like vein Isocrates has the younger Alcibiades speak in defense of his father (xvi. 32–35). *Cf.* Athenaeus, p. 3 e.

According to Euripides: with whom Isocrates also agrees (xvi. 34).

XI. 2. This fragment of an *epinikion*, or hymn of victory, by Euripides, is translated after the text of Bergk (*Poet. Lyr. Graeci*, ii.[4] p. 266). Alcibiades must have driven the victorious chariot himself, and retainers of his the others.

We get another fragment of this same *epinikion* of Euripides in the opening words of Plutarch's *Demosthenes*. "Whoever it was, Sosius, that wrote the poem in honor of Alcibiades, upon his winning the chariot-race at the Olympian games, — whether it was Euripides, as is most commonly thought, or some other person, — he tells us that 'to a man's being happy it is in the first place requisite he should be born in some famous city'".

It will be remembered that all of the extant poems of Pindar are *epinikia*, or hymns of victory. In commissioning Euripides to celebrate his victory, Alcibiades was reviving an obsolete custom. So the great tyrants of Syracuse and Agrigentum, Hiero and Theron, had patronized Pindar.

XII. 1. **Rivalry of cities**: the following items are found in [Pseudo-]Andocides "Against Alcibiades" (iv. 30), and are there correctly connected with the Olympic festival. Satyrus, a biographer of the Peripatetic school who flourished during the first half of the second century B. C., is quoted at length on Alcibiades by Athenaeus (pp. 534 f.). He makes the four cities furnish Alcibiades thus sumptuously for all his journeys abroad. Plutarch makes a similar lapse in xiii. 2.

XII. 2. **It is said**: apparently, Plutarch has here blended two stories of high-handed proceedings by Alcibiades in the matter of racing-chariots for the Olympic games. One victim was Diomedes, and the other, Tisias. The former, a friend of Alcibiades, was joint owner with him of a chariot and horses which were sent up to Olympia, but Alcibiades had them entered in his own name alone, and enjoyed all the fruits of their victory (Diodorus, xiii. 74). A variant on this story is that Alcibiades took the horses and chariot from Diomedes by force, screened by his prevailing influence with the Elean masters of the games ([Pseudo-]Andoc., iv. 26). The case of Tisias was quite different. He had commissioned Alcibiades to buy a likely chariot and horses for him in Argos, and Alcibiades had bought them for himself instead. The details were given in the lost opening paragraphs of the speech of Isocrates in defense of the younger Alcibiades (Introd. p. 3). For the influence of Alcibiades in Argos, see chap. xv.

XIII. Much of the material of this chapter is identical with that of the *Nicias*, xi., and has had full comment there. The treatment of the subject in the *Nicias* is the earlier and by far the better. In the present chapter Plutarch takes from his source — which was probably the same as for the *Nicias*, xi. and the *Aristides*, vii., since all three accounts are in substantial agreement — more material bearing upon the personality of Phaeax (see on the *Nicias*, xi. 7).

XIII. 1. **Though still a stripling**: Thucydides introduces him into his story as "a man who would have been thought young in any other city, but was influential by reason of his high descent" (v. 43, 1).

XIII. 2. **Eupolis**: a poet of the Old Comedy, a contemporary and rival of Aristophanes. Horace (*Sat.*, i. 4, 1) names him with Cratinus and Aristophanes as the most important representatives of that branch of poetry. Both Eupolis and Aristophanes, who were of about the same age, imitated and borrowed from each other, and attacked each other therefor. The verse cited here is from the "Demes",

so named from the chorus, which consisted of representatives of the townships of Attica. The play satirized the internal politics of Athens, and called up from Hades the great men of the past, like Solon, Miltiades, Aristides, and Pericles, to aid with their counsels. *Cf.* the *Pericles*, iii. 4, and see Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. pp. 279, 281.

A speech written by Phaeax: reading ὑπὸ, instead of καὶ Φαίακος, the evident correction of Coraës. This is the speech "Against Alcibiades" attributed to Andocides, so often alluded to already in the notes. See on the *Nicias*, xi. 7.

At his regular table: the accusation is found in § 29 of the speech, and is closely connected with other charges of high-handed conduct at the Olympic festival of 416. Alcibiades borrowed the city's utensils for use when he entertained the multitude who had witnessed his victories, not, of course, for his "regular table" (see on xii. 1).

XIII. 3. **Hyperbolus**: see on the *Nicias*, xi. 3.

XIII. 4. **Assuaging their envy**: see on the *Nicias*, xi. 1.

On one of the three: this is impossible. Ostracism drew the lines between two men, and the two policies which they represented, in this case, war and peace. Perhaps Phaeax controlled the votes of a body of aristocrats, and these, won by the diplomacy of Alcibiades, helped turn the scales against Hyperbolus (see on the *Nicias*, xi. 3).

Some say: from the *Nicias*, xi. 7, it is clear that the authority here referred to is Theophrastus. Phaeax headed no party, as Alcibiades and Nicias each did, and as Hyperbolus wished to do, but at most a coterie, or political club. It is probable that Theophrastus was misled into the statement which Plutarch cites, by the [Pseudo-]Andocides speech "Against Alcibiades". See the note on *Nicias*, xi. 7.

XIII. 5. **Plato, the comic poet**: see on the *Nicias*, xi. 6.

More at length elsewhere: in the *Nicias*, xi. The ostracism of Hyperbolus did not occur till the spring of 417, nearly three years after the events narrated in the next chapter (xiv.). Chronologically, therefore, the story is better

placed in the *Nicias*, where it follows those events. It is also more correctly told there.

XIV. This chapter repeats, in slightly different form, what has already been told in the *Nicias*, ix. 6 — x., and fully commented upon. Both versions are excellent condensations of Thucydides, who is unusually full and precise in narrating the parliamentary ruse of Alcibiades.

XIV. 1. **Consul Resident for the Lacedaemonians**: it is plain from Thucydides, v. 43, 2 and vi. 89, 2, that the relation was not recognized by the Lacedaemonians. "For they had not consulted him, but had negotiated the peace through Nicias and Laches, despising his youth, and disregarding an ancient connection with his family, who had been their proxeni; a connection which his grandfather had renounced, and he, by the attention which he had paid to the captives from Sphacteria, had hoped to have renewed." In his speech at Sparta, after his flight from arrest in 415, Alcibiades is made to say, "My ancestors in consequence of some misunderstanding renounced the office of Lacedaemonian Proxenus; I myself resumed it, and did you many good offices, especially after your misfortune at Pylos. My anxiety to serve you never ceased, but when you were making peace with Athens you negotiated through my enemies, thereby conferring power on them, and bringing dishonour upon me."

XIV. 5. **Nicias himself, he said**: this speech is inferential rhetorical elaboration of what is merely suggested in the *Nicias*, x. 3.

Friends of Athens: reading Ἀθηναίοις with the Bekker (Tauchnitz) text, instead of Ἀθηναίους.

XIV. 7. **What is the matter with you, etc.**: this speech likewise is inferential elaboration of what is merely suggested in the *Nicias*, x. 4.

XIV. 8. **On the following day**: strangely enough, this version omits all mention of the portentous earthquake (*Nicias*, x. 6) which delayed the decision of the Assembly for one day. It is natural, however, in a biography of Alcibiades, that the inglorious mission of Nicias to Sparta

(*Nicias*, x. 7), for the results of which the Athenians waited before entering into the alliance with Argos, should be passed over.

XV. 1. Alcibiades was probably appointed general in the spring of 419, but the alliance with the Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans was effected in the summer of 420. See on the *Nicias*, x. 8. The battle of Mantinea was not fought till the late summer of 418. Then Alcibiades was no longer general, having failed of election in the spring of that year, and given place to Nicias with other representatives of the peace party which had come again into power. The alliance with Argos, however, was not broken off, and a force of Athenians under Laches and Nicostratus took part in the disastrous battle of Mantinea, where both generals fell. The brilliant policy which Alcibiades had inaugurated of uniting with the maritime empire of Athens a league of democratic agricultural states in northern Peloponnesus, which should hem in the power of Sparta, came to grief, and the prestige of Sparta was completely restored by her victory. "They wiped out the charge of cowardice, which was due to their misfortune at Sphacteria, and of general stupidity and sluggishness, then current against them in Hellas. They were now thought to have been hardly used by fortune, but in character to be the same as ever" (Thuc., v. 75, 3). In his speech defending himself against the insinuations of Nicias in the Assembly, Alcibiades is made to say, "Did I not, without involving you in any great danger or expense, combine the most powerful states of Peloponnesus against the Lacedaemonians, whom I compelled to stake at Mantinea all that they had upon the fortune of one day? And even to this hour, although they were victorious in the battle, they have hardly recovered courage" (Thuc., vi. 16, 6).

This chapter, like the preceding, is based almost wholly upon Thucydides.

So many warlike shields, etc.: this reads like an ornamental citation.

XV. 2. **The Thousand**: a select corps of young men of high birth, "whom the city had long trained at the public expense in military exercises" (Thuc., v. 67, 2).

In consequence of the defeat of the alliance at Mantinea, Argos made peace with Sparta, and then alliance, and proceeded to act with her against Athens. Mantinea also came to terms with Sparta. "Next the Lacedaemonians and the Argives, each providing a thousand men, made a joint expedition: first the Lacedaemonians went alone and set up a more oligarchical government at Sicyon; then they and the Argives, uniting their forces, put down the democracy at Argos, and established an oligarchy which was in the interest of the Lacedaemonians. These changes were effected at the close of winter towards the approach of spring" (Thuc., v. 81, 2). This was the spring of 417.

The populace took up arms again: in the ensuing summer of 417. "The popular party at Argos, reconstituting themselves by degrees, plucked up courage, and, taking advantage of the festival of the Gymnopaediae at Lacedaemon, attacked the oligarchy. A battle took place in the city: the popular party won, and either killed or expelled their enemies" (Thuc., v. 82, 2).

Alcibiades came: there is no mention of him in the narrative of Thucydides, but his presence is a most natural inference. See the next note.

XV. 3. "Meanwhile the democracy at Argos, fearing the Lacedaemonians, and again courting the Athenian alliance in which their hopes were centred, built Long Walls to the sea, in order that if they were blockaded by land they might have the advantage, with Athenian help, of introducing provisions by water. The whole Argive people, the citizens themselves, their wives, and their slaves, set to work upon the wall, and the Athenians sent them carpenters and masons from Athens" (Thuc., v. 82, 5). In the ensuing winter (417/416) the still unfinished walls were captured and destroyed by the Lacedaemonians (Thuc., v. 83, 2), and in the summer of 416 Alcibiades sailed to Argos with

twenty ships and expelled three hundred of the Lacedaemonian sympathizers (Thuc., v. 84, 1).

Persuaded the people of Patrae: this was two years earlier, in the summer of 419, when Alcibiades was organizing the affairs of his new North-Peloponnesian confederacy. "Coming to Patrae, he persuaded the citizens to build walls reaching down to the sea" (Thuc., v. 52, 2). Patrae was the chief sea-port of Achaia, and in possession of it Athens could better control the commerce of the Corinthian gulf. The fine apophthegm of Alcibiades which Plutarch gives is not found elsewhere.

XV. 4. **The sanctuary of Agraulus**: among the rocks on the northern slope of the Acropolis. "It was at this point that the Medes ascended and massacred those Athenians who thought they knew more about the oracle than Themistocles, and had fortified the Acropolis with logs and stakes" (Pausanias, i. 18, 2). In this sanctuary the Athenian youth (the *Ephēboi*) took the oath of loyalty to the state. See Gardner-Jevons, *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, pp. 635 ff.; Harrison-Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Athens*, pp. 163 ff.

XVI. 1. **The decks of his triremes**: the place of the trierarch was at the stern of his trireme, where a tent was pitched and a couch spread for him. The "Mean Man" of Theophrastus (*Char.*, xxv., Jebb), "when he is trierarch, will spread the steersman's rugs under him on the deck, and put his own away."

A golden shield: this item is found in the long screed against Alcibiades cited from Satyrus by Athenaeus (see on xii. 1).

XVI. 2. **By Aristophanes**: in the *Frogs*, vv. 1425 and 1431–1433. The play was brought out (405) when Alcibiades was a second time in exile.

XVI. 3. **Voluntary contributions**: see on x. 1.

Public exhibitions: see on the *Nicias*, iii. 2.

XVI. 4. **Agatharchus**: of Samos, specially prominent at Athens as a theatrical scene-painter (460–420 B. C.). As the

story is told in [Pseudo-]Andocides, iv. 17, Agatharchus made his escape after three months, whereat Alcibiades was incensed, and threatened the artist for thus abandoning his task. See the *Pericles*, xiii. 2, and notes.

Taureas: as the story is told at length in [Pseudo-] Andocides, iv. 20 f., Taureas was a competing choregus with Alcibiades at the Greater Dionysia in a dithyrambic contest. A dispute arose concerning the parentage of one of the singers of Taureas, and Alcibiades beat Taureas out of the orchestra. The audience sympathized with Taureas, but the judges, out of fear and seeking the favor of Alcibiades, awarded him the victory. Demosthenes refers to the outrage in xxi. 147, as well as to the imprisonment of Agatharchus.

The prisoners of Melos: during the summer of 416, the island of Melos, colonized by the Lacedaemonians, which had preferred to remain independent of Athens, was attacked by her under the influence of Alcibiades. The town of Melos was invested by land and sea, and surrendered at discretion in the ensuing winter. "The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of military age, and made slaves of the women and children. They then colonized the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their own" (Thuc., v. 116, *fin.*). By means of an imaginary colloquy between Athenian envoys and the Melian government (v. 85–111), the historian has thrown into dramatic form "the overbearing spirit of the Athenians, flown with insolence, on the eve of an enterprise which was destined to bring signal retribution and humble their city in the dust" (Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 463).

The story of Alcibiades and his Melian mistress is told with great display of rhetoric in [Pseudo-]Andocides, iv. 22 f.

XVI. 5. **Aristophon painted Nemea, etc.**: Satyrus, quoted by Athenaeus (see on xii. 1), says that Alcibiades, on his return from Olympia, dedicated two pictures by Aglaophon: one representing Olympias and Pythias (personifications of Olympia and Delphi) crowning Alcibiades; the other Nemea, seated, and holding Alcibiades in her lap,

who was made fairer than the faces of women. There can be no doubt that this is the picture of which Plutarch here speaks, and to which Pausanias alludes (i. 22, 7) as "a picture of Alcibiades containing emblems of the victory won by his team at Nemea". Satyrus is probably correct in making Aglaophon, and not Aristophon, the author of the picture. The latter was a brother of the great Polygnotus (see the *Cimon*, iv. 5 and 6, with notes); the former a son or nephew of Polygnotus, bearing the same name as his grandfather. Such a painter, Aglaophon, was flourishing in 420–417, according to Pliny (*N. H.* xxxv. 60), and so might have painted Alcibiades.

Smacked of lawlessness : "it was forbidden by law to give the name of a quadrennial festival (like the Nemean, Olympian, and Pythian festivals) to a slave-girl, a prostitute, or a flute-girl (Athenaeus, p. 587 c); for the model who sat for Nemea in Alcibiades' portrait would almost certainly belong to one of these classes." See the excellent note of Frazer on Pausanias, i. 22, 7.

Archestratus: perhaps the choral poet who is mentioned in the *Aristides*, i. 4, as flourishing during the Peloponnesian war. That the story comes from Theophrastus is clear from the *Lysander*, xix. 3, where the same *mot* is uttered concerning Lysander by Eteocles the Lacedaemonian, and "Theophrastus says that Archestratus said the same thing about Alcibiades." The two stories are blended in Athenaeus, p. 533 d.

XVI. 6. **Timon the misanthrope**: attacked by Aristophanes and other comic poets as a man-hating solitary, — a "limb of the Furies", and made famous by the dialogue of Lucian which bears his name. Plutarch devotes chapter lxx. of his *Antony* to a short sketch of Timon. "This Timon was a citizen of Athens, and lived much about the Peloponnesian war, as may be seen by the comedies of Aristophanes and Plato, in which he is ridiculed as the enemy and hater of mankind. He avoided and repelled the approaches of every one, but embraced with kisses and the greatest

show of affection Alcibiades, then in his hot youth. And when Apemantus was astonished, and demanded the reason, he replied that he knew this young man would one day do infinite mischief to the Athenians."

XVII., XVIII. These chapters are evidently a later and less artistic presentation of material which the author has already treated much more fully in the *Nicias* xii. and xiii., to the notes upon which the reader is referred. There are many omissions in the *Alcibiades* of items given in the *Nicias*, some slight variations in the treatment of the same detail, much difference in the order of the various items, and one important addition, *viz.* the attribution to Corinthians of the defacement of the *Hermae* (xviii. 3).

XVII. 1. For the gradual rise of Athenian interest in and ambition to control Sicily, see on the *Nicias*, xii. 1.

XVII. 2, 3. Compare the *Nicias*, xii. 1–2.

XVII. 4. **Socrates**: see on the *Nicias*, xiii. 6.

Meton: see on the *Nicias*, xiii. 5.

XVIII. 1–2. See the *Nicias*, xii. 2–4, with the notes.

XVIII. 3–4. See the *Nicias*, xiii. 7 and 2, with the notes.

XIX. This chapter reproduces, substantially, Thucydides, vi. 28 and 29, with several interesting accretions in the way of detail, and with much rhetorical elaboration.

XIX. 1. **The mysteries of Eleusis**: originally a local agricultural cult, developed round the myth of Demeter and Persephone in earliest times at Eleusis, the little city commanding the Thriasian plain, between Athens and Megara. When Eleusis became part of the Athenian state, early in the seventh century B. C., its mysteries became part of the Athenian state religion, and one of the chief festivals of the Attic year, receiving various additional elements. During the years immediately following the Peace of Nicias (421), if not more than a decade earlier, a tax upon the fruits of the earth was laid on the farmers of Attica and the Athenian allies for the support of the worship of Eleusis, and "all Hellenic cities whom it seemed possible to approach on the mat-

ter" were invited to send first-fruits. The festival, that is, became Pan-Hellenic. "All Greeks, not impure through any pollution, were welcome to the rites of initiation; women were not excluded by their sex, nor slaves by their condition" (Bury). On the fourth of the nine days of the celebration, the image of Iacchus was taken from its shrine in Athens, and carried in solemn procession along the Sacred Way to the temple of the goddesses at Eleusis, which was reached at night, by the light of torches. The crowning function of the whole festival was the performance of the religious drama based on the passion of Demeter. To travesty this was as serious a sacrilege at Athens as the parody of the rite of the Holy Communion by a student of Hertford College, Oxford (Gribble, *Romance of the Oxford Colleges*, p. 311). "Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party. Moreover the individuals who held the great sacred offices at Eleusis (the Hierophant, the Daduch or Torch-bearer, and the Keryx or Herald) — which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidae and other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name of Demeter and Persephone" (Grote).

For further and more minute details of the Eleusinian mysteries, the general reader may be referred to the article *Eleusinia* in the classical dictionaries, to Gardner-Jevons, *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, pp. 274–284, or to Bury, *Greek History*, pp. 313–316. The special student will find the literature of the subject fully cited in Frazer's *Pausanias*, ii. pp. 513 f.

Androcles: "certain metics and slaves gave information," says Thucydides, with no mention of Androcles. The name has perhaps been inferentially and plausibly supplied from

Thucydides, viii. 65. In 411, when the oligarchical revolution at Athens was under way and half accomplished, "some of the younger citizens had conspired and secretly assassinated one Androcles, a great man with the people, who had been foremost in procuring the banishment of Alcibiades. Their motives were two-fold: they killed him because he was a demagogue; but more because they hoped to gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still expecting to return and to make Tissaphernes their friend."

They said, etc.: according to Andocides (*On the Mysteries*, 11–17), no less than four informations were laid before the Assembly of profane travesties of the mysteries, at two of which Alcibiades was present. But these contain no specifications of the part taken by the different feasters (*cf.* xx. 2, *fin.*). Such details Plutarch has here wrongly anticipated from the formal impeachment of Alcibiades introduced by Thessalus to the Council (cited in full at xxii. 3) later in the year, after the expedition had sailed. This was a different case.

XIX. 3. **A thousand in number**: either exaggeration or misunderstanding of Thucydides, vi. 43, 2, where the Argive hoplites number five hundred, and the Mantinean and other (Arcadian) mercenaries two hundred and fifty.

XX. This chapter contains, in §§ 1–3, matter greatly condensed from Thucydides, vi. 43–53, and 60; and, in §§ 4, 5, matter found in Andocides (*On the Mysteries*), and in Diodorus (Ephorus), with a citation from Phrynichus.

XX. 2. **Taking Rhegium**: this is inaccurate. Rhegium, like the other Italian cities, would not admit the Athenians within her walls, but allowed them to encamp on the shore, and furnished them with a market (Thuc., vi. 44, 3).

Proposed a plan: as did each of the other generals, in a formal council of war (Thuc., vi. 47–49). *Cf.* the *Nicias*, xiv. 3.

Secured the allegiance of Catana: as described at length in Thucydides, vi. 50 f.

As I have said: Plutarch should have said this in xix. 1,

instead of introducing there specific details (see the note *ad loc.*).

XX. 3. This is substantially what Thucydides says in vi. 53, 60 f.

XX. 4. **Thucydides omitted, etc.**: although he must have known them, if in no other way, from the speech of Andocides "On the Mysteries", delivered in 399. It was not appropriate to the large and general character of his story to give such minute details. He says that some of the most respectable citizens were imprisoned "on the evidence of wretches" (vi. 53, 2).

Others: Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, §§ 34–38.

Phrynichus: one of the most distinguished poets of Old Comedy, somewhat older than, though a rival of Aristophanes. His *Muses* took the second place when Aristophanes gained the first with his *Frogs* (405). The name of the play from which the following verses are cited is uncertain. See Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, i. p. 385, who thinks it may have been "The Solitary", which took third place when Aristophanes gained second with his *Birds* (414).

Dearest Hermes, etc.: some one addresses a stone figure which he has erected, and the Hermes replies as if alive.

XX. 5. **One of them**: Diocleides (see Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, § 38), in telling his story to the Council, said that it was the time of full moon, and that he recognized the faces of most of the three hundred *Hermae*-defacers by the light of the moon. It was afterwards proven that, at the time (early morning) when Diocleides professed to have seen these men, the moon had set. His lying tale, however, could never have found the credence that it did if he had lied so clumsily as to put such a memorable night at the time of full moon when it was really the time of new moon, *i. e.*, when there was no moon at all. But later tradition as represented by Plutarch, in this passage, and Diodorus (xiii. 2, 5 f.), made the story more piquant by putting the events at the time of new moon. Plutarch evidently draws from the same source as Diodorus (Ephorus), rather than directly from

Andocides. See Grote, *History of Greece* (Eng. ed.), vi. p. 35; Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. pp. 1288 f.

Casting into prison: stimulated by large rewards offered to informers, Teucer, a metic, had accused eighteen persons as violators of the *Hermae*, and Diocleides had designated forty-two out of the band of three hundred conspirators whom he professed to have seen. All of these who did not at once take to flight, were arrested and imprisoned.

XXI. 1. **Andocides**: see the Introduction, pp. 42 ff. Thucydides does not give his name. "One of the prisoners, who was believed to be deeply implicated, was induced by a fellow-prisoner to make a confession — whether true or false I cannot say; opinions are divided, and no one knew, or to this day knows, who the offenders were" (vi. 60).

Hellanicus: of Mitylene, a prolific author of genealogical, chorographical, and chronological works, whose activity covered the greater part of the fifth century B. C. See the Introduction, p. 42.

XXI. 2. **The only one to remain unharmed**: in his speech "On the Mysteries" (§§ 48–66), Andocides explains this by saying that it was assumed by the convivial party which (as he testified) defaced the *Hermae*, that he would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes himself, but he was confined to his bed on the night of the outrage. For the outrage itself, see on the *Nicias*, xiii. 2.

Its inscription: of dedication by the Aegeïd tribe.

A man named Timaeus: in the story of Andocides, it is Charmides, a cousin and friend of his, who made the appeal to him, and begged him, by means of a voluntary confession which would procure immunity from punishment for himself, to save the lives of many innocent persons, many of them his own kinsmen, and to rescue the city from its panic fears. Whence Plutarch got his divergent testimony, cannot be determined. It may be that it embodies what Andocides really said in 415, and that his account of the affair in his speech of 399 puts the matter differently. In that case we have to remember "that the version of the matter given in his speech

on the mysteries is, on the whole, true in itself, but is untrue as a representation of what he stated in 415" (Jebb, *Attic Orators*, i. p. 79).

XXI. 4. **All those whom he named**: he named twenty-two in all; but eighteen of these had already been denounced by Teucer (see on xx. 5), and the other four took to flight at once, without waiting to be arrested.

Were put to death: Andocides repeatedly (§§ 52, 59, 67) claims that the eighteen had already been put to death in consequence of the deposition of Teucer. But this is highly improbable, and is in direct contradiction to the testimony of Thucydides, who says that the Athenians "immediately liberated the informer and all whom he had not denounced. The accused they brought to trial, and executed such of them as could be found. Those who had fled they condemned to death, and promised a reward to any one who would kill them. No one could say whether the sufferers were justly punished; but the beneficial effect on the city at that time was undeniable" (vi. 60, 5). In consequence also of the testimony of Andocides, Diocleides was called before the authorities, and confessed that he had given a false deposition (see on xx. 5). He was condemned to death and executed.

Some of his own household servants: the enemies of Andocides affirmed that he included in his list of culprits some of his own nearest relatives. This Andocides denies in his speech, but says he offered his slaves to be tortured, in order that his story of being sick in bed on the night of the outrage might be confirmed by their testimony. Plutarch seems to jumble together the two cases.

XXI. 5. **Dashed . . . . against Alcibiades**: his enemies revived against him the charges of travestying the Eleusinian mysteries, made just before the expedition sailed. These were now readily proven (see xxii. 3–4, and notes). He was not connected in any way with the disfigurement of the *Hermae*, which was clearly the work of his enemies.

The Salaminian state-galley: one of three sacred galleys

reserved at Athens for special state services. The others were the "Paralus", and the Delian vessel. The absence of the last, on its annual mission to Delos, gave Socrates a month's reprieve from death. The Paralus was sent from the army at Samos to announce at Athens the fall of the Samian oligarchy, but fell into the hands of the Four Hundred (Thuc., viii. 74). Both the Paralus and the Salaminia served also as war vessels.

Accompany them home: on his own trireme. "He was ordered to follow the officers home and defend himself, but they were told not to arrest him; the Athenians, having regard to their interests in Sicily, were anxious not to cause excitement in their own camp or to attract the attention of the enemy, and above all not to lose the Mantineans and Argives, whom they knew to have been induced by his influence to join in the expedition. He in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily in company with the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens" (Thuc., vi. 61, 5 f.).

XXI. 6. **Lamachus**: see the *Nicias*, xv. 1, and note.

XXII. 1. **Robbed the Athenians of Messene**: "For Alcibiades, when he was recalled and gave up his command, foreseeing that he would be an exile, communicated to the Syracusan party at Messene the plot of which he was cognizant" (Thuc., vi. 74, 1). This was in September, 415.

XXII. 2. These reputed utterances of Alcibiades are also given by Plutarch in the *Apoph. reg. et. imp.* = *Morals*, p. 186 F, and by Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, xiii. 38.

XXII. 3. **His impeachment is on record**: in the collection of Craterus (Introd. p. 35), to which Plutarch is often indebted.

Thessalus, son of Cimon: see on the *Cimon*, xvi. 1. He was of course an oligarch, like his father, but seems to have been comparatively unimportant. The leaders of the popular party, who really pressed the case against Alcibiades, were glad to use a man of such great family prestige.

In his own house: before the departure of the expedition

a slave, Andromachus, had deposed before the Assembly that he had been in the house of Pulytion when Alcibiades, Niciades, and Meletus went through a sham celebration of the mysteries (see on xix. 1 *fin.*). That sacrilege is referred to by Pausanias (i. 2, 5) as follows: "One of the colonnades [running from the Dipylum gate to the inner Cerameicus] contains sanctuaries of the gods and a gymnasium called the gymnasium of Hermes. In it, too, is the house of Pulytion, in which, they say, some illustrious Athenians parodied the Eleusinian mysteries."

After the departure of the expedition, among the many depositions induced by the rich rewards promised to informers, a woman named Agariste, wife of Alcmaeonides, of the highest rank and family in the city, deposed that Alcibiades, Axiochus, and Adeimantus had parodied the mysteries in the house of Charmides (Andoc., *De myst.*, 16).

The sacrilege alleged against Alcibiades in the formal impeachment brought by Thessalus before the Council of Five Hundred, was a different one from these, and was committed in his own house, where he was assisted by Pulytion and Theodorus. Neither of these men is mentioned in the other two depositions. The fine house of Pulytion, in which the first of the three sacrileges was committed, was pledged for debt, and probably occupied by another man (see Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. pp. 1293, 1318). Neither in xix. 1 of this *Life*, nor in *Quaest. Conv.* i. 3 = *Morals*, p. 621 C, does Plutarch distinguish between the first and third cases: "Alcibiades and Theodorus turned Pulytion's banquet into a place of initiation, and represented there the sacred procession and mysteries of Ceres."

Mystae, Epoptae: "Initiates", "Beholders". It is sometimes held, though it is incapable of complete proof, that the first term refers to those who had undergone the initial rites of purification only, and the second to those who had been admitted to the crowning feature of the celebration, — the religious drama in the temple at Eleusis. See on xix. 1.

XXII. 4. **His case went by default**: "The Athenians, on

his non-appearance, sentenced him and his companions to death" (Thuc., vi. 61 *fin.*).

His property was confiscated: this followed as matter of course. Five fragmentary inscriptions have been found which relate to the sale at public auction of the confiscated property of those who had been condemned for defacing the *Hermae* and profaning the mysteries. One of them is a partial inventory of the bed-room furniture of Alcibiades, which indicates extreme luxury. See Hicks and Hill, *Greek Hist. Insc.*[2], pp. 142 ff.

By all priests and priestesses: this is manifest exaggeration. The curse was pronounced by the "Eumolpidae, Heralds, and Priests of Eleusis" only, as is clear from chap. xxxiii. 3, which agrees with Diodorus (Ephorus), xiii. 69, 2 and Nepos, *Alc.*, iv.; vi. (Theopompus). When the recall of Alcibiades was being discussed at Athens in 412, "the Eumolpidae and Ceryces [Heralds] called heaven and earth to witness that the city must never restore a man who had been banished for profaning the mysteries" (Thuc., viii. 53, 2).

Theano: whence this detail comes is not known. Plutarch refers to it in *Aetia Rom.*, 44 = *Morals*, p. 275 D: "And an execration is a fearful and a grievous thing. Hence neither is it thought fit that priests should curse others. Wherefore the priestess at Athens was commended for refusing to curse Alcibiades, when the people required her to do it; for she said, 'I am a praying, not a cursing priestess.'"

XXIII. 1. Regarding the movements of Alcibiades after leaving Sicily, Thucydides is unusually explicit (vi. 61, 6 f.; 88, 9 f.): "He in his own ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily in company with the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens. When they arrived at Thurii they followed no further, but left the ship and disappeared, fearing to return and stand their trial when the prejudice against them was so violent. The crew of the Salaminia searched for them, but after a time, being unable to find them, gave up the search and went home. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed not long

afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Peloponnesus, and the Athenians on his non-appearance sentenced him and his companions to death." "At Lacedaemon the Corinthian ambassadors met Alcibiades and his fellow exiles. He had sailed at once from Thurii in a trading vessel to Cyllene in Elis, and thence proceeded to Lacedaemon on the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, first obtaining a safe-conduct." It looks as though Thucydides had taken more than ordinary pains to give minute details on a controverted point. For romantic, apologetic, and hostile invention became busy with the career of Alcibiades, as with that of Themistocles, as soon as he had left his own country and become busy in foreign parts. Like Themistocles, romantic invention made Alcibiades take refuge first in Argos, and be driven from there into the service of his country's foes by attempts of the Athenians to have him delivered up to them. This version relieved somewhat the heinousness of the treachery of Alcibiades, and therefore was readily adopted by Isocrates in the speech which he wrote for the younger Alcibiades, — a speech which is largely an apology for his client's father. "Considering himself outraged in that when he was at home the people would not try his case, but when he was absent condemned him, not even so did he consent to go over to the enemy. Nay, he was so careful to do no wrong to his native city even when an exile from her, that he went to Argos and remained there quietly. But his enemies were so wanton as to persuade you [the people] to banish him from all Hellas, and publish his sentence on a stone tablet, and send envoys to demand his person from the Argives" (*De bigis*, 9). But the undisputed fact of Alcibiades' betrayal to the Messenians of Athenian designs upon their city (xxii. 1) revealed clearly his willingness to play the rôle of arch-traitor.

The statements of Thucydides were evidently followed by Ephorus (as represented in Diodorus, xiii. 5, 7); the more romantic inventions by Theopompus (as represented in the citation from Satyrus in Athenaeus, p. 534 b, and in Nepos,

Alc., iv. 4; xi. 3. In the latter, Alcibiades is made to show his wonderful power of adapting himself to varying surroundings by visiting Thebes, and even Thessaly, rather than Argos. More than two years elapsed between his recall from Sicily and his appearance in Ionia with a Spartan fleet (chap. xxiv. 1), and his wanderings in exile were as mythical as those of Themistocles. See Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. p. 1328.

XXIII. 2. Thucydides puts a long speech into the mouth of Alcibiades, by which the measures briefly noted in this paragraph were successfully urged upon the Spartans (vi. 89–93). It is one of the historian's most illuminating character-speeches, "no less masterly", says Grote, "in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an indication of the character of the speaker."

Gylippus: see on the *Nicias*, xviii. 5. It was not until the autumn of 414 that he effected his entry into Syracuse.

Deceleia: a mountain citadel of Attica, about fourteen miles from Athens towards Boeotia (Thuc., vii. 19, 2), commanding the Athenian plain, and visible from Athens. It commanded also the shortest routes by land from Athens to Boeotia and Euboea. Its occupation and fortification by the Spartans in the spring of 413 put a new phase on the struggle with Athens, and proved more than a full retaliation for the Athenian occupation of Pylos in Messenia. Attica suffered now from a permanent instead of a transitory invasion, of which there had been five during the first decade of the war, and Athens, as Grote says, "instead of a city, was reduced to the condition of something like a military post." In Thucydides, vi. 91, 6 f., Alcibiades thus sums up the advantages which the Spartans would gain by the occupation of Deceleia: "The whole stock of the country will fall into your hands. The slaves will come over to you of their own accord; what there is besides will be seized by you. The Athenians will at once be deprived of the revenues which they obtain from the silver mines of Laurium, and of all the

profits which they make by the land or by the law courts. Above all, the customary tribute will fail; for their allies, when they see that you are carrying on the war in earnest, will not mind them."

XXIII. 3–5. These delightfully rhetorical paragraphs are probably based on the romantic version of Theopompus (see on § 1). Describing the arts of a flatterer, Plutarch says (*Quom. adul. etc.*, 7 = *Morals*, p. 52 E): "Besides this, I appeal to the practices of men notorious for flattery and popularity to back my observation. Witness he who topped them all, Alcibiades, who, when he dwelt at Athens, was as arch and witty as any Athenian of them all, kept his stable of horses, played the good fellow, and was universally obliging; and yet the same man at Sparta shaved close to the skin, wore his cloak, and never bathed but in cold water. When he sojourned in Thrace, he drank and fought like a Thracian; and again, in Tissaphernes's company in Asia, he acted the part of a soft, arrogant, and voluptuous Asiatic. And thus, by an easy compliance with the humors and customs of the people amongst whom he conversed, he made himself master of their affections and interests."

Milesian wool: among the articles enumerated by the inscription referred to in the note on xxii. 4, are two Milesian couches. The Milesians, like the rest of the Ionians, were at this period famous for luxury. Their couches and other furniture were celebrated, and their woolen cloths and carpets highly esteemed.

XXIII. 6. **No child of Achilles, etc.**: the first part of the passage in quotation marks is an adaptation of an iambic trimeter by some unknown poet, which Plutarch uses entire in *Quom. adul. etc.*, 5 = *Morals*, p. 51 C: the flatterer, striving to adapt his nature by imitation to that of the person on whom he has designs, "so neatly resembles the original that one would swear, — 'Achilles' very self thou art, and not his son.'" See Nauck, *Trag. Gracc. Frag.*[2], p. 907.

The selfsame woman still: the wan Electra, in the *Orestes* of Euripides (vv. 128 f.), as Helen goes to have her

shorn locks and drink-offerings placed upon the tomb of her sister Clytaemnestra, cries: —

> "Her locks? behold, she shears off but the very tips,
> To save her beauty. 'T is the selfsame woman still."

XXIII. 7–8. The details of this famous scandal are given by Plutarch at even greater length in his *Agesilaus*, chap. iii. (*cf.* the *De tranq.*, 6 = *Morals*, p. 467 F, and *Lysander*, xxii.), on the authority of Duris of Samos (Introd. p. 47), whom he generally distrusts. The essential features, however, are accepted by Xenophon (*Hell.* iii. 3, 1–3). The more sensational touches only are due to Duris. Thucydides merely remarks, in his lofty manner, that Agis hated Alcibiades with a deadly hatred (viii. 12, 2; 45, 1).

Was refused the royal succession: although he had prevailed upon Agis "by his prayers and tears to declare him his son before several witnesses upon his death-bed". So Plutarch (*Ages.* iii.; *Lysander*, xxii.) and Pausanias (iii. 8, 7) both testify.

Whatever may be the truth about the parentage of Leotychides, the intrigue of Alcibiades with Queen Timaea was common gossip, as is shown by the citation from an unknown comic poet in Athenaeus, p. 574 d. It was in 398 that Agesilaus, a half-brother of Agis, became king of Sparta with the active support of Lysander. He disappointed Lysander by becoming an able and independent monarch, and reigned till his death in 361.

XXIV. 1. **After the Athenian disaster in Sicily**: with these words the two years which had now elapsed since the flight of Alcibiades (xxii. 1) are passed over, so far as the Sicilian expedition is concerned. They are covered by the narrative of the *Nicias* (xv.–xxx.). During these two years Alcibiades was active at Sparta.

The Chians, Lesbians, and Cyzicenes: as a result of the Sicilian disaster, the allies of Athens "were everywhere willing even beyond their power to revolt; for they judged by their excited feelings, and would not admit a possibility

that the Athenians could survive another summer" (Thuc., viii. 2, 2). The Euboeans sent envoys to negotiate with King Agis, who was in command at Deceleia. He accepted their proposals, and was about to make an expedition into the island, when envoys came to him from Lesbos, which was likewise anxious to revolt. As the Boeotians favored the Lesbians, "Agis was persuaded to defer the expedition to Euboea while he prepared to assist the Lesbians. . . . While he was supporting the Lesbians, certain Chians and Erythraeans (who were also ready to revolt) had recourse, not to Agis, but to Lacedaemon; they were accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom King Darius the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia. Tissaphernes too was inviting the assistance of the Lacedaemonians, and promised to maintain their troops. . . . He hoped also to make the Lacedaemonians allies of the King. . . . While the Chians and Tissaphernes were pursuing their common object, Calligeitus the son of Laophon, a Megarian, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their own country, who were residing at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came to Lacedaemon. They had been commissioned by Pharnabazus to bring up a fleet to the Hellespont; like Tissaphernes he was anxious, if possible, to induce the cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians, ... and he wanted the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King to come from himself. The two parties — that is to say, the envoys of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes — were acting independently; and a vehement contest arose at Lacedaemon, the one party urging the Lacedaemonians to send a fleet and army to Ionia and Chios, the other to begin with the Hellespont" (Thuc., viii. 4–6). These extracts show how inaccurate a condensation of Thucydides the words of Plutarch are.

The court of Pharnabazus was at Dascylium, near the Propontis; that of Tissaphernes at Sardis. For the first time since the victories of Cimon Persia intrudes herself into Hellenic affairs. She was destined to play an important part

there until the conquests of Alexander. The Great King had never renounced his claims upon the Greek cities of Asia Minor which had withdrawn from his allegiance and become a part of the Athenian empire. He now ordered his satraps at Sardis and Dascylium to collect arrears of tribute from those cities. This they could do only in case the cities were freed from their subjection to Athens, and to free them from that subjection the aid of Sparta and her fleet was essential.

The persuasion of Alcibiades: he was a hereditary friend of Endius, one of the Spartan Ephors for that year, and the influence of the two together was sufficient to have the plans of King Agis for the Lesbians relegated to the second place. "Agis, when he saw that the Lacedaemonians were bent on going to Chios first, offered no opposition; so the allies held a conference at Corinth, and after some deliberation determined to sail, first of all to Chios . . . then to proceed to Lesbos . . . and finally to the Hellespont" (Thuc., viii. 8, 2). During this same summer (412), however, the Chians helped the Lesbians to revolt, but the Athenians speedily recovered the island (Thuc., viii. 22; 23).

Alcibiades set sail in person: the ships of the Peloponnesian allies, on setting out from the Isthmus for Chios, were attacked and roughly handled by an Athenian fleet, and finally shut up in a lonely harbor on the Corinthian coast. The Spartans were to have sent out five ships to join the allies, "under the command of Chalcideus, who was to be accompanied by Alcibiades," but on hearing of the plight of the allied fleet, they were disheartened, and thought of giving up the expedition. But Alcibiades, with his usual splendid initiative, persuaded Endius and the other Ephors to persevere. They would arrive before the Chians could hear of the defeat of the allied ships, and he would at once secure the revolt of the Ionian cities. "To Endius he argued in private that he would gain honour if he were the instrument of effecting a revolt in Ionia, and of gaining the alliance of the King; he should not allow such a prize to fall into the hands of Agis" (Thuc., viii. 12, 2). There was often friction

and jealousy between the Ephors and the Kings at Sparta, and Alcibiades well knew how to reap advantage from it in this case.

Wrought injury to the Athenians: as detailed in Thucydides, viii. 13–44.

XXIV. 2. **The wrong he had suffered**: see chapter xxiii. 7–8.

Orders that he be put to death: "After the death of Chalcideus and the engagement at Miletus, Alcibiades fell under suspicion at Sparta, and orders came from home to Astyochus [the Spartan admiral] that he should be put to death. For he was hated by Agis, and generally distrusted. In fear he retired to Tissaphernes, and soon, by working upon him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause" (Thuc., viii. 45, 1). A new set of Ephors had come into office at Sparta towards the end of the year 412, to which Endius, the friend of Alcibiades, did not belong, and which was in sympathy with King Agis.

XXIV. 3. **His timely discovery of this**: Astyochus was not bitterly hostile to Alcibiades (Thuc., viii. 50, 3), and may have warned him. Romantic tradition, as represented in Justin, v. 2, 5, had the warning come from Queen Timaea.

XXIV. 4–5. In describing the life of Alcibiades among Persian grandees, romantic invention has been busy, as in the case of Themistocles. Many of the rhetorical details in these paragraphs come from Theopompus, who found in Alcibiades welcome justification for his hatred of demagogues. See the Introduction, pp. 32 ff.

XXV. 1–9. These paragraphs are, on the whole, fair condensation of, and inference from Thucydides, vii. 45–51. In some instances the very phraseology of the historian is reproduced.

XXV. 1. **Began to malign them**: see the citation from Thucydides in the note on xxiv. 2.

XXV. 2. **Loved and admired his adviser**: "For he gave his full confidence to Alcibiades, whose advice he approved" (Thuc., viii. 46, 5).

If his native city were destroyed: "He knew that, if he did not destroy his country altogether, the time would come when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him; and he thought that his arguments would be most effectual if he were seen to be on intimate terms with Tissaphernes. And the result proved that he was right" (Thuc., viii. 47, 1).

XXV. 3. **At this time**: during the winter of 412–411. While the other Ionian allies of Athens, beginning with powerful and wealthy Chios, were falling away from her and clamoring for Spartan help, the great state of Samos, in consequence of a democratic revolution there which threw the oligarchic party completely out of power, remained faithful (Thuc., viii. 21). After their unsuccessful attempt to reduce the revolting city of Miletus, the Athenian forces, on the sagacious advice of Phrynichus, retired to Samos, and made that island their base of operations (Thuc., viii. 27).

The fleet of Phoenician triremes: "Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a hurry about putting an end to the war, and neither to bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was preparing, nor to give pay to more Hellenic sailors" (Thuc., viii. 46, 1; 5). "For the Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships came as far as Aspendus — there is no doubt about this; but why they never came further is matter of conjecture" (Thuc., viii. 87, 3).

XXV. 4. **Bring Tissaphernes over, etc.**: "He would at the same time make Tissaphernes their friend; but they must establish an oligarchy, and abolish the villainous democracy which had driven him out" (Thuc., viii. 47, 2).

XXV. 5. **Had no more use, etc.**: "He maintained, and rightly, that Alcibiades cared no more for oligarchy than he did for democracy, and in seeking to change the existing form of government was only considering how he might be recalled and restored to his country" (Thuc., viii. 48, 4).

XXV. 10. **Afterwards**: in the summer of 411, Phrynichus having been deposed from his command at Samos (Thuc., viii. 54, 3), and having shown himself an ardent supporter of the revolutionary Four Hundred at Athens.

"He was afraid of Alcibiades, whom he knew to be cognizant of the intrigue which when at Samos he had carried on with Astyochus, and he thought that no oligarchy would ever be likely to restore him" (Thuc., viii. 68, 3). He had been sent with eleven other oligarchs to Sparta, authorized "to make peace with Lacedaemon upon anything like tolerable terms" (Thuc., viii. 90, 2). But the friends of democracy began to bestir themselves. "As yet the murmurs of discontent had been secret and confined to few; when suddenly Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lacedaemon, in a full market-place, having just quitted the council-chamber, was struck by an assassin, one of the force employed in guarding the frontier, and fell dead. The man who dealt the blow escaped; his accomplice, an Argive, was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred, but did not disclose any name or say who had instigated the deed. All he would confess was that a number of persons used to assemble at the house of the commander of the frontier guard, and in other houses" (Thuc., viii. 92, 2).

Hermon: the name is wrong, and has crept into the story by a curious error. Emboldened by the failure of the oligarchs to punish the murderers of Phrynichus, the people began to take more open and active measures. Some hoplites who were at work in the Piraeus upon a fortification designed to put control of the harbor in the hands of the oligarchs, seized an oligarchical general and imprisoned him. "Others joined in the act, including one Hermon, who commanded the frontier guard stationed at Munychia" (Thuc., viii. 92, 5). In the course of the story's tradition some one, either in carelessness or of set purpose, has identified the frontier guardsman who slew Phrynichus and escaped, with Hermon the commander of the frontier guard in Munychia.

An Athenian decree of the year 409, a time just subsequent to the restoration of the democracy, gives us Thrasybulus the Calydonian and Apollodorus the Megarian as the assassins of Phrynichus. To each, citizenship and a grant of land was voted, and to Thrasybulus the honor of a golden

crown with public proclamation. See Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*[2], pp. 148 ff.

Some time before this the murdered Phrynichus had been tried for treasonable conduct at Samos and found guilty. His property was confiscated, his house torn down, his remains exhumed and sent out of the country, and the decrees against him engraved upon a bronze pillar (see Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. pp. 1511 f.). The vengeance of Alcibiades was certainly complete.

XXVI. Nothing could be more explicit and clear than the account which Thucydides gives of the Revolution of the Four Hundred (viii. 47–97). Plutarch, however, as is often the case when he attempts to describe large political movements, gives no clear idea of the sequence of events. He can hardly have used his Thucydides at first hand, or else his charity prevails over his biographical fidelity, since he has nothing to say about the exposure of the impotence and cunning of Alcibiades when his oligarchical friends called upon him to make good his promise to bring Tissaphernes into alliance with Athens (Thuc., viii. 56).

XXVI. 1. **The friends of Alcibiades**: the oligarchical conspirators in the Athenian army at Samos. They never succeeded in getting control of the army and putting down democracy there. But they did inform the main body of the army "that the King would be their friend and would supply them with money if Alcibiades was restored and democracy given up", and "the prospect of the King's pay was so grateful to them that they offered no opposition" (Thuc., viii. 48, 2 f.). At a conference of the conspirators, however, Phrynichus protested against the plan, as already described by Plutarch in xxv. 5. His objections did not avail, and the conspirators "prepared to send Peisander and other envoys to Athens, that they might manage the recall of Alcibiades and the overthrow of the democracy, and finally make Tissaphernes a friend of the Athenians" (Thuc., viii. 49). Then followed the treacherous negotiations of Phrynichus with the enemy, as already described by Plutarch in xxv. 6–9.

XXVI. 2. **The so-called Five Thousand**: Peisander and his colleagues arrived at Athens and proposed their plan, which aroused angry opposition. But at last "a decree was passed that Peisander himself and ten others should go out and negotiate to the best of their judgment with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades." On the denunciation of Peisander, Phrynichus was deposed from his command at Samos (see on xxv. 10). After setting a secret plot on foot for the overthrow of the democracy at Athens, Peisander and his colleagues, as they had been directed to do, set out to interview Tissaphernes (Thuc., viii. 53 f.). But they found that Tissaphernes, acting under advice from Alcibiades, craftily raised his demands beyond even their willingness to accept, and at last it dawned upon them that they had been duped by Alcibiades. They therefore returned in wrath to Samos (Thuc., viii. 56). But although they gave up Alcibiades, they did not give up their conspiracy against the democracy at Samos and Athens. Peisander and one half the envoys returned to Athens, while the other half were sent to set up oligarchies in subject cities of Athens. Arrived at Athens, Peisander found that his plot had been working well during his absence, and that the city was in a terrorized state. The program of the oligarchs had been made public. "No one ought to receive pay who was not on military service; and not more than five thousand should have a share in the government; those, namely, who were best able to serve the state in person and with their money" (Thuc., viii. 63–66).

Only four hundred: finding all things ripe for the final stroke, Peisander and his colleagues called an Assembly, and secured the election of ten commissioners empowered to frame a constitution, which should be laid before the people on a fixed day. When that day came, the commissioners summoned an Assembly and proposed that any Athenian should be permitted to propose any resolution whatsoever, subject to none of the usual penalties for unconstitutional action. This proposal having been adopted, Peisander moved "to abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment of magistrates, and to

choose a presiding board of five; these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the hundred was to co-opt three others. The Four Hundred thus selected were to meet in the council-chamber; they were to have absolute authority, and might govern as they deemed best; the Five Thousand were to be summoned by them whenever they chose" (Thuc., viii. 67 f.). The terrorized Assembly passed this motion and was dissolved. Then the Four Hundred, armed, and supported by armed accomplices, burst into the council-chamber, where the Council of Five Hundred were in session, and told the Councilors to take their pay and begone. The Council retired without remonstrance, and the Four Hundred proceeded to rule despotically, and to make overtures of peace to the Lacedaemonians (Thuc., viii. 69 f.).

XXVI. 3. **Many had been slain**: including Androcles (see on xix. 1).

When the army in Samos learned, etc.: the Four Hundred sent ten commissioners to Samos to inform the army of what had been done, and to pacify them. They were afraid that the Athenian sailors would be impatient of oligarchy (Thuc., viii. 72). But these commissioners got no farther than Delos for some time. There they heard that the Samian oligarchs had just been crushed in an attempted revolution, with the aid of the Athenian army, and that Samians and Athenians alike were now bound by the most solemn oaths "to maintain a democracy and be of one mind, to prosecute vigorously the war with Peloponnesus, to be enemies to the Four Hundred, and to hold no parley with them by heralds." For news of the revolution at Athens had already come to the army at Samos in this way. The Paralus (see on xxi. 5) had been sent from Samos to Athens with dispatches, and its crew seized by the Four Hundred. Its commander, however, made his escape, and got back to Samos with wildly exaggerated stories of the outrageous proceedings of the Four Hundred. The commissioners of the Four Hundred halting at Delos heard also that the Athenian army at Samos had appointed new generals and trierarchs who could not be suspected of

oligarchical sympathies, and considered that Athens *had revolted from them*, and that they were strong enough, with Samian aid and sympathy, to put down the revolt (Thuc., viii. 72–77). Strangely enough, the revived democracy in the Athenian army at Samos in its turn looked to Alcibiades for salvation, in spite of the fact that the oligarchic conspirators had found his promises to bring Tissaphernes over to their side vain and false. "Alcibiades," they said, "if we procure his recall and pardon, will be delighted to obtain for us the alliance of the King" (Thuc., viii. 76, 7).

Started to sail to the Piraeus: this happened twice. The first time it was in consequence of the speech of Alcibiades to them after he had been brought over from Tissaphernes to Samos with promise of full pardon. He lamented the cruel fate which had banished him; inspired them with bright hopes of victory; and assured them that Tissaphernes had promised him to bring up the Phoenician ships which were at Aspendus to assist the Athenians and not the Lacedaemonians, provided only that Alcibiades were restored to power. "The Athenians immediately appointed him a colleague of their other generals, and placed everything in his hands . . . so excited were they that under the influence of his words they despised the Peloponnesians, and were ready to sail at once for the Piraeus." But Alcibiades forbade them to do this and leave so powerful an enemy behind them. He would go at once to Tissaphernes, and devote himself to the conduct of the war; and to him he went "straight from the assembly". He wished to have the Athenians think that he did nothing without Tissaphernes, and also to show Tissaphernes that he was now general of the Athenians, and could be of service to him. "Thus Alcibiades frightened the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians" (Thuc., viii. 81 f.).

But it is the second threat of the army to sail to the Piraeus which Plutarch here has in mind (see the next note).

XXVI. 4. **The salvation of the city**: after Alcibiades had satisfied himself that Tissaphernes was still minded to aid

neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians, but to allow them to wear one another out, he returned to the army at Samos. Thither came also at last the envoys of the Four Hundred who had been tarrying at Delos. At an assembly of the army, they attempted to defend the revolution at Athens, but the more they said the more furious the army became, and again insisted on sailing to the Piraeus. "Then Alcibiades appears to have done as eminent a service to the state as any man ever did. For if the Athenians at Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail against their fellow-citizens, the enemy would instantly have obtained possession of Ionia and the Hellespont. This he prevented, and at that moment no one else could have restrained the multitude: but he did restrain them, and with sharp words protected the envoys against the fury of individuals in the crowd" (Thuc., viii. 85 f.).

XXVI. 6. **Thrasybulus . . . . did the shouting**: this is not Thucydidean testimony, but inference, probably, from the well known facts that Thrasybulus was prominent in restoring the democracy at Samos, and had insisted on the recall of Alcibiades (Thuc., viii. 81, 1). As a bit of literary embellishment, it may have been suggested by the famous story of Darius arriving at the Danube on his retreat from Scythia, finding his bridge broken up, and bidding "an Egyptian, who had a louder voice than any man in the world", call Histiaeus the Milesian (Herod., iv. 141).

XXVI. 7. **Credited with this diversion of the ships**: and with perfect justice, since it was undoubtedly Alcibiades who had suggested to Tissaphernes the policy of wearing both contestants out, and helping neither, though promising aid to both. When the Peloponnesians had become angry with Tissaphernes because of his repeated deceptions, the Satrap went to Aspendus to fetch the Phoenician ships up to their aid, as he assured them. But the ships never came any further than Aspendus. Various reasons for this were given, which Thucydides carefully enumerates (viii. 87). But the real reason was "that he wanted to wear out and to neutralize the Hellenic forces . . . . and not strengthen

either of them by his alliance". Alcibiades knew the real mind of Tissaphernes, and when he learned that the Satrap had gone to Aspendus, promptly sailed thither himself, promising the Athenians to do them one of two great services: either he would bring the Phoenician ships to them, or, at least, prevent them from being brought to the Peloponnesians, — a promise which was easily fulfilled (Thuc., viii. 88).

For it was perfectly clear, etc.: so Thucydides thought (viii. 87, 4).

XXVII. 1. **The Four Hundred overthrown**: as narrated by Thucydides in viii. 89–97. They had usurped the power in June of 411; they fell from it in September of the same year. They were deposed by an assembly of the people, which voted that the government should be in the hands of the Five Thousand (see on xxvi. 2). "No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain of falling under a curse. In the numerous other assemblies which were afterwards held they re-appointed Nomothetae, and by a series of decrees established a constitution. This government during its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my memory. Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attempered. And thus after the miserable state into which she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head. The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and others from exile, and sending to him and to the army in Samos exhorted them to act vigorously" (Thuc., viii. 97).

The friends of Alcibiades: no longer the oligarchical conspirators, as at xxvi. 1, but men who believed that Alcibiades alone had the ability necessary for conducting the war against Sparta.

Set sail from Samos: he had returned with his thirteen ships from the pretended visit to Tissaphernes at Aspendus (see on xxvi. 7), "announcing that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet from coming to the assistance of the enemy, and that he had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athenians than ever. He then manned nine additional ships, and exacted large sums of money from the Halicar-

nassians. He also fortified Cos, where he left a governor, and towards the autumn returned to Samos" (Thuc., viii. 108, 1 f.). But even before his first return to Samos the seat of war had been suddenly transferred from the Ionian sea to the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Exasperated by the endless duplicity of Tissaphernes, the Peloponnesians under Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, had abruptly left Miletus and sailed for the Hellespont, to coöperate with Pharnabazus against the Greek cities in that region which still remained faithful to Athens. They had been closely followed by the Athenian fleet at Samos under Thrasyllus (Thuc., viii. 99–103). Thrasyllus and the other generals doubtless left orders at Samos for Alcibiades, which he obeyed by making the cruise to Halicarnassus and Cos.

XXVII. 2. **There he heard**: rather at Samos, before starting on this cruise.

Hastened to the assistance of their generals: not until they had won a great victory over the Peloponnesians in the battle of Cynossema (a promontory in the Hellespont), recovered the city of Cyzicus, which had revolted, and summoned reënforcements from every possible quarter to fight another and a decisive battle with the strongly reënforced Peloponnesian fleet (Thuc., viii. 104–107).

By chance: this is not likely. The phrase is taken from Ephorus, and not Xenophon, who now succeeds Thucydides as our chief authority (see the next note). Alcibiades had probably been commissioned to keep watch of Dorieus, a Spartan commander with fourteen ships at Rhodes. As soon as Dorieus left Rhodes and sailed to the Hellespont, at the beginning of November, to effect a junction with Mindarus, Alcibiades followed in hot pursuit. But Dorieus had about twelve hours the start. His arrival at the mouth of the Hellespont brought on a general engagement between the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets off Abydos, which had lasted nearly all day when Alcibiades came up (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 2–5).

XXVII. 3 f. The simple and straightforward account

which Xenophon gives (*Hell.* i. 1, 6 f.) of the course of the battle off Abydos after the arrival of Alcibiades, is here colored by sensational items from Ephorus, of whose story we get a good idea in Diodorus (xiii. 46, 2–5). It is characteristic of Plutarch, however, to make his hero the principal author of the victory. Xenophon says: "Victory and defeat hung still in the balance, when Alcibiades came sailing up with eighteen ships. Thereupon the Peloponnesians fled towards Abydos, where, however, Pharnabazus brought them timely assistance. Mounted on horseback, he pushed forward into the sea as far as his horse would let him, doing battle himself, and encouraging his troopers and the infantry alike to play their parts. Then the Peloponnesians, ranging their ships in close-packed order, and drawing up their battle-line in proximity to the land, kept up the fight. At length the Athenians, having captured thirty of the enemy's vessels without their crews, and having recovered those of their own which they had previously lost, set sail for Sestos."

XXVII. 4. **Visit the Satrap**: "After the above incidents, Tissaphernes arrived in the Hellespont, and received a visit from Alcibiades, who presented himself with a single ship, bringing with him tokens of friendship and gifts, whereupon Tissaphernes seized him and shut him up in Sardis, giving out that the king's orders were to go to war with the Athenians" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 9).

Tissaphernes had been at Aspendus, busy with his ruse of bringing the Phoenician fleet into Ionian waters (see on xxvi. 7). When he heard there that the Peloponnesian fleet had gone to the Hellespont and Pharnabazus, he hastened back to Ionia. He had come to the end of his double-dealing with the Peloponnesians, and felt that they were now his enemies. "He was also disgusted at discovering that Pharnabazus had induced the Peloponnesians to join him, and was likely in less time and at less expense to be more successful in his war with the Athenians than himself. He therefore determined to go to the Hellespont, and complain of their conduct . . . , offering at the same time the most plausible

defence which he could concerning the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet and their other grievances. He first went to Ephesus, and there offered sacrifice to Artemis . . . ," and with these words the work of Thucydides breaks off abruptly, and we are left to the tender mercies of Xenophon.

XXVIII. 1. "Thirty days later Alcibiades, accompanied by Mantitheus, who had been captured in Caria, managed to procure horses and escaped by night to Clazomenae" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 10).

Clazomenae was an Ionian city on the southern shore of the bay of Smyrna. It had revolted from Athens with Chios in 412, but was soon reduced (Thuc., viii. 23), and successfully resisted the Spartan admiral Astyochus (Thuc., viii. 31). Part of an Athenian decree ratifying, in 408, certain agreements between the city and the Athenian generals made two years earlier, is preserved (Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*[2], pp. 146 f.).

To the camp of the Athenians: this was now at Cardia, a city of the Thracian Chersonese, at the head of the gulf of Melas. After the victory of Abydos (early in November of 411), the Athenians retained only forty ships at Sestos. The others, some forty or fifty in number, were sent off under different commanders on different errands, chief of which was the collection of moneys from subject cities to pay the expenses of the fleet. The Peloponnesian fleet meanwhile was receiving subsidies from Pharnabazus, who was a generous and honorable man, in great contrast with Tissaphernes. Not long afterwards Tissaphernes arrived in the region, and Alcibiades made him his luckless visit. During the captivity of Alcibiades at Sardis, Mindarus restored his fleet to fighting condition, and early in February of 410 "the Athenians at Sestos, hearing that Mindarus was meditating an attack upon them with a squadron of sixty sail, gave him the slip, and under cover of night escaped to Cardia. Hither also Alcibiades repaired from Clazomenae" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 11).

Where he learned, etc.: according to the trustworthy story of Xenophon, which is here rhetorically abridged, Alci-

biades learned at Cardia that the Peloponnesian fleet "had left Abydos and was in full sail for Cyzicus". Accordingly he set off himself overland to Sestos, bidding the Athenian fleet sail round the peninsula and meet him there. Just as he was putting out from Sestos, Theramenes with twenty ships, and Thrasybulus with as many more came up. Alcibiades bade these commanders follow him to Parium as soon as they could clear for action. This they did, and the united squadron of eighty-six vessels pushed on during the night to Proconnesus. "Here they learnt that Mindarus was in Cyzicus, and that Pharnabazus, with a body of infantry, was with him" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 11–14).

XXVIII. 2. **Roused the spirits of the soldiers**: not at Cardia. On the day following their arrival at Proconnesus (see the preceding note), Alcibiades summoned an assembly and heartened up his men, warning them that a three-fold service was now expected of them (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 14).

Giving orders, etc.: this had been done on the day before the assembly was held, immediately upon arriving at Proconnesus (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 15). "He had further caused a proclamation to be made, that any one caught sailing across to the opposite coast would be punished with death."

XXVIII. 3–4. Plutarch's story of the engagement off Cyzicus, besides revealing slight embellishments of his own, is seen to be a blend of the accounts of Xenophon and Ephorus (Diodorus, xiii. 49–51). The latter is clearly a fanciful sketch, full of the author's well known military conceits. These two paragraphs of Plutarch correspond to the following words of Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 1, 16–17): "When the meeting [see the preceding note] was over, he got his ships ready for action, and stood out to sea towards Cyzicus in torrents of rain. Off Cyzicus the sky cleared, and the sun shone out and revealed to him the spectacle of Mindarus's vessels, sixty in number, exercising at some distance from the harbour, and, in fact, intercepted by himself. The Peloponnesians, perceiving at a glance the greatly increased number of the Athenian galleys, and noting their proximity to the port,

made haste to reach the land, where they brought their vessels to anchor in a body, and prepared to engage the enemy as he sailed to the attack."

XXVIII. 5. "But Alcibiades, sailing round with twenty of his vessels, came to land and disembarked. Seeing this Mindarus also landed, and in the engagement which ensued he fell fighting, whilst those who were with him took to flight" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 18).

XXVIII. 6. "As for the enemy's ships, the Athenians succeeded in capturing the whole of them (with the exception of the Syracusan vessels, which were burnt by their crews), and made off with their prizes to Proconnesus. From thence on the following day they sailed to attack Cyzicus. The men of that place, seeing that the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus had evacuated the place, admitted the Athenians" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 18 f.).

A dispatch : from the vice-admiral of Mindarus. It was taken to Athens (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 23). If we trust Ephorus or Theopompus (Diodorus, xiii. 52 f.), — and most historians do, although Xenophon is silent on the subject, — so great was the depression at Sparta produced by the loss of its fleet in the Hellespont, that informal overtures of peace were made to Athens. But the popular party at Athens had come to its own again with the brilliant victories of its sailors, and cherished anew the most extravagant hopes of final success, now that Alcibiades was once more serving them with his unequaled military genius. The overtures of Sparta were rejected (see Grote, *History of Greece*, vi. pp. 345 f.).

Nothing shows the irresistible magnetism of Alcibiades better than his returning from captivity in Sardis, discredited, after all his boasts, by the manifest enmity of Tissaphernes, and at once taking the offensive against Mindarus. He had able colleagues, it is true, in Theramenes and Thrasybulus; but these men were ardent admirers of his, and willing to coöperate with him to the utmost of their powers. It was clearly Alcibiades to whom the phenomenal success of the Athenians at Cyzicus was chiefly due.

XXIX. 1. **Not long before this**: the victory of Cyzicus was won in the early spring of 410. During the following summer Thrasyllus conducted an unsuccessful expedition into Ionia, returning to join Alcibiades at Sestos in the late autumn. From there the united forces crossed over to Lampsacus, to the fortification of which they devoted the winter of 410–409. But the soldiers of Alcibiades refused to be incorporated into one body with those of Thrasyllus (Xen., *Hell.* i. 2, 15).

Their bronze trophy: the detail of material is not given by Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 2, 10), in speaking of two trophies which the Ephesians erected, and is thought to have reached Plutarch through Theopompus (Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. p. 1551).

XXIX. 2. **Attacked the forces of Thrasyllus**: according to Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 2, 16 f.), the expedition was made by the entire Athenian force, and community of struggle and victory brought the two factions together in amity.

XXIX. 3. **On the following day**: "This expedition was followed by other incursions during the winter into the interior, where they found plenty to do in ravaging the king's territories" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 2, 17). The specific detail of Plutarch's paragraph must come from Ephorus or Theopompus. It is fetching, of course, to have a commander, who was still under the curse of the Eleusinian priesthood (chap. xxii. 4), treat a barbarian priesthood with such consideration.

Setting out to attack Chalcedon: this was in the early spring of 409. According to Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 3, 3), Alcibiades was supported in his expedition against the Bithynian Thracians by the fleet, which followed along the coast.

Chalcedon was a flourishing Greek city in Bithynia, just opposite Byzantium, and a short distance below the entrance to the Thracian Bosporus. It was a colony of Megara, and therefore Dorian in sympathy.

XXX. 1. **From sea to sea**: from the Bosporus to the Propontis.

Put Pharnabazus to flight: according to the account of

Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 3, 4–7), Thrasyllus faced Hippocrates, and Alcibiades Pharnabazus. Alcibiades not only prevented his opponent from effecting a junction with Hippocrates, but with a detachment of hoplites and cavalry came to the assistance of Thrasyllus. Pharnabazus withdrew to his camp.

XXX. 2. **Levied moneys**: the exhausted state of the Athenian finances compelled the generals to support their expeditions by enforced contributions. According to Xenophon, Alcibiades visited the Thracian Chersonese also on this expedition (*Hell.* i. 3, 8).

XXX. 2–5. Selymbria was a Greek city on the northern shore of the Propontis, forty-four miles west of Byzantium. It was a colony of Megara, like Byzantium, and had once been a member of the Athenian alliance. In the spring of 410, twenty days after the victory of Cyzicus (see on xxix. 1), Alcibiades had visited Perinthus and Selymbria. The former place admitted him within its walls; the latter refused this, but gave him money (Xen., *Hell.* i. 1, 21). Now, a year later, after collecting moneys in the Hellespont (§ 2), he visited Selymbria a second time, and captured it. This is all that Xenophon states (*Hell.* i. 3, 10). Diodorus (xiii. 66, 4) adds that the place was betrayed, and probably found in Ephorus, from whom he was excerpting, the lengthy description of the city's capture by stratagem which Plutarch here incorporates into his story. Most of the details are doubtless the invention of Ephorus, although it may well be that Alcibiades found within the city a party which favored Athenian occupation.

Portions of a decree confirming the agreements under which Selymbria reëntered the Athenian alliance are preserved (Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*[2], pp. 155 f.).

XXX. 4. **Thracian soldiers**: after the capture of Selymbria, Alcibiades "appeared before the walls of Byzantium at the head of the men of Chersonese, who came out with their whole force; he was aided further by troops from Thrace, and more than two hundred horse" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 3, 10).

Good will they bore Alcibiades: *cf.* chap. xxiii. 4 f.

XXXI. 1. **The Athenian generals**: Thrasyllus and Theramenes. The paragraph agrees substantially with Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 3, 8 f.). The sum of money paid by Pharnabazus was twenty talents.

An Athenian embassy: to win the King over to the support of Athens. Such an embassy, consisting of seven members, was escorted by Pharnabazus as far as Gordium in Phrygia, where they spent the winter (409–408). In the spring, as they were setting out on their further journey, they were met by a Spartan embassy returning successful from the King, escorted by Cyrus, who had been newly appointed Satrap of Asia Minor, and commissioned to aid the Lacedaemonians. Cyrus had the Athenian embassy detained until the close of the war, three years later (Xen., *Hell.* i. 3, 13; 4, 1–7).

XXXI. 2. **Came back from Selymbria**: to Byzantium, the siege of which he at once began. From Byzantium he went towards Chalcedon as far as Chrysopolis, where he met envoys of Pharnabazus, and whence he sent his own envoys to Pharnabazus at Chalcedon. The two commanders not only took the general oath, but made a special covenant of friendship with one another (Xen., *Hell.* i. 3, 11 f.), and Athens was thus assured of Persian aid.

XXXI. 3. **Then he sailed off, etc.**: this stratagem, too, like the one at Selymbria, is the invention of Ephorus (Diodorus, xiii. 67), who could not rest satisfied with the simple story of Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 3, 14–22). Clearchus the Lacedaemonian was commander in Byzantium, with a force of perioeci, helots, Megarians, and Boeotians. These he kept well supplied with provisions, while the Byzantians went hungry. As long as he remained in Byzantium, the besiegers made little headway. But when he left the city to the command of his lieutenants and went out to raise forces wherewith to drive off the besiegers, the Athenians came to an understanding with the party of Byzantians who were friendly to them. These opened the city to them by night, admitting Alcibiades and the army. The lieutenants of

Clearchus, with their forces, surrendered, and were sent prisoners to Athens.

XXXI. 4. **In garrison at Byzantium**: according to the fictitious stratagem of Ephorus, they were lured from the city to the harbor by the attack of the Athenian fleet.

XXXI. 5 f. These paragraphs are merely a rhetorical amplification of Xenophon (§§ 18 f.), probably in the manner of Ephorus, though Diodorus has not included the matter in his excerpts.

Acquitted the men: Xenophon mentions three besides Anaxilaus and Lycurgus.

XXXII. 1. **Set sail**: from Samos. Byzantium was recaptured during the winter of 409–408, and in the spring of 408, having assured the whole Hellespontic region to Athens, Alcibiades went with the greater part of his armament to Samos, in order to renew the struggle for the subjection of Ionia. Before taking this up in earnest again, however, he wished to revisit Athens and enjoy the rewards for his marvelous successes. He plundered Caria to raise one hundred talents, sent Thrasyllus with the larger part of the fleet to Athens, and Thrasybulus with thirty ships to subdue Thasos and the adjacent Thracian coasts. He himself with twenty ships visited Paros, and from there made a detour to Gytheium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, wishing to reconnoiter the triremes said to be building there. At this place he heard that Athens was eager to see him, and had elected him general again, together with his friend and supporter, Thrasybulus. He therefore hesitated no longer to return to his native city, after nearly seven years' absence (Xen., *Hell.* i. 4, 8–12). The rhetorical ornaments of this paragraph come from Ephorus, as is clear from Diodorus (xiii. 68, 2 f.).

XXXII. 2. **Duris the Samian**: see the Introduction, p. 47. His lurid description is given at greater length in Athenaeus, p. 535 c, d.

Chrysogonus: known besides only as the author of a poem entitled "Politeia", attributed by some to Epicharmus (Athenaeus, p. 648 d).

Callipides: famous especially for his realistic imitations of the actions of ordinary life. Puffed up with his fame, as Plutarch narrates (*Ages.* xxi.), he once forced himself upon the notice of the Spartan king Agesilaus, asking "Dost thou not recognize me, O King?" "Art thou not", said the King, looking him full in the face, "Callipides the buffoon?"

XXXII. 3. **Theopompus, Ephorus, Xenophon**: see the Introduction, pp. 8; 32; 45; 50.

Was in actual fear: "When the vessels came to their moorings, Alcibiades, from fear of his enemies, was unwilling to disembark at once. Mounting on the quarter-deck, he looked to see if his friends were there. Presently his eyes lit on Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, who was his cousin, and then on the rest of his relations and other friends. Upon this he landed, and so, in the midst of an escort ready to put down any attempt upon his person, made his way to the city" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 4, 18 f.).

XXXII. 4. This paragraph in all probability represents Theopompus, as may be inferred from Nepos, *Alc.* vi. 1–3: "Sic enim populo erat persuasum, et adversas superiores et praesentes secundas res accidisse eius opera . . . . Hic ut e navi egressus est, quamquam Theramenes et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus praefuerant simulque venerant in Piraeum, tamen unum omnes illum prosequebantur, et, id quod numquam antea usu venerat nisi Olympiae victoribus, coronis laureis taeniisque vulgo donabatur."

Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 4, 13–17) dwells at length on the conflicting feelings both of his friends and of his enemies in the crowd. The former thought him the ablest of the citizens, unjustly banished in consequence of the malicious plottings of inferior men, and driven by necessity to court the favor of his country's enemies. "Others, however, insisted that for all their past miseries and misfortunes Alcibiades alone was responsible: 'if more trials were still in store for the State, here was the master mischief-maker ready at his post to precipitate them.'" It was hard then, as it is perhaps harder

now, rightly to estimate "a man whom neither friends nor enemies could describe with moderation" (Jebb).

XXXIII. 1. **Before this**: nearly three years before, in the late autumn of 411, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred (Thuc., viii. 97, 3).

On motion of Critias: Critias, later one of the "Thirty Tyrants", is cited by Plutarch twice in the *Cimon* (x. 5; xvi. 81), and once in the *Lycurgus* (ix. 4). A brilliant follower of Socrates, like Alcibiades, he also brought odium upon the Master, and gave color to the charge against him of corrupting the youth. As one of the "Thirty Tyrants", he was conspicuous for rapacity and cruelty, and brought about the death of Theramenes, then the champion of moderation. He was the author of tragedies of considerable merit, a few fragments of which survive (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*[2] pp. 770 ff.), and also of elegies, or elegiac poems on political subjects, six fragments of which are extant (Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graeci*, ii.[4] pp. 279 ff.).

According to Ephorus (Diod., xiii. 38, 2) and Theopompus (Nepos, *Alc.* v. 4), it was Theramenes who was foremost in securing the recall of Alcibiades, and it is probable that Critias merely acted for him in bringing in his formal motion.

XXXIII. 2. **At this time**: on the actual return of Alcibiades, in the early summer of 408.

Addressed them: according to Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 4, 20), he spoke both before the Council and the Assembly, "defending himself against the charge of impiety, and asserting that he had been the victim of injustice, with other like topics, which in the present temper of the Assembly no one ventured to gainsay." Ephorus evidently followed Xenophon (Diod., xiii. 69, 1). Theopompus, on the contrary, if we may judge from Nepos (*Alc.* vi. 4), put a more pathetic speech into the mouth of Alcibiades on this occasion, modeled clearly upon the speech which Alcibiades had made to the army at Samos on his return to them in 411 (Thuc., viii. 81, 2). Plutarch here follows Theopompus.

Crowned him with crowns of gold: this seems to be

Plutarch's exaggerating touch. None of his sources, so far as we control them, speak of such an honor.

General with sole powers: he had been elected one of the generals for the current year before his return (see the note on xxxii. 1). He was now made commander-in-chief. Here the sources are unanimous. The board of ten generals constituted the ministry, and that one of them on whom "full powers" were conferred, was the prime minister. But this "ministry" was subject to constant direction and correction from the Assembly. They practically held office only from month to month, and only on condition of good behavior. See Gardner-Jevons, *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, pp. 517 ff.

XXXIII. 3. The items of this paragraph are not given by Xenophon, but there is no sufficient reason for thinking Ephorus (Diod., xiii. 69, 2) and Theopompus (Nepos, *Alc.* vi. 5) untrustworthy here. For the movable property which had been confiscated and sold (see on xxii. 4), restitution could be made with lands belonging to the state. The pillars on which his condemnation had been inscribed were thrown into the sea. Theodorus the High Priest, refusing to recant, is an artistic counterpart of Theano the priestess who refused to curse (xxii. 4).

Alcibiades, who had often aspired to be the political heir of Pericles, now stood on the same pinnacle of power which that great statesman had occupied so long, and with him, as with Pericles, success was merely a question of retaining the confidence of the people.

XXXIV. 1. **Prospering brilliantly**: in appearance only. During the four months of his stay at Athens (a fatal delay as it proved), Lysander came out to Ionia as Spartan admiral. He was the equal of Alcibiades in ability, and his superior in self-control. Lysander won the favor of Cyrus, who now took the places of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in dealing with Hellenic affairs for the Great King. Tissaphernes had tried to wear out both Spartans and Athenians; Pharnabazus had favored the Spartans, but had at last wearied of them

and taken up the cause of the Athenians. Cyrus, however, was an implacable enemy of Athens, and gave Sparta, as represented by Lysander, undeviating and generous support. It was this combination which finally turned the scales decisively against Athens. The coming of Lysander to Ephesus bears a relation to the war in Ionia like that of the coming of Gylippus to Syracuse to the Sicilian expedition. Plutarch sums up the situation well in his *Lysander* (iii. 1 f.): "The Peloponnesian war having now been carried on a long time, and it being expected, after the disaster of the Athenians in Sicily, that they would at once lose the mastery of the sea, and ere long be routed everywhere, Alcibiades, returning from banishment, and taking the command, produced a great change, and made the Athenians again a match for their opponents by sea: and the Lacedaemonians, in great alarm at this, and calling up fresh courage and zeal for the conflict, feeling the want of an able commander and of a powerful armament, sent out Lysander to be admiral of the seas."

On the very day, etc.: "on the very day of the festival of the Plynteria, when the statue of Athena is veiled and screened from public gaze. This was a coincidence, as some thought, of evil omen, and unpropitious alike to himself and the State, for no Athenian would transact serious business on such a day" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 4, 12). The Plynteria was a sacred washing-day, on which the robes of the ancient wooden image of Athena in the Erechtheium were cleansed by the holy gens of the Praxiergidae. The Attic month Thargelion corresponded to the latter part of May and first part of June, and the festival fell therefore about the middle of June.

XXXIV. 2. **One hundred triremes were manned**: after the celebration of the mysteries, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 4, 20 f.), Alcibiades collected a force of fifteen hundred hoplites, one hundred and fifty horsemen, and one hundred ships. Preparations for this armament, however, must have been making during most of the summer.

The Eleusinian mysteries: see on xix. 1.

XXXIV. 3. **Since Deceleia had been fortified**: in the

spring of 413, five years before, in accordance with the advice of Alcibiades to the Spartans. See on xxiii. 2.

XXXIV. 4–5. This detailed description reads as though based upon Ephorus, but Diodorus has preserved no mention even of the celebration, and Nepos is silent on the subject. Xenophon is very brief: "armed with this authority, his first act was to institute anew the processional march to Eleusis; for of late years, owing to the war, the Athenians had been forced to conduct the mysteries by sea. Now, at the head of the troops, he caused them to be conducted once again by land" (*Hell.* i. 4, 20). The paragraphs of Plutarch, whether of independent origin or not, are clearly nothing but a free and imaginative expansion of the words of Xenophon. It was certainly a master stroke of Alcibiades, who had been accused of profaning the mysteries, thus to restore their celebration to its customary forms.

XXXIV. 6. This paragraph must not be taken as history. It rests on no reliable source. It is inferential literary embellishment, such as Theopompus might have allowed himself. With Ionian Greece still to a large extent refractory, and Sparta more than ever sure of Persian support, there was no occasion and no excuse for any body's dreaming of a "tyranny" at Athens. Nor could the Athenian people, even "of the humbler and poorer sort", have desired it. The main reason why the profanations of the mysteries in 415 had so agitated the people was the fear that they covered some conspiracy to set up oligarchy or tyranny (Thuc., vi. 60, 1). At that time the people did think that Alcibiades "was aiming at a tyranny, and set themselves against him" (Thuc., vi. 15, 4).

XXXV. 1. **Anxious to have him sail**: not so much, we may feel sure, because they feared that he might assume a "tyranny", for which the time was not ripe, even had Alcibiades cherished the idea, as because they longed to have Spartan power in Ionia crushed.

Colleagues of his own choosing: the ten generals for the year 408–407 had already been chosen. Alcibiades was now

allowed, as commander-in-chief, to select from these Aristocrates and Adeimantus as his special colleagues for land operations (Xen., *Hell.* i. 4, 21).

Andros: an island forming a continuation of Euboea. It had revolted from Athens in 411. Setting sail for Ionia towards the end of October (408), Alcibiades attempted on the way to carry the city of Andros by storm, but failed. The situation in Ionia was so grave that he could not think of tarrying to conduct a siege of Andros. He therefore left Conon with twenty ships to do this, while he himself, after a few days, proceeded to Samos, and made this his base of operations during the ensuing winter (Xen., *Hell.* i. 4, 22 f.; 5, 18; Diod., xiii. 69, 5).

Fresh charges: reading *καινῶν* for *κοινῶν*, with Bekker, after Haiting.

XXXV. 2. **Would not believe in his inability**: "nihil enim eum non efficere posse ducebant" (Nepos, *Alc.* vii. 2).

The Chians: see on xxiv. 1.

XXXV. 3. **An almoner of bounty in the Great King**: when Lysander with a Spartan embassy interviewed Cyrus at Sardis and urged him to prosecute the war against Athens with vigor, "Cyrus replied that not only had he received express injunctions from his father to this effect, but that his own views coincided with their wishes, which he was determined to carry out to the letter. He had, he informed them, brought with him five hundred talents; and if that sum failed, he had still the private revenue, which his father allowed him, to fall back upon, and when this resource was in its turn exhausted, he would coin the gold and silver throne on which he sat, into money for their benefit" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 5, 3 f.).

XXXV. 4. **Four obols**: see on the *Nicias*, iii. 6. Lysander had asked Cyrus to pay his seamen a drachma (six obols) per diem, on the plea that the Athenian seamen would then desert. But Cyrus had appealed to a definite agreement between the Lacedaemonians and the King, in accordance with which thirty minas (*i. e.* 3000 drachmas, or

18000 obols) were to be given to each vessel per month, "whatever number of vessels the Lacedaemonians might choose to maintain" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 5, 5). Since the regular crew of a war trireme consisted of 200 men, this allowance would mean three obols per diem for each man.

To the reply of Cyrus "Lysander at the moment said nothing. But after dinner, when Cyrus pledged his health, asking him what he could do to gratify him most, Lysander replied, 'Add an obol to the sailors' pay.' After this the pay was raised to four instead of three obols, as it hitherto had been" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 5, 6 f.). *Cf.* also the *Lysander*, chap. iv.

In the winter of 412, Tissaphernes had distributed one month's pay among the Peloponnesian ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma a day per man, "as his envoy had promised at Lacedaemon." For the future, however, he proposed to give only half that sum, which was the regular wage (Thuc., viii. 29).

Sail for Caria, etc.: from his headquarters at Samos Alcibiades did undoubtedly make several expeditions during the winter of 408–407 for the purpose of levying moneys. But it was on none of these that Antiochus was left thus in charge of the fleet. Lysander, when his fleet was duly organized, lay quietly at Ephesus, secure in its ample harbor, perfecting his ships and crews. It was as much for his interest to postpone a decisive engagement as it was imperative for Alcibiades to provoke one. At length, in the spring of 407, Alcibiades left Samos and stationed his fleet at Notium, just north of Ephesus, in the hope of enticing Lysander out to battle. While here, he heard that Thrasybulus had come down out of the Hellespont with his squadron, and was besieging the Ionian city of Phocaea. Alcibiades sailed to join Thrasybulus, from military motives which can readily be imagined, and left Antiochus in charge of the fleet at Notium (Xen., *Hell.* i. 5, 10 ff.).

Antiochus: a favorite, perhaps on account of his rescue of the quail of Alcibiades (chap. x. 1). He was merely the

pilot of Alcibiades' ship, a paid officer, and yet he had been set over trierarchs, "who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost" (Grote). The two generals who were colleagues of Alcibiades had been appointed expressly for service on land (see the note on § 1).

XXXV. 5 f. These paragraphs are a free and rather brief reproduction of Xenophon (*Hell.* i. 5, 12–15). Dramatic justice demands the death of Antiochus, but neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentions it. It is easy inference from the simple story of Xenophon that the Athenians fought with no order, but in haphazard fashion, owing to the absence of their commander-in-chief. They lost fifteen triremes, and retired to Samos. Lysander set up his trophy of victory at Notium. *Cf.* Plutarch's *Lysander*, v. 1 f.

XXXVI. 1. **Thrasybulus, the son of Thraso**: to be distinguished from the illustrious commander, who was the son of Lycus (Thuc., viii. 75, 2). This detail probably comes from Ephorus, judging from Diodorus, xiii. 73, 6. Ephorus also related the mishandling by Alcibiades of the allied city of Cymé, ambassadors from which brought complaints against Alcibiades to Athens at this time. But Cymé had revolted from Athens, like Phocaea, a fact which Ephorus, a native of the city, glosses over by this invention. The charge which the enemies of Alcibiades naturally found most effective against him was that he was again acting in collusion with Tissaphernes in an effort to protract the war until both parties to it were exhausted. Xenophon mentions only the charges of negligence and dissolute conduct (*Hell.* i. 5, 16).

It is not impossible to make out a good defense of Alcibiades. He was in a desperate strait owing to the refusal of Lysander to fight. The operations of his colleague Thrasybulus, at Phocaea, offered him an opportunity to levy the ever necessary moneys, and also to lure Lysander out from his safe refuge in the harbor of Ephesus in pursuit of him. In such a case the Athenian fleet at Notium, with strict orders not to engage the enemy in the absence of Alcibiades, might have been used to catch Lysander between two hostile squadrons.

The ruse, if such it was, failed because of the disobedience of Antiochus (Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, iii. pp. 1574 f.).

XXXVI. 2. **Near Bisanthe**: on the north-western coast of the Propontis. He had another fortress near Pactye on the Thracian Chersonese, south-west of Bisanthe. It was to this latter that he retired (§ 3). This time his exile was self-imposed.

XXXVI. 3. **Chose other generals**: "accordingly they chose ten new generals. . . . . Alcibiades, who was moreover in bad odor in the camp, sailed away with a single trireme to his private fortress in the Chersonese" (Xen., *Hell.* i. 5, 16 f.). The sequence of events is here not very clear. Probably Alcibiades was first deposed from office, and Conon, who was conducting the siege of Andros (see on xxxv. 1), was sent to Samos to take provisional command in his place (Xen., *Hell.* i. 5, 18). At the following annual elections, held later in the same spring of 407, the principle of a single commander-in-chief with autocratic powers, and two assistants (xxxiii. 2; xxxv. 1), was abandoned, and a board of ten generals with equal authority was elected, of whom Conon was one.

XXXVI. 4. **At Aegospotami**: on the western shore of the Hellespont, directly opposite Lampsacus. Plutarch's story leaps over the events of two and a half years, — from the spring of 407 to the autumn of 405 (see the chronological table). The Athenian fleet under Conon and his fellow generals, for lack of means, was compelled to confine itself to predatory excursions from Samos as its base. Callicratidas, the successor of Lysander, managed, even without Persian aid, to raise a powerful fleet, which defeated Conon and blockaded him in the harbor of Mitylene. With the last energies of despair the Athenians sent out still another fleet of one hundred and ten ships. Callicratidas was defeated in the battle off the Arginusae islands, and Conon was relieved (summer of 406). But this achievement exhausted Athenian powers. Well planned initiative was beyond them, and they were soon absorbed in the misguided prose-

cution of their victorious generals for neglect of duty. Early in 405, Lysander resumed the direction of Spartan affairs, and with Persian aid equipped a powerful fleet. About the middle of the summer he proceeded to the Hellespont and captured Lampsacus, in the harbor of which he took up a safe position. The Athenian fleet pursued, and occupied an unfavorable station directly opposite. No master mind dominated their counsels, and discipline was lax. Their ships numbered one hundred and eighty.

XXXVI. 5. **Alcibiades**: from his stronghold near Pactye, he could see the operations of the Athenian fleet (Xen., *Hell.* ii. 1, 25).

From Sestos: about two miles south of Aegospotami. "He advised them to shift their anchorage to Sestos, where they would have the advantage of a harbour and a city. 'Once there,' he concluded, 'you can engage the enemy whenever it suits you'" (Xen., *loc cit.*). Even in his self-imposed exile he makes it clear to us that he, and he alone, could have coped with so wily and able a foe as Lysander.

XXXVII. 1. **Tydeus insulted him**: "But the generals, and more particularly Tydeus and Menander, bade him go about his business. 'We are generals now — not you,' they said; and so he went away" (Xen., *Hell.* ii. 1, 26).

This is the last mention of Alcibiades in Xenophon's history, and also the last well attested fact in his career.

He told his acquaintances, etc.: the remainder of the paragraph and the first two sentences of the next consist of questionable material, furnished, in different form, by Ephorus, or Theopompus, or both, as may be seen in Diodorus, xiii. 105, 3 f. and Nepos, *Alc.* viii. Xenophon says nothing of it. It reads like the inventions of Ephorus, containing here and there an ingenious and plausible inference. Strangely enough, Plutarch does not use it in the far more extended story of the same events which he gives in his *Lysander*, ix.–xi.

XXXVII. 2. **The event soon testified**: for five days in succession the Athenians proceeded as described in xxxvi. 4;

then Lysander fell upon them. Xenophon gives a succinct account of the battle (*Hell.* ii. 1, 27–29), and Plutarch an amplified version of this in his *Lysander*, x. f.

Eight of their triremes: not counting the Paralus (see on xxi. 5), which Conon sent with tidings to Athens.

XXXVII. 3. **Three thousand**: "as to the men themselves," says Xenophon (*Hell.* ii. 1, 28), "the large majority of them were easily made prisoners on shore, a few only escaping to the small fortresses of the neighborhood." This would ordinarily mean many more than three thousand, even if the one hundred and seventy-one captured ships were not manned with the full complement of two hundred men. But the greater part of the crews doubtless consisted of metics, slaves, and mercenaries, so that three thousand might well represent the actual Athenian citizens among the prisoners. All these, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* ii. 1, 32), except the general Adeimantus, were put to death. It was charged that the Athenians had voted to cut off the right hands of their prisoners if they were victorious, and this in spite of the protest of Adeimantus. Some, however, charged that general with betrayal of the fleet to Lysander, in recompense for which his life was spared.

In a short time: in the spring of 404, some eight months later.

XXXVII. 3 — XXXIX. Little is really known about Alcibiades from this point on, and especially about the manner of his death, judging from the orations of Isocrates (xvi. 40) and Lysias (xiv. 38), which were written in 397 and 395 respectively. "The conscientious historian, in giving what he believes to be true history in this matter, cannot go much, if any, beyond what was known to Isocrates and Lysias: Alcibiades, soon after the accession of the Thirty to power in Athens, sought refuge from enemies whom he feared the more, with Pharnabazus, whom he feared the less, but was soon put out of the way by that Satrap, in response to the demands of Sparta" (*Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.*, xxxvi. pp. 25–37). All else is plausible inference or romantic invention

on the part of oral tradition or rhetorical historians like Ephorus and Theopompus.

The account of Ephorus is preserved for us in distinct citation by Diodorus (xiv. 11, 1–4), and doubtless represents the current belief of his time. In one unessential point Ephorus controverts the current belief, *viz.* in his over-ingenious and improbable interpretation of the motives which prompted Pharnabazus to send his murderers against Alcibiades. It was not, Ephorus declares, to please the Lacedaemonians, as was generally thought, but, in his own interests, to prevent Alcibiades from forestalling him in bringing the rebellious schemes of Cyrus to the notice of the Great King. The emissaries of Pharnabazus, Ephorus goes on to say, found Alcibiades encamped in a certain village of Phrygia, and surrounded his tent in the night with a mass of firewood. When this had been lighted and was in a great blaze, Alcibiades attempted to defend himself, but was overwhelmed by the fire and the darts shot at him by his enemies, and so perished.

Nepos, three centuries later than Ephorus, in his account of the death of Alcibiades (*Alc.* ix. f.), shows us that by his time a mass of invented detail had accumulated around the simple Ephorean nucleus. Nepos combines (as he himself states) material from Theopompus, the rival of Ephorus; from Timaeus of Tauromenium, who flourished in the century after Ephorus and Theopompus; and doubtless from stock Alexandrian biography through which these versions came down to him. In the main, however, we may feel reasonably confident that he represents the tradition of Theopompus.

We find in the story of Nepos many accretions both to the causes assigned for the death of Alcibiades in the Ephorean version, and to the circumstances of it. For most of these accretions it is not difficult to suggest a probable genesis. Alcibiades, according to the tradition of Theopompus in Nepos, learns of the plotting of Cyrus against the Great King, and asks from Pharnabazus, at whose court he has

been treated like another Themistocles, an escort up to the royal court, that he may make use of his knowledge there to gain the favor of the King. But the Thirty at Athens warn Lysander in Asia that Alcibiades must be put out of the way if Lysander's work at Athens is to endure, and Lysander therefore demands Alcibiades from Pharnabazus, dead or alive. The Satrap chose to violate his hospitality rather than to alienate the Spartans from the King, and sent Susamithres and Bagaeus to kill Alcibiades in Phrygia, where he was preparing his journey to the King. Coming secretly to the place where Alcibiades was, they took measures to kill him. They dared not attack him with ordinary weapons, and so by night they heaped firewood around the house where he was sleeping, and set it on fire, in order to kill with the flames one whom they despaired of overwhelming by force. Alcibiades, roused by the flames, although his sword had been removed from him, snatched a dagger from a faithful Arcadian friend whom he had with him, and who had vowed never to leave him. This man he bade follow him, and then snatching up what clothing there was at hand, threw it upon the flames, and so passed safely through them. When the Barbarians saw that he had escaped the fire, they hurled their weapons at him from afar, slew him, and brought his head to Pharnabazus. But a woman, who was accustomed to live with him, wrapped his dead and headless body in her woman's garments, and burned it in the flames of the house where his enemies had planned to burn him alive.

More than a century after Nepos, Plutarch gives his artistic version of events at the close of Alcibiades' career, following in the main the tradition of Theopompus rather than that of Ephorus. Certain deviations and additions peculiar to Plutarch may be briefly indicated here, before seeking to get the total effect of his narrative. We find in Plutarch a little more definiteness in the adventures of Alcibiades before reaching Pharnabazus. It is in Bithynia that the Thracians rob him, rather than " supra Propontidem ". The

analogy of Themistocles is used very differently. It is at the court of Artaxerxes, not that of Pharnabazus, that Alcibiades wishes to revive the rôle of Themistocles, and to this end he seeks successfully the favor of the Satrap. In Plutarch, Lysander is reluctant to meet the wishes of the Thirty, and only when the Ephors order him to put Alcibiades out of the way, does he require Pharnabazus to perform the deed. There is no ghastly, oriental decapitation of the victim in the main story of Plutarch, although in a curious way he shows his acquaintance with this grosser phase of the tradition. Instead of being on a journey to the King, Alcibiades was living in the Phrygian village with Timandra, and shortly before his death had a prophetic vision. Plutarch gives two versions of this vision, the second of which only is based on that form of the tradition which has Alcibiades beheaded and his headless body burned. The version which Plutarch adopts is conformed to that softened and pathetic account of the final disposition of Alcibiades' body which the gentle writer either constructed himself or selected from his sources. And the bravery of Alcibiades is much enhanced in Plutarch's story. There is no Arcadian attendant to assist the hero. Alone he scatters the Barbarians who have set fire to his house, and alone he falls by their missiles. Timandra, whose escape from fire and missiles is not explained, wraps his body in her own woman's garments, and gives it such honorable burial as she can. Almost all the essential variations of his story from that of the tradition of Theopompus are such as one would expect in a writer of Plutarch's temperament and character, if he were allowing himself artistic freedom in the reproduction of the material of tradition. His result we must regard as romantic and beautiful historical fiction.

XXXIX. 1. **Phrygia**: Lesser Phrygia, on the Hellespont, a province subject to Pharnabazus. Under Roman rule in Asia Minor, the traditions of the death of Alcibiades had fixed themselves upon a village of Greater Phrygia, which, at the time of Alcibiades' death, had been part of the domain

of Cyrus. In this village, called Melissa, the emperor Hadrian caused a memorial to be erected, which was surmounted by a statue of Alcibiades, of Parian marble (Athenaeus p. 574 f.).

XXXIX. 4. **Lais the Corinthian**: see on the *Nicias*, xv. 4.

XXXIX. 5. **Some say**: what writers (or writer) are here meant, is wholly uncertain.

If we may trust the elder Pliny (*N. H.* xxxiv. 12) and Plutarch (*Numa*, viii. *fin.*), a statue of Alcibiades stood in the Roman comitium from the time of the Samnite wars down to that of Sulla, to commemorate "the bravest of the Hellenes". And the encomium pronounced upon Alcibiades by Isocrates (*Or.* xvi.) bears witness already to a strong reaction in favor of his memory. Even shortly before the catastrophy at Aegospotami, Aristophanes in his *Frogs* (vv. 1431 ff.) had clearly voiced the belief of many that the only salvation for Athens lay in the restoration of Alcibiades to command. At the time of the Macedonian supremacy, two generations of men after Aristophanes, when Ephorus and Theopompus wrote their *Hellenica*, the prevailing attitude toward the memory of Alcibiades was one of admiration for his great powers, rather than of detestation for his excesses and follies. This is clear from the reference to him by Demosthenes (*contra Meid.* 143–147). How prominent a figure he became in men's recollections of the great age of Athens, is shown by the fact that when Aristotle wishes to illustrate the individualizing procedure of history as opposed to the generalizing procedure of poetry, he selects the achievements and sufferings of Alcibiades (*Poet.* ix. 4). The long debate between the enemies and the friends of the memory of Alcibiades ended with the triumph of his friends. And Plutarch is one of his friends. "It is true, indeed," he says, in comparing Alcibiades with Coriolanus (ii. 3 f.), "that Alcibiades, by his resentment, was the occasion of great disasters to his country, but he relented as soon as he found their feelings to be changed; and after he was driven out a second time, so far from taking pleasure in the errors and inadvertencies of

their commanders, or being indifferent to the dangers they were thus incurring, he did the very thing that Aristides is so highly commended for doing to Themistocles; he came to the generals who were his enemies, and pointed out to them what they ought to do."



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